Critical Planning

Critical Planning

Critical Planning volume 9, summer 2002

Note from the Editors

Is the "new regionalism" old wine in new bottles? What is meant by "region," anyway? Why has regionally based analysis becoming popular among academics, and why are regional-level planning and policy interventions advocated by professionals these days? The first section of this issue of **Critical Planning** tackles some of these questions.

Interest in regions has, once again, blossomed in the academic literature and planning. This can be seen at all levels, from global trade agreements to community activism. In planning, this interest has been manifested by the amount of attention paid to the Portland experiment in regional government as well as to nascent regional planning processes elsewhere in the US.

In an interview with Renia Ehrenfeucht, Edward Soja, professor in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA, discusses the new regionalism, explaining the significance of regionalist thinking to an increasingly broad array of subjects and activities. He explores the major debates in the new regionalism in the context of an ongoing de- and re-territorialization of space.

The new regionalism literature provides evidence that geography and institutions matter as much as ever, despite the information and communications revolution. Based on this and other arguments, in "Trading in Welfare: Does Global Trade Undermine Social Policy and Planning?" Yves Bourgeois finds that the process of globalization may increase both the importance of local regional economies and the need for social policy intervention.

In "Okinawa as a Region: A Brief History, Current Economic Conditions and Prospects," Joseph Boski asserts that an understanding of the dynamics of overlapping regions, coupled with local knowledge, can be useful in carrying out policies to improve the economic fortunes of Okinawa residents. Boski emphasizes the importance of the history of the island prefecture, which has shaped its economically marginal status as a Japanese periphery and American military outpost.

Jeremy Nelson interviews Ethan Seltzer, of the Institute for Metropolitan Studies at Portland State University. Seltzer provides a concise and useful overview of how regional thinking has evolved over the twentieth century. Regionalists like Mumford and McKaye in the 1930s saw the regional plan as a potential savior of modern society, but this view gradually gave way to one of region as pragmatic planning device.

John Provo's "Development in Oregon: Finding a Place for Equity Issues in Regional Governance" overviews the literature on regionalism in planning practice, focusing particularly on equity-based regionalism and on the new connections being made in theory and practice between local community development and regional economic development. Provo finds that in two parts of Oregon, a recent change in state policy has made it possible for regional planning to include equity concerns.

Based on her research on the Haaglanden region of The Netherlands, Leonie B. Janssen-Jansen describes the complexity of regional planning efforts and concludes that democratic legitimation is a crucial issue that cuts across all its dimensions. In "Regional Governance and Strategic Area Development: Some Dutch Experiences," Janssen-Jansen emphasizes that governance efforts must acknowledge the special role of government institutions in coordination and cooperation.

The second section of the issue contains a selection of articles on other topics ranging from housing to planning theory.

In "Transferring the Neighborhood Unit to Caracas: Examples of Foreign Influence in Venezuela," Nelliana Villoria-Siegert and Arturo Almandoz trace the application of Clarence Percy's neighborhood unit model in Caracas. They argue that European modernist architectural theory influenced public housing, resulting in a high density adaptation; in private housing, the model remained low density. In both cases, it lost its social and political objectives.

In "Deep Ecological Planning: Ecocentrism, Bioregionalism and Planning Theory," Benjamin Stabler describes the relationship between environmental ethics and planning theory and advocates for a deep ecological planning paradigm, one that treats all species equally. He suggests two attainable approaches, moral expansion and bioregionalism, to such a major ethos transformation.

Sonia A. Hirt's "Postmodernism and Planning Models" tracks the sea-change in late twentieth-century planning theory. She argues that, contrary to common assertions in the planning literature, the currents of postmodern thinking have informed planning theory for decades. Hirt calls for a progressive postmodernism, a merging of a humanistic modern approach with a postmodern inclusion of previously ignored social groups and issues.

In "Bureaucracy and Housing for the Poor in India," Ashok Das argues that qualities inherent to bureaucratic culture, rather than simply inadequate policies, impede the provision of housing for the poor in India. He considers the emergence of the Indian bureaucracy and describes an entrenched official system that produces far more inefficiency and corruption than it does affordable housing units.

The third and final section of the journal contains two reviews of books addressing subjects relating to the new regionalism. The first is Bill Pitkin's review of *Place Matters: Metropolitics for the 21st Century*, a new book by Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom. The second is a review by Carl Grodach of Edward Soja's *Postmetropolis: Studies of Cities and Regions*.

-Todd Gish, Renia Ehrenfeucht and Dan Chatman

The New Regionalism: A Conversation with Edward Soja

The New Regionalism: A Conversation with Edward Soja

Renia Ehrenfeucht

We invited Professor Edward Soja from the Department of Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles, to talk with us about the New Regionalism. Professor Soja's publications include *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (Blackwell Publishers 2000), *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (Verso 1989) and *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-imagined Places* (Blackwell 1996).

Ehrenfeucht: Let's start with a very basic question. What is the New Regionalism?

Soja: Today, regions and regionalism are being studied at a wider scope then ever before and applied to a more diverse set of areas and topics inside and outside of planning. This renewed attention extends also to studying cities and urbanism. Cities and regions are increasingly blending together, both in a concrete sense in what some call global city-regions, as well as in new theoretical debates. To reflect this, we now have a new area for doctoral research in Urban Planning that we call Critical Studies of Cities and Regions, in which urban and regional issues are always seen as interconnected. The New Regionalism goes well beyond planning, however, and is affecting a wide variety of fields and disciplines, from literature, politics and geography, to art, music and film studies. This comprehensive interest in cities and regions is generating new ideas and approaches across the humanities and social sciences, in theory building, critical analysis and practice.

Among the many concepts being given renewed attention are territory and territorial governance, the notion of scale and how human life is embedded in multi-scalar nodal regions, and the role of regions in understanding the relationship between the global and the local. All these concepts are interwoven and they all reflect the growing impact of globalization processes, economic restructuring and new technologies. These are the three most important forces of change affecting the contemporary world, and each is contributing in different ways to the larger resurgence of interest in regions, regionalism and regional analysis.

Using an old regional metaphor, there are both core and peripheral answers to the question what is the New Regionalism? At its core, the New Regionalism has involved an intensified interest in conceptualizing regions and regionalism as fundamental components of all social theory, of all social life, integral to the very nature of human society. Regions at various scales shape our lives in significant ways, and, at the same time, we shape our regions—the whole hierarchy of nodal regions in which we live, from our body space to the regional organization of the global economy and everywhere in between. In Michael Storper's work, for example, regions are presented as of equal significance to markets, states and families—the three major focal points of the social sciences in terms of the organizational structure of our lives. We live, he says, in a "regional world." At the core of the New Regionalism, then, is a more assertive and powerful re-theorization of the basic concepts that have always been associated with regional studies.

On the periphery of the New Regionalism, something else is happening. There is an expansion outward of the relevance of regions and regionalism to more arenas of theory and practice than ever before. Here, the New Regionalism expresses itself more in terms of discovery and new opportunities for application rather than in re-theorization and assertiveness of core concepts.

Ehrenfeucht: How is scale becoming important? What is different about the scales that we are discussing now?

Soja: The concept of scale is central to all forms of spatial and especially regional thinking. Regions are particular spaces and places, and the concept of region—even in its traditional form—applies across many different scales. This means that regions exist at many different levels, from the neighborhood to the globe, and that each of these levels is intertwined with the others. A major focus of the New Regionalism has been not just to analyze these multiple, interacting scales but, in particular, to make practical and theoretical sense of the dramatic changes in the impact of different scales that have been occurring over the past thirty years.

These changes in scale and scalar relations have been shaped primarily by the forces of globalization and economic restructuring. One of the most interesting ways these changes have been studied in recent years is as a product of a double-side process of de-territorialization and re-territorialization. At one level, old forms of territorial governance and identity are breaking down, becoming less rigidly defined than they were in the past. And at the same time, new and different forms are beginning to emerge. This restructuring of territories is happening at all scales.

The global scale, for example, is becoming more powerful than before, at least relative to national and local scales. Globalization is also carrying with it advanced forms of urban industrialism and industrial production that are affecting all scales below the global. Large segments of what was once considered the periphery, where there was little evidence of advanced industrialism, have become intensely industrialized. The NICs, or newly industrialized countries, are the

best example of this, but I would also include other new industrial spaces such as Silicon Valley and Orange County.

Also becoming more powerful and important are supra-national regions, the scale between the global and the nation-state. Many new trading blocs have formed and play an increased role in shaping what is happening in globalization and the global economy. Even more dramatic has been the formation of the European Union as a supra-national region. This is something unique. Never before has a collection of advanced industrial nation-states coalesced together into a larger supra-national state.

Then there is the restructuring of the nation-state, a very controversial process that has led some to proclaim the end of the nation-state. Many debates are still going on as to whether the power of the nation-state is really disappearing or just reasserting itself at different scale, supra-national as well as sub-national.

Whatever is actually happening to the nation-state, there has been a very major resurgence of sub-national regionalism all over the world. Some are revivals of older cultural regionalisms, others are new reactions to globalization and economic restructuring. Whatever the mix of the old and the new, regionalism below the level of the nation-state, from Quebec and Catalonia to the global city-regions of Shanghai and Southern California, has become a very important issue in the contemporary world.

All these changes at larger regional scales are affecting local communities as well. In some areas, such as here in Los Angeles, this has generated a new kind of community-based regionalism. Regionalism and regional thinking have spread to areas that thirty years ago would have paid very little attention to regional issues. Again, this relates back to globalization and economic restructuring. Decisions affecting local communities are increasingly made elsewhere, not only within the immediate local government context but at regional, state, national and global scales. In reaction to these external forces and especially to the many negative effects of globalization and economic restructuring, many communities are beginning to see the need to organize at a regional scale, to form new regional coalitions and alliances, to develop specifically regional strategies to attain their community development objectives. Here, scale and region become very important political and strategic issues.

Ehrenfeucht: With regard to community-based regionalism, is there something different about spatial arrangements that makes regionalism interesting to community-scale activities and activism? Or it is a change in the theorizing and work around it that has made regional thinking more relevant?

Soja: Well, I often answer such either/or questions with both/and also. There is an element of both in this. On the first level, yes, the conditions of the world around the community have been rapidly changing over the last thirty years. Among other things, regions and regional economies have become more important in the global economy. At the same time, globalization has reduced the autonomy of the local, so what used to be handled at the community scale is increasingly less susceptible to local control. This means that it is more difficult for communities to engage successfully in their traditional forms of

organizational struggle. Community leaders and activists are beginning to realize that they have to organize at a larger scale and create coalitions across race, location, gender, class. Coalitions are not new, of course. What is new now, though, is the scope and scale of the coalitions. More than before, they are moving into all different kinds of areas, not just labor, but as I said earlier, across racial boundaries, class boundaries and other kinds of boundaries that used to be fairly impermeable.

One can also see a significant contribution to this community-based regionalism coming from the debates and discussions in the academic world, including those from the New Regionalism. To use Michael Storper's word in a different way, there is a kind of "buzz" about regions all over the world today, and this buzz is spreading well outside academic circles and reaching into such areas as community organizing, where regional thinking was almost non-existent before.

Ehrenfeucht: What are the major debates in the New Regionalism?

Soja: There are many, but we might as well start at what I called the core of the New Regionalism, which has to do with the development of the field of regional political economy. Regional political economists have taken the lead in re-theorizing the importance of regions, pushing the importance of regions and regionalism into more and more arenas, and each step is being discussed and debated in significant ways. For example, there is going to be a whole series of sessions at the geography meetings[1] on what is called the relational turn. The relational

turn is, in large part, an attempt to move away from mechanical spatial location theories into looking at the softer, cultural, social and political relations that shape regional development. These include such things as the atmosphere for entrepreneurialism, for cooperation and trust, for technology sharing and learning. These softer features are not easily captured in hard statistics on income and skill levels, wages and productivity changes—the data that have traditionally been the focus of how one looked at development. Now there is a digging underneath the hard data to these softer layers of human relations as well as spatial relations that are at the basis of regional economies. This rich theorization of regional relations and conventions is coming mainly, but not exclusively, from this area that formed fifteen to twenty years ago as regional political economy.

Related to this has been a vigorous new debate on the importance of proximity and agglomeration in the stimulation of innovations and regional development more generally. This is where the urban and the regional come together in the most exciting and interesting ways. There has been a kind of re-discovery of the importance of clustering people and economic activities in space, in what can be called the generative force of cities, of urban agglomerations. Michael Storper calls this *buzz* and relates it directly to the face-to-face contacts that arise from proximity and clustering. In my recent book, *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*, I call the same thing *synekism* and define it as the stimulus of urban agglomeration. We can go on and on talking about this topic, which I think is one of the most impor-

tant and exciting ideas coming out of the New Regionalism.

Perhaps the most interesting debate relating most directly to planning and policy studies is about governance. The debate about regional governance is related up and down the scale hierarchy—down to community-based regionalism and all the way up to the organization of the global economy. The discussion begins with recognizing how regions play a vital and increasing role as a driving force of the global economy, especially the 300 or so global city-regions that today contain most of the world's population. These global city-regions have become the leading power in the highly competitive global economy, and often relate to one another more intensively than they relate to other major metropolitan regions within the nation-state. But what we are discovering is that there are very few governmental structures that exist or are effective at the level of the global city-region, and that new structures have to be created. But how do we do this, especially given the continuing power of older, long-established local government units? Do we have to eliminate counties and municipalities and states to create effective regional governance? This is making regional governance an extraordinarily complicated challenge today. One thing that nobody wants to do is go back to the older notions of formal metropolitan government. But what else is possible?.

Adding to the challenge of regional governance is the realization that the same restructuring processes behind globalization and the New Economy of flexible postfordist production are also intensifying so-cial and economic inequalities. We know now that what is making regions more competitive and powerful, if left uncontrolled, tends to lead to increasing social polarization, intensifying inequalities and greater injustice. The greatest challenge of regional governance today is how to continue to be competitive economically and control the rising inequality and polarization between the rich and the poor at the same time.

Ehrenfeucht: Inequality and injustice within a region?

Soja: Yes, within cities and within regions, but also between regions. Before, the all-powerful nation-state was responsible for dealing with problems of poverty, social inequality and geographically uneven development. Even regional planning was an arm of the state or federal government. Today, for many reasons, we need to find ways of regionalizing governance and governmental power.

Ehrenfeucht: How does the spatial turn relate to the New Regionalism?

Soja: Where do I begin? For me, the New Regionalism is one of the most important outgrowths of the spatial turn, which I see as a broad-ranging shift in critical thinking and analysis affecting nearly all fields. Very briefly, the spatial turn means that such concepts as place, location, territory, scale, proximity, agglomeration, landscape, environment, region—all the aspects of what can be called the spatiality of human life—have become much more important than ever before in a much wider set of disciplines

and areas of study. So the New Regionalism is not synonymous with the spatial turn, but is directly related to it and has expanded, in part because of the more widespread recognition of spatial thinking and analysis. More people are now aware of the importance of regions and regionalism, and how regional geographies affect our lives, our communities, our identity, our economic conditions, and so forth. We can see more clearly the ways in which power and social control are embedded in the spatiality of cities and regions, how this can hurt us and oppress us.

Getting back to the issue of scale, another part of the New Regionalism that has been affected by the spatial turn has been the leading role played by regional and spatial scholars in studying the effects of globalization and economic restructuring, the formation of the New Economy, and especially the relations between the global and the local. In earlier periods of restructuring, such as during the Great Depression or the last decades of the nineteenth century, critical spatial thinking was rarely an important part of how new developments were analyzed and interpreted. But in this period of restructuring, since 1970 or so, spatial and especially regional thinkers have been at the center, right at the core, in understanding what has been happening

Ehrenfeucht: This raises a question about the need for new kinds of activism that are informed by the spatial turn, by thinking across scales and regionalist thinking. How do these new concepts help us better understand what forces affect us and our neighborhoods or communities?

Soja: Here I would start with the broader impact of the spatial turn, particularly with regard to activism and political movements at every geographical scale. There is a new kind of spatial consciousness that was not widespread twenty years ago. It almost did not exist at all, even in geography and among regional planners. It begins with the notion that space is socially produced, that we make our geographies, shape our spaces from the local to the global; and that they simultaneously shape us, shape our behavior and our thinking, shape our identity and our class consciousness, our designs, our buildings, our communities, cities and regions. This is the first step. Once we see that we produce our spaces, we realize that we can change them as well. So the next step is the awareness that the spaces or geographies that we produce can oppress us, can harm us, can seriously constrain our lives. In other words, the geographies in which we live, the multi-scale hierarchies of nodal regions in which we live, play a role in shaping our lives both positively and negatively. Thus, we can conceive of geographies to be more or less unjust or oppressive. This is vital. It leads to another realization, that gaining greater control over how our geographies are produced can be a powerful political target for community mobilizing, organizing, and activism.

The environmental justice movement can be seen as arising from something very much like this new spatial consciousness, the spatial turn moving into political practice. The same can be said for the development of community-based regionalism. People become aware that the internal problems of the local community are, in a significant way, being shaped by what is happening in the region. And in order for these community problems to be addressed, there

must be some changes made at the regional scale. The Bus Riders Union (BRU) is a great example of this new spatial and regional practice. It was able to convince the court that the geography of the fixed rail transit system that the Metropolitan Transit Authority was producing was unjust, that the plan was not only racially discriminatory but also spatially discriminatory, that it would benefit predominantly white and wealthy suburban households much more than the transit-dependent and largely immigrant working poor who live primarily in the central city, that investing billions of dollars in improving the bus system would be more democratic and beneficial to those that were most in need of public transit.

Ehrenfeucht: Are there qualities about LA itself that affected the emergence of the BRU?

Soja: Yes, of course. Everything is affected by the local geographical context in one way or another. Given what we have been discussing, however, there is something of unusual importance in the Los Angeles context that I think played a key role in the emergence of the BRU, although this role is not very visible or easy to measure. This has to do with the extraordinary agglomeration of the immigrant working poor in the core of the larger Los Angeles region. This concentration at the center of LA of about four to five million people, most of whom are foreign-born workers unable to achieve incomes much above the poverty level, is one of the largest such concentrations in the world. Although fragmented into different ethnic communities and super-exploited in the New Economy, with little choice but to become domestic workers, gardeners and street vendors, the high densities (and proximities) also bring with it

increased face-to-face contact and social interaction that can lead to innovative new ideas. This resembles what I earlier called *synekism* and Storper calls *buzz*, the stimulus of urban agglomeration, the stimulus of nodality, of concentrated density creating new ideas and new movements. These clusterings of people can be highly generative of innovation. Sometimes this stimulation is expressed in art and music, at other times it works to create new kinds of innovative labor and community coalitions.

The factor of proximity and agglomeration also relates to another feature of Los Angeles that I think has been important in these new developments. This has to do with the relations between communities and the university, and the related feedback between theory and practice that can occur when these relations are close and maintained over a long period of time. I have a small research project I am working on now looking at the history of the Urban Planning Department's connections with community and labor groups, which has been very intense for more than thirty years. I can't get into this very much here, but I do think it is at least part of why these new, spatially conscious examples of community based-regionalism are happening in LA more than in most other big city-regions.

Ehrenfeucht: Is there a California School or a Los Angeles School of regionalism?

Soja: If you see regionalism and urban studies together—say, in the critical study of cities and regions, or in the analysis of global city-regions—then I think one can speak of an LA School. There has always been something special about LA as a city and region, and there has for the past few decades been an

unusual concentration of innovative urban-regional-spatial thinkers at UCLA and other universities. There are good arguments to expand the definition to a California School, to recognize some very important contributions made in northern California, especially at Berkeley. But the leading edge of creative spatial thinking and consciousness, especially with regard to the New Regionalism as I have been discussing it here, has fairly clearly been in LA.

Ehrenfeucht: Would you say that the LA School's approach is most important? Or, is it that there is something distinctive about the region itself?

Soja: Again, I will answer by saying that both need to be seen together, the approach and the context interact in important ways. Like Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s, when there developed a very distinctive Chicago School of urban studies, Los Angeles has been an extraordinarily rich laboratory in which to study to study the city and, more broadly, urbanism as a way of life. LA has been prototypical for a lot of urban trends over the last hundred years, and one can see these trends more clearly since they are less complicated by a longer history of urbanization, as in New York and other eastern US or European cities. But I think the approach that has developed to study the city is more important that the distinctiveness of the city in defining an LA School.

There are several different ways this distinctive approach can be defined. Michael Dear at USC sees postmodernism as the defining feature. But what I see at the core of the LA School approach—and this is not unlike what was at the core of the old Chicago School—is an emphasis on what can be described as spatial causality, the ways in which the specific geography of the city affects all aspects of urban life. In the Chicago School, this causality or explanatory factor was rooted in ecological patterns and processes, that is, more environmental than spatial. Today, Los Angeles is at the forefront for the development of a specifically spatial notion of understanding and explaining contemporary urban and regional life, and for a more general theoretical framework for the critical study of cities and regions all over the world.

It is all interrelated, the spatial turn, the New Regionalism, the question of scale, the study of globalization and the New Economy, the emphasis on spatial explanation and causality, the links to planning and public policy, and the connections that are being made between good theory and progressive political practice. I think this may be an appropriate place to end the interview: with the hope that these achievements are only the beginning of something bigger and better.

Endnote
[1]Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles, 2002

RENIA EHRENFEUCHT (reniae@ucla.edu) is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA.

Trading In Welfare: Does Global Trade Undermine Social Policy and Planning?[1]

Yves Bourgeois

The question whether social policy must be restricted in order to pursue trade openness and growth is a false dichotomy. First, economic growth depends not only on trade; endogenous factors must also be considered. Second, limits on social policy may result more from the ideology of dominant trading partners than from globalization as such. Third, the new regionalism literature provides evidence that geography and institutions matter as much as ever, despite the information and communications revolution. Finally, the benefits of trade may hinge upon the stability of the economic system, which may in turn depend on social policy.

Introduction

Must we choose between growth and equity? Do societies have to choose between rising income levels and declining income gaps? Does growth hinge solely on trade? Does increasing global trade spell the demise of the welfare state? The short answer to all of these questions is no.

In recent years, two related phenomena have been discussed at great length in academic and policy circles: rapid technological change in information and communication technologies (ICTs), and globalization, the re-territorialization of social and economic relations. In particular, there have been fanciful prophecies such as "the death of distance" (Cairncross 1997), "the end of the nation-state" (Ohmae 1995), and other obituaries, in which socio-technical and global imperatives are predicted to make policy and geography relics of the twentieth century. Borders are said to become irrelevant, and without them governments have no territory upon which to intervene. Not wanting to miss their own funerals, some policymakers and planners have been quick to accept the premise that global competitiveness requires decreasing social welfare. Conservatives have long argued that social welfare programs decrease incentives to work and to compete, and push local firms to relocate (Friedman 1999).[2] Now even some liberal democrats accept that global competitiveness requires reduced interventionism to prevent social programs from going bankrupt.[3]

The debates on globalization and welfare state retrenchment have been misconstrued. As a result, they either mask important political economic consequences of globalization, or portray these outcomes as inevitable. Specifically, a popular argument suggests that policymakers must choose between the efficiency gains of greater openness to international trade or sacrifice these gains by pursuing redistributive social welfare policies.

Policymakers and planners thus seem pressed to decide how much economic gain a nation will sacrifice in order to maintain social spending. The conundrum worsens if the sustainability of social welfare programs is contingent upon continued economic growth, if this growth depends on international trade, and if it is jeopardized by social expenditures. In other words, slashing short-term social spending to ensure efficiency, competitiveness and sustained economic growth will, hopefully, preserve a pared-down version of social programs over the longer term.

The supposed trade-off between social spending and economic growth is misleading for four reasons. First, the extent and direction of causality between trade and growth are contestable. Second, it is not globalization as such that limits available policy instruments, but rather specific political landscapes of the trading partners. Ideologies of dominant trading partners shape the policy agendas of smaller countries. Third, the belief that distance and geography no longer matter is inaccurate, and detracts attention from the crucial localized institutions that underpin production and growth. Finally, any growth-versus-welfare trade-off implies that increased openness in trade requires a corresponding decrease in state intervention in social welfare. Yet growth may not only co-exist with interventionism—it may require it to ensure social stability. I further explore each of these arguments below, after first defining globalization and then illustrating the extent to which its threat is perceived by academic, media and policy circles.

Globalization as a Process of Re-Territorialization

Debates unfold on the myriad ways in which globalization expresses itself. Much of the literature ignores the debates, however, instead choosing to make sweeping generalities, such as "nation-states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today's borderless world" (Ohmae 1995). Yet the persistence of state-sanctioned armed conflict, tightening national borders, and stable or increased government spending as a percentage of total GDP suggest that the state has retained great relevance. Any serious debate on state retrenchment needs to address the magnitude and reversibility of the expected change.

In contrast, Rosenau (1997) posits globalization as a process of "boundary-broadening," and opposes it to localization, as a process of "boundary-heightening." This conception of opposed processes serves two purposes. First, it allows us to question the deterministic view that globalization is inevitable and follows one irreversible path. More importantly, it allows us to see both global and local forces at work simultaneously (Knox 1995), illustrating that globalization does not de-territorialize but re-territorializes (Tonelson 1997; Scott et al. 2001). In other words, globalization does not make geography obsolete. It changes the scale at which social, political and economic activity occurs, and how subnational and supranational regions interact with each other.

What remains uncertain is the extent of any mismatch between economic and political domains. Are current nation-state boundaries impediments to the otherwise closer economic integration of localities such as Copenhagen-Malmö, Tijuana-San Diego, or Vancouver-Seattle? Nationwide laws and regulations may prove cumbersome, either at a smaller scale where they do not reflect sub-national specificities (e.g., inflation-control policies when some subnational regions are in recession), or at a larger scale where supranational cooperation or acquisition is impeded by rules restricting foreign ownership of domestic industries or firms. The common argument is that the process of globalization requires the devolution of responsibilities onto subnational and supranational governance bodies, in order to allow subnational regions to better compete with an increasing number of other regions around the world, and supranational regions to adequately manage trade agreements, intellectual protection rights, and so forth. But while some responsibilities devolve from the nation-state, others are appropriated by it. For example, nation-states fund business export incubators and export development corporations to assist subnational regions to compete and collaborate with other regions. At the supranational scale, social issues such as human and labor rights protection have been promoted by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, and this has put pressure on states to create national institutions to address these issues. Hence re-territorialization is a continuous process of re-shuffling both socioeconomic activity and governance responsibili-

ties across scales. Nation-states retain many of their responsibilities and acquire new ones.

TINA's Golden Straitjacket: How Globalization Has Become Inevitable...Again

The dichotomy of trade-led growth and social intervention is articulated by de Jonquières (1997) as follows: "Governments can accept [globalization], or reject it. Some have done just that, by continuing to insulate their economies from global markets and international competition." Margaret Thatcher coined the acronym TINA to suggest that "there is no alternative" to neo-liberal economic policies in ensuring economic prosperity. The acronym remains appropriate as a label for those who claim an end to history or ideology, or suggest that there is only one appropriate response to globalization.

References to the inevitability of globalization abound in popular media. *New York Times* columnist and author Thomas Friedman (1999: xxi-xxii) writes, "Globalization, like the dawn, is inevitable. Generally, it is a good thing that the sun comes up every morning. It does more good than harm. But even if I didn't much care for the dawn, there isn't much I could do about it." Friedman projects this feeling of individual helplessness onto governments by introducing the notion of the golden straitjacket: "Once your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, its political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke – to slight nuances of taste, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in design to account for local traditions, some loosening here or there, but never any major deviation from the core golden rules. Governments ...

which deviate too far from the core rules will see their investors stampede away, interest rates rise and stock market valuations fall" (1999: 87-88). Friedman adds: "[Government's] main job these days is enticing the Electronic Herd and Supermarkets to invest in their states, doing whatever it takes to keep them there and constantly living in dread that they will leave" (1999: 116).

From this view, if regions are to be competitive and prosperous, they must heed globalization's challenge, which requires the adoption of neoliberal trade and macroeconomic policies including tight monetary controls, deregulation and industry privatization. It becomes more than a pragmatic question about which public intervention options are allowed by globalization, but also a normative question of desirability: what governments can and should do to ensure growth. Martin (1997) suggests that not only growth is at stake: "It is possible to opt out of globalisation, but the price that is paid is not merely an economic one. It is also a political one, because the desire to repress globalisation leads to an inevitable extension of the powers of the state and a loss of individual freedom." This faith has been embraced by government officials from wealthy and poor countries alike (Rodrik 2001).

The notion of inevitable globalization demanding a choice between openness and protectionism underlies the false dichotomy, not just because it promotes a particular set of economic measures, but because it implies there can only be two sets of measures from which to choose. Rather than accepting the dichotomy, we need to contextualize trade and recognize both its value and limitations. The following four sections explore these limits and their neglect of social policy.

Trade Is But a Partial Contributor to Growth

The first misleading aspect of the trade-versus-welfare dichotomy relates to the causes of economic growth. To various degrees, trade theory based on Ricardian principles of comparative advantage suggests that domestic economies have much to gain from international trade and competition. Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade models illustrate how countries benefit from specializing in industries that use factors of production with which they are relatively well-endowed. Capital-rich countries should produce capital-intensive goods that use higher levels of technology and machinery, such as computers, while countries with relatively higher labor-to-capital ratios should produce labor-intensive goods, such as garments. International trade encourages countries to specialize in what they do best. Because more goods are produced when international trade is possible, theoretically everyone stands to gain, especially smaller economies that now have access to larger markets. This implies that a deregulated price system, without protectionist tariffs and quotas, would be broadly beneficial.

The neo-classical tradition further suggests that removing impediments to factor mobility would equalize prices on those factors over time, leading to converging per capita income throughout the world.

However, there are few cases where this has occurred. Post-World-War-II Western Europe and Japan are two obvious examples, yet these countries had long-standing traditions of industrialization. China and India have liberalized trade and have experienced strong growth rates in recent years, but it remains to be seen whether these rates can be sustained. Moreover, Rodrik (2001) argues their strong growth rates have more to do with domestic industrial policies and reforms pursued prior to trade liberalization.

The neo-classical assumption of perfect factor mobility has proven tenuous. Challenging this assumption, Krugman introduces geographic variables into trade theory to explain that higher value-adding industrial activity still agglomerates in wealthy regions due to economies of scale in production and distance decay in the movement of goods (1991, 1995; Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999). Models of increasing returns to scale find trade to be beneficial in two ways: by increasing competition, and by increasing specialization that leads to greater economies of scale (Baldwin and Caves 1997).

Despite these improvements to trade theory, whether trade liberalization causes or results from growth remains a question. Weiss (1999: 67) argues that "international political cooperation (systematized through the institutions of Bretton Woods) paved the way for economic integration (mainly through trade) rather than vice versa." Even if there were a correlation between trade and growth, the direction of causality is unclear (Edwards 1993).

In contrast, endogenous models of growth argue that neo-classical trade and growth theory overemphasizes the accumulation of labor and capital as the cause of growth. Endogenous models posit that growth is the result of qualitative changes in existing labor and physical inputs, not simply their increased quantity. Romer (1986, 1990, 1994) illustrates this with a kitchen analogy, comparing factors to ingredients, and production to recipes. Growth comes from improving recipes, not simply cooking more, and we have consistently underestimated our potential for finding new recipes and ideas. Endogenous models emphasizing qualitative improvements in capital are called models of technological change. Such models focus on how technological innovations improve aggregate productivity (Solow 1957; Nordhaus 2001). Becker (1993) attributes rising productivity levels and growth to qualitative improvements in human rather than physical capital. Models of organizational change emphasize the interaction of capital and labor (e.g., "just-in-time" versus mass assembly line production). Endogenous models do not reject the importance of markets or trade as mechanisms of resource allocation, but they make the critical distinction that growth depends on how things are produced before they are traded. They place much greater importance on education and industrial policies.

Thus, the extent of participation in trade provides but one possible explanation of economic growth, complementing endogenous models of technological change, human capital and organizational change.

If the fiscal sustainability of social policies rests on economic performance, it is necessary to consider the various possible causes of growth, evaluating any real constraints imposed by trade and benefits from investments in innovation or education policies. As Rodrik (2001) argues, this is not to suggest that the potential benefits of trade should be rejected, but neither should we be "peddling a cartoon version of the argument, vastly overstating the effectiveness of economic openness as a tool for fostering development."

Dominant Trading Partner Ideology Limits Social Policy Options

The second misleading aspect of the trade-versus-welfare dichotomy relates to evolving geographical patterns of trade. Because globalization is commonly believed to consist of the strengthening of a non-hierarchical web of trading relations, instead of a clustered process of greater economic integration, the fact that dominant countries have ideological influences on their trading partners is often not acknowledged.

Louch, Hargittai and Centeno (1999) identify three possible patterns of globalization. In "interdependent globalization," reciprocal ties between countries expand on a system-wide basis and in a somewhat uniform fashion, in which each unit becomes equally connected to every other unit. In the "civilizations and empires model," subnetworks (closed cliques, trading blocs) emerge and interaction concentrates within these clusters, namely the Unites States, European Union and Japan. In "hegemonic globaliza-

tion," a small core of rich countries controls most trade. Thus the global web, including the pattern of international trade, can be viewed as universal, clustered or hegemonic.

Universal globalization may be characteristic of some economies, but not all are opening themselves up to all parts of the world equally. For example, examining Canada-US trade data between 1988 and 1996, Helliwell (1998) and Ceglowski (2000) suggest that the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), now the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has redirected Canadian interprovincial trade toward the United States. By factoring in the size of the provinces and states' economies, as well as the distance between them, Helliwell's gravity model shows that interprovincial trade intensity diminished from twenty times that of trade with the US in 1988 to twelve times by 1996. Ceglowski finds similar results, but shows that this drop occurred mostly in the early 1990s.

Despite the decline in intra-national trade in Canada, Helliwell and Ceglowski's results also demonstrate the persistence of a "home bias," an empirically demonstrated preference to export and import domestically even when controlling for distances between trading partners. Similarly, Wei (1996) finds that the average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country prefers domestic products twice as much as imported goods, even if imported from a neighboring country speaking the same language. The home bias could be attributable to economic patriotism or socio-cultural factors such as perceived product reliability. While the

literature on home bias is unclear, given that a large portion of international trade involves intra-industry trade of semi-finished goods between producers, rather than finished goods destined for consumer markets, institutional characteristics such as the legal framework and reliability of investments may also be important factors.

Nevertheless, there has been a substantial redirection of Canadian trade south of the border. The United States is Canada's largest trading partner in terms of imports and especially exports, and this trade dependence has further increased during the 1990s, as clearly illustrated with Canadian exports to the US (Figure 1, see facing page) and to a lesser extent with imports (Figure 2). The universal globalization thesis would have suggested that trade would increase with all regions somewhat equally, not in a concentrated manner with one particular country. But in the case of Canada, globalization as increased trade has been a very clustered or hegemonic process.

The Canadian experience is not unique. Figure 3 (see facing page) illustrates how trade dependence with the US is also increasing for Mexico. Moreover, a 2000 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe report on globalization trends in Europe shows that Western Europe has become much more European than global in its trading patterns: "Well over two thirds of Europe's exports and imports now consist of intra-west European exchanges compared with some 55 and 46 per cent in the inter-war period. Trade with the rest of the world, and espe-

cially with the developing countries, has tended to decline in relative importance" (UNECE 2000: 7).

Greater economic integration means that countries within clusters tend to become more attuned to the political debates, issues and reforms underway among their trading partners. In the Canadian case, the imperatives of US interests, or US policy preferences, are interpreted as the imperatives of globalization. For example, Helliwell (2000) suggests that the national health policy reform debate in Canada is constrained by the options that have been discussed in the US; meanwhile data reveal Americans to be the least satisfied with their health care system of OECD countries. Alternatives exist, however. Esping-Anderson (1996: 15) contrasts the Scandinavian route of the 1970s and 1980s pursuing "active labour market policies, social service expansion, and gender equalization" with the neo-liberal route pursued in Britain, which attempted to "manage economic decline and domestic unemployment with greater labor market and wage flexibility."

Riddell and Riddell (2001) show that between 1984 and 1998, unionization rates fell eight percent in the United States and seven percent in Canada. They argue that structural changes in the economy have had minimal impact on unionization. Instead, increased management opposition to unions, changes in legislation curbing unionization, and growth in "union substitute services" have played a larger role. Drache (1996: 53) suggests "the sovereignty of nations is in peril not on account of the international economy but because of the power of corporations to invest

Figure 1
Percent of Canadian Exports by Destination
Source: Strategis trade data (strategis.ic.gc.ca)

Figure 2
Percent of Canadian Imports by Origin
Source: Strategis trade data (strategis.ic.gc.ca)

Figure 3
Mexican Trade with NAFTA Members
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics

with less restriction, to reshape public policy in support of private wealth generation and, most of all, to appropriate the political culture of nations for corporate ends." Jessop (1999: 79) concurs: "To the extent that policy is 'constrained,' the sources of constraint are less external or global in origin than domestic-institutional." This suggests that political agendas may be promoted in the name of economic efficiency.

Helleiner (1995) argues that globalization has not come at the expense of nation-states but has rather been promoted by them. Rodrik (1996) raises the ironic question as to why more open economies have bigger governments if public intervention is supposed to stifle trade. The possibility of political motives permeating the debate and the existence of alternative routes to welfare reform both suggest that the chosen paths can be ideologically constructed as much as reflective of economic trade-offs.

Alive and Well: Distance, Agglomerations, and Institutional Stickiness

The third misleading aspect of the trade-versus-welfare dichotomy pertains to the enthusiastic claims about the "death of distance" that emerge with each new wave of innovations in transportation and communications technologies. The hypermobility of people, labor, firms, goods, capital and investments is seen as curtailing governments' sovereignty and consequently their ability to intervene socially (Strange 1996). Others have also embraced the view that factors of production are increasingly mobile, that geography no longer matters in production and,

as a result, economic activities increasingly disregard national boundaries (Cairncross 1997). If capital is truly footloose, state intervention in economic affairs stands to be ineffective at best, and at worst disruptive if it increases the risk or cost of investments. Thus economic globalization puts downward pressure on the taxation powers of nation-states, who risk losing investments and jobs to lower-taxing nations. These restrictions on national authority extend far beyond economic policy and management. Globalization, understood in this way, undermines the ability of nation-states to engage in other spheres of social life by driving down their revenues.

It is true that transportation costs, in terms of freight shipment and long-distance calls, for example, have decreased significantly throughout the century, affecting the mobility of financial capital and the geography of some industries. However, not all industries have become hypermobile (Leamer and Storper 2001). The diffusion of economic activity seems likely in cases where knowledge and interactions are codified and certain, but those industries that require higher degrees of trust, face-to-face interaction and context-dependent (tacit) knowledge, and those that are faced with greater market uncertainty, are more prone to agglomerate (Storper and Venables 2001). Agglomeration increases the speed of interactions between individuals, and larger cities benefit from higher levels and diversity of skills (Glaeser 1999) and industries (Hanson 2000). Geography matters, but not only because of increasing returns to scale and distance decay, as Krugman (1991, 1995) argues.

Furthermore, one new regionalist perspective asserts the prime importance of localized economic and sociopolitical institutions in explaining economic performance. Markets are underpinned by social relations; economic activity is not limited to producing and exchanging tangible goods, but includes immaterial transactions (Storper and Venables 2001) localized in regions in which producers are linked by untraded interdependencies (Storper 1997). Called the "relational turn" in geography, new regionalism has increasingly emphasized the role of social relations, conventions and institutions to production. This has also been captured by the notion of social capital (Putnam 1993). Although the role of trust and trustworthiness is contentious, Scott (1998: 157) finds Putnam's hypothesis important because "cooperation and institutional collaboration are the essential leavening of competitive advantage in modern regional economies."

Some new regionalist scholars have also noted that the borders of nation-states may overlap with economic territories. Varying international trade patterns among sub-national regions, along with the persistence and even intensification of regional industrial agglomerations, suggest that policies that are national in scope can benefit or hinder some regions more than others. Re-territorialization may involve the devolution of some nation-state responsibilities to supranational or subnational institutions of governance because they better accommodate changing realities. Whether sovereignty is truly shifting is an open question. Even if sovereignty does devolve onto new scales, inhibiting nation-states from intervening with social policy, this will not destroy the need for social policies but would require enaction and implementation at new scales. "The question of governance and policy, then, is intimately bound up with wider concerns, not only about the synoptic bases of economic performance, but also about income distribution and social and cultural goals" (Scott 1998: 152).

Equity as a Basis for Social Stability

The fourth misleading aspect of the trade-versus-welfare dichotomy is the way in which it ignores the need for social stability. If an economic and policy regime exacerbates differences between rich and poor, it may undermine economic growth.

Labor economists suggest that trade liberalization is contributing to the widening income gap within industrialized countries, what Freeman (1995: 30) calls "the immiseration of the less-skilled." They argue that if trade liberalization affecting a labor-intensive industry ("Industry X") increases competition between two countries, one with relatively low and one with relatively high wages, Industry X wages in the poor country will increase relative to wages in its other industries, while Industry X wages in the high-wage country will decline relative to its other industries. This would produce a widening income gap in both countries.

Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) argue that the main cause of wage differentials within the US economy is technological progress among industries relying on skilled labor, not the decline of prices of goods that

use less-skilled labor relatively intensely. Stated differently, the income gap widens not because of foreign trade, but because of the domestic introduction of new technologies. When innovations are skill-biased and enhance the productivity and thus wages of skilled workers, they increase the income gap. In contrast, relative wages converge when new technologies replace the previous know-how advantage of skilled workers. The income gap has not widened at the same rate for all countries, and a preference for skill-biased technologies helps explain why the income gap has widened more in the US than in Canada (Murphy, Riddell and Romer 1998) or Germany (Beaudry and Green 2000). In this case, attention may need to focus on economic and social policies that promote education and innovation before trade.

The benefits of trade to both rich and poor countries, and to the wealthy and poor populations therein, may be high enough that those who gain from trade liberalization can compensate losers and still be better off than in the more protectionist situation. However, such an outcome seems politically feasible only if those who control the system of redistribution are willing to provide unemployment insurance, training programs, and other efforts to help the transition of displaced workers into other industries. The neo-classical model suggests that workers will use savings or borrow money to finance their own re-training or relocation, but it would appear just as rational for them to oppose the liberalization of their industry. In either case they become losers by expending either financial or political capital to remedy their displacement.

Ultimately, this requires addressing distributional issues through socio-economic and social welfare policies. If the benefits of trade more than compensate the losses, then workable distribution schemes in terms of social security, welfare and job training programs for the displaced are crucial (Wood 1995). As Rodrik (1997: 36) writes, "The broader challenge for the 21st century is to engineer a new balance between the market and society—one that will continue to unleash the creative energies of private entrepreneurship without eroding the social bases of cooperation."

Many welfare reform efforts have accepted the premise of what economists call the welfare trap, in which unemployment insurance and other social welfare policies are seen as providing disincentives to work. However, the argument that people will stay at home given similar compensation between benefits and salaries neglects the social value of work, the friendships and sense of worth it provides, as a motivation. The welfare trap premise also supposes that mismatches between industry needs and local skills are easily bridged. Quite often, these mismatches are seen as spatial and are projected onto regions. It is easier to tell unemployed workers to move where there are jobs than to address underlying economic structural issues, or even to acknowledge that people have a right to live where they choose.

After two decades of conservative reforms in Britain and North America, evidence remains inconclusive at best whether decreasing social welfare spending increases competitiveness and job market participation. At worst, it contributes to the widening income gap

by reducing recipient benefits, while neglecting more important bases of economic performance such as education (Murphy, Riddell and Romer 1998).

Burtless (1995) argues that social welfare programs can thus be justified on the bases of efficiency, equity, social and distributional justice, as well as social cohesion to preserve the system's stability (Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 1996). For Wood (1995), this shifts the problem to two questions. Do income transfers slow the supply response, creating a problem in addition to that of wage differentials and unemployment? And, is there enough political will from skilled and high-wage workers to subsidize the unskilled? The answer to the first question is a matter of debate, and the answer to the second is even less certain. Nevertheless, neither can be overlooked, for to do so is to ignore the social basis upon which production and exchange depend. In summary, paying attention to issues of social welfare is a necessity more than a luxury.

Conclusion

Trade promotion is not necessarily a constraint to social policy and planning in a globalizing world. Rodrik (1996) shows that states with larger governments are also more open to trade. The literature and empirical evidence is inconclusive as to which offers the better explanation of economic growth, neoliberal trade models or endogenous models of human capital, technological and organizational change. Rather than a universally dispersed global economic order, economic globalization is a clustered process creating trade blocs, one in which ideological influ-

ences can constrain perceived social policy choices. Reforming social programs need not mimic any single jurisdiction, but should draw upon a much larger diversity of initiatives from other social welfare traditions. State sovereignty has yet to be significantly undermined by the "death of distance" and footloose industries, and social intervention does not translate into scaring off business. Although there may be mismatches between political boundaries and economic spaces, localized socio-political institutions remain crucial underpinnings to production and social stability. Dissonance between economically-integrated regions and political boundaries may lead to new regional configurations, but the crucial role of institutions suggests evolving—not disappearing—forms of governance, and new roles for nation-states. Finally, the necessity of redistributive social programs can be framed as a collective agreement that winners should compensate losers, as continuously rising income inequality threatens long-run economic and political stability.

The emerging new regionalist narrative enlightens us with respect to this topic in four ways. It posits a view of globalization as a dynamic process of re-territorialization, of changing scales and the interactions between invigorated regions. Second, in so doing it rejects the notion that distance and geography no longer matter. To the contrary, for some activities agglomerations may matter more than ever. Third, it has emphasized the importance of social relationships embodied in conventions and institutions, stressing that these localized institutions provide the bases for market exchanges and explain why

production is organized differently across regions. Fourth, some new regionalists consider equity as central in economic development, as a form of justice and a basis for system stability and sustainability.

Planning and social policy need not dismiss or conflict with the benefits of trade and trade promotion. One can question the narrow neoliberal discourse and proposed path to development without reverting to protectionism. Once the false ideological dichotomy of "there is no alternative" is recognized, planners and policymakers can conceive of a wider variety of social intervention policies without believing they must come at the expense of openness or growth. The need for social policy is as great as ever.

Endnotes

[1] I extend due gratitude to Professors Michael Mann and Lois Takahashi, Dan Chatman, Renia Ehrenfeucht and two anonymous reviewers, who endured versions of this draft, and provided most welcome comments. I am also indebted to the generous support of the Fondation Baxter et Alma Ricard.

[2] "If we are going to have real economic development in the world, most of that will come from capital coming into those countries to create jobs. We are not going to do it with welfare." — Paul O'Neill, US Secretary of the Treasury, International conference on financing for development. Monterrey, Mexico. Quoted in *New York Times*, March 23, 2002, p. A7.

[3] "The process of global economic integration is well underway. We cannot stop it, nor should we try. Product, capital, and labor markets are increasingly transnational just as the process of production is." – John Sweeney, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), testimony to US Senate Committee on Finance hearing on "US trade policy in the era of globalization." Washington. January 29, 1999.

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YVES BOURGEOIS (yves@ucla.edu) is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA, concentrating in regional political economy. His research includes regional centers of innovation, regional economic development, social policy reform and minority nationalism.

Okinawa as a Region: A Brief History, Current Economic Conditions and Prospects

Joseph Boski

In this paper, a brief account of Okinawa's history of subjugation and a description of its regional situation are the context for a discussion of current economic conditions, including a continued disparity with the rest of Japan and a land-hungry US military presence. Development plans since 1972 are described and their limitations are noted. Innovative efforts in Yomitan Village are discussed and considered potential models for local and regional development to move Okinawa into a future better understood and better controlled by Okinawans.

Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*

Perhaps the opening lines of Tolstoy are not entirely applicable to regional economies, but certainly economies are "unhappy" for unique and complex reasons. Complex local idiosyncrasies are likely the main causes for failure of formulaic economic development plans based on successes such as Silicon Valley. The economy of the Ryukyu Islands that make up Japan's Okinawa Prefecture can be characterized as unhappy. Various efforts to develop Okinawa economically, led by the Japanese central government, have had only moderate success at best. Okinawa remains a peripheral part of Japan. Its economy relies on tourism, government subsidies from the mainland, and spending by the United States' military; it is characterized by high unemployment, the lowest income levels of any region in Japan, and high concentrations of employment in vulnerable services and construction sectors. The brightest prospects for Okinawa come from within the region itself, as illustrated in this paper by a description of Yomitan Village. Because of its geopolitical significance, the failures of central government policies, other problems of the region itself and the potential for success in locally-based efforts, Okinawa presents itself as an excellent case study of regional development.

The study of Okinawa as a region is also of interest at a theoretical level. Its islands are geographically, politically and historically situated in such a way that multiple scales, so often neglected in discussions of regions, are impossible to ignore. Five scalar levels have clear relevance to Okinawa: the global scale, evident in its involvement with the geo-politics of US military policy; the supra-national scale, particularly its relations with

the rest of East Asia; the national scale, apparent in long-standing tensions with the rest of Japan; the sub-national scale, or Okinawa itself; and the local scale, illustrated in the discussion of Yomitan Village. Interaction across these levels is central both to Okinawa's historical underdevelopment and to the potential for its future.

After presenting a concise history of Okinawa, I describe the main island and development plans for it since 1972, focusing on employment, general economic structure and income disparities between Okinawa and Japan. This is followed by a discussion of recent and current economic conditions, the growth of tourism over the last three decades and the issue of US military bases. Plans for the future, including the International City plan and free trade zone proposals, are then discussed and compared with the more innovative actions taken at Yomitan Village. Throughout, the drastic political changes that have affected the Ryukyu Islands are evident. A history of sometimes free and sometimes constrained trade, and a more recent past marked by a massive US military presence, constitute the context of the discussion.

A Brief History[1]

Japan's Okinawa Prefecture, formerly the Ryukyu Kingdom, has never been a particularly wealthy or powerful region. However, today Okinawa is part of one of the world's wealthiest countries, and serves as a military outpost for the world's most powerful country. More than most places, Okinawa has often been in a position of subordination.

Most histories of this small East Asian island nation, now one of Japan's forty-seven prefectures, begin around 1100 AD, though human settlement in the Ryukyu Islands dates back to at least 30,000 BC. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries AD, political and social consolidation was taking place

Figure 1
Okinawa and East Asia
Source: Virtual Ginza
(www.virtualginza.com/japan3.htm)

among many small chieftains. By the fourteenth century, the main island of Okinawa was divided into three main kingdoms, and by 1429 the island had been united under one rule. The dominion spread to smaller islands over the next decades. By this time, trade had been established with the regionally dominant and advanced Chinese civilization, and the new, unified kingdom continued as a single tribute nation. Trade was also taking place with Japan and other parts of East and Southeast Asia. International trade during this period allowed for the relative prosperity of the Ryukyu Islands and its ruling class. This ruling class was somewhat unusual in its relatively large size—one-third of the total population—as well as its industriousness: the elite was composed of artisans as well as administrators and intellectuals. Culture and politics also flourished at this time, heavily influenced by the Chinese.

In 1609, the powerful Satsuma clan of Kagoshima, Japan, invaded and easily conquered the peaceful Okinawans. Shuri Castle was occupied briefly, and Ryukyu's king was temporarily removed to Edo [Tokyo] and required to swear allegiance to Japan. The Satsuma regime controlled the Ryukyu Kingdom's trade, reaping huge profits and demanding burdensome tributes. This conquest roughly coincided with the establishment of the Edo or Tokugawa shogunate, which began in 1603 and which enforced a long period of national isolation from 1629 until the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853. The Okinawan port of Naha grew in importance for the Satsuma regime, joining Nagasaki and a few other officially sanctioned domestic points of trade. The

Okinawa-Japan relationship was deliberately hidden from the Chinese, as Okinawa maintained dual subordination to China and Japan. Chinese cultural influences remained strong and the Ryukyu Kingdom remained a tribute nation, but Japan exerted much stronger control over Okinawa's economy than China did. This situation provided much wealth to Satsuma, and avoided possible loss of face by the Chinese. Meanwhile, Okinawan prosperity faltered and faded.

Over the next two-and-a-half centuries, Okinawa experienced increasingly frequent contact with Western traders and missionaries. In the mid-nineteenth century, and somewhat ominously in retrospect, Naha was used as a base of operations for the American Commodore Perry, who forcibly entered Okinawa's Shuri Castle before making his way into Japan itself, thereby "opening" Japan to the West in 1853.

Japan's Meiji Restoration took place in 1868. Reunited under an emperor, Japan became more uniformly administrated, and quickly modernized. The new nation expanded to the north into Hokkaido, subjugating the Ainu people, and to the south into the Ryukyu Islands, subjugating the Ryukyuans. This was the beginning of decades of expansion and colonization by Japan throughout East and Southeast Asia. The Ryukyu Kingdom feebly resisted the Japanese takeover. Despite efforts to maintain independence and calls for intervention to the United States, China, Great Britain and the Nether-

lands, in 1879 the Ryukyu Kingdom became a part of Japan and was renamed Okinawa Prefecture.

Japan's defeat of China in 1895 opened the way for assimilation programs by Japan, which had been somewhat stalled until that time. The Japanese victory also reduced the reluctance on the part of many Okinawans to discard their Chinese-based cultural and political traditions. Assimilation included forced changes to nearly all aspects of everyday life, from clothing to language to food (Morris-Suzuki 1998).

Assimilation continued until 1945, when Okinawa was essentially sacrificed to the United States in order to protect the Japanese mainland in the most deadly confrontation in the Pacific theater of World War II. In all, over 230,000 soldiers and civilians were killed, including almost 140,000 Okinawans, nearly one-third of Okinawa's population at the time. The United States officially occupied Japan until 1952, but remained in Okinawa for an additional twenty years. In 1972, Okinawa reverted to Japan as a prefecture, but a large US military presence remains.

Okinawa Prefecture and Okinawa Island

Okinawa Prefecture consists of about 160 islands, fifty of which are inhabited. The prefecture makes up only 0.6 percent of Japan's land area and one percent of its population. Within the Ryukyu Islands, the largest concentration of people as well as cultural, social and economic activity has always been on Okinawa Island. Over eighty percent of the prefecture's 1.3 million people live on the long,

thin island, which is about 1,201 square kilometers and accounts for over half the area of the prefecture (Figure 2).

On the island itself, the population is concentrated in and around Naha, the current capital and major port near the historic capital and palace-city of Shuri. Naha is the largest city in Okinawa, with 302,000 residents.

Okinawa is the only prefecture in Japan without a completed rail network. Okinawans rely exclusively on roads and motor vehicles for intra-island travel. Water and air transport connect the islands with each other, with mainland Japan, and with other countries. An elevated light rail system connecting the airport and Shuri castle, two important tourist sites, is currently under construction. It appears that the rail line will do little to satisfy local commuter or industry needs outside of tourism-related industries.

Okinawa Island, and the whole of the prefecture, is resource-poor. The supply of water is low enough to discourage manufacturers from mainland Japan who might otherwise consider locating there (Egami 1994). Land is also in short supply for agricultural, industrial and residential uses, particularly in the central parts of Okinawa Island where the population and American military bases are concentrated. American military bases cover more than ten percent of the total area of Okinawa prefecture, and almost one-fifth of the main island (Okinawa General Bureau n.d.; Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education 2000). There are over 27,000 active US military personnel in Okinawa, with an additional 24,000 dependents.

Figure 2
Okinawa Island Administrative Divisions, 1990
Source: University of Texas Library (www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/japan.html)

Together this group represents approximately five percent of the population, and an equal proportion of the economy (Bandow 1998). Bases, personnel and dependents contribute to the local economy mainly through rents paid to private Okinawan landowners,[2] employment of approximately 8,300 Okinawans on the bases, various construction projects and off-base services for American military personnel and dependents, including restaurants, housing and shopping. The rents, Okinawan salaries and most construction and maintenance costs are paid by the Japanese, not US, government.

While many Okinawans resent the presence of the bases and associated problems such as noise and crime, some also consider the bases significant obstacles to economic development. Former Governor Ota called the unwieldy land-use pattern forced on Okinawa by the bases "the greatest problem of post-war Okinawa" (Ota 1999). One critic has characterized the five percent contribution to the economy, in combination with the use of twenty percent of the island's land, as a fifteen percent economic loss (Johnson 1999). It can certainly be argued that the bases take up far more land than they require, thereby limiting development. For example, some base lands include golf courses, which have stood in the way of needed road construction.

Both the bases' contribution to the economy and the number of Okinawans employed there have been decreasing significantly as Okinawa's economy has grown. In 1972 an estimated 50,000 Okinawans worked on American bases, and the base-contribution share of the economy was estimated at 19.4

percent (McCormack 1999). Now the numbers are less than 10,000 and five percent, respectively.

Economic Goals and Economic Realities in Okinawa Since 1972

Since reversion from American control in1972, the Japanese central government has had two explicit economic policy goals for Okinawa: "eliminating the gap with the mainland" and "providing the basic conditions for autonomous development." In 1992 a third goal was added: to make Okinawa "a center for exchanges with the south" (Sasaki 1999: 249). Since 1972, Japan's central government has invested approximately five trillion yen (US$40 billion) in Okinawa, primarily in public works projects such as roads and airports (McCormack 1999). During this period Okinawa experienced a thirty seven percent increase in population, from approximately 950,000 in 1972 to just over 1.3 million in 1998 (Statistics Bureau 2000). Over the same period, the population of Japan grew about twenty two percent.

The Okinawa-mainland economic gap has not been eliminated. However, Okinawa's situation has improved, and per capita income has risen significantly. In 1972 it was sixty percent of the national average. It peaked at 75.9 percent in 1986 and has been slowly declining since then, reaching 70.1 percent in 1996 (Okinawa General Bureau n.d.). For Okinawa to have narrowed the income gap means it must have kept pace with and even surpassed the amazing income growth in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. This should be considered an achievement, though it was accomplished largely through public

works projects that have created an unbalanced economy with an over-reliance on services and construction.

On a less encouraging note, Okinawa has consistently had the highest unemployment rate in Japan since reversion. In 1972, the unemployment rate in Okinawa was three percent (1.4 percent in Japan) with 11,000 people unemployed; in 1982 it was 4.9 percent (2.4 percent in Japan) with 23,000 people unemployed; and in 1998 it was 7.7 percent (4.1 percent in Japan) with 42,000 people unemployed (Okinawa General Bureau n.d.). Unemployment among the young has consistently been well over ten percent in recent years.

Japan's second goal for Okinawa—creating a basis for autonomous development—has not succeeded at all, unless massive growth in tourism is considered a success. Since reversion in 1972, Okinawa has made some minor progress with regard to self-reliance, according to Kakazu (1994), but there is a great dependency on mainland Japan's government and mainland private investment. In contrast, Taira (1999: 171) argues that infrastructure-related public investment has brought some prosperity, but in the process has "creat[ed] an economy dependent on public works." Also, "contrary to the economic planners' expectations, agriculture and manufacturing (the goods-producing sector) have been performing poorly, while the tertiary sector (trade, utilities, finance, services, government, etc.) has grown to unhealthy proportions, employing more than seventy percent of Okinawa's labor force" (ibid.).

As shown in Table 1 (facing page), Okinawa has undergone structural changes that appear similar to those occurring in many "advanced" countries and regions. There has been a relative decrease in primary and secondary industries, and a relatively strong rise in tertiary industries. Japan has undergone similar changes, but experienced only a 21.3 percent relative decline in secondary industries from 1972 to 1997, compared to a 36.6 percent decline for Okinawa in the same period. Japan is also less reliant on tertiary/ service industries than Okinawa.

Table 1
Percent of Gross Regional Product by Industry Type, Okinawa and Japan

	Okinawa			Japan		
Year	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
1972	7.2	28.7	66.6	5.5	43.6	54.9
1976	7.1	21.4	73.6	5.3	40.3	58.5
1980	5.2	21.6	74.9	3.7	39.2	60.8
1984	4.5	21.9	75.8	3.3	38.0	62.8
1988	3.3	21.8	77.4	2.7	37.7	64.1
1992	2.6	21.4	79.0	2.3	37.7	64.9
1996	2.3	20.1	81.0	1.9	35.0	67.3
1997	2.4	18.2	83.0	1.7	34.3	68.4

Note: Uncorrected percentages from primary source data sum to over 100; see source (below).

Source: Okinawa General Bureau (www.ogb.go.jp; see also ogb.go.jp/move/english/kiso09_e.htm).

Table 2 (facing page) shows a more detailed comparison of the working populations of Okinawa and Japan for 1998. Particularly noteworthy are the numbers for construction and manufacturing. For Okinawa, 13.6 percent of the total working population is involved in construction. This is notably higher than construction's 10.2 percent share of the workforce nationwide. More striking is the fact that less than six percent of Okinawa's workforce is involved in manufacturing, compared to over twenty percent for Japan. Okinawa has one percent of the total Japanese population but only 0.2 percent of the nation's manufacturing jobs.

Construction and tourism have been the only major growth industries in Okinawa over the past three decades. Tourism contributes to construction with the development of resort areas, and tourism revenues grew approximately tenfold from 1972 to 1998. Okinawa had 4.1 million visitors, and total revenue of 4.4 million yen in 1998 (Okinawa General Bureau n.d.). About ninety five percent of tourists are from mainland Japan (Roberson 2000).

The International City Plan and the Base Return Action Program

Initial efforts toward Japan's third goal, making Okinawa an exchange center for the southern part of Japan and nearby countries, have not been successful either (Kakazu 1994, Sasaki 1999), although there are some ambitious plans at the prefectural level. The first such effort was the establishment of Japan's first free trade zone in 1988. The Okinawa Free Trade Zone, however, "turned out to be a complete failure" for several reasons, including not being fully open to foreign capital, exports to the mainland not being duty-free and a limited focus on goods to the exclusion of services (Kakazu 1994: 162).

Despite this early failure, subsequent plans called for the entire prefecture of Okinawa to be designated a Free Trade Zone by 2001. This ambition was part of the International City Plan, originally proposed in April 1997. The plan, as summarized by Sasaki (1999: 250), proposed that:

> Foreign goods imported into the prefecture (with the exception of some primary products) would be exempt from tariffs and other charges… Japan would have to adopt a special tariff system with reduced tariffs on goods processed within Okinawa using imported materials, liberalize imports through elimination of the import quota framework, speed up and simplify import procedures, cut the corporate income tax, and deregulate the transport and basic services sectors.

The plan faced many obstacles, including an apathetic if not opposed central government in Tokyo. There were also concerns about the potential threat to Okinawan agriculture and industry, as well as the plan's proposed rapid pace. As a result, the plan was scaled down. The new version calls for liberalization policies to be implemented in a limited number of sectors by 2005, with gradual expansion after that. However, "at this point it remains unclear what industries the prefecture will be able to attract, and so far the only item recognized under the tariff removal system is processed beef for fast foods such as instant noodles" (Sasaki 1999: 251).

Associated with the International City Plan is a call for technology-based development, a familiar ele-

Table 2
Working Population (000s) in Okinawa and Japan, 1998

	Okinawa	(%)	Japan	(%)	OK/Japan
Total Population	1,310		12,699		1.0
Total Working Population	565		6,462		0.9
Primary	40	(7.1)	335	(5.2)	1.2
Agriculture and Forestry	36	(6.4)	307	(4.8)	1.2
Fisheries	4	(0.7)	28	(0.4)	1.4
Secondary	109	(19.3)	2,008	(31.1)	0.5
Construction	77	(13.6)	657	(10.2)	1.2
Manufacture	32	(5.7)	1,345	(20.8)	0.2
Tertiary	416	(73.6)	4,078	(63.1)	1.0
Retail/wholesale	135	(23.9)	1,483	(22.9)	0.9
Services	185	(32.7)	1,686	(26.1)	1.1

Source: Okinawa General Bureau (www.ogb.go.jp; see also
ogb.go.jp/move/english/kiso11_e.htm)

ment of many regional economic plans. In Okinawa's case, the hope is for the island to become a financial and information center at the "crossroads of Asia" (Maeshiro 2000, 2001). However, this approach neglects competition from nearby regions already possessing distinct advantages in terms of human and other resources. It is hard to imagine Okinawa successfully competing with the Fukuoka/Kita-Kyushu region or even Kagoshima City or Kumamoto City at the domestic level, or Seoul, Shanghai or Taiwan at the international level.

The Base Return Action Program is another plan whose government support and overall feasibility are doubtful. It calls for the phased removal of all US military installations from Okinawa by 2015. The plan proposes a return of nine bases to Okinawan control by 2001, fourteen more by 2010, and the remaining seventeen by 2015 (Bandow 1998: 6). Base lands are to be converted to various uses, including industrial districts of the planned free trade zone. However, things have not gone according to plan. One base is under consideration for removal, but this is contingent on relocating its heliport facilities. A proposed replacement site off the coast of a depressed part of Nago City in the northern part of Okinawa prefecture has met with environmental and political controversy, and the entire plan has stalled as a result (Appel 1999; Bandow 1998).

Even more discouraging than the lack of state support for implementation of the International City Plan is the united opposition by the Japanese and American governments regarding base lands. From the perspective of Washington and Tokyo, the interests of the Okinawan people are clearly secondary to

those of the US and Japanese governments. Worsening the problem, Governor Ota, a proponent of base reductions, lost a close election in 1998. His successor, though claiming to support base reductions as well, does not give the issue primary emphasis.

Without support from the national government of Japan in liberalizing trade, or from the United States in removing military installations, these grand plans remain hopes at best. But ambitious proposals such as the International City Plan and the Base Return Action Program indicate a strong desire for action on the part of Okinawans. Okinawa's continued peripheral status in Japan and its value to the American military remain major obstacles to any initiative taken by the Okinawan people.

These obstacles, and the inaction they encourage, are the legacy of Okinawa's long and continuing dual subordination to Japan and the United States. They also illustrate the various scales of a region, from the sub-national up to the global. In this case, the global and supra-national regions of which Okinawa is a part—seen in the continued presence of US military bases—limit opportunities for the development of the sub-national region of Okinawa Prefecture. In the face of such obstacles, an alternative approach is to begin at the local level, as has been the case in Yomitan Village.

Innovative Approaches to Development in Yomitan Village

Yomitan is a municipality of 36,000 people in central Okinawa (see Figure 2, above).[3] The Yuntanza Village Development Company (YVDC) was founded in 1992 to facilitate new industrial development, and

to encourage a general atmosphere of collaboration among Yomitan businesses. The YVDC began with investments from townspeople totaling fifteen million yen (US$125,000). The YVDC is a stock company but "it bears many of the marks of a nonprofit organization" (Sasaki 1999: 255). For example, its managers receive no salaries, and its primary goal is to increase the economic opportunities for Yomitan Village generally.

YVDC has succeeded in several endeavors. For example, by "fostering cooperation among local cultivators" (Sasaki 1999: 254), YVDC coordination efforts have led to the creation of a processing industry for making *beni-imo* (purplish-red sweet potato) paste that is used in cakes, ice cream, bread, and other products. YVDC has also set up markets for this product in the town itself, elsewhere in Okinawa, and in major cities in Japan including Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. As a result, "[b]oth the acreage devoted to *beni-imo* in the village and the size of the harvest have increased rapidly. At a time when the output of other agricultural products such as sugar cane is declining, the development of *beni-imo* and other local specialty products has played an important role in helping to stabilize agricultural income" (Sasaki 1999: 254). The YVDC has also helped to establish a company called Bio-Yomitan, which uses environmentally friendly procedures to maintain golf courses.

The YVDC did not emerge from a vacuum. Yomitan Village has long had a strong identity, due both to collective action against American military bases and to the local weaving and pottery industries. Beginning in the 1970s, Yomitan residents and public officials lobbied to reduce the amount of local

land used by bases, and succeeded in reducing the portion of the village used for base functions from an astounding seventy three percent in 1972 to forty eight percent by 1978. This enabled the expansion of the local pottery industry that had started developing in the early 1970s. Yomitan is now the largest pottery producing region in Okinawa. In May 1997, a new town hall was built on former base lands—no doubt to the great satisfaction of, and with much symbolism for, Yomitan residents. The town's strong identity, and its citizens' capacity for cooperation, seems to be reflected in the activities of the YVDC.

Yomitan's policies for resort development are another strong example of innovative approaches to improving the local economy. Though resort development in Yomitan is funded with outside capital, local landowners maintain ownership rights. Yomitan Village also requires local golf courses to use bio-friendly methods, and resort hotels to use a particular method to purify their wastewater and divert it to local irrigation, with the costs paid by the hotels (Sasaki 1999).

The Yomitan Village government has also attempted to avoid the economic segregation that often occurs when resort areas are located in developing communities. One way is by enforcing the prefectural law that bans private beaches. Thus a municipal beach has been built with funds donated from the two large-scale resorts in town. Hotel restaurants have special agreements to use local agricultural products, and some hotels allow a "Yomitan morning market" to sell local goods, especially fruits and vegetables, on their grounds. Hotels are also required to employ a high proportion of local workers.

While in the past tourism has damaged Okinawa's environment, and its employment opportunities have been of questionable benefit, Yomitan Village's environmental regulations and retention of some local control have the potential to overcome tourism's adverse effects while maximizing its benefits. Sasaki (1999) describes similar innovative efforts in other parts of Okinawa, including Ogimison Village and Nago City on the northern part of the main island, as well as on Ishigaki Island.

Towards Innovative Local Development Networks

Though experiencing relative prosperity compared to many parts of the world, Okinawa is both a military outpost for the United States and an underdeveloped periphery of Japan. Improving Okinawa's autonomy remains a central issue for Okinawans. Rather than pursuing plans without workable implementation strategies, such as the International City Plan and the Base Return Action Program, Okinawa should concentrate on examples like Yomitan Village, and attempt to build local networks which can interact productively with outside capital.

Generally, the actions taken by the people of Yomitan Village provide an appropriate model for other parts of Okinawa to consider, along the lines of Keating's concept of "development coalitions." However, as Keating warns, business and development goals should not "become synonymous with the general interests of the region" (2001: 387). Rather, they should help to politicize the region while promoting a vital and resilient economy. In Okinawa this would mean, among other things,

facilitating dialogue and action about the fragile environment and the ever-present issue of American military bases.

Because Okinawa is at a severe disadvantage in terms of scale and power, its leaders should build on current strengths. To do this requires coordination among local networks, including the main island of Okinawa, but also the smaller islands. As an example, the tourism industry, which, for good or ill, will continue to play an important part in Okinawa's economy, would benefit from such local-regional networks (such as transportation), and perhaps some adverse effects could be minimized. Developing and linking together local and regional economic (as well as cultural, social and political) activities would benefit agriculture and other sectors as well—for instance, in promoting markets outside Okinawa.

Okinawa's large emigrant population and proximity to other countries in East Asia could be instrumental in expanding local-regional networks into transnational ones. If Okinawans can create a stronger economic and political presence at regional and international levels, their attempts to reduce American influence and to improve their standing with Japan are likely to be more effective.

Okinawa's unique position as both Japanese periphery and American outpost, coupled with its unusual history and geography, make the interplay among local, sub-national, national, supra-national and global forces particularly prominent and observable. To modify a popular adage, one might say with regard to Okinawa that we should think and act globally, locally and regionally, all at once. Based on several policy failures, obstacles presented by both US pres-

ence and Japanese peripheral status, and, most importantly, the model of Yomitan Village and its potential for local economic mobilization, Okinawa should pursue locally based and regionally integrated participatory development. Okinawans, not other Japanese and not Americans, should decide the political, cultural, and economic destiny of this unique place.

Endnotes

[1] Historical information comes from many sources but primarily from Kerr (1972), Morris-Suzuki (1998), Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education (2000) and Ota (1997).

[2] Landowners are forced to lease their land to the military. There are more than 3,000 landowners who protest this. The number of such landlords has grown by dividing their land into small parcels of one tsubo, approximately 3.5 square meters, and selling them to similar minded individuals to make things more complicated and difficult for the central government and the US military. In 1995-6, Governor Ota of Okinawa refused to sign the leases in place of protesting "tsubo landlords." Until then, "legally" forcing the land rentals had been done at the prefectural level via the governor's signature. Since then it has been done at the national level. In total, there are about 28,000 private landlords in Okinawa who lease land for bases. The income for this is over US$600 million annually, averaging about US$18,000 per landlord.

[3] The discussion of Yomitan Village comes mainly from Sasaki (1999: 252-258). Some additional information comes from the Yomitan Village Homepage (n.d.) at www.vill.yomitan.okinawa.jp. Yuntanza is the former name of the area that is now Yomitan Village.

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JOSEPH BOSKI (jboski@ucla.edu) is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. His main research interest is the use of spatial control strategies on the Global Justice Movement and his other research interests include Japan, East Asia and regional economies.

New Regionalism and Planning: A Conversation with Ethan Seltzer

Jeremy Nelson

Nelson: As a prelude to our discussion of new regionalism, I wanted to first ask you about your background and how your professional training and personal interests led you to focus on regionalism and regional planning issues. For example, I found it interesting that your entry point into the planning profession was via biology and environmental science—fields that inevitably span jurisdictional or political boundaries. Does your background affect how you conceptualize other regional issues such as economic development, transportation and land use?

Seltzer: Because of my background, I have what you might call a landscape orientation when it comes to planning issues. I start by seeing the regional landscape and then the local jurisdictions. I've had the luxury of being able to do that conceptually, and also in terms of the work that I have done. When you think about it, people don't really live within cities anymore. Even in the largest cities, residents sleep, shop, recreate, work and socialize in regions of their own devising. These territories rarely are confined within the boundaries of a single jurisdiction. In fact, people residing in the same neighborhoods often don't live their daily lives within the same territory anymore, which is one of the greatest challenges that planners face: What is the community and who are we planning for? However, the political reality is that authority and resources reside within jurisdictions; so, it is important to make the match between the territory within which people live and the issues they are concerned about on the one hand, and, on the other hand, this territory for administrative purposes, which is where the power to resolve the issues resides.

Nelson: You have recently done some research on the history of regionalism and regionalist thought in the US. Can you outline the historical and intellectual precursors of the new regionalism in the US?

Seltzer: When it comes to metropolitan areas, the issues that we are dealing with today are not new issues; in fact, they were pretty well identified eighty years ago. The fragmentation of jurisdictional authority in metropolitan regions, as an impediment to developing effective responses to issues of metropolitan growth and change, was something that was being discussed in the 1920s. The impact of the automobile on communities, from simply the physical presence of autos in communities to the relationship between communities to the geographic spread of the metropolitan area, was something that was very well documented in the late 1920s and 1930s. And while the car accelerated things in some ways, if you look at the turn-of-the-century streetcar suburbs, the beginnings of regional residential development and commuting patterns were already there. So I think that a lot of the issues that we are contending with today are not new phenomena.

Regionalism in the 1920s, the regionalism that Benton McKaye and the RPAA [Regional Plan Association of America] were working on, was first and foremost very idealistic and very much about the evolution and perfection of society. This was not an instrumental, 'How-do-we-solve-traffic-congestion?' kind of perspective. It was very idealistic and very broad scale, and it wasn't just a narrow enterprise focused on the efficiency of urban systems.

In the 1930s, there were about a dozen people who were very active in the RPAA and who were very well connected to the Roosevelt administration. They were able to have a profound impact. Regionalism during this era remained tremendously idealistic, but because of the great Depression, the focus was really on economic restructuring. If you look at what was written in the mid-1930s by the New Deal agencies associated with planning and regional planning, regionalism was very much seen as a means for restructuring the economy. With the entry of the US into World War II, regionalism took a back seat, although ironically the War Production Board's work to manage resources represented a high degree of centralized planning that probably gave nightmares to the opponents of regional planning in the 1930s.

After World War II, in an era of peace and prosperity, regional planning really began to focus on efficiency, the rationalization of government services, and the development of infrastructure, like the interstate highway system. All of this was partially in response to the need for creating the links that made it possible for the post-war boom to happen. And so, starting in the 1950s, and continuing into the sixties and seventies, the argument was that regionalism made sense only when it could achieve efficiencies. There was a heavy focus on infrastructure and on efficiency in linking government institutions together. But regionalism in this era was not about sweeping ideological notions, as had typified the work of Benton McKaye and the RPAA. So I would say that World War II marks a distinct break in regionalist thinking.

The next distinct break in the history of regionalism was in the 1980s during the Reagan administration, when cities and their regions were nowhere on the federal agenda. That was also the period in which construction of the interstate highway system came to an end. There just wasn't much investment in metropolitan areas at all.

What has brought regionalism back to the forefront of the political agenda in the 1990s is the notion that metropolitan places weren't working very well, and a general sense that there was a need to seek new relationships and new solutions. For example, at the bioregional level, our knowledge of watersheds in environmental systems led us to believe that our management of those systems wasn't working very well. I think that that's backed up by the emergence of the broad landscape approaches to environmental management and habitat protection. Even the Endangered Species Act has promoted another burst in regionalism simply because that is the scale at which you have to address those issues.

At the level of the metropolitan area, you've seen the emergence of governmental approaches to regionalism because of the inability of individual jurisdictions to effectively act on the issues that people seem to care about most, like transportation, affordable housing and environmental protection.

I think there has been a strong push from the business community to begin to look at regionalism again. Businesses are increasingly dependent not only on cities or suburbs working well, but on entire regions working well. They not only need to move

goods around these regions, but they must have access to labor—and the talent they need is residing everywhere within a metropolitan area. I think that there has been an acknowledgement by businesses that they are competing globally, albeit from a metropolitan base.

In essence, what you see in the 1990s is a resurgence of regionalism that is taking a step beyond the efficiency base which really dominated postwar regionalism. But it is still nowhere near the idealistic roots that characterized the regionalism of the RPAA of the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, the new regionalism is not yet a comprehensive vision of society. It's a vision of the physical arrangement of different pieces. It is more than just efficiency, because it is concerned with qualitative aspects and value judgements associated with what is good or smart versus what is bad or dumb.

The early regionalists were well-educated, elite folks, but their vision was extremely expansive and inclusive, and ventured into areas that planners in most places don't talk about much today. We don't have a well-developed professional vocabulary for talking about a broad vision of society like we do for talking about the setback for buildings or the workings of transportation systems. I'm not saying that as a criticism of the new regionalism, I'm just saying that it's a regionalism that reflects our current conditions rather than a regionalism that reflects historical roots.

Nelson: What are some potential opportunities and challenges of the new regionalism for contemporary planning practitioners, and what are some of the

shortcomings of the new regionalism? For example, new regionalist thought and practice seems to be relatively silent on equity issues.

Seltzer: I'd say that the work of Manuel Pastor and some of the folks in the Los Angeles area are some of the best examples of people seeking equity-based solutions through regional relationships, and there are some good examples in other places. But there are not that many regions, maybe not any at this time, where interest in equity issues has really driven the regional agenda.

Both historically and today, regionalism is largely a reform movement. People seek regional solutions when the more traditional pathways don't deliver. Regional initiatives typically stem from one of three roots. It will be mandated; for example, the federal MPO [Metropolitan Planning Organization] process gets a certain kind of buzz out of regionalism because people have to come to the table to make the money flow for transportation funding. Or, regionalism will occur for self-interested reasons. For example, jurisdiction A can cut down its policing costs by fifty percent if it contracts with jurisdiction B.

The third kind of regionalism is an organic regionalism, something that grows out of a recognition that folks share a common fate and that they have to come up with some new kind of relationship that enables them to act on that. They see that they have something in common and that it is important enough to them that taking a regional approach is the best strategy for moving to the next level. So mandated, self-interested or organic is where you're going to find the roots for regionalism in this country. Consequently, what that means for equity issues is that, in the absence of a mandate from above, or a desire to become more efficient, advocates for equity must rely on becoming part of a political agenda for change, probably the hardest path for some of the least powerful people in a metropolitan area.

What are the opportunities? It seems like the opportunities really lie with being able to better understand when selecting a regional strategy is likely to be more productive than not. Regionalism is just a tool. In this era, it is not an ideological formulation. We're not promoting regionalism in America today because we think that it will lead to the perfection of society, to the next evolution. Rather, we are promoting regionalism because we think that it is going to enable people to be more effective or return a better result that the approach they are currently taking.

Nelson: Can you talk a little about the future of regionalism and the role of the federal and state governments in encouraging regional solutions?

Seltzer: I would say when you look at state and federal governments, the challenge is to convince them not to get in the way of regional approaches. In other words, the way in which state and federal governments use their authority and deploy their resources can have a lot to with whether regional solutions are attractive or even possible. The real question is, will federal and state implementers get in the way of those locally generated, regional approaches to solving what are essentially local problems, and much less whether they will actually provide incen-

tives for local regional approaches to emerge. At this point, I would just settle for trying to get federal and state governments to agree not to get in the way. It would be a wonderful thing if they took the next step in recognizing that the way that they use our resources—all of them: monetary and non-monetary, administrative and non-administrative—will have a huge impact on whether those regional efforts result in something tangible. In some cases, if you take a look, for example, at TEA-21 [Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century], and before that, ISTEA [Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act], the federal government has recognized the role that its investments play in prompting interaction at the regional level, in different kinds of ways. But I don't think that is typical.

Nelson: Expanding on the subject of the future of regionalism and regional planning, could you talk a little about implementation issues in terms of the role of visioning in the regional planning process, and about marketing regionalism as a planning practitioner?

Seltzer: I think that regionalism is very place-based and that the regional planning task is therefore first and foremost a community organizing task. What you are trying to do is the same thing that community organizers are doing, which is to determine to what degree people will recognize a common set of interests strong enough to promote collective action of some sort. At the regional level, you have to start with the questions, what is the regional community, who cares about it, and can you get them all to the table to take action? So, I think the first stage in the regional planning process is to bring to the table compelling, common interests that will enable people to look beyond the boundaries that they are used to in order to find partners in new and unexpected places.

Secondly, regarding the visioning process, there needs to be a strong sense of what it is that folks are trying to achieve. It may be relatively simple or narrow or it may be expansive. But there is an element of vision that is extremely important, and again, because we don't have a lot of institutional infrastructure at the regional level, in many cases those regional visions have never been articulated. So I think that the visioning aspect is very important.

The third part is a much more instrumental plan-making step. Once you have created a sense of common fate, once you have identified a set of common objectives, then you have to devise a plan or strategy for actually achieving them. I think that essentially leads you into the planning process that planning practitioners and scholars are familiar with. To collect the data, assemble a set of reasonable alternatives, figure out a way that the alternatives will sort themselves out, to choose one and implement it, and then keep the plan going. I think one of the really critical issues for planning is, how do we keep plans alive? More and more, I am finding that keeping plans alive means that you need to regularly revisit the issues. You can only implement a plan for so long before you need to loop back and go through

another planning process, because no shared vision will last for fifty years in the public's mind.

Nelson: In recognition of the diversity of US society and the size of some regions, how do planners come up with a regional visioning process in terms of marketing, community participation and outreach methods that can actually attract a majority of residents and decisionmakers to a shared vision?

Seltzer: First of all, I think that it is one thing to deal with a relatively small community and it is another to deal with millions of people. It is a very different task to run citizen participation for a well-defined set of nested institutional units and quite another to run a citizen participation program in a territory that hasn't necessarily identified itself as a territory. I would also say that the state of the art is evolving before our eyes. We have not been doing this long enough or well enough to say that there is a recipe book for rolling this stuff out. And if you take a look at the regional planning efforts in the nation today, they are very idiosyncratic. Yes, they have some similarities, but they are so strongly shaped by place-based characteristics that I think you almost need to say that we are in a period of experimentation. It is action research. At this point, we are figuring out how to do this stuff by doing it. If you look for literature, for example, on community building at the regional scale, there is none. If you look at literature about how to do regional planning, there is very little that actually talks about what it means to do a regional plan. There is a lot of stuff on rationales for regionalism, or rationales for regional approaches, or the reasons why regions are the correct unit for analysis. But there is hardly anything out there for the practitioner who is asking, What is step one? What do you do on Monday?

I think that there is a whole series of practical questions to be worked out as we go along, such as how regional planning is different from local planning, how developing a regional plan is different from developing a local comprehensive plan, and how implementing a regional plan is the same or different than rolling out a zoning code to implement the comprehensive plan. All of those questions, I think, are still up for grabs, and I think that it is going to be the practice of regional planning in the next decade that will give us some insights into what new regionalism is.

Nelson: The Portland metropolitan area has been very active on many of the issues we have been talking about and has been held up as a national model of good regional planning. What is your take on the transferability to other regions of the approaches that have been taken here in Portland—or are regional planning strategies so place-based as to be almost non-transferable? Does every region need to create its own brand of regionalism from the ground up?

Seltzer: Let me just start out by saying that Portland did not set out to create a model for Los Angeles, Houston, Cincinnati, Boston, Curitiba, Rome or Mogadishu. We did not do what we did here because we wanted to create a national and international model. We did what we did as a response to the landscape that we are in. It was done for local purposes. Ironically, the critics of what we have done

here like to criticize Portland by saying it is not a model for the rest of the world. Well, we would be the first to say that what has been done here is not a model for the world—we did what we did because of the particular conditions that we encountered here and what we felt needed to happen.

Is it transferable? Well, take a look at what is transferable. Basically, what I think that people from other regions can learn from Portland is, first that you can change the existing pattern in your region. If you don't like the pattern in Los Angeles, you can change it if you want to. Now exactly what the nature of that change should be is up to you. There are some other things that can be learned from Portland's experience, like good things take time to come to fruition. We have been at this for over forty years. If it is a good idea, it has a good chance to realize itself but it takes time. Leadership is also important; these things don't just happen because one day all of the molecules rearrange themselves. Change happens because people commit to a vision and they do things every day to make that vision happen.

Is what we have done in Portland an exact prescription for anyone but us? No. And I think that it is really important not to look at the solutions developed in one region as software that can be installed in the hardware of another region. It's more important to ask what have other regions learned by trying to change who they are? And based on those observations of other regions, ask, what can we do to take who we are and change it, if that is what we want to do?

Nelson: I'd like to conclude our discussion by asking you if you think that the new regionalism needs to be activist in order to succeed?

Seltzer: Yes, absolutely, because in the end you cannot take a growth-neutral approach to change. When you know what you want, you have to actively seek it. And planners have to envision themselves as activists if they are going to succeed at the regional level. It is not an enterprise for the weak of heart because it is hard work—the rewards come only when you are willing to put yourself out there.

JEREMY NELSON (urbanvista@hotmail.com) is dedicated to realizing a vision of a more equitable, more sustainable, and better-designed built environment through his work at a variety of private- and public-sector planning organizations. He is currently working as an independent planning consultant while completing his Master's degree in urban planning at UCLA.

Planning for Regional Economic Development in Oregon: Finding a Place for Equity Issues in Regional Governance

John Provo

While the state of Oregon is cited in the new regionalism literature for exemplary land use and environmental planning, this paper focuses on the treatment of equity issues. Implementation of a revised statewide regional economic development program is discussed, contrasting efforts in the metropolitan Portland area with rural southeast Oregon. Despite following very different planning and grant-making processes, both introduced equity issues concerned with ensuring access to the economy. In Portland this meant aspiring to connect economically distressed communities with a successful regional economy while in southeast Oregon a distressed region hoped to connect with the state's growing economy.

Introduction

Regionalism has a diverse array of meanings. Pastor, Dreier, Grigsby and Lopez-Garza (2000) identify separate efficiency, environmental, and equity agendas associated with new regionalism. The efficiency agenda focuses on the overall functioning of the metropolitan economy, while the environmental agenda is concerned with stopping urban sprawl. The equity agenda, generally the most difficult to address, includes identifying and alleviating disparities of resource allocation within regions, and, in particular, deconcentrating poverty. Equity issues also include access to jobs and economic opportunities. While Oregon is known for regional cooperation on environmental issues relating to urban sprawl, equity issues have not earned similar recognition for the state, and addressing issues of equity within regions remains a challenge.

Local factors can promote or impede the inclusion of equity concerns on a regional agenda. This has implications for the interaction between economic and community development theory and practice in the new regionalism. To that end, this paper considers Oregon's history of regional planning for economic development. Two cases of local implementation, the Portland metropolitan area and rural Southeast Oregon, are contrasted to highlight how the local planning framework affects the inclusion of equity concerns within regional policy making.[1]

With new opportunities for participation in community development, the state's revised "Regional Investments" program created the potential for a new collaborative regional agenda including equity concerns. At the same time, the decision whether to include such concerns remained within the purview of local govern-

ments, and was affected by local choices of county partners, board composition, and staffing resources. In the end, these issues were important determining factors in the implementation of equity-based regionalism.

The New Regionalism in Economic and Community Development

Academic research on regional economic competitiveness has exerted great influence on economic development practice over the last decade. At the same time, research on social and economic equity within regions has increasingly pointed community development practice towards recognizing the significance of the regional economy to individual communities. Although Pastor et al (2000: 7) describe community and economic development as "ships that passed in the night," they go on to identify in each discipline "new regionalists and new community builders" (181) as making similar arguments about social capital and organizing around the regional economy that represents potential common ground.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1995) and Michael Porter (1990) popularized the notion of competitive advantage, repackaging concepts that had long been a part of the economics literature. Kanter's neatly packaged case studies of "makers, thinkers, and traders" promote specialization as the path to achieving "world class" economic aspirations. Porter's detailed studies of industry clusters dependent on mutual economic linkages and shared resource pools highlight the mechanics of economic specialization in the increasingly connected global economy.

Responding to local aspirations to build the next Silicon Valley, practitioners rushed to implement industry cluster strategies. These often organized and facilitated the provision of services through regional industry trade associations, broadening the definition of economic development policy to acknowledge the place of individual jurisdictions in regional economies and the place of those regions in the global economy (Waits 1998). The profusion of industry cluster studies that followed were criticized for their inconsistent terminology and unrefined methodologies (Held 1996). This generated opportunities for economists, geographers and planners to refine Porter's work. In February 2000, Economic Development Quarterly, a leading scholarly journal in the field, devoted a complete issue to an exploration of methodologies for cluster analysis.

By the end of the decade, many practitioners had grown increasingly comfortable with some sort of narrative about regional economies, and with ideas about inter-regional competition, as embodied in Peirce's (1993) "citistates" and the "regional economic commons" described by Barnes and Ledebur (1998). Both Peirce's journalistic case studies and Barnes and Ledebur's analysis argue that existing political boundaries are fundamentally disconnected from regionally-functioning economies.

Myron Orfield's (1997) analysis of Minneapolis-St. Paul introduced an equity perspective into this new understanding of the importance of regions. Orfield presents evidence of economic and social disparities among jurisdictions within the region. This analysis

became part of the basis for forming a coalition of fiscally distressed center-city and inner-suburban jurisdictions in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Demonstrating that even progressive regions are not immune to sprawling suburban development and center city decline, the coalition won state legislative support for a regional revenue sharing program to address disparities.

Greenstein and Wiewel (2000) broaden Orfield's agenda by outlining three areas for further study: inter-metropolitan concerns with regional economic competitiveness in the global economy; intra-metropolitan concerns with economic links across jurisdictions; and concerns with effective intra-metropolitan governance, such as the existence of institutions or mechanisms that can efficiently deliver services regionally. They also note that the emergence of polycentric metropolitan areas might alter the political calculus which was successful in Minnesota.

In the same edited volume, Gottlieb (2000) assesses the empirical research on how intra-regional disparities affect regional economic performance. While Gottlieb finds some correlation with reduced economic performance, the causal relationship remains less certain. Gottlieb suggests that more research should be done on how human or social capital deficits related to poverty might create a drag on regional productivity.

Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2001), like Orfield, advocate a political approach to addressing regional inequities, although on a national scale. They conducted a rich and descriptive empirical analysis of

intra-regional disparities and their impacts on quality of life. They recommend a long-term solution as a part of a federal metropolitan policy agenda: constructing an urban-suburban political coalition to curb sprawling development in the suburbs and revitalize central cities.

While noting the limits to the Clinton Administration's approach to these issues, Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom point to Clinton's success in uniting urban and suburban voters over the course of two presidential elections as evidence that such coalitions are possible. Advocates within the Clinton Administration did call for a more holistic approach to community problems and a regional perspective on many issues (Cisneros 1995; Stegman and Turner 1996). Typically, however, the federal role was limited to encouraging cooperation with an emphasis on public-private partnerships, market solutions and ad hoc forms of governance.

Encouraged in part by the Clinton-era approach, regionalism as an emphasis in community development emerged, recognizing not only spatial interdependence among communities within the larger regional economy, but also the interconnected nature of community problems (Harrison and Weiss 1997; Nowak 1997). Nowak also places the problem of inner-city poverty in a regional economic context, criticizing community development for focusing on real estate and service delivery and ignoring issues of income security and asset accumulation. Based on his experience managing a community development financial institution in inner-city Philadelphia, he ar-

gues that community developers need to better understand the regional economy in order to develop strategies linking regional employers with workers in local communities.

Academics have debated the prospects for racially and economically isolated communities, typically left out of regional economic growth. Porter (1995) suggests that efforts to assist such communities should depart from a social model focused on serving individuals' needs, and should instead promote private sector growth, identifying undervalued real estate and other local advantages such areas might offer. In response, Fainstein and Gray (1997) point to more than 50 years of government policies focusing on private sector investment, from urban renewal to empowerment zones, which have not made a substantial positive impact despite consistency with Porter's recommendations. Fainstein and Gray instead recommend supporting improved schools, housing, and services that will aid inner city residents in directly realizing the benefits of increased private sector activity.

Some advocate keeping economic and community development objectives distinct. Hill (1998) argues that blending the respective efficiency and equity goals of economic and community development misdirects resources—for example, when efforts to improve the quality of life and social fabric of individual communities are incorrectly justified as enhancements to the productivity of the regional economy. Fainstein and Markusen (1993) argue that democratic access and long-term economic vitality are incorrectly omitted from the economists' idea of an equity-versus-efficiency tradeoff. Spatially and socially isolated urban and rural populations may not have access to the regional economy. Further, agglomeration economies, public infrastructure investments, and a "sense of place" accruing in specific communities are all potential contributors to the long-term economic health of a region.

While Orfield (1997) in his legislative approach advocates revenue sharing as a first step, Rusk (1999) rejects this approach as too unimaginative. In Rusk's account, social and environmental concerns such as affordable housing, growth management, and urban sprawl are stronger motivations for regional cooperation. He emphasizes the role of local entities such as churches, business coalitions, universities and grassroots citizen's groups working outside of the legislative system. Similarly, Pastor et al (2000) include examples of regional organizational efforts in Boston, Charlotte and San Jose. In an effort to substitute a quantitative method for the usual subjective selection of regional success stories, they choose case studies from among regions which have enjoyed rising per capita incomes and simultaneously decreasing central city poverty. This highlights the diverse sources of interest in working for growth with equity, although offering no evidence of causation between such efforts and equitable growth.

One common feature in the various efforts discussed by Rusk and Pastor et al is the extent to which they were initiated and sustained outside of government, relying largely on business and the non-profit sector.

Although some of the policies that resulted from these efforts may have addressed only facets of any one problem, they promoted an ongoing regional dialogue. However, given the ad hoc nature of these arrangements it is not clear whether the apparent success of these efforts can be reproduced elsewhere.

Earlier regional policy focused on organizing metropolitan governments through city-county consolidations or tiered service structures, which had direct implications for control of tax revenues. Currently, most regionally-based institutions have fewer direct impacts on local fiscal control (Stephens and Wikstrom 1999). Pastor, Dreier, Grigsby and Lopez-Garza (2000) describe such institutions as a "crazy quilt of governance bodies," confusing not only to average citizens, but to seasoned observers as well. These quasi-public and public-private mechanisms span political boundaries but operate in specialized policy spheres often designed to serve a single purpose, one shaped by special funding sources. Bollens also attacks such single-purpose bodies as de-emphasizing social and redistributive questions. He states that while "the affiliation of regional planning with single purpose functions…has facilitated and legitimized regionalism… at the same time it has limited its scope and potential" (1997: 117).

Absent requirements for regional cooperation being imposed by higher levels of government, or support from outside of government, the ability of such regional institutions to address equity concerns is questionable. At the same time, the evolution of the new regionalism has placed intra-metropolitan eq-

uity, traditionally associated with community development issues, onto an agenda formed by those primarily concerned with regional economic competitiveness. Cumulatively, this has contributed to an eroding distinction in practice between economic and community development. However, the meaning of that change on a regional scale remains at issue.

Oregon Policy Background

Oregon's role in funding regional planning for economic development was initially a response to competitiveness concerns raised during an economic restructuring crisis. The state's position has evolved over time, moving away from a focus solely on regional economic competitiveness under state guidance to a much more decentralized program open to community development goals. This move staked out a new direction in keeping with the evolution described above.

During the first half of the 1980s, core state industries including wood products, fishing, and tourism all posted significant job losses. Recovery in employment was slow and highly uneven across the state. The populous Willamette Valley, which contains not only lush farmland but also the diverse manufacturing base of urban Portland, eventually made a strong recovery. But the state's vast rural expanses found in the arid sections east of the Cascade Mountains— home to irrigated agriculture and ranching, and the timber, fishing, and tourism-dependent areas along the state's rocky coast and southern border with California—continued to lag economically.

The distinction between these "two Oregons" has long been a feature of state politics. Former Portland Mayor Neil Goldschmidt's successful 1986 race for Governor turned, in part, on reassuring suspicious voters in rural areas that he would focus on economic health for the whole state. In fulfillment of that promise, in 1987 he initiated the Regional Strategies Program, emphasizing regional economic competitiveness and supporting job creation strategies in targeted industries (Slavin 1991; Slavin and Adler 1996). The state program allocated funds to 15 regional boards to fund projects based on these criteria.

For several years, regional plans under the Regional Strategies Program were reviewed by the state in the context of economic development objectives. However, after 1995 they were reviewed by Regional Community Solutions Teams, locally-based interagency taskforces involving economic development, environmental, housing, land use and transportation agencies (Community Development Office 2001). New community development priorities were also introduced when responsibility for a designated rural development fund was added for each region (OECDC 1998).

After the state experienced more than a decade of strong economic growth that failed to substantially affect poverty, particularly in rural parts of the state, the program was reauthorized in 1999 under the name "Regional Investments." The Governor at the time, downstate physician John Kitzhaber, had begun his term by signing an executive order that mandated that state resources be used to further "quality development objectives." This holistic approach was intended to promote balanced communities and, it was hoped, channel some growth from urban to rural areas (Kinsey-Hill 1999). The trend culminated when the legislature removed both industry targeting and job creation requirements during the passage of the Regional Investments program. Regional boards were now required to prioritize economically distressed communities and individuals left out of the state's growing economy. Although the regional boards were not required to use it, the state defined an index of distress based on various economic measures such as per capita income and industrial diversity (OECDD 2000).

The basic implementation mechanisms have remained the same. County-appointed regional boards receive state lottery funds for projects in economic and community development, in response to a plan developed by the boards. These counties rarely have expertise to deal with this mandate and typically contract out staffing. In fact, numerous intermediaries have been engaged by counties in managing the program, including regional councils of government, rural economic development districts, a private consultant, a small business development center, and a university research institute (OECDD 2001a). With local implementation undertaken by organizations with diverse capacities and characteristics which may influence process outcomes, and with critical internal evaluations citing a need for state economic development to focus on "solving problems, not running programs" (OECDC 1998), concern with how to judge the program's outcomes remains at issue. Cur-

rently the state has committed about $20 million to the Regional Investments program, five percent of the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department's $400 million budget for the 2001-2003 biennium (OECDD 2001b).

The changes sought to please both urban areas focused on growth management that were now opposed to the original program's job creation requirement, and rural areas that were still struggling to reposition themselves in the changing economy. With a new focus on areas that were left out of past growth, the program maintained one foot in the realm of inter-regional economic competitiveness while shifting the other foot by creating the opportunity for regions to address intra-regional economic disparities. The result was that alongside traditional economic development, regional boards funded projects that in the past had been labeled as community development, creating the opportunity to address economic equity issues.

A Tale of Two Regions: Metro Portland and Southeast Oregon

Multnomah and Washington Counties, at the northern end of the state's populous and fertile Willamette Valley, represent the core of the Metropolitan Portland Region. Together they make up just over half of the population of the six-county Metropolitan Statistical Area. Although they are among the state's smallest counties by geographic area, they are also the state's most densely populated, and their 1.1 million residents represent one-third of the state's total population (US Census

2001). At the other extreme, Grant, Harney and Malheur Counties are located along the state's mountainous and often arid southeastern edge. Together the three counties cover one quarter of the state's land mass, but with only 47,159 residents they have some of the lowest population densities in the state, 1.7 persons per square mile on average (SE Regional Alliance 2000a).

While these are considered regions for the purposes of the program, it is important to recognize that neither represents a functional regional economy. Multnomah and Washington Counties, described hereafter as Metro Portland, actually represent only part of the two-state Portland/Vancouver Census PMSA. The rural counties of Grant, Harney and Malheur (referred to in this paper as Southeast Oregon) are similarly problematic. Rural Grant and Harney Counties are considered independent labor markets by the Oregon Employment Department, and while not part of a metropolitan area, Malheur County is considered part of a three-county, two-state (Oregon/Idaho) labor market (OED 2000).

Not surprisingly, there are contrasts in the planning resources brought to bear by each regional board. Staffing entities with varying missions and boards with different memberships means that each region developed very distinct processes.

Figure 1
Oregon Regional Case Study Areas: Metro Portland (Washington and Multnomah Counties) and Southeast Oregon (Grant, Harney and Malheur Counties)
Cartography by Meg Merrick, Portland State University, 2001

Metro Portland

Emerging from the recession of the 1980s, Portland's economy grew consistently over the next decade, with population, wages, and personal incomes rising steadily. The region diversified its industrial mix with growing strength in high technology, especially semiconductor manufacturing and creative services. The region has also retained some traditional strength in old economy industries, such as metalworking, wood products and nursery products (MW Regional Investment Board 2001a). Employment grew at more than 4.5 percent annually from 1994 to 1997, almost double the national rate. By 2000, however, growth had leveled off to just over two percent annually, on par with the national rate (Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies 2001).

This economic expansion has relied on growth in the region's skilled workforce, driven largely by in-migrants, more than half of whom had college degrees. This group accounted for more than two-thirds of the population increase between 1990 and 1997, and appears to have enjoyed most of the benefits of the region's job growth. Meanwhile, a significant portion of the population continues to experience high poverty and school drop-out rates, particularly those living in north and northeast Portland (which contains most of the state's African-American population) and certain rural areas outside of the Metro Portland urban growth boundary, as well as a large portion of the growing, but more geographically dispersed, Hispanic population (MW Regional Investment Board 2001a). Furthermore, much of the region's employ-ment remains in relatively low-wage occupations. A 1998 Oregon Employment Department Survey found that a majority of all jobs in the region were in occupations earning, on average, less than $25,000 per year (OED 2000).

The size and complexity of the regional economy and its problems may have been one reason why the Metro Portland Regional Board was not a priority for the county governments. They did not act to appoint a Board for the new program until faced with a loss of funding near the end of the biennium. Only one elected official served on that body, and he was a member of the Metro Council, Portland's three-county regional government responsible primarily for land use and transportation planning. Other board members included the head of the regional agency that administers federal job training funding, two local economic development staffers, a banker, and several business people, including representatives of the African American and Hispanic chambers of commerce (MW Regional Investment Board 2001a).

Administration and staff support were contracted out to Portland State University's Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies, which had experience serving as a neutral convener for the region's governments (Rusk 1999). The Institute had also completed a study analyzing industry clusters and their role in the regional economy. The Institute's director and two graduate students were assigned to the project, receiving assistance from the City of Portland's quasi-public economic development

agency, the Portland Development Commission, which served as the financial agent handling contracting with grantees.

Building on the earlier staff work on industrial cluster analysis, the Metro Portland Board asked project applicants to address the connection between "people, places and clusters." The quick consensus that developed around these broad goals reflected the short timeline faced by the Board. While not abandoning the original program's focus on target industries, the Board placed an emphasis on projects serving specific target populations and locations. Assistance to state-defined "distressed" communities was emphasized, along with the region's geographically dispersed but growing Hispanic population (MW Regional Investment Board 2001a). The question of how funding should be distributed between projects in the two counties was also considered by staff, but remained in the background for much of the Board's deliberations.

Most successful applications to the Metro Portland Board were put forward by non-profit organizations, particularly those involved in job training and educational projects, which received almost 60 percent of all the region's nearly $2 million in funds. This included $104,000 for El Centro Cultural, a community-based organization targeting the region's rural Hispanic population with basic job readiness skills and advanced technical training in partnership with the nursery products industry. Another $110,000 was granted to an accelerated training program for entry-level semiconductor technicians provided by the Portland Community College-Capital Career Center,

a partnership between a local community college and the one-stop job training center serving Washington County (MW Regional Investment Board 2001b). Distressed communities received almost half of the funds allocated. The largest of these grants, $200,000, went to the Black United Fund, a non-profit organization in north Portland developing a small business incubator.

Metro Portland Board staff described the targeting of particular industry sectors, or "clusters," as perhaps the weakest criterion in the funding process. While many of the "people and place" project proposals went to great lengths to describe their relevance to industrial clusters, not all were successful at creating substantive connections to industry. Meanwhile, several industry cluster project applications showed a limited understanding of the changing dynamics of the program by failing to identify connections to places or people. These changes meant that the Board was no longer likely to favor the biotech labs and engineering conferences that had been typical projects funded under Regional Strategies. While not simply shifting from economic to community development, the new partnerships they funded, for example, targeted workforce development, expanded the economic development dialogue to include actors from both disciplines and from across the region.

Southeast Oregon

Conditions in Grant, Harney and Malheur Counties were considerablly different during the1990s. All three counties are included in their entirety on the state list of distressed communities. All three counties have also experienced population growth rates below the state average and unemployment at more than twice the state rate throughout the decade (OED 2000). The region has been challenged economically by stagnant prices for agricultural commodities, particularly alfalfa and sugar beets, and also by dramatic losses in the timber industry in Grant County.

As has long been the case, government represents a major employer in the area, with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management overseeing more than nine million acres in the region. State Corrections and other state, local and federal employment supplied almost one-third of the region's employment in 1998. This was followed by farming and manufacturing mostly in food products, and lumber and wood products (OED 2000). While economic diversification is a topic of discussion, many people still place great faith in traditional industries, believing "how great things will be [in Grant County] when the Forest Service lets us cut again" (Lino 2001).

With the advent of the new Regional Investments program, a new Southeast Oregon regional grouping was constructed from these three counties that had previously been in different groups. Reflecting the significance of government employment in the area, some two-thirds of Southeast Oregon Board membership came from the public sector. This included not only county judges, who are the chief local elected officials from each county, but also representatives from the Federal Bureau of Land Management and city government staff. The Board also included a banker, two ranchers, and staff from local non-profit organizations (SE Regional Alliance 2000a).

The Greater Eastern Oregon Development Corporation (GEODC), a non-profit agency that provides counties in the eastern part of the state with a range of economic development services, administers the Regional Investments program for the three counties. The GEODC provides two staff members, one full time manager and one part time loan officer (OECDD 2001a). Only one of the three counties had previously worked with the GEODC.

The Board members from each county considered projects proposed by their own areas, often financially strapped local governments, and made recommendations back to the full Board. The Board attempted to focus on a long term plan for developing a locally sustainable economy. However, tempered by the immediacy of their rather dire economic situation, the plan avoided formal industry targeting, remaining open to so-called immediate opportunities (Lino 2001; SE Regional Alliance 2000a).

Government projects received the majority of funds allocated by the Southeast Oregon Board. These included very basic forms of infrastructure such as wastewater treatment plants in two small cities, land acquisition and planning for industrial parks, and several recreational facilities. The Board also funded

economic development staff positions for Grant and Harney Counties, as well as multiple Geographic Information System (GIS) projects that involved some overlap between regional and local projects. While public sector projects received a majority of the Southeast Oregon Board's roughly $1.5 million in funds, almost a quarter of the funding was directly or indirectly allocated to the private sector. The largest single allotment of $200,000 went to a revolving small business loan fund managed by GEODC. Smaller sums also went directly to private businesses (SE Regional Alliance 2000b).

Unlike Metro Portland, where a short timeline and existing relationships among staff facilitated a rapid consensus around goals, Southeast Oregon was among the first Boards appointed in the state, and involved a new regional alignment. That meant forging new relationships among counties and between Board members and staff, with the time to conduct a decentralized process that exhibited great deference to the counties.

Southeast Oregon staff described the changes in the program, particularly the removal of the target industry requirements, as a shift from economic to community development. While they suggested that the Southeast Oregon Board caused only a minor shift in their thinking from the old program, their new support for general infrastructure and local business capital differed markedly from their predecessors' grants for industry-specific infrastructure. For example, under the Regional Strategies program, Harney County funded a project to refurbish a rail

line that rapidly became unprofitable, and was later embroiled in legal action when the company that had benefited from the public assistance wanted to dismantle the line and sell it for scrap (Brandon Roberts + Associates and Mt. Auburn Associates 1992).

Conclusions

The Southeast Oregon Board invested heavily in places, local infrastructure and capacity building, in addition to providing significant capital resources to locally owned business. The Metro Portland Board focused more clearly on people-based projects. They provided the lion's share of their resources to non-profit organizations engaged in job training and related programs, with less money going to local government and nothing directly to private businesses. Broadly considered, the Southeast Oregon Board's "place focus" parallels the fact that the primary fiscal responsibility of county governments in Southeast Oregon is providing infrastructure, while Metro Portland's "people focus" parallels the urban counties' responsibilities for social services, neither of which were reflected under the old program.

While a dire economic situation and concerns with economic diversification may have encouraged a high tolerance for risk in the private sector investments by the Southeast Oregon Board, its funding decisions shifted from industry-specific infrastructure under Regional Strategies to more general place-based infrastructure during the Regional Investments program. In contrast, the Metro Portland Board, while attempting to retain the industry cluster focus that had been central to their mission under the Regional

Strategies program, had to make significant adjustments in project selection, rejecting some industry projects in favor of those that incorporated the new focus on distressed communities added under Regional Investments.

Both regions took advantage of changes in the state program requirements to broaden their traditional perspectives on economic development and include equity concerns. While not a dramatic and redistributive shift, their activities did use a regional approach to provide access—in Metro Portland, by connecting distressed communities to a successful regional economy (for example, in targeted workforce projects), and in Southeast Oregon, by building local capacity to help distressed rural communities to participate in the state economy (for example, through the provision of capital to local businesses).

While some of the differences in implementation between these two approaches were inevitable given the different challenges the two regions faced, the state's choice to address regional economic development planning through this uniform approach was clearly in tune the placement of the state's stark urban-rural disparities at the top of the state's agenda and ahead of intra-regional issues. At the same time, implementation through county-affiliated, quasi-governmental bodies with limited scope may have limited the prospects for the sort of dramatic change that took place under Orfield's program in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

While highlighting a weak spot in Oregon's history of regional planning, positive lessons from this process may become clearer as the second biennium of the new program unfolds. While options may be constricted by the power which counties hold over the structure of implementation, adjustments in approach to the new program and parallels emerging within county government may serve to institutionalize this new direction. Having moved beyond traditional economic development responsibilities to engage a broader spectrum of potential participants from community development, these regional boards may now choose to build on this experience, to actively engage with other state and local planning processes.

Endnotes

[1] The paper is based on interviews and conversations with current and past staff of Oregon state government and some of the thirteen Regional Investment Boards. Particular help came from Ethan Seltzer and Heike Mayer of Portland State University's Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies, Sondra Lino, project manager of the Greater Eastern Oregon Development Corporation, Larry Andrew of the Coos Curry Douglas Business Development Corporation, Laila Cully and Joan Rutledge of the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department, and Joe Cortright, a private consultant and former chief economist for the Oregon state legislature. Additional data is drawn from public documents, including published regional plans and project information elaborating on the activities of the regional boards.

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JOHN PROVO (provoj@pdx.edu), a doctoral student in Portland State University's School of Urban Studies and Planning, is a research assistant at the Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies. He also serves as staff to the Multnomah-Washington Regional Investment Board.

Regional Governance and Strategic Area Development: Some Dutch Experiences

Leonie B. Janssen-Jansen

It has often been said that comprehensive plans can best be implemented at the regional level. Recently, European policy-makers have borrowed and applied promising insights from the US new regionalism and growth management literatures. Using these insights along with European and American theories of multilevel and multi-agency governance, I construct an analytical framework for regional strategic area development. I test some of the hypotheses derived from the analytical framework using a Netherlands region as an example. The conclusions emphasize the importance of regional cooperation, financial responsibility and institutional conditions.

Introduction

Strategic area development programs are intended to coordinate urban land-use and infrastructure policies and projects in order to serve numerous social, economic and ecological goals within a long-term planning framework. Strategic area development is more comprehensive than traditional land-use planning, due to the complex problems demanding coordination, such as inner city restructuring under diverse forms of land ownership. Specific regional issues necessitate the involvement of a broad set of actors in each region in order to formulate policy responses. Strategic area development recognizes the mutual dependence between private actors and public authorities across spatial levels and industrial sectors.

In both the US and Europe, the dynamic relationships of open economies have meant that the traditional subjects of planning, such as infrastructure projects and new residential development, seldom coincide with territorial borders. As a consequence, strategic area development now extends to provinces, nations and even supranational entities (Kreukels 1997; Scharpf 1989; Scharpf 1994). The solution to such spatial problems is assumed to depend on the ability to create strategic visions and new "spatial identities" (Albrechts 2001) that include sociocultural, economic, physical and administrative features specific to each region.

The concept of region is not scale-dependent. Instead, regions are defined on the basis of a particular planning issue, such as housing, transportation or water supply. Furthermore, functional regions are often comprised of non-contiguous territories. For example, the municipality and port of Rotterdam are more functionally connected to the Ruhr area and Rhine River corridor in Germany than with direct neighbors (see Castells (1991) on functional space).

Yet the metropolitan level is often seen as the regional scale at which the most important planning challenges occur and must be overcome. Several European governmental publications, such as the latest Dutch report on spatial planning, state that desired spatial quality improvements should occur at the metropolitan level because this is where most of the important actors converge and form coalitions (Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment 2001).

The necessity to improve strategic area development for regions as a means to overcome coordination problems has recently been recognized in the Netherlands and most other western countries (Scientific Council on Government Policy 1998). Valuable insights have come from the US growth management movement, an umbrella concept including plans, regulations and policies to control urban economic growth and counter excessive suburbanization in US metropolitan areas. Growth management includes spatial trade-offs, regional planning and public-private partnerships. Negotiated trade-offs among private sector and government stakeholders can produce greater social surplus value for the region as a whole. Such trade-offs are often mediated by financial agreements, more prominent in places with Anglo-Saxon traditions like the Netherlands, and hence may be promising as a methodology for spatial area development.

Needham and Faludi (1999) and Evers, Ben-Zadok and Faludi (2000) argue that US growth management is a "policy of growth control" that leans towards European-style planning, and that American planners should learn from their European counterparts. American planners may lack appreciation for innovations from which Europeans have learned, such as *concurrency*, a pay-as-you-go development policy in which no new developments may occur if municipal service levels would decrease (Janssen-Jansen 2001; Kreukels 1996a; Sietsma 2000). In contrast, other scholars have made policy recommendations for Dutch planning based on growth management programs in several US states (Puijn 2001; Wegewijs 2000). For example, TNO-Inro, a prominent research institute in the Netherlands, is considering the applicability of US growth management principles to urban and regional problems in the Netherlands (TNO-Inro 2000). The variety of growth management strategies applied in practice contributes to the divergence in views (Janssen-Jansen 2001).

Successful regional strategic area development typically requires changes in common administrative and governmental relations, but few administrative structures have adapted well to new responsibilities. Attempts to integrate policies at the metropolitan level through administrative reform have generally failed (Barlow 1991; Self 1982). The focus on restructuring regional and local government by creating metropolitan governments has shifted to the coordination of joint efforts between and within administrative levels (Kreukels 2000; Rothblatt and Sancton 1998). At the same time, a new balance is being sought between public and private interests, due to the growing importance of private and public investments (Derksen, Ekelenkamp and Hoefnagel 1999).

Strategic area development is characterized by the participation of all stakeholders, without government or private actors being dominant. The process delineates negotiated rules of the game to balance competing interests.

Regional *governance*, as opposed to *government*, has become the new keyword in planning as part of an attempt to address issues of fragmentation and competition and to encourage coordination, coproduction and cooperation among stakeholders. In asserting that governments are no longer the dominant actors steering development, the governance literature often diminishes their democratic, legitimizing role. However, governments remain the only party that can intervene one-sidedly, giving them more power than other actors.

Regional Governance as a Solution

Many countries have experimented with regional administrative structures, but without lasting success (Anas 2000; Barlow 1991; Self 1982). Modifications of existing administrative frameworks were based on the argument that too many uncoordinated local government units created inefficiency, ineffectiveness and inequity in public service provision (Barlow 1997). According to this view, efficiency was undermined by costly externalities, and effectiveness was reduced by obstructive municipal boundaries and by a lack of citywide coordination. This resulted in inequities caused by intermunicipal variations in the quantity and quality of services (Self 1982). Consolidation of governments was said to lead to advan-

tages of scale, while it reduced negative externalities and inequalities (Post 2000).

Metropolitan political fragmentation received the most attention in the United States, where the problems were believed most severe (Barlow 1991; Rothblatt and Sancton 1998). A commonly proposed solution was to create two levels of government for metropolitan areas, with numerous local units providing smaller-scale services and a single metropolitan-level unit providing larger-scale services and carrying out strategic planning. Kreukels and Salet (Scientific Council on Government Policy 1992) characterize such attempts to use metropolitan-level government to transform city-regions into metropolitan areas as rear-guard actions. According to Kreukels (1996b), empirical evidence on metropolitan administration over the long term shows that even the most celebrated examples of metropolitan governments, like those in Stockholm and Toronto, are unstable and degenerate into territorially-fragmented, functionally-organized regimes.

Public choice theory argues that competition in government service delivery promotes effectiveness and responsiveness while encouraging participants to share in governmental responsibilities (Ostrom 1971; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). Parks and Oakerson (1989) use the example of St. Louis to suggest that a few relatively small local governments embedded in a structure of overlapping jurisdictions and coordinated service delivery arrangements might be a good way to organize metropolitan areas. This governance-not-government perspective emphasizes

the importance of local diversity and local, politically accountable control (Norris 2001; Sietsma 2000).

New forms of effective regional governance are needed to address metropolitan area problems (Brunori and Hennig 1996; Hall 1995; Harding, Wilks-Heeg and Hutchins 1999; Heinz 2000; Orfield 1997). Regionalism has regained prominence as the political, economic, cultural and social meaning of space is changing in the contemporary world. The new regionalism recognizes that the decomposition and recomposition of the territorial spheres of public life depends on changes in the state, the market and the international context (Keating 1997: 383). Although regionalism is sometimes concerned with the formation and development of a substantive intermediate level of government, in economics and planning the focus is on governance (Brenner 1999; Gibbs and Jonas 2001: 271). New regionalists, therefore, define governance as the functional and territorial coordination of regional activity among numerous stakeholders (Keating 1998, Foster 2001).

Heinz (2000: 23) asserts that intraregional cooperation takes many forms depending on the specific problems, tasks and underlying factors at hand, such as political and administrative structures, the national context and involved actors and their readiness to cooperate. Policies are not only the result of intentional action, but are characterized by dependency relations among a set of involved actors (Montfort 1995; Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel 1976). Rescaling strategic area development then involves reforming planning policies on a local or regional level to ben-

efit from local stakeholder knowledge. New institutions must be designed to resolve specific regional problems. The form these institutions take depends on stakeholder interest and regional context. As the roles of some governmental units are increasingly defined by their relationships with the profit and nonprofit sectors, public-private partnerships supplant the vertical coordination between higher and lower governments. Cooperation between local governments becomes more important.

The process and context of planning concern themselves respectively with democratic legitimation and the competition, fragmentation, coproduction and cooperation among stakeholders. However, the perceived regional problems and issues that form the content of strategic regional planning are as important as regional actors and structures in bringing about development. The next section constructs a theoretical regional area development framework that takes into account planning content, context and process.

Perspectives for Strategic Regional Area Development

Growth management in the US is considered by some to represent the best practices and doctrines of regional spatial planning at the moment (Gainsborough 2000; Knaap 2001; Stein 1993). Regional growth management programs have typically been adopted in areas experiencing strong developmental pressures, such as in Florida, California and Oregon. The planning process is typically focused on identifying and addressing long term region-specific

trade-offs among goals that relate to various subjects of planning. These planning areas include the regional economy, human capital, real estate and infrastructure, the transportation and communication system, and the land use system. Numerous economic, quality of life, environmental, and equity considerations guide these planning processes.

The process of negotiating these trade-offs takes place at a regional level and includes interested private sector parties along with affected public sector agencies and local communities. In some cases state government is also involved. The political character of the strategy expresses itself in the financial imperatives of who pays and who profits. In Florida, for example, developments expected to have an impact on the quality of public services are required to pay up front for a corresponding expansion of public facilities, or to make appropriate payments over time. This produces economic trade-offs even before development starts.

At a more abstract level, this strategy of regional development comprises three dimensions: content through developmental and maintenance planning, context through coordinative planning[1] and process through negotiated planning. They are not separate parts of regional area development, but are aspects of a three-dimensional whole with strong reciprocal relationships that require trade-offs.

These trade-offs may occur as part of strategic planning, or they might be the result of an unplanned bottom-up process. In turn, the trade-offs will then influence the three planning dimensions in an ongoing process of puzzling, or learning, and powering, or decision-making (Hall 1993; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The final outcomes can be seen as results of spatial development politics (IPO 2001). Together they form the framework of regional area development. I will now take a closer look at each of these three dimensions.

Content: Development Planning

Development planning includes sustainable building, large scale restructuring of areas, and urban renewal on a small scale. Every region is exposed to similar national and international socio-economic developments that demand spatial solutions and particular trade-offs. Planning solutions can be successful only when they have taken into account the region's physical, economic and socio-cultural characteristics. Regional competencies, territorial and functional features such as the population's age-dependency ratio, and regional involvement or identity may demand particular solutions to contextual problems. Through the commitments of the involved actors, regional identity might result in a regional discourse of ideas about qualities and spatial values. The new European and global context has important effects on the representation of regional identity, removing it from the confines of the state and encouraging a process of imitation and learning among regions in different states (Keating 1997: 388). However, when it comes to the institutional context, the nation state remains very important.

Figure 1
Framework of Regional Area Planning

Content
- Regional characteristics
  -space and society-
- Regional developments
  -path dependency-

Regional spatial outcomes
Trade-offs, decision making,
financial commitments

Context
- Norms, values
- Rules of the game
- Conditions / institutions
- Position of actors

Process
- Role of (semi)public
  and private actors
- Coalitions and coordination

Context: Coordinative Planning

Coordinative planning helps establish, and is part of, the institutional structures—or context—in which area development is shaped. Not only are formal institutions like laws or procedures important in determining the positions of, and relationships between, various actors, but so too are informal institutions such as values and norms. Together, these form the rules of the game that condition chosen solutions for regional spatial problems (Young 1996). Institution-specific norms too can shape actor preferences (Scharpf 1997; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000: 21-22), as actors can influence institutions. The rules of the game are often called regimes. Krasner (1984) and Levy, Young and Zürn (1995) define international regimes as social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue-areas. Urban regime theory has become influential in urban and regional planning (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Stone 1989), its original insights deriving from the international relations literature (Krasner 1984; Zacher and Sutton, 1996).

Area developments are always nested in several institutional contexts or regimes: regional, national and often international. Regimes also serve as important vehicles for individual and social learning. For example, actors can fight for an adaptation of land-use laws in favor of regional planning. Learning can bring about improvements in the government's understanding of cause-effect relationships in a regime's issue area, but a broader type of learning occurs when a principle applicable to more than one issue

area proves particularly successful in specific cases (Levy, Young and Zürn 1995: 35). An important impediment this kind of institutional learning is path dependency (also called historical structuration) in which historically evolved institutional arrangements predetermine social interaction and outcomes. It may explain different institutional outcomes in various regions.

Learning and subsequent adaptations are never politically neutral. Institutions are always both the outcome and the object of political struggle. Political structuration is the process by which political structures and institutionalized regulation systems define power relations and conflicts of interest by strengthening the public status of some actors at the expense of others. The discourse that stakeholders use is also a result of a learning process. Institutions embody normative orientations and expectations that influence strategic action, what Peter Hall refers to as normative structuration (Hall 1993; Hemerijck 2001).

The context in which regional developments take place consists of a multitude of dependency relations (Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel 1976). Hanf and Scharpf (1978: 1) point out that due to these dependency relations, and the fragmentation that characterizes modern society, the "formulation and implementation of public policy increasingly involves different governmental levels and agencies, as well as interaction between public and private authorities and private organizations." This has resulted in an ever more stratified society. At the same time the speed at which society evolves has increased, requiring multilevel and multi-agency policies.

Regional differentiation results in differentiated power relations and coordination mechanisms. In one region, informal and ad hoc coordination can work perfectly, while in the other formal and structural coordination may be more advantageous. This will impact the nature of competition as well as the potential of coproduction (public-private partnerships). Regions are the loci of coordination and combination for several decision-making processes and their outcomes.

Process: Negotiated Planning

Actors belong to the private, public or semipublic realms and can thus act as individuals, collectives or corporate actors (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Actors may also continually switch between methods like negotiation, cooperation, and coercion. Moreover, it is possible for situations of conflict, coordination and cooperation to coexist, since actors may agree on some issues while disagreeing on others. The learning process is very important in this respect. Here I focus on the concept of negotiation.

When actors negotiate, not only is their position important, as defined in the institutional context, but so too is their role. Actors make choices that suit their needs. These roles are then institutionalized in the rules of the game, which define competencies, veto positions and modes of interaction.

Private actors, both corporations and individuals, are increasingly becoming government partners in regional negotiating processes. Outcomes are not steered solely by governmental policies nor do they occur purely as a result of market processes; they are influenced by both through dependency relations. Government activity is also increasingly coordinated both horizontally and vertically. Accordingly, the preoccupation of articulated and stratified policies with the specificity of problems is gaining increasing attention relative to more general comprehensive policies. Governments negotiate with private actors on issues like phasing and priorities.

Politics, the power play of admitting, collaborating and thwarting, as well as renewal and innovation take place where the three dimensions of content, context and process come together. This is because power relations and institutional rules are not fixed, but result from and are changed by interaction. The spatial outcomes are the result of decision-making, such as accepted arrangements, as well as struggles in the political arena.

Strategic Area Development Programs

The preceding discussion implies that a proactive regional strategic area development program, in practice, can be expected to exhibit five characteristics.

1. Local governments increasingly coordinate their own developments in dialogue with their neighbors. They determine their regional needs with respect to housing, employment and so on. Economic, infrastructural, socio-cultural and ecological interests are taken into account. Trade-offs between these aspects are not overly comprehensive in nature.

2. Policymaking occurs in a multilevel and multi-agency context, with great regional variation. It

is not always clear which actor has the ultimate responsibility. This leads to a lack of transparency and democratic accountability, which may hinder coordinative planning.

3. Financial autonomy at a local/regional level is necessary to make arrangements with other parties in the region. Investment flows will not be linked to the regional level if these financial rearrangements are not established.

4. Optimal trade-offs can only be made when content, context, and process are all taken into account. The region-specific content of development planning supposes differentiation in the way these regional outcomes are achieved. This also implies differentiation in coordinative and negotiative planning.

5. The institutional conditions that limit or stimulate participation in the realization of regional area development differ from region to region and are adapted to specific circumstances in a puzzling and powering process. Differences in institutional conditions from region to region, and the eagerness of learning among actors, affect the functioning of regional governance. Sufficient latitude must be given if actors are to engage in strategic and learning behavior. This implies that loose steering is generally preferable.

In the next section, I discuss the extent to which several Haaglanden region strategic plans exhibit the above characteristics.[2]

Case Study: The Haaglanden Region

The Haaglanden city-region is located in the western part of the Netherlands, and consists of the metropolitan areas of Rotterdam, The Hague, and Leiden along with the Drechtsteden. These cities all are situated in the South Wing of the Randstad. There are many, sometimes competing, strategic plans and projects. Three cases are discussed here: the new housing development of Ypenburg, the restructuring of some inner-city areas in The Hague (especially Spoorwijk) and the restructuring of the Westland.

Municipalities and public agencies located within the Haaglanden city-region participate in coalitions at six different regional levels. The first is the intra-municipal level, where the municipality collaborates with private actors like housing associations. This can happen over the entire territory or in one or more neighborhoods. The second is the inter-municipal level. The Administrative Commission of the Westland (BCW) is an example of this, as is the horizontal coordination in Ypenburg. Other examples include the link between Delft, The Hague and Zoetermeer, or the link between the smaller suburbs. In each case, both groups of municipalities made their own plans. Third, there is the city-region, such as Haaglanden itself, in which the bigger cities and suburbs work together by law; in that example, each municipality is represented on the Haaglanden council according to population size. The fourth level consists of horizontal relations with municipalities in other city-regions, like the weak cooperation in the South Wing of the Randstad between The Hague and Rotterdam. Despite their proximity, these cities

seldom work together on developments like housing and infrastructure. The fifth regional level is the *Randstad* level, the level of super-regions within the national context. A sixth level consists of coalitions between the big cities and the national government.

Cooperation or coordination at each of the levels can be voluntary or forced, structural or ad hoc. Depending on the issues involved at specific regional levels, private actors might participate in an existing coalition or they might take the initiative to establish a new coalition with one or more governments as partners.

A number of issues emerge when the expected characteristics (based on the analytical framework) are compared to the Haaglanden case study. The first characteristic, that local governments increasingly coordinate their own developments in dialogue with their neighbors, holds true. However, they also participate in several coalitions at various levels. In all these coalitions, they determine regional need with respect to housing, infrastructure and so on, but the resulting trade-offs are in a context of mutual competition, at the expense of overall cooperation. For some public actors there is a dominant coalition, such as that between the national government and large cities in the Netherlands. Within the regional trade-offs made by stakeholders, infrastructure is an issue somewhat neglected in the Netherlands because it functions on a sectoral basis relatively autonomous from other concerned parties. This causes difficulties in implementation, as exemplified by the lack of good infrastructure, as well as private and public

transport networks among new housing developments in the Netherlands.

Second, policymaking does occur in a multilevel and multi-agency context, with great regional variation. It is not always clear which actor has ultimate responsibility given differences in law and practice, although national and municipal governments usually hold the strongest position. On the intermediate or regional level, several municipalities share this responsibility. This division among a great number of municipalities sometimes frustrates the planning process. Especially for situations of national or even international importance, it is important that the provinces or national government should be given responsibility. Governments can act one-sidedly and intervene in processes where private parties cannot due to their role in democratic legitimation, which is sometimes overlooked in governance theory. Administrative responsiveness offers better solutions for this democratic gap than does a parliamentary view (Scharpf 1998).

The third characteristic, lack of financial autonomy at the local or regional level, is also present in the Haaglanden region. Without this autonomy, regions cannot adequately compete with each other or forge coalitions with private partners. Dutch municipalities are kept financially dependent on the national government. This favors the position of the national government in the planning system, but does not always benefit the planning process. Many municipalities are unwilling to pay for developments in neighboring jurisdictions. Coupling investment

flows at the regional level may improve regional planning processes, but regional autonomy may decrease local financial autonomy. Money in the form of grants provides very good means to get different actors to cooperate and realize development, provided they are net beneficiaries. If regional integration implies redistribution to poorer localities, more affluent communities may not willingly participate.

Fourth, in comparison to a few decades ago, more attention is now being paid to the region-specific content of development planning, as well as to differences between areas. Thus it appears that content is more important than context and process. Despite the strong financial position of the national government, it is the local actors, including the province and the municipalities, which make large contributions to this type of regional planning.

Finally, institutional differences did indeed vary across the three projects investigated here and were adapted to the specific circumstances in a puzzling and powering process. Differences in institutional conditions and an eagerness to learn produced better regional governance in one region than the other. Spatial, financial, political-institutional and personal factors seem to be the most important motives for regional cooperation. The *problem load* is very important in this respect.

Many other projects and plans in the region complement and compete with the three mentioned above. One actor can participate in different coalitions at the same time. All these coalitions have their own ideas, but some of these clash with those of other coalitions. Thus, occasionally the left hand of a municipality or province conflicts with its right.

Does all this happen through the governance processes that are thought to be the cornerstone of future policies? The answer is both yes and no. Elements of new governance arrangements can be observed, for example in the restructuring process of the Spoorwijk and the new comprehensive plan for Westland. However, when it comes to implementation, the positions of governmental bodies differ. They are often unequal partners in the planning process, given the asymmetry of resources and conditions in relation to private sector stakeholders. Furthermore, they have an obligation to pursue the common interest and thus all public-sector parties can, or are expected to, intervene one-sidedly. This can make governments unreliable because they are ultimately accountable to the electorate. This democratic legitimation is of great value, and although it can frustrate planning processes, few would reject the ideal. The degree of democratic legitimation is the crucial issue that cuts across all three dimensions.

Conclusion

In this article a regional area development framework has been constructed. Some statements derived from this framework were tested against findings in the Haaglanden region. This provides insights into the area of regional cooperation, financial responsibility and institutional conditions.

The work also raises questions about the concept of governance, and especially the position of the government in such processes. Governments occupy a

special position in the planning processes due to their democratic legitimation role. What will emerge: a further consolidation of government dominance or a hollowing-out? What consequences will this have upon regional development? With respect to the three dimensions of planning, not only are content, context and process important in themselves, but also the interaction among them is critical.

It will be interesting to see whether these findings for the Haaglanden apply elsewhere. This would increase the framework's explanatory power, namely in ascertaining how and the degree to which regional regional coalitions dominate.

The growth management strategy shows the importance not only of economics, but also of infrastructure for spatial planning. Increasingly complex problems have compelled strategic planning to become more comprehensive. Dutch planners should bear this in mind and pay more attention to the place of infrastructure in planning.

Regional spatial outcomes demand a clear division of responsibility for each government level. Local and regional governments should have sufficient scope for policy-making, including entering into relations with non-governmental parties. In situations of national and international importance, the provinces or national government should have responsibility, but this is true in very few cases. Without regional financial autonomy, regions cannot compete with each other, nor can they form coalitions with private partners. Thus, without autonomy they cannot be real partners in the negotiation process.

Endnotes

[1] It is difficult to translate the concept of *vervlechtingsplanologie* into English. In the end I have chosen "coordinative planning." The term refers to the institutional structures in which area developments take shape, and includes the interdependencies that exist between levels of governments, within these levels, and the interdependencies between the government and other parties.

[2] I performed the case studies in the region of Haaglanden in 1999 and 2000 (Janssen-Jansen 2000). Since January 2001, I have been working on case studies in North Brabant, another Dutch region (Janssen-Jansen 2002).

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LEONIE B. JANSSEN-JANSEN (L.Jansen@geog.uu.nl) is working on her doctoral thesis, Regional Planning and Growth Management: An Institutional Approach *at the Urban Research Centre in Utrecht, Faculty of Geographical Sciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.*

Transferring the Neighborhood Unit to Caracas: Examples of Foreign Influence in Venezuela

Transferring the Neighborhood Unit to Caracas: Examples of Foreign Influence in Venezuela[1]

Nelliana Villoria-Siegert and Arturo Almandoz

The concept of the "neighborhood unit" has its origins in the United States in the 1930s. This article traces the transfer of the neighborhood unit model from the US and European context to Venezuela. In Caracas, the private sector applied the model to low-density developments, while the public sector applied it to the creation of high-density neighborhood units informed by the Le Corbusier vision. Although in both public and private cases, the model was stripped of its original social and political objectives, the new physical structure helped to define neighborhoods, providing identity and new venues for community activities.

Introduction

During the 1950s foreign consultants, mainly from the United States, were hired by the Venezuelan national government to plan Caracas, the capital city. These consultants brought with them ideas espoused by the European Congresses of International Modern Architecture (CIAM) as well as comprehensive planning techniques prevalent in the US at that time. The neighborhood unit (NU) model was among these ideas. Based on a rationalist paradigm, planners claimed that this model could be applied in any context, and that it would generate a sense of community for citizens. Not just a formula for physical planning, the NU model was employed to achieve social, political and functional goals. This importing of American and European modernist planning models to Latin America, and particularly Venezuela, is a subject that remains largely unexplored in the literature (notable exceptions include Holston 1989, Almandoz 2002, and Gutiérrez 1983). The case of Caracas in the 1950s offers a useful opportunity to trace the adoption of modern planning concepts in this affluent country.

This article examines the transfer of the neighborhood unit idea from an international context to its application in Venezuela. The purpose of this analysis is to describe the conditions that facilitated the adoption of the NU model and the challenges faced in its application. The paper is organized into four sections. The first summarizes the main points of the NU model. The second section discusses European ideological trends that gave birth to CIAM—an important source of planning thought at the time. The third section describes

the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions that facilitated the adoption of modern ideas in Venezuela. The final section describes different applications of the NU model in Caracas.

The Neighborhood Unit Model

The concept of the neighborhood unit dates back to the *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs* (1929). Clarence Perry, a sociologist-planner and member of the Regional Plan working group, created a model for the design of residential areas. The neighborhood unit would offer city residents more open space, recreational opportunities, and educational and commercial facilities. It would also create self-contained, self-sufficient neighborhoods in which residents would not need to travel long distances in order to satisfy basic needs.

The NU model was based on the assumption that with the provision of appropriate spaces and functions, residents would naturally associate in order to pursue collective ends; this, in turn, would elicit a strong sense of community. The NU model was informed by several antecedents: the English settlement house and Garden City movements; segregated-use zoning; the community center movement; and large-scale planned developments such as Forest Hills Gardens in Queens, New York, where Perry had lived (Rohe and Gates 1985).

The neighborhood unit had six important characteristics: appropriate size, identifiable boundaries, provision and siting of open spaces, institutional sites, local shops, and an internal street system. A neigh-

Figure 1
Neighborhood Unit Model

Source: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs (1929)

borhood unit would have a population no larger than that which could be served by one elementary school, while being large enough in area to allow low residential density. The neighborhood unit was to be bounded by arterial streets to discourage through traffic, and organized around a system of open spaces, parks and recreation areas. The local school and other institutions were to be centrally located, roughly equidistant from all residential areas. Shopping districts were to be located at the circumference of the unit in such a way to serve abutting neighborhood units. In addition, the internal street system was to employ cul-de-sacs in order to secure residen-

tial privacy (Regional Plan of New York and its Environs 1929).

The CIAM Contribution

The NU model was an important element within broader developments in modern architecture and planning. In 1928, a group of European architects met to discuss problems plaguing cities at that time. They called their group the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (International Congresses of Modern Architecture), or CIAM. Le Corbusier—a Swiss architect who would later symbolize CIAM, if not European modernism itself—chaired the first meeting. From that assembly came a manifesto in which members declared their social and economic goals for modern architecture and urbanism. Subsequent CIAM meetings took place every one to four years in different European cities over the next three decades, focusing on subjects like the dwelling, the neighborhood, and the scale of cities. Membership changed over time, and when the group met in 1959, participants decided to disband. Through the CIAM meetings and the publicity surrounding them, an influential modernist planning and architecture ideology emerged (Mumford 2000).

In the third CIAM (1930), the NU model advanced in the New York regional plan was proposed as a possible solution to the housing problem in Europe. Sigfried Giedion, CIAM's secretary, reported that "the deliberations of the Third Congress…dealt with the question of how to organize whole groups of dwellings into neighborhood units in such a way that human needs could be satisfied and with the

further question of what legislative changes were necessary to allow workable solutions" (Dahir 1947: 70-71). Walter Gropius, Richard Neutra, and Le Corbusier were among the notable and influential practitioners who espoused and supported the NU model at that meeting (Mumford 2000).

A central figure in the transfer of CIAM's ideas to the United States, and later to Latin American countries, was Spanish architect Jose Luis Sert. Sert actively participated in the CIAM congresses from the second meeting onwards. As a student in Spain, he had admired Le Corbusier's works and had interned in the master's Paris studio. In 1939, at the end of the Spanish Civil War, Sert was exiled and moved to the United States. In America, the NU idea was becoming popular and Sert became one of its main proponents. In 1942, he published *Can Our Cities Survive?* in which he chronicled the conclusions of the fourth CIAM including the advocacy of the NU model. He later created his own version of the NU model, which was applied in Latin American cities in the 1940s and 1950s (Sert 1942).[2] By the time the American NU model appeared in Caracas, it had already been informed by European planning ideas discussed in the CIAM meetings (Villoria 1998; Mumford 2000).

The Venezuelan Context

By the time the NU model was introduced to Caracas, Venezuela had already experienced centuries of foreign influence. From its founding in 1567 until Venezuela's independence in 1811, Spain had imposed its traditions of religion, urban development,

and class structure. Later, in nineteenth-century Latin America, France became the paradigm of elite urban culture (Almandoz 1997). Europe's economic, political and cultural influence in Latin America declined after World War I, but a belated expression of French aspiration took place as late as 1939 when four Paris-based planners developed the Monumental Plan of Caracas (Plano Monumental de Caracas). This plan reflected both the Haussmannian ambitions of Caracas's Governor and the Beaux-arts urban design techniques of architect and planner Maurice Rotival (Almandoz 1997).

Caracas changed rapidly in the early decades of the twentieth century. The discovery of oil in Venezuela in the 1910s quickly brought American capital and culture to Caracas. Oil companies "became increasingly important in Venezuela from the 1920s on; they produced town landscapes and living standards very different from the traditional Hispanic and French ones. . . . [O]ther foreign institutions and mass media helped to spread the sense of a modern 'American Way of Life' not only among the wealthy elites but also among the middle classes while contributing to Caracas' great building boom" (Gonzalez 1996: 66).

During the 1930s, new residential subdivisions started to appear at the periphery of the city. In the 1940s, neighborhoods were developed in the more remote east areas, replacing vacation houses. These new neighborhoods offered amenities like social and sports clubs. The historic city center, crammed with banks, public offices, cultural and commercial activi-

ties, remained vital until the 1940s when, as the city grew eastwards, a new linear business district developed. In the 1950s, suburbs developed further to the east and southeast and much infrastructure was built (Villoria 1998).[3] This was the most intensive era in Caracas's development, as huge amounts of oil revenue were invested in public works, including highways, streets, and the campus of the Central University of Venezuela (Lopez 1994: 103-119).

American influence intensified in the 1950s, when, as Venezuela's main beneficiary of oil revenues and public expenditures, Caracas's development practices began to resemble US patterns of architecture and planning. The car had become a mass phenomenon, and suburbs were developed with low-density neighborhoods. By 1966 Caracas covered 44.4 square miles, showing a twenty-fold expansion in only three decades (Villoria 1998). Supermarkets, shopping centers, and skyscrapers began to appear throughout the city.

Other examples of American influence in Caracas's urban landscape were works by Wallace Harrison, Robert Moses and Donald Hatch (Gonzalez 1996). Their projects represented three American symbols of the time: oil, cars and consumption. Wallace Harrison designed the Hotel Avila, a place to host oil entrepreneurs. Robert Moses authored the "Arterial Plan for Caracas" in the late 1940s, which included a system of roads and highways based on the main lines laid out by Rotival in the 1939 PMC. Finally, Donald Hatch developed the first supermarket in

Caracas, in Las Mercedes, a bourgeois American enclave.

Post-World-War-II immigration from Spain, Italy and Portugal greatly increased the Venezuelan middle-class population (Perna 1981). The construction boom facilitated a massive rural-to-urban migration, greatly increasing the presence of low-income households in Venezuela's emerging metropolis, and beginning what is today one of the more complex social problems of the city—the vast *barrios de ranchos*, or shanty towns (Villanueva 1992).

The growth of Caracas during the middle third of the twentieth century was extraordinary. In 1936 Caracas's population was 163,000; by 1951 it had more than quadrupled, to 700,000. During the 1950s, this population nearly doubled again, to over 1.3 million (Machado, Pacheco and Plaza 1981). During this period, the geographical area of Caracas increased twenty-fold.

Translating the NU Model

The neighborhood unit model reached Venezuela through European and American cultural channels. In the late 1940s, European-educated Venezuelan professionals and officials, such as Maurice Rotival, Gaston Bardet and Carlos Raul Villanueva, introduced CIAM's teachings to Caracas's planning discourse. In the early 1950s, foreign advisors from the United States, such as Francis Violich and José Luis Sert, brought the model to Venezuelan design studios, lecturing in architecture schools and at conferences organized by public planning institutions (Villoria 1998).[3]

These professionals created new variations of the NU model. Bardet proposed organizing the city by scale, in which the neighborhood unit would be the smallest (Bardet 1953). Similarly, Rotival (who had also lived in the United States) proposed a "Doctrine and Work Method," by which the city would be planned at several levels. Each level would be comprised of larger units: the cooperative group, the neighborhood unit, the sector, the city, the zone and the region (Rotival 1957). Sert, who later became one of the main proponents of International Style modernism in South America, created a high-density NU model. He also proposed that groups of neighborhood units be part of a larger assemblage, constituting a municipality, township or borough. This larger whole would support more community facilities, such as theaters, administrative offices and secondary schools.

Violich, from the University of California at Berkeley, contributed knowledge about new American planning paradigms and techniques: the study of regions, the diagnosis of social problems, and zoning (Martin 1996). Villanueva, another strong advocate of the International Style of modernism in local architecture, became the main link between foreign advisors and public planning agencies and architecture schools. Villanueva was actively involved in public housing and planning as a practitioner and professor in the architecture department at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, and was important to the dis-

semination of the neighborhood unit concept at all levels of planning action and thought (Villoria 1998).

On the Ground: The Regulatory Plan of Caracas

The growing influence of American theories and European modernism in Caracas were evident in the Regulatory Plan of Caracas *(Plano Regulador de la Ciudad de Caracas* 1951). Government advisors Violich, Sert and Rotival introduced a shift from an aesthetic, physical form-centered "urbanism" to a planning process focused on rational methods. Specific objectives of the Regulatory Plan were to improve the development of residential areas, to achieve a better distribution of industrial and commercial districts through rigorous zoning and the creation of shopping centers, and to identify and develop recreational areas *(Plano Regulador de la Ciudad de Caracas* 1951). This would be achieved via construction of a road system and the segregation of land uses; nevertheless, newly and appropriately separated urban functions would be very well connected.

This scheme drew directly from CIAM's Charter of Athens (Le Corbusier 1989), proposing the "separation, classification and organization of the different elements which integrate the city in terms of its basic functions: habitation, work, circulation, education" *(Plano Regulador de la Ciudad de Caracas* 1951: 406). The plan divided Caracas into twelve communities, each one further subdivided into neighborhood units. These units were designed to have all the services necessary for self-containment, while remaining connected to one another via the urban transportation system.

Implementation of the NU model in the Regulatory Plan managed to achieve functional objectives, but left behind the original social and political aims. The neighborhood unit was essentially used as a template to subdivide Caracas into independent, efficient cells, but Clarence Perry's intentions for improved community were absent from design or development. The text of the Regulatory Plan reflects the ideas of Perry for physical means, but not social ends (MOP-CNU 1987):

> We have agreed to divide the residential areas into communities and these into neighborhood units; the former are represented by the current concept of the . . . (parish) and the latter . . . by a group of families, whose children in school age justify the existence of an elementary school.

> Taking the school as nucleus of the organism, the dwellings should be located at an appropriate distance from the schools, so that the children can walk without facing any danger.

> In this area there should also be—at pre-established distances—the complementary services of a human group, such as the mall, the church, the social center, the sport fields, etc., which extension is ruled by the number of residents on the unit.

The school served as the community focal point for neighborhood units developed in the United States, and the Regulatory Plan's language emphasized the school's importance in Venezuela as well. In practice,

however, the plaza became the principal focus in the Venezuelan application. The plaza's long history in Latin America's urban culture proved much more powerful than the imported schoolyard, and almost all neighborhood units built in Caracas centered on a plaza in which the local church or school was located.

Neighborhood Units in Private Development

Neighborhood units built by private developers were designed to expedite vehicular circulation, reflecting two major factors. First, vehicle ownership had significantly increased among Venezuela's upper- and middle-classes, the groups occupying privately-built residential areas. Second, these developments were often located in suburbs far from the city, making them nearly impossible to reach without a motor vehicle. Though ostensibly designed as independent units, in many neighborhoods for the wealthy community facilities were reduced to private clubs, golf courses, parks, plazas and, later, malls. Rarely were schools part of the unit; the exceptions were usually private institutions.

Two cases, Montalban I and La California, exemplify the application of the NU model by Venezuela's private sector. Located on the west side of Caracas, Montalban I was intended to be built in four phases. The first phase was designed in the 1950s containing single-family houses; the remaining phases were designed in the 1960s and contained different dwelling types. Montalban I contains a mall, church, public school, and police station. The neighborhood is defined by clear boundaries—a river, a freeway, a major boulevard, and an avenue—and has few access points. It is separated from Montalban II by a local

Figure 2
La California Norte
Source: Villoria 1998

road. Houses are organized in groups of superblocks, and in the center of each one, a small plaza serves as a public park.

La California (1955), its very name reflecting American influence, is located on the east side of the city. It was designed as two neighborhoods. Designed as a neighborhood unit, La California Norte had community facilities distributed in two areas, "one of them for a church and school and the other one for a park" (Advertisement of La California 1953: 44). A library was eventually built in the park. The neighborhood unit was bounded by a freeway, arterial avenues, and a greenbelt separating it from an indus-

trial zone. La California Sur was not planned as a neighborhood unit.

Other neighborhoods, such as Cumbres de Curumo and Terrazas de Club Hípico, exhibit some of the main principles of the NU model in their original designs. However, when built, the all-important community facilities were reduced to recreational areas. Furthermore, Prados del Este and La Trinidad in the southeast part of the city were designed as "communities," or groupings of several neighborhood units, as promulgated in the PRC.

Neighborhood Units in Public Development[4]

In the public sector, the Banco Obrero employed the neighborhood unit as a design concept for public housing. The Banco Obrero was created by Venezuela's government in 1928 to provide housing for low-income families. It created the *Plan Nacional de la Vivienda* (*National Housing Plan*) and the Talleres de Arquitectura del Banco Obrero (Banco Obrero Architecture Workshops), to facilitate the development of numerous public housing complexes. The *National Housing Plan* projected the construction of more than twelve thousand housing units in four years (*Plan Nacional de la Vivienda* 1951). The Banco Obrero Architecture Workshops were groups of architects and engineers—many of whom had graduated from American schools or from the Universidad Central de Venezuela—who designed these residential projects. The late 1940s and 1950s was the most productive period for the Banco Obrero, during which it developed 111 residential subdivisions, of which 48 were located in Caracas (Villoria 1998).

Figure 3
Superbloques
Source: Villanueva and Pinto 2000

When the NU model was applied to public housing in Venezuela, more changes were made. The NUs built for the middle- and upper classes in Caracas were low-density; those built for lower-income groups were high-density complexes, comprised of multifamily buildings called *superbloques* (Figure 3).

Even though an original goal of Perry's NU model was to avoid high residential density, in Caracas this principle was often ignored in order to accommodate high numbers of poor people requiring shelter. The result was that only some of Perry's original principles survived in public housing developments. Nonetheless, their planners considered them neighborhood units.

In order to shelter Caracas's booming population, planners merged the NU idea with CIAM proposals for dense housing, seen most clearly in Le Corbusier's "Unite d'Habitation" in Marseilles. Le Corbusier's plan—high-rise housing complexes and

community facilities scattered over vast green areas—informed the design of most neighborhood units built by public housing authorities in Caracas. The high-density neighborhood units contained towers in super-blocks, with separated pedestrian and vehicular circulation accommodated in aerial hallways and curving streets. Community facilities such as schools, social centers, churches, retail stores and parks were located in the open spaces.

Rotival (1957) and others advocated for this type of development. Rotival stated that in an urban area of limited space, such as the Caracas valley, it was better to increase densities. Neighborhood units of low-density, single-family houses were appropriate only for the less-populated interior of the country. In addition, the large size of public housing complexes was the government's solution to achieving its policy of "extirpating" the *ranchos* (Tenreiro 1995). The clear objective of Caracas's officials was to replace all of the shantytowns with new modernist neighborhood units of one kind or another.

Conclusion

The Venezuelan application of the neighborhood unit model to private and public sector development had both negative and positive aspects. In both public and private cases, the model was stripped of its original social and political objectives, becoming just a functional and spatial template for efficiently organizing major urban components. However, public sector development did provide decent dwellings and minimum facilities to poor residents, something they had lacked previously. In the case of private

neighborhood units for the middle and upper classes, the new physical structure helped to define neighborhoods, providing identity and new venues for community activities. And, despite the fact that the NU model was largely stripped of its original democratic objectives intended to encourage collective social and political participation, central spaces for community association were in fact provided as part of the physical design program. Eventually, this amenity did contribute positively as space for community organizing, when the neighborhood movement flourished in the subsequent years of democracy in Venezuela after 1958.

In Caracas, problems applying the NU model in public housing schemes were more attributable to massive scale than to any shortcomings of the original model. In the case of private development, a weakness of the model for the middle and upper classes became evident: the assumption that community facilities would be used only by those living in that community. In the modern metropolis, higher levels of mobility (both physical and social) allowed more and more people to satisfy their individual needs based on preferences, not geographic location.

Another important facet of the implementation of the NU model in Venezuela was its two distinct versions, each based on geographic conditions. Caracas's density, topography and large poor population resulted in high-density complexes of multifamily housing. In the nation's interior, developments were more like urban extensions, with fewer geographic limitations, and sheltered those with the resources to

commute. There, low-density, low-scale neighborhood units were far more common (Mindur-Inavi 1986).

The application of the neighborhood unit concept in Caracas is instructive for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the merger of planning models, showing how ideas are carried to different regions and adapt to different contexts, and in particular, the American and European influences on Venezuelan planning. These different paradigms and practices helped to transform the Venezuelan landscape in ways that reflect its particular culture and past. Second, it sheds useful light on the little-known but important history of Caracas's urban development.

Endnotes

[1] Thanks to Renia Ehrenfeucht, Ashok Das, Todd Gish and the anonymous reviewers of *Critical Planning* for their assistance with this paper. Thanks also to Professor Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris for her valuable observations.

[2] Sert, together with Paul Lester Wiener and Paul Schulz, founded Town Planning Associates in 1945, a consulting firm that would plan several developments during the 1950s. Many of these were in South America: Ciudade dos Motores in Brasil (in which CIAM postulates were also merged with the NU model); Chimbote in Peru; Medellin in Colombia (with Le Corbusier as consultant); and Puerto Ordaz in Venezuela, among others. For more information on this see Freixa (1979).

[3] An important part of this research was the new identification of residential subdivisions built during the 1950s in Caracas. Our methodology included overlays of historical maps, review of periodicals from the period, and interviews with field researchers. We have included only a summary of our findings in this article.

[4] Details of the application of the model in Caracas are from in-depth interviews with five Venezuelan professionals of architecture and urbanism, who provided their theoretical and practical views on the subject. The people interviewed were: Arq-Urb. Victor Fossi; Arq. Tomas Sanabria; Arq. Juan Jose Martin Frechilla; Arq-Urb Dietrich Kunkel; and Arq-Urb Lorenzo Gonzalez Casas.

Illustration

"Superbloques" (figure on page 96) reprinted with permission from *Carlos Raúl Villanueva*, Tanais, Madrid 2000, English ed. by Princeton Architectural Press, German ed. by Birkhäuser Verlag, Italian ed. by Logos Art.

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NELLIANA VILLORIA-SIEGERT (nvillori@ucla.edu) is a master's student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA in the Community Development and the Built Environment concentration with international focus. This article is the product of a research project conducted in Caracas, Venezuela in 1998 as the author's undergraduate studies final thesis.

ARTURO ALMANDOZ (almandoz@usb.ve) was the thesis advisor in this research and is Associate Professor at the Urban Planning Department, Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas. His research fields include history and theory of modern planning in Latin America, the city and literature, and cultural studies.

Deep Ecological Planning: Ecocentrism, Bioregionalism and Planning Theory

Benjamin Stabler

In this paper, I argue for a deep ecological planning theory. To develop a deep ecological ethic for planning, this paper begins with a review of environmental ethics, focusing on the ecocentric arguments of deep ecology. It then provides an overview of the rational, advocacy and communicative planning models. Next, it describes how environmental ethics has been incorporated into planning theory, and finally, it discusses the ways in which deep ecology has been and could be integrated into planning through moral expansion and bioregionalist approaches.

Introduction

In the decade leading up to the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, people in many Western societies began to acknowledge their destruction of the earth. The annual State of the World report issued by the Worldwatch Institute comprehensively reviewed the current global environmental situation and concluded that the world is in a state of significant ecological decline (Brown et al. 2001). In order to surmount this environmental crisis, action must be taken to minimize the detrimental behavior of human beings. In an effort to formulate norms for a more ecologically-minded world, there has been a surge in the theoretical literature concerned with human-nature relations during the last thirty years.

Arguing for the ideological separation of "deep" and "shallow" environmentalism, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess coined the term "deep ecology" in the 1970s (Naess 1973; Sessions 1995a). Naess contrasted the "shallow" view of environmentalists who act in an anthropocentric way regarding the environment with those who act in an ecocentric way in their relations with the non-human world. Deep ecology is the strand of environmental philosophy, and way of life (Devall 1988), that has developed in association with this ecocentric worldview. It was popularized outside of Scandinavia during the 1980s by the US publication of *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered* by Devall and Sessions (1985) and by the radical environmental activism of Earth First! (Sessions 1995b).

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between the environmental ethic of deep ecology and the bases of planning theory, and to suggest a new, more ecological approach to planning. The paper will expand on what Innes (1995) refers to as substantive ethics, or broad socially embedded ethics, in planning.

Innes argues that the contemporary emphasis on communication, consensus building, discourse and practice in planning theory constitutes a new paradigm. Innes finds it essential for planners to be sensitive to whose values get represented and suggests that research on substantive ethics is an important contribution to the emerging paradigm.

To develop a deep ecological ethic for planning, this paper begins with a review of environmental ethics, focusing on the ecocentric arguments of deep ecology. It then provides an overview of the rational, advocacy and communicative planning models. Next, it describes how environmental ethics has been incorporated into planning theory, and it concludes with a discussion about the ways in which deep ecology has been and could be integrated into planning through moral expansion and bioregionalist approaches.

Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethics is concerned with conceptualizing the appropriate relationships among nature, animals and humans. It can be classified into shallow and deep environmentalism (Naess 1973). The shallow environmental view is characterized by efficiency (usually in neoclassical economic terms), utilitarianism, and considering non-human beings as a resource for human benefit. Popularized in 1907 by Gifford Pinchot, the first director of the U.S. Forest Service, the shallow environmental perspective is often associated with conservation or resource management. According to Pinchot, conservation in natural resource use means the greatest good to the greatest number of people for the longest time (Nash 1989).

In contrast, the deep ecology view values all life equally for its intrinsic worth. This includes ideas such as preserving natural areas, taking life only when necessary, developing an ecological consciousness, and believing that an ecosystem is "not just a collection of individuals but really an entity in its own right" (Singer 2000: 101). Naess argues the most important principle in life is equal opportunity for self-realization, or an equal chance for success, for all life forms (Naess 1995a). This deep ecological view is often associated with the early twentieth century preservationist and first president of the Sierra Club, John Muir. According to Sessions, in 1864 John Muir had a "pivotal experience" in a Canadian swamp (1995b: 165). While walking he came across rare white orchids in isolation from the human world and realized that living things have intrinsic value. This view was later encapsulated in Aldo Leopold's land ethic, first published in *A Sand County Almanac*, in which he argued that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (1949: 224-225).

In 1984, Naess and Sessions developed the basic platform of the deep ecology movement (Naess 1995b; see Table 1, overleaf). As with all moral doctrines, there are inconsistencies in the implementation of deep ecology. The platform raises three major questions. How do we define "vital" needs? Whose needs are justified? How do we implement deep ecological change to improve the relationship between human and non-human beings and to reduce destructive human practices? The absence of a satis-

Table 1
The Deep Ecology Platform

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population.

5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.

7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

Source: Naess (1995b: 68)

factory answer to the third question has caused the largely abstract deep ecological theory to be overlooked in planning literature (Beatley 1989; Beatley 1994; Harrill 1999a).

Devall (2001) and Sessions (1995b) argue that a paradigm shift from an industrial civilization to a new ecological worldview is required to avoid a planetary environmental crisis. In *Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology* (1988), Devall insists that as long humans think "me first," they will suffer. Instead, "when we put the vital needs of other beings above our narrowly conceived self-interest, then we discover that our broader and deeper needs are met in the context of meeting the needs of the 'other,' because we have broadened and deepened our self to

include the other into ourself" (Devall 1988: 2-3). It is exactly this inclusive broadening of our needs to include the "other" that is paramount to a new deep ecological planning.

To implement deep ecology, Devall suggests numerous lifestyle choices including buying products from one's own bioregion, reducing energy use, living simply and participating in bioregional actions. Devall expands on Naess' idea of living in mixed communities with other creatures such as wolves and sheep, arguing that in practical situations, individuals can kill others in self-defense, but not in economic defense (such as a farmer killing a wolf to save a sheep for economic reasons). He also supports policies such as the protection of wilderness areas and the contain-

ment urban expansion. Although Devall asserts that "we need more urban planners who are dedicated to the principles of deep ecology" (1988: 190), he does little to present a methodical approach to eco-fitting cities (Beatley 1994).

Critiques of Deep Ecology

Deep ecology has been criticized and often misunderstood to be misanthropic, or anti-human, rather than ecocentric, or valuing all life equally (Sessions 1995a). Shallow environmentalists consider deep ecology ineffective due to its radical departure from mainstream environmentalism and because it is difficult to quantify. The shallow argument holds that instrumental approaches are more effective in protecting the environment because deep ecology fails to demonstrate benefits to those who believe protecting the environment is counter to their interests (Beatley 1989).

Smith (2001) frames his critique of deep ecology within the debate between social constructivists and deep ecologists. Social constructivists find no truly intrinsic value or essential qualities in nature. According to deep ecologists, nature has essential qualities that helps shape how humans construct culture, society and nature. According to Smith, the either/or dualism between humans (the central concern in the shallow environmental view) and nature (the central concern in the deep ecology view) needs to be exchanged for a post-modern both/and ethic. Nonetheless, Singer (2000) argues that deep ecology is flawed in its aspiration to assign value to non-sentient creatures because such value is too difficult to calculate; ethics should remain confined to the interests of sentient creatures, present and future.

Other environmental ethical positions have been developed, including ecofeminism, social ecology and political ecology. Ecofeminists argue that the oppression of nature and women emanate from the same roots. These roots, which are manifested in oppressive structures, include excessive rationalism, dualistic thinking and hierarchy. Both women and nature are viewed as wild and irrational and, as a result, need to be controlled by the rationality of the human mind (Jacobs 1995). Ecofeminists maintain that the domination of nature is due, in large part, to androcentrism (Fox 1995).

Ecofeminism has many similarities to and differences from deep ecology. Most importantly, both argue that attitudes are key to improving the environment (Fox 1995; Jacobs 1995). Both ecofeminism and deep ecology attributes environmental destruction to a lack of appreciation and equality for the "other." But ecofeminists are quick to point out that deep ecology is too abstract, as its origins are in philosophy as opposed to empiricism. As a result, deep ecology neglects the social and political contexts such as race, class and gender that ecofeminists recognize (Jacobs 1995).

Social and political ecologists have also criticized deep ecology. Social ecologists, such as Murray Bookchin, argue that the roots of environmental, social and economic problems lie in the development of social hierarchy throughout human history: "The basic problems which pit society against nature emerge

from within social development itself – not between society and nature" (Bookchin 1990: 32). As a result, social ecologists believe that federations and local self-reliance will help curtail the environmental crisis.

Political ecologists argue that political relations between organizations such as nation states are the most significant factor in the environmental crisis. Consequently, improved relations, especially between developed and developing countries, would bring a significant improvement in global environmental health (Harrill 1999a). Deep ecologists respond to all these critiques by arguing that the emphasis on human-to-human relations is not the issue; rather, the emphasis should be on the dualistic relationship between human beings and other living things.

Another environmental ethic, bioregionalism, is an environmental practice concerned with how people live in and learn from a place. Its central tenet is to understand place and to live in harmony with the natural surroundings. An ethic based on bioregionalism can, as Carolyn Merchant suggests, be labeled an "ethical vernacular" because it stresses local over universal truths and bioregional relativistic knowledge (Cheney 1989; Devall 2001). Bioregionalism stresses local autonomy and decentralization. In contrast with ecofeminist, political and social ecological theories, which address societal relationships, bioregionalism offers a way to develop an applied deep ecology (Devall 1988). An ethic organized by deep ecology and largely informed by pragmatic bioregionalism will greatly contribute to building a more complete planning theory.

The Rational, Advocacy and Communicative Planning Models

Like environmental theory, planning theory has distinct strands. Advocates of the rational planning model, both the comprehensive (Kent 1964) and the incremental approaches (Lindblom 1959, 1979), argue that the planner should be a neutral rational-scientific technician, working outside the political realm as an advisor to decision makers. The comprehensive rational planner defines both the problems and the solutions, relies on extensive information about current conditions and future trends, and works for the public interest. The incremental planner defines the scope of the project much more narrowly and works through the planning process one step at a time, focusing on the immediate problems and, therefore, requiring less knowledge to make decisions.

Practitioners of the advocacy planning model, as described by Davidoff (1965) and practiced in a related form by Krumholz (1982), call for the planner to discard the neutral technician role and instead become a political advocate for those in need. Advocacy planning theories hold that the common public interest cannot be defined. Instead, the planner should work for one of the multiple public interests and promote participatory democratic planning. The planner is, in a sense, a public defender for the disadvantaged. Even though Davidoff's article is one of the most read pieces on planning theory in professional education (Klosterman 1981; Klosterman 1992), advocacy planning has had little impact on

professional practice, due in large part to its inability to achieve structural social justice.

Proponents of the communicative or consensus-building planning model (Forester 1989; Healey 1992a, 1992b; Innes 1995, 1996) argue, like advocacy and incremental planners, that planners alone cannot define the public interest. Rather, planners must work with representatives from multiple public interests to improve communicative practice and work through conversation to identify significant problems and the best solutions to those problems. The emphasis is on discourse and the ability to use discussion to work out solutions that benefit the most while minimizing the costs. Communicative planning requires interested parties to set aside adversarial methods, work toward consensus, and redistribute power so that all affected parties can be heard (Innes 1996). It focuses on practice and says little about substantive issues such as social justice or environmental degradation and ethics.

Environmental Ethics and Planning Theory

There are three seminal works that attempt to integrate environmental ethics and planning theory. Beatley (1989) presents a comprehensive review of the environmental ethics literature and attempts to relate it to planning theory. Although he covers the historical roots of environmental ethics, the human/nature dualism, conservation or preservation, and three ideas inspired by environmental ethics (the moral community, obligations to future generations, and biocentrism), he does not integrate environmental ethics with planning theory. He deliberately omits

building an environmental planning model since "in the end most moral decisions are some combination of logic and intuition" (Beatley 1989: 26). Furthermore, Beatley asserts that deep ecology is not a highly developed ethic; "rather it remains at a spiritual and intuitive level – referring to and drawing from, in a rather disorganized manner, a range of interdisciplinary literature and ideas" (Beatley 1989: 26). Thus, the planning and policy implications of deep ecology remain unclear. Beatley recommends a pluralistic, context-dependent method to incorporate environmental ethics into planning.

Picking up where Beatley leaves off, Jacobs (1995) explores the relationship between deep ecology, ecofeminism, and bioregionalism alongside comprehensive-rational, incremental and advocacy planning theory. Jacobs argues that because environmental ethics seeks to expand the scope of planning with its ecological systems view, it is more aligned with comprehensive planning than with incremental planning. According to Jacobs, ecofeminists could develop a more egalitarian planning process by emphasizing communication and validating moral and aesthetic knowledge. In addition, Jacobs asserts that deep ecologists have a connection with advocacy planners. Instead of social advocacy for disadvantaged people as Davidoff (1965) intended, deep ecologists would advocate for non-human beings.

Harrill (1999a) argues for a pragmatic approach as a way to link political ecology and planning theory. The social learning planning model could cultivate a sense of communalism toward one another and towards the earth. Furthermore, Harrill sees progressive eco-

logical planning as a mix of advocacy, negotiation and translation in the tradition of Friedmann's (1987) radical planning which emphasized self-empowerment, thinking without frontiers, recovering the wholeness of life, building coalitions and learning through mutual understanding. All these authors agree that bioregionalist thought criticizes planning theory for being too abstract and placeless and that it offers a more specific theory based on the experience of the unique spatial context (Jacobs 1995; Beatley and Manning 1997; Harrill 1999a).

Deep Ecological Planning: Synthesizing Deep Ecology and Planning Theory
A Moral Expansion Approach

The inability of theorists to connect deep ecology philosophy with practice has been a major roadblock in its incorporation into planning theory (Beatley 1989, 1994; Harrill 1999b). Because deep ecologists see the environmental problem as based on attitudes toward nature as opposed to laws or management strategies, changing the attitudes of human beings is the most important step to solving the environmental crisis (Jacobs 1995). The significant contribution that deep ecological theory can offer planning theory is the concept of expanding the moral community from the human to the non-human worlds (Beatley 1989; Jacobs 1995).

Nash (1989) argues that ethics have expanded over time to include those once outside the moral domain. A moral domain that includes nature is the next step (Figure 1, facing page). He observes that

force is often required to expand the moral community because certain groups benefit from the denial of rights to others; in this way, the actions of groups such as Earth First! could be seen as similar to those of the Underground Railroad and to those of the American colonialists. If we can look back and see that slavery was wrong, then we can look forward and suggest that ecological slavery is also wrong. Based on this view of social progress, the actions of radical environmentalists are potentially morally correct if the actions of participants in the Underground Railroad are now seen in that light. However, this is a risky argument to make, as it could be used to morally justify almost any action. Still, the moral community today continues to remain largely outside the domain of non-human life forms, especially non-sentient life such as trees and plants (Nash 1989).

Beatley (1994) offers three dimensions to defining the moral community: geographical, temporal and biological. The traditional and most common contemporary definition of the moral community is geographical—the city or state based on political boundaries and the rights of those who live within them. Recognition of the temporal definition of the moral community refers to a concern for future generations. The biological definition, the rights of non-human life forms, is the most controversial and can be understood according to Nash's (1989) concept of expanding the moral domain as the gradual logical extension to different beings over time.

The moral community is simply the ethical version of the public interest, a major theoretical concern for the field of planning theory. According to Innes

Figure 1
The Expanding Concept of Rights
Source: Nash (1989)

Nature
Endangered Species Act, 1973

Blacks
Civil Rights Act, 1957

Laborers
Fair Labor Standards, 1938

Native Americans
Indian Citizenship Act, 1924

Women
Nineteenth Amendment, 1920

Slaves
*Emancipation
Proclamation, 1863*

American Colonists
*Declaration of
Independence, 1776*

English Barons
Magna Carta, 1215

Natural Rights

(1996), planning through consensus-building approximates the public interest. Under planning as consensus-building, the planner does not independently know the public interest; rather, the parties involved in the process, assuming all the parties are represented, define an approximate it. But the deep ecology critique asks who represents the voice of nature in the consensus-building process—who speaks for the trees?

Deep ecology can be taught through environmental education. Sarkissian (1996) proposes an environmental education model that emphasizes teamwork, direct experience of nature, grounding in community, the study of environmental ethics and new literacies through alternative ways of being, knowing and acting/teaching. Sandercock (1998) adapts Sarkissian's model into a five-dimensional model of ecological literacy for planners. This resembles Beatley and Manning's (1997) ethic for sustainable places (see Table 2, overleaf), an ethic which on their account requires environmental education.

A Bioregionalist Approach

Bioregionalism represents the most likely application of deep ecological principles to planning practice. Harrill (1999a) outlines five general principles of bioregional planning. First, avoid planning projects that disorient community residents or that disengage people from place. Second, practice ecological restoration as a regular planning activity. Third, promote "organic" design that protects the spirit of place as opposed to imposing an artificial sense of place. Fourth, facilitate bioregional networks and local wa-

tersheds councils, communities and cities. Finally, promote community "storytellers" in order to preserve the customs of the bioregion through written and oral history.

According to Harrill, bioregionalism can also combat global capitalism—an environmentally destructive force—and its ability to flow across political boundaries. Bioregionalism acts as an alternative by restricting capitalistic activities through territorial geography, based on ecology and carrying capacities; bioregional communities can also become self-sufficient as a way to avoid dependence on the whims of the global market (Harrill 1999a).

Friedmann, one of the early planning theorists to suggest participatory regional reconstruction of social institutions, acknowledges ecological connections, and recognizes that the "environment can no longer be subordinate to man; it has to be accepted as a partner" (1973: 225). Friedmann emphasizes

mutual learning as a planning method. Mutual learning requires frequent dialogue through face-to-face relations founded on trust. This informal person-centered theory of "transactive planning" must be self-organized in small groups to be successful. But Friedmann recognizes the limits of complete decentralization and instead suggests a "cellular structure" of working groups, or planners, based on mutual learning, which could be networked to facilitate social learning through dialogue.

Friedmann (1987) also argues that radical planners must disengage themselves from the dominant power structure, instead focusing on mutual learning through communicative acts between small action groups carrying out participatory planning. In addition, he suggests recentering political life on the household and the recovery of political community at the household, regional, peasant periphery and global levels. In order to tame capitalism at the re-

Table 2
A New Ethic for Sustainable Places

Current Ethic	Ethic of Sustainable Places
Individualism, selfishness	Interdependence, community
Shortsightedness, present-oriented ethic	Farsightedness, future-oriented ethic
Greed, commodity-based	Altruism
Parochialism, atomistic	Regionalism, extra-local
Material, consumption-based	Nonmaterial, community-based
Arrogance	Humility, caution
Anthropocentrism	Kinship

Source: Beatley and Manning (1997: 195)

gional level, Friedmann argues that planners must work to extend political territory to economic territory by creating regional governments, and work for greater self-reliance by developing small businesses and community-based services and by recovering public spaces, especially the streets. Finally, Friedmann underscores the interdependencies between humans and the environment: "The environmental harm that already has been inflicted on humanity...requires the most urgent attention as a problem of global proportions" (1987: 384). Friedmann's ideas on the regional nexus as an arena for the recovery of the political community are closely related to bioregional planning. The integration of deep ecology, bioregionalism and communicative planning with an emphasis on ecological education represents a promising environmental direction for planning theory.

Conclusion

Deep ecological planning is based on critical self-reflection of fundamental norms, especially anthropocentric ones (Healey 1992b). It conceptualizes a truly representative consensus-building as an approximation of the ecologically conceived public interest with an emphasis on bioregional ways of knowing. As with communicative planning, dialogue in egalitarian situations for mutual social learning is fundamental. Not only is it the task of the planner to work to limit the amount of "misinformation" in consensus-building (Forester 1989) between human groups, but also to limit the amount of "misinfor-

mation" being transmitted between human beings concerning the non-human world.

Planners can work to integrate ecocentrism into practice based on bioregional ideas such as regional government, Sarkissian's model of ecological literacy, Beatley and Manning's new ethic of sustainable places, and by fostering a better sense of the uniqueness of place. The key to changing people's attitudes is education, especially pragmatic learning, since environmental change on the "outside" is only possible with ethical change on the "inside."

Deep ecological planning's most useful aspect is its emphasis on interconnectedness. This paradigm shift toward equality and sustainability is only possible once humans, and specifically planners, recognize themselves as partners with the rest of nature and are informed and educated in ecological ways. The longer humans practice unsustainable and inequitable planning, the more difficult it will be to curb the environmental crisis. There is hope; shallow environmentalism is now part of the political agenda of most nations (Devall 2001). But the ecological paradigm shift that deep ecology calls for has yet to take place.

Historically, planning theory has been concerned largely with providing stability, or social harmony, with the underlying assumption of economic growth and increased consumption for humans (Harvey 1996). Deep ecological theory, with the help of practical bioregionalism, brings to light the excessively anthropocentric focus of planning theory, and recommends the construction of a new deep ecologi-

cal planning theory with space for human and non-human alike.

Deep ecology faces numerous challenges. Who is empowered to speak for the rights of animals in the decision-making process? At the very least, it would have to be a human who is dedicated to deep ecology who could be trusted to speak for the animals—for example, the rights of deer and mountain lions in growth management planning. And, as Singer (2000) suggests, at first deep ecologists may have to settle for a representative of sentient creatures only.

But if sustainable planning is ever to be achieved, many of the principles of deep ecology need to be taken more seriously by the planning community. As long as humans consider themselves above non-humans, the pillage of earth will continue, and ultimately our consumption-driven lifestyle will come to a halt. Once planners recognize their deeper connections in the ecological matrix, planning will become more sustainable and representative of an ecologically-conceived public interest.

Illustrations
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BENJAMIN STABLER (benstabler@yahoo.com) is a graduate student in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Akron in Ohio. His research interests include environmental ethics, community technology, and urban and regional planning.

Postmodernism and Planning Models

Sonia A. Hirt

Postmodern thought has influenced most fields of intellectual activity, including planning. In this article, I analyze the impact of postmodern effects on the urban planning models that challenge the established dominance of comprehensive rationalism. I develop a progressive postmodern framework which continues modernism's humanistic premise but poses a major challenge to modernist epistemology. I then use the framework to analyze the extent to which existing planning models, from advocacy to communicative planning, carry a progressive postmodern potential for social betterment through inclusionary processes.

Introduction

In his latest book, *The Postmodern Urban Condition* (2000), Michael Dear regrets that there is overall apathy among planning theorists to challenges posed by postmodern thought.[1] Though explicit debate linking planning and postmodernism may be limited, I contend that the substantial changes which have occurred in planning thought over the last few decades have emerged, albeit quietly, from the intellectual currents of postmodernism. However, the competing planning models that have developed have a conflicted relation to the basic premises of postmodern thought and all carry a noticeably modernist component. Despite postmodernist claims that postmodernism makes a radical break with modernism, in most fields, including planning, the relationship between the two has been largely one of relative continuity.

This article examines to what extent the evolution of planning models is linked to the basic intellectual premises of postmodern thought. Is there postmodernism in planning? Is planning up to speed with intellectual developments in other disciplines? Exploring this linkage provides a better understanding of where planning stands as a profession in the context of broader cultural changes and what directions planners might follow in the future.

I begin with a discussion about postmodernity and modernity. I use this to develop a definitional framework for a progressive postmodernism based on the expansion of the humanistic premise of modernism but with a revision of its epistemological foundation. Next, I provide a brief survey of some influential planning models and I analyze each model explicitly in terms of its relation to progressive postmodern principles.

The Modern and the Postmodern

The terms modernity, postmodernity, modernism and postmodernism have been interpreted in many ways. Dear (2000) distinguishes between two types of postmodernism. The first is postmodernism as an epoch or as a periodizing concept signifying a new transitional era in which a number of interrelated socio-economic, political and cultural changes occur simultaneously. The second type is postmodernism as method, an intellectual shift in viewing the world that moves away from modernist intellectual conventions—humanity's ostensibly linear historic progress or the supposed ultimate truth of scientific laws (Dear 2000). In either case, according to Dear, postmodernism goes beyond its narrowest interpretation as only a particular aesthetic style in the arts, most notably in architecture. I accept Lyon's (1994) distinction between postmodernity and postmodernism: postmodernity signifies a socio-historic condition or era and postmodernism signifies the dominant cultural condition with which it corresponds.

As a cultural paradigm, modernism dates back to the fifteenth century (Berman 1982; Jencks 1986) and came into prominence during the eighteenth century, in the period referred to as the Enlightenment (Harvey 1990). Modernist ideology sought to "discover that which is universal and eternal through the scientific method and human creativity, in order to dominate natural forces and thereby liberate people from irrational and arbitrary ways" (Ellin 1996: 105; see also Harvey 1990). The ultimate goal was to break away from the unjust and chaotic past in pursuit of freedom and progress. In the words of Jurgen Habermas, modernism, or

> the project of modernity as it was formulated by the philosophers of the enlightenment . . . consists in the relentless development of the objectivating sciences, of the universalistic foundations of morality and law, and of autonomous art, all in accord with their own immanent logic. But at the same time it also results in releasing the cognitive potentials accumulated in the process . . . and attempting to apply them in the sphere of the praxis, that is, to encourage the rational organization of social relations. Partisans of the enlightenment . . . could still entertain the extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would not merely promote the control of the forces of nature, but also to further understanding of self and world, the progress of morality, justice in social institutions, and even human happiness. (1996: 45)

This suggests that modernism is based on two distinct premises. The first is its epistemological premise, resting on an objectively existent and knowable reality whose laws could be uncovered through the power of human reason. This epistemology resulted in the production of "objectively" or scientifically-obtained postulates with claims to a fixed, universal truth or meta-narrative (Lyotard 1979).

The second is its humanistic or social emancipation proposition.[2] Human reason could be used to effect material change. This elicited a commitment to a continuous struggle for human betterment and liberation "rooted in the capacity of individuals to be moved by human suffering as to remove its causes, to give meaning to the principles of equality, justice

and freedom," and to enable humanity to overcome material and ideological types of domination (Giroux 1991:71). Though the betterment of the human condition has remained a constant effort through all human history, it was not until the birth of Enlightenment philosophy that the pursuit of human betterment became not just means towards an end but an end in itself (Scott 1998).

Postmodern Critiques of Modernism

The two premises of modernism, epistemological and humanistic, may be labeled modernist means and the modernist ends. Modernism is commonly lambasted today, but the critiques focus on the faults of its epistemology, that is, the failure of the means (positivist knowledge creation) to deliver the ends (social emancipation), rather than on the relevancy of the ends. Scholars debate whether such modernist means were ever capable of accomplishing emancipatory ends or whether they were inherently flawed and predisposed to produce only top-down, totalitarian outcomes. In the 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) argued that Enlightenment prescriptions had been predestined to lead to oppression, not emancipation, while defenders of the modernist project, such as Berman (1982), Harvey (1990) and Habermas (1996), assert that oppression arose not from modernist means but from faulty application.

It is the challenge to modernist epistemology and its search for absolute, singular truths (that is, the challenge to the modernist means) that defines the essence of a postmodern approach. Postmodernism represents an increased interest in what is subjective, local, particular, contextual and pragmatic; it emphasizes the voices of "others," groups excluded by modernist totalizing discourses: women, nature, the colonized and the disadvantaged (see Huyssen 1986; Spretnak 1997). It is "deconstructive" in the sense of incessantly questioning modernist conventions, "antifoundationalist in the sense of dispensing with universals as bases for truth," "nondualistic" in the sense of refusing to impose an absolute split between fact and value, and it encourages "plurality and difference" (Milroy 1991: 183). Thus, postmodernism strikes at the very core of modernist epistemology.

The shortcomings of the modernist epistemological program, however, need not detract from the relevance of the modernist humanistic premise. Should the social emancipation premise of modernism be abandoned as well, we run the risk of being co-opted in nihilism. Critiques of postmodernism have claimed that, taken to its extreme, the doubt in the existence of any objective reality, of any unifying truth, may lead directly to nihilism, moral relativity and inability to work towards social justice since no common notion of social justice could be agreed upon (Harvey 1990, 1996). Thus, critics have accused postmodern philosophy of abandoning the modernist social emancipation project.

This is the dilemma: on one side, postmodernists question authority and domination with the intent to further liberation; on the other, they deny the possibility of a coherent struggle for liberation by rejecting the possibility of any unified concept of domi-

nation or liberation (Harvey 1990, 1996). This internal contradiction enables postmodern rhetoric to be used for both liberal and conservative purposes and explains why postmodernism has been heavily criticized by both the left and the right (Dear 2000). The conflict between postmodernism and modernism has become a source of concern in planning. The state of planning theory has been described as ambiguous, stuck between modernity and postmodernity (Beauregard 1996), in an "abyss" (Beauregard 1991; Harper and Stein 1995) or being reduced to "weightlessness" (Milroy 1991).

A Progressive Postmodernism

I define a progressive postmodernism as one that represents a major challenge to modernist totalizing, often utopian, discourse obsessed with scientific rationality and singularly right prescriptions of how to build a "brave new world," but does not reject its humanist principles. With respect to epistemology, it challenges modernism's objectifying, positivistic, generalizing premise, and replaces it with a more holistic, open-ended theory of knowledge with focus on the partial, the particular, the historic and the local (see Jencks 1986). It subscribes to a notion that knowledge is not objective but rather socially constructed.

Progressive postmodernism continues the modernist social emancipation premise by expanding the very notion of social emancipation to explicitly include the perspectives of those that a modernist ideology has ignored: women, nature, the underrepresented, the colonized, non-westerners and minorities. The postmodernist ideology acknowledges these groups' rights to freedom, as each defines it, rather than their inclusion as small, acquiescent parts of a monolithic society.

To accomplish this, the emancipatory agenda must shift from liberating society en masse toward the complex co-existence of many fragmented agendas for liberating smaller groups. The dictate of a singular, prescriptive definition for a unitary common good is insufficient. In this sense, postmodernism can be interpreted as the ultimate development of the search for individuation which originated during the Enlightenment (Giddens 1990; Inglehart 1997). This definition of a progressive postmodernism will serve as the theoretical framework for evaluating the progressive postmodern potential of existing planning models.

Modernism and Postmodernism in Planning

Most planners could point to examples of postmodern architecture while being unable to say how this paradigm has been important to planning thought (Milroy 1993). So, it is not surprising that a well-known planning history has been written without discussing the term (Hall 1989), or that its author claims that the term is not very useful in understanding planning's intellectual evolution (Hall 1988). Postmodernism is generally seen as an import from architecture (Hemmens 1992) and theorists in that field claim that "architects have been the ones to generate visions of change" (Ellin 1996: 88). Further, planners have been accused of not paying enough attention to contemporary intellectual developments

in social theory (Dear 2000) or the humanities (Dakin 1993). However, the combination of postmodern thought and planning is not new (see also Fainstein 1996, 2000; Milroy 1993).[3]

To define postmodernism in planning, it is first necessary to define modernism in the same context. Modernist planning is generally associated with large-scale utopian attempts to discipline the urban environment and organize it into formal social and spatial order through a comprehensive rational process (Boyer 1983). The comprehensive rational model embraces identifying problems, articulating goals and objectives, identifying opportunities and constraints, designing courses of action, projecting outcomes, and evaluating alternatives (Alexander 1986). The ultimate product is the master plan—planning's modernist meta-narrative (Beauregard 1996).

Modernist planners have assumed a reality which can be controlled and perfected, a reality whose internal logic can be uncovered and manipulated through the application of rational and scientific principles (Beauregard 1996). This methodology provided legitimacy to the planning profession in several ways. It permitted: the claim of impartial reasoning, which can serve as basis for a just actions claim (Healey 1997); freedom from any special-interested biases (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996); and transcendence over the fragmented and conflicted interests of capital, labor and state (Beauregard 1996). Thus, planners in this model viewed themselves as value-free technocrats, able to stand back and away from competing interests and to offer a comprehensive prescription of how to pursue a common public good. Operating within the most progressive methods of the time, planners became "priests of rationality" (Boyer 1983: 285), able to envision, because of their unique expertise and critical distance, a supposedly objective and singularly defined, monolithic public good.

Comprehensive rationalism may be the only model to have ever truly dominated the planning profession. Its elevated status was maintained until the 1960s (Alexander 1986; Beauregard 1996); since then, its merits have been consistently under attack. While it continues to wield powerful influence in planning (Baum 1996; Dalton 1986), the rational model has been forced for several decades to compete with several alternative models, each based on a particular critique of comprehensive rationalism.

These alternative models stem from a soul-searching professional crisis brought about by growing mistrust of the modernist approach. Planning experienced the breakdown of its dominant paradigm starting in the early 1960s (Beauregard 1996; Hall 1989)—during the same period that it occurred in architecture (Ellin 1996; Jencks 1986) and a similar "legitimacy crisis" occurred in many fields (Habermas 1975). Jane Jacobs (1961) launched her famous attack on the practices of city planning at that time, and the first two influential alternatives to the comprehensive rational model, disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom 1959, 1965) and advocacy planning (Davidoff 1965), were introduced. The term postmodernism may be an import, but for years its

underlying concepts have played an integral part in challenging modernism's dominance in planning.

Alternative Planning Models

In this section I will discuss the major approaches which have arisen to challenge the modernist rational planning model: advocacy planning, disjointed incrementalism, strategic planning, radical planning, and communicative planning. To what extent do these alternatives offer a progressive postmodernist approach? Or, are they only minor revisions of modernism?

Advocacy Planning

Davidoff's (1965) classic work on advocacy and pluralism in planning is considered one of the early postmodern challenges to comprehensive rationalism (Dear 2000; Ellin 1996; Hall 1989). Davidoff argued that it is impossible for the planner to be entirely neutral and value-free, and because values and interests of various groups in society inevitably differ, attempts at neutrality should be abandoned. Instead planners should become aware of their values as well as those of the different groups. In this case, society is not a cohesive whole whose common good can be objectively determined to reach a "right" solution. Planning provides room for the expression of pluralistic and conflicting social values and interests. Planners, much like lawyers, would serve as advocates for client groups from communities who want their interests pursued. Each client group could have its own plan prepared with the aid of planner-consultants. The final plan would be formulated through democratic debate over alternatives prepared by the different groups.

In its emphasis on promoting social justice, advocacy planning clearly represents a continuation of the humanistic commitment of modernism and, further, it expands it precisely in the manner of a progressive postmodern model; it purposefully includes those previously excluded. The advocacy model abandons the abstract modernist notion of a singular truth—here, a single common good—and acknowledges the multiplicity of competing values and conflicts (Dear 2000; Ellin 1996; Hall 1989). However, each of the plans assembled by competing groups would be prepared through a rational comprehensive process, with advocacy planners applying conventional methods within the new context of a specific client group (Hemmens 1992). In this sense, advocacy planning offers only a multi-party adjustment to modernist planning (Healey 1997).

Disjointed Incrementalism

Another important critique of the comprehensive rational model came from Charles Lindblom (1959, 1965). He argued that policies should be advanced by trial and error rather than through comprehensive planning—through pursuing practical problems in small steps rather than grand goals in large steps. Lindblom's critique focuses on two basic premises: that it is doubtful that political decision-making truly follows policy prescriptions developed through comprehensive rational planning; and that it is unlikely that planners or other experts will ever be intellectually capable, or have enough information, to perfectly understand situations in their full complexity. Here,

Lindblom rejects planners' attempts to dedicate full consideration to all alternative solutions. Rather, he proposes that planners concentrate on a few possible strategies, none very different from the status quo. Groups choose between the alternatives by evaluating the marginal differences instead of considering each alternative as a whole, separate program. Lindblom's unwillingness to significantly challenge any status quo has brought a critique of conservative bias; indeed, disjointed incrementalism has been labeled non-planning by some theorists (Alexander 1986; Fainstein and Fainstein 1996).

Nonetheless, disjointed incrementalism does exhibit some postmodern nuances—it questions the wisdom of comprehensive rational decision-making and unitary solutions to complex problems. Yet, does it advance a social emancipation premise? The model might simply advance the same old technical type of decision-making, but at a more modest, micro-economic level, and by doing so, it would represent only a "market adjustment" to modernism (Healey 1997: 24). I doubt that a return to Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the free market involves any progressive social emancipation component. Thus, it remains rational planning—less utopian, more pragmatic, but still technical and positivist.

Radical Planning

If disjointed incrementalism represented a political right turn for planning, it was counterbalanced by a number of proposals during the 1970s and 1980s to dramatically reform the status quo. These movements grew out of concern for persistent and deep social failures, such as poverty and racism. While sharing the concern of advocacy planners for marginalized groups, radical planners insisted upon working outside or even in direct opposition to the political system (Friedmann 1993, 1996). The emancipation and social mobilization potential of planning would be realized through critical theory, Marxism, feminism and other forms of radical thought and practice. The role of radical planners was to employ whatever measures necessary to assist disadvantaged groups in their struggle for self-empowerment and liberation.

Radical planning called for decentralized, local and contextual agendas. In this sense, it is planning in a non-positivist, "non-Euclidian" mode (Friedmann 1993: 482), and therefore progressively postmodern. Yet, it remains to be seen how a radical agenda where planners act as free-lance agents could be carried out in practice. Would radical planners join the institutions they had helped to subvert, or would they continue to act in opposition? This is perhaps why there are few radical planner practitioners (Alexander 1986) and why radical planning retains some modernist components.

Strategic Planning

During the 1980s, in response to decreasing public funds, another idea took root in planning theory and practice—strategic planning. This approach imports techniques developed in the corporate and military world to public planning practice. Strategic planning, unlike comprehensive planning, does not aspire to an abstract public good, but rather sets up specific and attainable goals and focuses on their implemen-

tation. For strategic planners, communities exist in a competitive environment and must actively compete for resources (Kaufman and Jacobs 1996).

Strategic planning, similar to disjointed incrementalism, is indeed more pragmatic and less utopian than classic modernism. However, instead of being driven by an abstract common good, it focuses on immediately attainable, narrow goals. But the goals are related to economic growth—certainly not an archetypal postmodern priority (Inglehart 1997)—and strategic planning fails to pursue emancipatory ends.

Communicative Planning

Contributions to planning theory in the late 1980s and 1990s have come from a group engaged in a theoretical discourse with the critique of the Enlightenment-modern project developed by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas and the American pragmatists John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Although Habermas advocated for the continuation of the "unfinished project of modernity" (1996), he launched a devastating critique of its epistemological foundations. He chastised the modernist replacement of a holistic theory of knowledge with a narrow philosophy of science, which often served to veil the basis for decision-making behind an obscure abstract rationality (Habermas 1968). In lieu of this modernist rationality Habermas (1984) developed a theory of communicative reason: he argued for an alternative rationality in which claims are justified, priorities identified and strategies chosen based not on abstract scientism but on interaction and public debate.

Among planning theorists building upon the work of Habermas, the most notable are Forester (1989, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1999), Healey (1996, 1997) and Innes (1996, 1999; Innes and Davis 1999a, 1999b). Their proposed models could be placed under a broad umbrella of a "communicative turn" in planning theory which advocates for substituting the concept of socially constructed reality for the technocratic view of an objective reality. Communicative planners view planning as a form of communicative action. They emphasize the process of plan-making rather than the plan. Planning becomes a social-learning and culture-building experience which produces a system of shared meanings between planners and the public. Proponents of the communicative model emphasize its capability of mobilizing the creative and self-empowering potential of a community.

It appears that communicative planning is the only model which achieves both objectives of a new progressive postmodernism. It continues the social emancipation project of modernism by facilitating a bottom-up planning process in which the planner empowers different voices and enables pluralistic discourse. The communicative model also revises the modernist epistemology by treating plan-making as a social-learning process—an open-ended, two-way dialogue between community members and planners, rather than as a top-down prescription.

An important question remains, however. Does the seeking of consensus actually end up eliminating important differences that postmodernism would rather accept and even celebrate? Innes (1996), a lead-

ing proponent of consensus-building planning, advocates the retention of comprehensive planning by pursuing a unitary common good through a process of dialogue rather than through the application of technical rationality. While the substitution of dialogue for rationality is consistent with a postmodernist epistemology, a unitary common good may not be. In addition, the consensus-building planner would serve as a disinterested facilitator among different constituent groups, pursuing consensus without contributing views and values in the process. This disinterested, neutral role for the planner is reminiscent of modernist thinking (Allmendinger 2001; Fainstein 2000). Lastly, consensus-building may bring out the more regressive features of postmodernism: people might arrive at consensus on smaller and vague items rather than effecting concrete structural changes. Such an outcome would maintain the status quo rather than advance the social emancipation agenda.

Conclusion

Whether or not we choose to use the term postmodernism to describe recent turns in planning theory, it is evident that such intellectual currents have been informing planning thought for several decades. Planning practitioners and theorists shy away from the term because postmodernism is often interpreted narrowly—as merely an aesthetic style—or it is associated with an extreme, potentially nihilistic relativism. A much more useful interpretation of postmodernism might be a method to counter the modernist belief in scientific objectivity and to intro-duce the notion that knowledge and expertise are imperfect, shifting social constructs.

In this article, I have argued for a progressive type of postmodernism to challenge modernism's scientific, positivist epistemology, but also to carry on modernism's humanistic premise—by expanding its definition of social emancipation to explicitly include the voices of "others" long excluded from modernist totalizing discourses. I suggest that all planning models which challenge comprehensive rationalism incorporate at least some postmodern intellectual currents. However, the analysis also uncovers conflicting evidence: all the discussed models carry a strong modernist component as well. Thus, the effect of progressive postmodern thought on planning models is still very much a work in progress.

Endnotes

[1] Dear (2000) claims that only a dozen articles on the subject have been published in major journals over the last fifteen years.

[2] Along similar lines, Giroux (1991) argues for a political component of modernism and Harper and Stein (1995) for a liberal component.

[3] These include but are not limited to Harvey (1990, 1996), Soja (1989, 2000), Boyer (1983), Ellin (1996), Dear (1986, 2000), and Allmendinger (2001) but Harvey, Soja and Dear come from the field of urban geography. Also, Sandercock (1998) has contributed to the rewriting of planning history by telling the stories of groups long excluded from traditional modernist narratives.

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SONIA A. HIRT (sangelo@umich.edu) is a doctoral candidate in urban planning at the University of Michigan. Her areas of interest and expertise include urban planning and urban design history and theory, comparative urbanizations, quantitative and qualitative research methods, and housing patterns.

Bureaucracy and Housing for the Poor in India

Ashok Das

This paper examines the aspects of bureaucratic organization and culture that interfere with the provision of housing for the urban poor in India. It traces the rise of bureaucracy in India and, through the examples of three housing projects for squatters, describes the ways in which the regressive bureaucratic culture of public agencies impeded their successful implementation.

Introduction

Since independence in 1947, the Indian government has adopted a welfarist role and recognized the need to provide housing access to the poor. Housing policy has been incorporated beginning with the earliest development plans, and since the 1980s it has become increasingly comprehensive and participatory. Nonetheless, the actual construction of housing stock for the poor has been minimal.

The general failure of housing projects has been associated with top-down bureaucratic structures, a lack of political will and official commitment, and the high-handedness of government officials. However, even in instances where the central state has taken a reformist stance by empowering local governments and people, reducing its own role in decision-making, and enabling the involvement of the private sector and NGOs, the results have been unsatisfactory (Chauhan and Lall 1999). The problem is not simply policy flaws; it is the structure of bureaucracy.

In this article, I attempt to explain the ways in which bureaucratic agencies impede the implementation of housing policies and programs in India. I first describe the origins of Indian bureaucracy. Next, I provide an overview of Indian housing policy in India. I then use three housing projects for squatters as examples to describe some dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy in Indian housing policy. Finally, I discuss the inherent qualities of bureaucracies that lead to these problems.

The Origins and Growth of the Indian Bureaucracy

Bureaucratic administration was forcibly imposed upon Indian society during British colonization, beginning with the governance of the East India Company in the early eighteenth century. Subsequently, the Government of India Act invested the British crown with the responsibility for Indian administration in 1858 (Misra 1977). This growth of bureaucracy in India in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries corresponded with the theoretical development of the concept of bureaucracy in Europe.

Theoretical roots of bureaucracy were developed in the writings of Hegel, Marx, Mosca and, most importantly, Weber. It is Weber's theories that modern bureaucracies most closely resemble (Misra 1977). Weber's ideal bureaucracy had seven main characteristics. First, public bureaucracies have fixed jurisdictional boundaries generally ordered by laws or administrative regulations. Second, they have well defined hierarchies characterized by an ordered system of superordination and subordination. Third, the management of a bureaucracy is based upon written documents such as standard operating procedures, or decision rules, designed to assure that administrative procedures survive incompetence, dishonesty, and departure or death of functionaries.

The fourth characteristic of an ideal bureaucracy is a clear division of labor to reduce duplication of effort. Fifth, the management of bureaucratic offices presupposes expert training as personnel are selected and promoted based on their technical competence, professional experience and education. Sixth, officials are remunerated with fixed salaries based on rank. Finally, the full working capacity of the individual is required, regardless of officially delimited obligatory time (Gerth and Mills 1958; Misra 1977). Weber considered the bureaucratic process inevitable and rational– precision, speed, reliability, discipline, continuity and uniformity then became its common features (Misra 1977).

Between 1858 and 1919, colonial India developed a rational bureaucracy. Rationalization, characterized by the classic ideals of proper selection based on meritocracy, grading, and clear division of labor, was necessitated by the extension of the state's activities:

> Rationalization meant an emphasis on the codification of law and procedural rigidity, which tended to invest public administration with an element of predictability. Its natural corollary was 'red-tapism' and the centralization of bureaucratic control, which in turn tried to reduce to uniformity every process of decision-making. This in fact was a period of 'bureaucratic despotism' which at every level tightened the chain of subordination (Misra 1977: 91).

Rationality, however, was absent in the social aspect of the process. The British restricted the entry of Indians to administrative jobs while India's caste system restricted its own lower class people as well. The bureaucracy invested itself with an aura of elitism and power. This inequity made the poor wary of the bureaucracy. Following independence in 1947, India retained the colonial bureaucratic structure.

The stagnancy of India's bureaucracy has lead to numerous problems. It is huge and hierarchical, and

corruption is a widespread problem that people have learned to tolerate. Due to inadequate mechanisms for redress or accountability, citizens have devised ways to circumvent bureaucratic procedures or to minimize interaction with public agencies. In addition, there has been excessive interference of politics in administration (S. Das 2001). Nevertheless, almost all services and industries have been under public control, and housing and socioeconomic development for the poor have remained the state's responsibility (Pugh 1990).

An Overview of Housing Policy in India

The central (federal) government became involved in housing policy soon after India's independence. In 1950, a planning commission was created which developed a series of five-year plans (the first in 1951) to integrate and direct national economic and social development. Through them, the central government adopted numerous housing strategies. During the second (1956-61) and third (1961-66) five-year plans, it adopted a slum eradication policy, which was intended to uproot slum dwellers from illegally occupied urban land. This was attempted in several cities without success. By the fifth plan (1974-79) the slum eradication policy had been changed to a "sites and services" program, which provided affordable access to titled land with basic infrastructure and allowed beneficiaries to build dwellings over an extended period. This policy was adopted because the central government realized that it was beyond its financial means to provide housing for squatters (Bhattacharya 1990).

In 1988, during the seventh five-year plan period, the government passed the National Housing Policy (NHP). The NHP laid out objectives and strategies aimed at helping the homeless and inadequately housed. In India, housing provided by the private sector is accessible only to high- and middle-income households. Despite the large numbers of people who live in slums, government-created housing accounts for less than five percent of total housing each year (Pugh 1990).

Currently, an estimated forty to fifty percent of the population of India's three largest cities, New Delhi, Bombay, and Calcutta, live in slums, with equally high percentages in the smaller cities. Despite the succession of five-year plans, the slums are grossly deficient in basic services and infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, health, education, and productive economic incentives (Thakur 1998). Most of these people are employed in the informal sector, outside the legal or tax framework (Pugh 1990; Nangia and Thorat 2000).

The NHP recognized the need to improve living conditions in slums through the provision of sanitation and basic amenities; to invest in housing to increase and maintain the nation's housing stock; and to make the system more effective through improved access to land by removing legal, financial, and administrative barriers. It also promoted strong partnerships among the private, public and cooperative sectors. To achieve its objectives, the NHP identified several strategies for implementation, of which prime ones are to support cooperative and group

housing activities and to institutionalize the participation of non-governmental organizations (Bhattacharya 1990). In addition, the NHP created a National Housing Bank to mobilize capital for housing and to act as an intermediary between state housing institutions and the capital market.

The responsibility for the operational aspects of public housing belongs to the state governments. The central government supports public housing at the state level through the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO). HUDCO finances low-interest loans for housing construction and reviews state applications for public housing support. HUDCO is autonomous and has managed to protect itself from the frictions of intergovernmental relations (Pugh 1990). Most other aspects of housing, such as utility provision, drainage and sanitation are the responsibility of the central government. The World Bank has also operated directly in projects in the states, encouraging and practicing innovation, which in turn influenced central policy developments in the 1980s.

In 1991, the Indian government launched a landmark program called Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP). UBSP brought together a wide range of individual programs dealing with the physical, social and economic aspects of poverty, with the aim of organizing on the basis of community involvement (Diacon 1997). The program has been strengthened with the passing of the 74th Amendment Act to the Indian Constitution in 1992 which devolves decision-making power to ward-level committees.[1]

Because of the limited success of "sites and services," the central government disbanded old housing delivery systems and, instead, encouraged decentralized housing delivery by NGOs and the private sector (UNCHS 1990). The NGOs act as binding agents between governmental agencies, market agents and future residents, because they are not profit-driven and are more knowledgeable about the needs of the people than government agencies are. Private sector involvement makes projects financially feasible and reduces the burden on the government. Several projects in recent times have experimented with collaboration among the state, the private sector, NGOs, and local communities. However, the state's changed outlook has not been matched by a change in its bureaucratic culture and, as a result, projects have been less effective than anticipated.

Housing for the Poor and Bureaucratic Control in India

Three ambitious and innovative projects—the Jaunapur slum resettlement project and the slum networking projects in Indore and Ahmedabad—have been broad-based, participatory experimental projects that held considerable promise, but failed to achieve the desired level of success. These projects highlight different dimensions of bureaucracies including the pervasive problems of apathy, collusion, and corruption that plague public bureaucracies in India.[2]

The Jaunapur Slum Resettlement Project

The Jaunapur project involves the resettlement of a squatter colony from an environmentally sensitive ridge area to the village of Jaunapur near the southern border of Delhi.[3] An Indian Supreme Court decree in 1996 ordered the resettlement of 3,600 families who had encroached on an area within the southern part of the ridge. This decision was the result of concern raised over the environmental degradation of the ridge. The Slum and Jhuggi-Jhopdi Department (SJJD) of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had responsibility for the resettlement.[4] Out of a number of proposals, the government of Delhi and the SJJD approved a scheme developed by the Nizamuddin Building Center (NBC), an autonomous agency under the umbrella of HUDCO whose status is similar to that of an NGO.

NBC's plan used traditional planning and construction wisdom to drastically reduce expected costs and to propose an environmentally sustainable settlement. In addition to using locally available materials and blending traditional construction techniques with innovative, modern low-cost building technology, the project would develop a rugged, undulating site by using traditional site-planning techniques. The choice of location, an area designated in the Delhi master plan as wasteland, resulted in the purchase of land for the project at low prices, further reducing expected costs. The plan's ingenuity received international acclaim, and it was was included by the United Nations Center for Human Settlements in its list of global best practices (A. Das 2001).

In spite of its potential, the project stalled soon after the construction of a few trial dwellings. The project had originally been placed under the control of the Delhi Development Authority, the main land-owning body in Delhi, so that land could be made available to the SJJD directly in order to avoid construction delays. It was then placed under the authority of the SJJD, but subsequently transferred back to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) by the Delhi government because the SJJD was unable to implement the project unless the MCD provided basic services to the land (Laul 1999).

The slum dwellers, the Forest Department and the government of Delhi provided funds to finance the proposal. After funds had been transferred to the SJJD, the project was not developed. The SJJD cited a lack of funds. However, the SJJD had a vested interest in causing delay. The sums of money that are deposited with the SJJD accrued interest, and this interest provided a source of operating funds for the SJJD, as long as the projects were not implemented (Laul 1999).

There were numerous delays for the Jaunapur project. The SJJD extended the project by nine months to verify the ability of the sewage treatment systems to avoid contamination of the water supply, despite the fact that this had already been verified. At the behest of the SJJD, the Ground Water Board initiated another delay of several months to ascertain ground water availability. These postponements increased the overall cost, leaving the SJJD with inadequate money to complete the project. In addition,

since several years have passed without completion, the slum population has increased significantly, resulting in the need for new surveys and a reworking of project specifications (Laul 1999).

The Indore Slum Networking Project

Slum networking is an integrated approach to improving the physical and social conditions of slums by weaving together a number of critical dimensions of development (Parikh 1995; Diacon 1996). The strategy coordinates the development of physical services in slums across the city simultaneously. The techniques for providing these services are both innovative and cost-effective. Roads, water supply and sewerage are networked to eliminate duplication and include features such as sunken streets that can be used as storm water drains, piped gravity-based sewerage systems in lieu of septic tanks, and piped water connections for individual dwellings. Slum networking also embraces social and community development by improving education, health and employment levels and local management of the infrastructure (Diacon 1997; Diacon 1996; Nicholson 1995).

The Indore slum upgrading project is one of the most extensive projects in India. It was funded by the British Department for International Development, formerly known as the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), which had substantial experience in similar slum development projects in India prior to the Indore project. The Indore Development Authority (IDA), a governmental agency, implemented the project from 1990 to 1997 (Diacon 1997).

The start of the project was delayed for over two years because of a disagreement between the Indore Municipal Corporation (IMC) and the IDA about post-completion maintenance responsibilities. Although the project proceeded slowly, the IDA continued to pursue staff recruitment and training, study visits and establishment activities; senior bureaucrats saw this as a prestigious project capable of drawing international attention. Accordingly, work would be expedited in spurts, coinciding with important public or political events such as the British prime minister's visit (Verma 1998, 2000).

The project was plagued with difficulties. There were public complaints of misuse of IDA funds; collusion of officials; use of substandard construction materials; and officials ignoring threats to public health, which resulted in jaundice and other water-borne diseases. Moreover, problems such as blocked drainage affected the progress of community development activities, as the community development staff lost credibility due to the inability of the IDA to solve the physical infrastructure problems. As the drainage problem became progressively worse, it was regularly reported by the local media. However, none of the agencies took responsibility. IDA blamed the IMC for negligent maintenance; in turn, the IMC accused IDA of faulty development work (Verma 2000).

IDA bureaucrats continued to promote the project nonetheless because awards help secure foreign funds, and associated prestige helps high officials

promote their careers (Verma 2000). In spite of all its problems, the Indore project won international acclaim, including the 1993 World Habitat Award from the United Nations and the Aga Khan Award in 1998.

The Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project

The project in Ahmedabad is the first example of a joint collaborative slum networking effort. A private company, Arvind Mills, was the main source of financing and was responsible for the physical development. A governmental agency, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), facilitated the process. Costs were to be shared by the primary stakeholders—Arvind Mills, AMC and the beneficiaries. The NGOs responsible for the socio-economic development were relatively autonomous. Most importantly, the future residents were involved in all stages of the decision-making process. Despite the ideal collaborative effort, the project fell short of its stated goals.

Unlike the Jaunapur project, through progressive efforts of the municipal commissioner, the AMC imparted substantial autonomy to the other partners, while reserving a modest role for itself. The shortcomings in this project resulted from bureaucratic intransigence and harassment by lower-ranked officials in the AMC hierarchy. The NGOs and the contractor working for Arvind Mills had to depend on the AMC for approval of all plans and construction documents, at which point the AMC engineers interfered with the project. Moreover, different departments handled the various aspects of the physi-

cal development, such as electricity, water supply, and roads, with little coordination; instead, there was significant friction. At times, AMC engineers took an active supervisory role on the site, obstructing the autonomy granted by the municipal commissioner (Chauhan and Lal 1999).

Limitations of the Ideal Bureaucracy

The shortcomings of these case studies stem from the way they were implemented. The problem with the Jaunapur project was the machinations of public officials who are at the top of the bureaucratic ladder, a phenomenon that is representative of agency culture. The Ahmedabad case is an example of resistance from the bottom of an agency to top-directed change in institutional character. The Indore project is an example of a project where a public agency is solely responsible for the progress of development, and shows how callous leadership mars the performance of the agency as a whole. In addition, senior bureaucrats and technocrats are often influenced by powerful politicians who desire particular outcomes. As a result, bureaucratic actions or inactions hamper collaborative efforts and the smooth functioning of projects. This is independent of the level of hierarchy, since corruption and a lack of motivation to perform transcend position.

The tendency of public bureaucratic organizations to constantly slide back into the mire of inefficiency and regressive action is a function of the structure of bureaucracy. Bureaucracies in India, and elsewhere in the developing world, try to emulate Weber's ideal bureaucracy, which uses rational methods of finance, personnel selection, and procedural oversight. Famil-

iarity with long-standing and rigid standard operating procedures, institutional memory, and the tendency of bureaucratic structures to keep expanding are factors that render these institutions resistant to changes in organizational structure or goals (Perrow 1993; Gerth and Mills 1958). This unintended yet latent intransigence impedes the effectiveness of public sector participation.

Even though its model resembles the ideal bureaucracy, India is an ill-governed soft state, where rational bureaucratic principles take a backseat to pragmatic self-interest.[5] This is because of politicians' tacit yet strong control of the administrative arm, which stymies the creativity and motivation of public officials. Thus, it is common practice for politicians and administrators to collude for selfish ends. These offenders have a vital stake in protecting corruption and the present system (S. Das 2001).

There are also inherent problems associated with the individuals who populate these organizations. These problems result from personal behavior and action, where individuals are a small part of a powerful hierarchy that limits their discretion and creativity. Douglas McGregor's Theory X (1960), Abraham Maslow's pyramid and theories of self-actualization (Lawry 1973), and Herbert Simon's (1957) concept of bounded rationality explain the inconsistencies in individual behavior in bureaucratic settings—the cumulative effects of which often impede the implementation of public policy (Perrow 1993). Inefficiency arises because people work for selfish ends rather than the greater good. In addition, individuals have limitations which bureaucracies are slow to identify and compensate for.

Lower-level public officials who come in direct contact with the public are more prone to inefficiency because of the stress that their jobs entail. Though they often have substantial discretion (which leads to undesirable actions also), they are restricted by the availability of time, burdened by high workloads, limited by lack of control over the agencies resources, and forced to perform in situations that threaten their authority (Lipsky 1980).

In a soft state bureaucracy, certain other factors engender an attitude of callousness and apathy, especially among officials at the lower end of a hierarchy. A government job is difficult to obtain owing to widespread competition and cumbersome selection procedures. It is not the prestige that lures most people to public sector jobs—especially for low-income or lower middle-class people—but the security afforded by such jobs. Terminating the employment of a permanent employee in the public sector is an extremely lengthy and tedious process due to vertical hierarchical structures and procedural requirements. Thus, senior public officials tend to overlook minor violations of code and ethics.

Aside from internal scrutiny, external checks by clients or citizens to ensure performance of public officials are few and ineffective. As a result, public officials are not accountable for their actions. In addition, remuneration in the public sector is lower than in comparable private sector jobs (Khandwalla 1999). The

combination of low pay, high job security and lack of accountability encourages inefficiency.

Conclusion

Housing programs for the poor in India are unable to accomplish their intended goals, in spite of government concern. Major housing policy decisions are made by the central government, operational mechanisms are devised by state governments, and most of the funding for housing projects is dispensed through a rigid hierarchy of public bureaucracies at central, state and city levels. The experiences of three progressive slum development and housing projects indicate that all levels of the bureaucracy can, and often do, obstruct development in myriad ways.

I suggest a three-pronged strategy to create conditions for change. First, the judiciary must force change by clearly demarcating roles and functions for administrators in order to insulate them from political influence. Within the last ten years, the Indian Supreme Court has dealt with corruption cases, people's courts have been established, and the higher courts have taken on public interest litigation cases. This is a start and has instilled confidence on the part of the people in the legal system (S. Das 2001).

Second, the change must take place at the bureaucratic level—in the organizational behavior and institutional character of public agencies. Primarily, employee satisfaction must be improved. One of the first steps would be to make the remuneration of public officials commensurate to that of the private sector (Khandwalla 1999). Another incentive would

be to create performance-based advancement opportunities.

Third, pressure should come from the people and grassroots organizations. People must be made aware of their rights. NGOs and the media can play a vital role in this area. Media exposure raises awareness and can make the judiciary realize the gravity of the situation, thereby encouraging corrective action— a bottom-up approach invites top-down pressure. The National Campaign of Housing Rights, a movement that emerged in the early 1980s led by a coalition of academicians, professionals and residents, is a promising start. Its stated goal is to make housing a fundamental right within the Indian Constitution. One of its successes has been a Bill of Housing Rights and the subsequent establishment of the NHP (Sen 1998).

As a concluding observation, the World Bank, based on its global experience, stresses the need for "good governance" as a prerequisite for sound development management. From a narrow administrative point of view, good governance means an efficient, independent, accountable, and transparent public service (Leftwich 1994). These tenets of good governance resemble the findings herein. Based on the discussion of slum development projects in India and the role of the bureaucracy, they highlight the need for reforming the regressive character of bureaucracy.

Endnotes

[1] Several wards comprise a city municipality.

[2] This section is based on newspaper articles and an interview with, and writings by, the project planner for the Jaunapur project, Anil Laul. To the author's knowledge, there is scant evidence in the form of published articles or reports that criticizes action in these projects. Reports published by the government agencies focus on achievements and not failures.

[3] The ridge is a hilly and rocky tract that is considered to be the weathered vestiges of the ancient Aravali mountain range. Most of Delhi is built on the ridge and only pockets of pristine land remains. Most of the large patches are located in the western and the southern parts. Considered by environmentalists to be the lungs of Delhi, they are densely vegetated.

[4] *Jhuggi-jhopdi* means slums and shanties in Hindi, a language spoken in most parts of north India.

[5] Gunnar Myrdal noted the distinction between soft states and hard states. Hard states set priorities and carry them out strictly according to Weber's rational bureaucratic principles. In a soft state, administrators habitually circumvent laws and regulations, officials and politicians often collude to thwart implementation of public policies, and corruption is rampant. In the soft state political accountability of the rulers to the people, the accountability of the bureaucrat to his/her superior, the law and the people, and the rule of law become eroded (Khandwalla 1999).

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
ASHOK DAS (adas@ucla.edu) is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. As an architect-planner, his interests are in housing squatters and in improving quality of life for the poor in South and Southeast Asia.

BOOK REVIEW
Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century

BOOK REVIEW

Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century

reviewed by **Bill Pitkin**

Despite decades of attention from policy makers, researchers and community activists, the state of many cities in the US continues to be rather bleak. US cities contain deteriorating neighborhoods and face severe fiscal crises. They are home to millions of poor residents who lack access to gainful employment, good schools, safe and affordable housing, and financial and health services. Efforts to revitalize distressed urban areas have tended to be either *place-based*, seeking to improve the conditions in certain neighborhoods, or *people-based*, attempting to improve opportunities for poor residents. A place-based approach would include strategies to attract investment in housing and job creation to poor neighborhoods, while people-based strategies tend to focus on increasing the mobility of low-income residents to job opportunities that are most likely located in other areas of the city.

In this book by three prominent analysts of urban policy, Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf and Todd Swanstrom dispute the false dichotomy between place and people. For them, the conditions of poor residents and deteriorating urban neighborhoods are completely intertwined. Personal characteristics such as race, gender and educational level certainly impact the opportunities afforded to people, as demonstrated by research on how these factors impact differential access to such fundamental needs as jobs, higher education and access to credit. The contribution of this book, however, is that it convincingly asserts the role that place—namely, where we live—plays in these outcomes.

The first three chapters lay out an array of evidence—including data and vivid case studies—that demonstrates how US society is increasingly segregated by place. This segregation is economic in nature, as "economic

classes are becoming more spatially separate from each other, with the rich increasingly living with other rich people and the poor with other poor" (1). The US has the greatest income disparities of any industrialized nation, and for these authors the negative effects of this concentration of wealth is heightened by the fact that it is concentrated by place. Increasing economic segregation and urban sprawl over the past thirty years have generated economic and social costs for residents of both poor inner-city neighborhoods and wealthy suburbs.

The authors lay most of the blame for the economic segregation not on negative externalities of the free market, but rather squarely on the shoulders of the federal government. They blame federal transportation, housing and tax policies for encouraging suburban sprawl; they outline the failed history of federal urban policies from the post-war Urban Renewal program to the small-scale targeted revitalization programs of today. These past policies have created a fragmented environment in which fiscally distressed local governments are left to try to clean up the mess left by decades of increasing economic segregation.

The last three chapters of the book focus on possible strategies to deal with problems facing US cities. They begin, in "Regionalisms Old and New," by tracing various experiments and strategies to provide regional solutions to the problems brought about by economic segregation. Coming to this with substantial background from the new regionalism literature (Pastor et al. 2001; Swanstrom 1996), the authors conclude that well-known cases of regional

cooperation such as Portland, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Jefferson County, Kentucky provide cautious optimism. There is increasingly broad support for regional approaches, but implementing them has been difficult due to local competition and political fragmentation. As one of the co-authors of *Regions that Work* has shown, new regionalist doctrines that promote cooperation between urban and suburban jurisdictions are impractical in a region such as Los Angeles (Pastor 2001). These authors likewise deny that regionalism will be a cure-all.

In the last two chapters, the authors more directly outline their unique approach to dealing with economic segregation, namely what they call a federal metropolitan policy agenda. This section of the book is probably the most controversial and open to critique, but also the most stimulating. Summarizing their rejoinders to a variety of possible critiques, the authors are sure to upset the Right and the Left, everyone from free-marketers, to economic and community development practitioners, and activists who see racial discrimination as the fundamental component of social inequality. They promote some pretty radical policy changes, such as reducing the home mortgage deduction on the personal income tax, and raising the federal minimum wage above the poverty level, but they also resort to some pretty benign, but vague, goals such as "linking community development to the regional economy" and "strengthening public schools."

As often happens when reading through an ambitious laundry list of prescriptions to solve urban

problems, I ask myself, "how in the world can this be politically implemented?" Thankfully—and in contrast to many urban researchers who thrive at documenting problems but who are less adept at proposing solutions—the authors anticipated my anxiety. "The most potent criticism of our proposals is that they are politically impossible to achieve" (230). In the preface to the book, the authors foreshadow their prescription, contending that "the problems presently facing America's cities are primarily political in nature" and "since their origin lies in politics, so does their solution" (xi). In the final chapter, they lay out a strategy to develop political coalitions to support a federal metropolitan agenda.

The authors dispute the conventional wisdom that suburban voters, who outnumber urban voters by more than two to one in the US (see table 8.1 on page 238), are too conservative to back an increased federal role in dealing with urban problems. For evidence of this, they look to the Clinton-Gore ticket's success in winning over suburban voters to the Democratic Party in 1992 and 1996. This leads them to argue essentially for redistricting and other strategies that will increase the influence of the Democratic Party both locally and in Congress. I found this section of their argument disappointing, as the authors seem to have forgotten their own admission that

Democrats have been nearly as neglectful of urban problems as Republicans. The solutions to economic segregation must go beyond partisan politics, and this kind of consensus is likely more difficult in the current environment in which homeland security dominates the political scene. While I applaud the authors for presenting a courageous political solution to the problems facing our cities, I would challenge them to outline a more pragmatic approach.

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BILL PITKIN (wpitkin@ucla.edu) is Research Director at the UCLA Advanced Policy Institute (http://api.ucla.edu) and a doctoral student in the UCLA Department of Urban Planning, focusing his research on the political, social and economic forces that have impacted housing and neighborhood conditions in Los Angeles.

BOOK REVIEW
Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions

reviewed by **Carl Grodach**

In *Postmetropolis*, Edward Soja foresees the day when tourists entering Los Angeles will be provided with "a visitor's passbook to hundreds of cultural worlds, with rights to one meal in an appropriately 'ethnic' restaurant, an authentic cultural encounter, a musical event, and a brief language lesson" (342). Actually, the day may already be here. The Los Angeles Visitors Bureau has produced a film geared toward the regional tourism industry to call attention to the touristic potential of Los Angeles' ethnic neighborhoods and businesses. This "simcity" is one of six manifestations of what Soja characterizes as the postmetropolis. Six discourses— the *postfordist industrial metropolis, cosmopolis, exopolis,* the *fractal city,* the *carceral archipelago* and the *simcity*—represent the postmetropolis, and in particular, Los Angeles, as a multinodal urban agglomeration in which new urbanization processes are emerging.

Following *Postmodern Geographies* and *Thirdspace,* which both influenced the recent spatial turn among a diverse array of academic disciplines, *Postmetropolis* is the denouement of Soja's trilogy of critical urban and regional studies. In addition to continuing his pioneering work on the spatiality of social life, *Postmetropolis* can also be read as a conceptual framework for the new regionalism. In each of the three parts that comprise the book (primarily in the first two) Soja constructs an explicitly spatial and historical narrative to justify and demonstrate the theoretical power of a regional approach. Part 1 situates the urbanization of human thought and behavior into 11,000 years of regional geohistory. Part 2 outlines the six representations of the postmetropolis listed above to demonstrate the distinctive features of today's urban regionalism. Part 3 consists primarily of quotations drawn from commentary that revolved around the 1992 Los Angeles uprisings

following the trial of Rodney King. As such, while the purpose of *Postmetropolis* is not to empirically apply a total regional approach, it lays the theoretical groundwork for new directions in regional planning.

In Part 1: *Remapping the Geohistory of Cityspace*, Soja establishes the new regional consciousness by constructing an alternative narrative of urbanization that situates the region as an historical fact of social life and human history. He embeds the terminology of the new regionalism into the history of urbanization to legitimate its vocabulary and to assert these concepts as intrinsic to human development. As such, regional thinking is essentially the culmination of 11,000 years of urban agglomerations. Soja arranges his history of city development as a set of spatial myths, that is, the reinterpretation of three urban revolutions: pre-agricultural settlements of hunters, gatherers and traders; the formation of the city-state; and the industrial capitalist city.

In reinventing the origins and development of urbanization, Soja seeks to reveal alternative perspectives on urban history. With each period, a *synekism* produces an increasing need and desire for more intense interdependencies and political and cultural conventions necessary to the urban agglomerations that have propelled social development since the dawn of humankind. *Synekism*—a term Soja disinters to describe the stimulus of urban agglomeration—is an ancient Greek concept that refers to a network of urban settlements within regional boundaries, where innovation, growth and development occur. It is through such competitive learning that cities have evolved. I must stress, however, that

Soja's reconstitution of the historical roots of regional planning is not simply to sanction these roots as historical fact. More importantly, it is an attempt to abolish the notion of cities and nations as bounded and atomized entities where the flow of people, goods and ideas remain contained within isolated spaces.

Moreover, Soja continually makes the point that, today, the postmetropolis attracts and participates in the economies and cultures of the entire globe. In today's urbanized areas, boundaries are porous and ill-defined—hence the growing attention to regional thinking. This sentiment is made most cogently in the core of the book, Part 2: *Six Discourses on the Postmetropolis*, in which Soja examines how scholars have attempted to make sense of contemporary processes of urbanization.

What Soja characterizes as the *postfordist industrial metropolis* is most closely associated with, and most actively conceptualized by, the new regionalism. Those who study the postmetropolis under this lens examine the role of industrial production within the processes of postfordist economic restructuring, flexible accumulation and geographically uneven development. In particular, this scholarship examines the geographic intricacies of the deindustrialization and de-territorialization of fordist economies, and their reconstitution into more flexible, and often regional, forms of production and location decisions. Furthermore, the significance of the region takes on increasing analytic power as the migration of culture, labor and capital intensify at a global scale.

No longer is the nation-state the unchallenged center of economic, political and social life. As Soja points out, new forms of economic organization, cultural identity and citizenship have emerged at regional and transnational levels amidst global restructuring.

Contemporary theories of globalization, which Soja summarizes under the heading *Cosmopolis*, engage in a rethinking of this ubiquitous term. The most recent theories attempt to break down the global/local dichotomy that characterized past scholarship on uneven development to examine the vast flows of international capital and culture entangled in the processes of restructuring. Consequently, these writings also point out that the nation-state, while still extremely powerful economically, politically and ideologically, is no longer the only territorial delineation of cultural identity and economic organization. Likewise, with the rise of flexible production, new forms of government are necessary to support new forms of capital accumulation and divisions of labor. Cognitively, if not physically, territories are being remapped and reconstituted. New coalitions and professional and group affiliations are characterizing local, regional and national spaces, and new forms of regional power have emerged (for example, and most prominently, the European Union).

Soja uses the terms *exopolis* and the *fractal city* to identify some of the major social and geographic outcomes of restructuring. Exopolis captures the physical mass of postsuburban development. The economic changes wrought under the postfordist economy have generated vast new built environ-ments and have intensified social stratification. Out of exopolis come the "fictional histories" (249) of the new urbanism—its residents clinging to an imagined past—as well as an inner city which increasingly functions as a dormitory of transplanted, flexible, third world labor. Simultaneously, young urban professionals colonize downtown territory to set up a mythical urban life, while ethnic minorities claim the suburbs. Exopolis is indeed the city both turned inside-out and outside-in, twisted and densely layered, for as demographics belie a simple urban-suburban dichotomy, somehow the city still retains intensified social and spatial polarization.

Likewise, the fractal city is meant to characterize increasing social and spatial inequality and polarization emerging within the geography of postfordism. The "restructured social mosaic" (265) that distinguishes many city-regions, however, is also marked by the rise of new space-based social movements and a political consciousness—which Soja touches on in Part 3 as well—that is slowly being defined at a regional level by groups in LA such as the Los Angeles Bus Riders Union (BRU) and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE).[1]

The *carceral archipelago* and the *simcity* reflect different ways that social control is instituted in cities and regions. Out of the restructuring of public and private space, the carceral archipelago fashions increasingly balkanized private spaces and fosters the idea of a diminishing classical public realm that separates social groups both physically and psychologically. The simcity describes a softer manipulation of social per-

ception and the power of the urban imaginary to influence not only popular taste but also civic consciousness. Ultimately, both obscure the possibilities for spatial coalitions and the perception of common situations between socially disparate groups.

In Part 3, *Lived Space: Rethinking 1992 in Los Angeles*, the book concludes with a fascinating array of quotations that reconstruct the multiple perspectives surrounding the 1992 Los Angeles uprisings following the Rodney King trial. While perhaps lengthier than necessary, Soja's cut-and-paste approach succeeds in transporting the reader to multiple spaces and experiences around the city that a more analytic or objective account could not possibly provide. From here, as in Part 2, Soja touches on the current struggles toward spatial justice and regional democracy within LA.

Postmetropolis reaches across disciplinary boundaries in its conceptualization of the city-region and the multiple, colliding processes of urbanization. Soja's six representation types demonstrate that urban and regional change cannot be mapped or conceptualized simply in economic terms, by studying demographic movement or by mapping changes in urban morphology. The major strength of *Postmetropolis* lies in its ability to synthesize many of the major issues in urban and regional studies that are often negotiated separately. This comprehensiveness makes the book an ideal text for an introductory course in urban and regional studies. However, some might find this strength the book's primary flaw. Beyond the histori-

cal interpretations of Part 1, *Postmetropolis* does not assert any radically new theoretical insights in and of themselves. And, despite the book's comprehensiveness, some large omissions occur. Some readers may find the lack of non-western cases problematic, especially in the context of globalization. Others may find discussion of environmental regionalism conspicuously absent.

Soja does, however, open many new and exciting perspectives to the reader. He masterfully synthesizes the scattered interpretative strategies typically employed to make sense of contemporary urbanization and commands huge amounts of theoretical and empirical material in the process. *Postmetropolis* is an invitation to new explorations that will definitely inform urban and regional planning studies in the future. As Iain Chambers explains, "the metropolis is, above all, a myth, a tale, a telling that helps some of us to locate our home in modernity, there to find the new gods, the new myths...."(71). Quite simply, Soja's reinvention of the region is to postmodernity as the metropolis was to modernity. In *Postmetropolis*, the region is a new tool for grasping recent transformations in political, ideological and economic spheres, and a framework for thought and action.

Endnotes
[1] BRU works toward improving the availability and affordability of mass transit for the working poor in the Los Angeles region. LAANE seeks to mobilize disenfranchised groups in Los Angeles through actions such as the Living Wage Campaign.

CARL GRODACH (cwg@ucla.edu) is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA.

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Critical Planning
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