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critiques associated with each form. By placing the hypothesis within the context of economic restructuring and the current poverty policy environment, Spencer makes it newly relevant.

Finally, Peter V. Hall takes us to Richards Bay, a port in South Africa, to examine the interaction between national industrial policy and regional institutional structure. In *Regional Development and Institutional Lock-In*, he shows that when development policy fails to take into account the particular historical institutional factors of a targeted region, it cannot be expected to make a significant difference in the course of development. Hall's work also offers some general insights into how to approach the entrenched institutional structures in which planning policies are usually implemented.

In the second section, we draw on two UCLA conferences from the past year. Kathleen Lee interviews Allen J. Scott, the main organizer of the Global City-Regions Conference. Their conversation ranges from the IMF and the World Bank's role in globalization to the implications of the development of global city-regions on the field of planning. Following a brief overview of a conference entitled Cities and Cultural Diversity in France and the Francophone World, Babak Hedjazi and Liette Gilbert provide a translated and edited version of a paper by Rémi Baudouï, *Building the Third Millenium City*. Baudouï's essay describes the historical development of urban policy in France in the context of immigration trends and traditional French republicanism.

In the final section, Kathy A. Kolnick reviews *Eden by Design*, a new book by Greg Hise and William Deverell in which the 1930 Olmsted/Bartholomew report *Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches in Los Angeles* has been reprinted. The book examines the politics and circumstances surrounding the commission of the plan and discusses the plan's relevance. The final section also includes a feature we hope to continue in future editions of *Critical Planning*—a space for contributions by undergraduate students of planning. To paraphrase Cenzatti, planning must begin to recognize multiple knowledges. In that spirit we present here short works by Flor Barajas and Alexandra Howard, students at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Thomas Townsend, a recent graduate of California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.

We end by bidding farewell to Marco Cenzatti. He has been a great teacher and friend. We wish him the best in his new position and are sure that a new generation of planners will benefit not only from his expertise as a scholar of planning theory, but also from his passion and commitment.

The Editorial Collective
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47

6th Street Bridge, Los Angeles, CA 1998   *David Vimont*

Leaping into the Abyss - Planning and Postmodernism

Marco Cenzatti

Two episodes prompted this paper. The first was a question asked at a symposium, when a discussant responded to a presenter's call for planners to recognize, as part of the emerging postmodernist politics of difference, the grievances, concerns, and, above all, the existence of marginal social groups, by asking: "How is this different from what we have been doing since the sixties, with advocacy planning?" The other episode was a panel at a conference of the Associated Collegiate Schools of Planning

(ACSP). The panel, borrowing from a 1991 article by Robert Beauregard on postmodernism and planning, bore the title *Leaping the Postmodernist Abyss*. The discussant's question and the title of the panel—one stressing continuity in the planning arena, the other claiming that postmodernism introduces a break in planning theory and practice—indicate two opposite reactions to the questions that postmodernism poses for planning.

First, the question at the symposium, if I am reading it correctly, suggested that the challenges to the totalizations and metanarratives of traditional (modernist) views that have emerged from critical studies, literature, history, geography, the arts and politics, are not dissimilar from the views advocacy planning championed. To be sure, postmodernism has brought into focus histories, interests, and voices of social groups and movements—feminist, gay and lesbian, ethnic—that advocacy planning had not taken into consideration. Yet the discussant saw them as an expansion (and a vindication) of the major themes that advocacy already broached. In his famous 1965 article, Paul Davidoff had called for a plurality of plans in which all the special interests of different social groups would be represented and where advocate planners would seek out "clients" to represent according to "shared common views about desired social conditions and means towards them" (333). Although the groups to which Davidoff was referring were mainly low-income communities and the arena of advocacy planning was largely limited to housing issues, it seemed that advocacy could easily expand its horizons to include the voices of the new

movements and themes. Indeed, the latest incarnation of advocacy—equity planning—is providing this expansion (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). For the discussant, what was surprising in the encounter between postmodernism and planning was not the encounter itself, which simply expanded the horizon of advocacy, but the lateness with which this encounter was taking place, at least a decade after post-modernism made its voice heard in other disciplines.

In contrast, following Beauregard's lead, the panel at the conference maintained that the postmodernist critique goes far beyond a simple expansion of modernist disciplines. Postmodernism, by rejecting modernist reductionism—its centralized universal social subject—and the universality of rationality and knowledge, attacks the epistemological base of modernism. Planning, which borrows most of its knowledge from other fields, is certainly not exempt from this critique. Thus, the purpose of the panel was to open a discussion on how planning can change itself in order to answer these critiques and how planners can "leap the abyss" on which they are "suspended, between a modernism whose validity is decaying and reconfiguring, and a postmodernism whose arguments are convincing yet discomforting" (Beauregard 1991: 193).

These very different reactions to postmodernism provide two different entry points of my discussion on planning and postmodernism. The first section of this paper responds to the discussant's question by focusing on the changes in the material conditions in which planning currently operates in most western countries. A growing body of literature has recog-

nized an ongoing economic and social restructuring as a new, post-Fordist, "regime of accumulation." This is characterized by an overall flexibility that no longer requires the macro-regulatory mechanisms of the previous (Fordist) period. The neoliberal policies inaugurated by Reagan and Thatcher and now followed in varying degrees in most industrialized countries, and the general attitude of "enough with big government," are symptomatic of the withering away of those mechanisms. As a result, planning, as one of these systems of regulation, has been retreating. It has reached the point that today any attempt to institute, say, a national industrial policy or a health care plan is doomed to failure. Advocacy planning grew out of this earlier context of wide-ranging state intervention, was shaped by it, and, although critical of it, can still be seen as part of the Fordist regulatory system. Roweis and Scott (1977) have characterized the advocacy position as an "imperfect negation," since it does not go far enough in distancing itself from its mainstream counterpart. As a result, advocacy is not exempt from the crisis that the new regime of accumulation has provoked in the planning field. The discussant's attempt to see the postmodernist politics of identity and difference as an expansion of advocacy is, therefore, self-defeating in two respects. It is not sufficient to give new energy to advocacy planning, unless postmodernist critiques can help advocacy to sever its regulatory roots and become something else. At the same time, the attempt to incorporate postmodernism into the existing advocacy paradigm reduces the possibility that postmodernism can open genuinely new directions in planning.

The second half of the paper, taking the panel as its starting point, shifts its focus to another facet of planning's crisis—the weakening of its theoretical underpinnings. Perhaps pushing the theme of the panel beyond its intentions, it argues that the postmodernist critique cannot be satisfied by suggesting a new theory of planning, or a new planning paradigm, or even a new role for the planner. Rather, the critique should lead to questioning the assumption that there is one meaning of planning, one scientific knowledge, and one planning theory (even if that theory is contested). From this perspective, planning can take on different meanings, contingent upon the specifics of individual situations and according to the social groups involved. Confronting a recognized instability of knowledge and of planning discourses, planning theory, rather than seeking the dominance of one planning discourse, should be concerned with the need to open up spaces where a multiplicity of discourses and of knowledges can be recognized and encouraged. It should be aimed, in other words, at creating "epistemological heterotopias,"[1] spaces that accept difference and the juxtaposition of dissimilar knowledges and plannings. In this space, the figure of the planner too becomes variable. The planner is no longer, or not always, the pre-established holder of appropriate knowledge, or even the privileged interpreter of social needs. Instead, the planner's roles and who should fulfill them emerge from each context. Therefore, the problem with "leaping the abyss" is that it assumes that the planner can bridge the abyss and re-establish order. However, if we take postmodernism's attack on

metanarratives and order seriously, we should instead be ready to leap *into* the abyss, without the comfort of an opposite bank on which we, as planners, can safely land.

A reader of a draft of this paper pointed out that the two sections of the paper are not well integrated and "scream at each other," since the first section falls squarely into an economic-reductionist perspective, proposing a linear metanarrative of dominant planning paradigms that follow one another according to economic crises and restructurings, while the second, by calling upon the instability of knowledge and the multiplicity of discourses, undermines the very approach of the first section. It is not my intention to suggest a perfect symmetry or a cause-and-effect relationship between material crisis and planning's intellectual reconceptualization. Rather, my purpose is to juxtapose two dimensions of the crisis and restructuring of planning. In this sense, it may be positive that the reciprocal scream of the two sections can be heard, since it means that the two dimensions have not collapsed into a unitary explanation. Gianni Vattimo pointed out that ideology is not false thought only because it masks a truth, but also because it presents as totality what is only partial (Vattimo and Rovatti 1983: 14). My attempt here is to present two partialities that both demonstrate the need for a restructuring of planning theory, despite their two different and even contradictory trajectories. To be sure, these are not the only narratives or dimensions from which the predicament of planning theory and practice can be reviewed. Feminist and minority critiques are other obvious perspectives

from which to trace other trajectories. Restructuring, I think, involves many dimensions. Rather than a unitary dynamic, it should be seen as a "node" where different narratives cross each other and interact. The questions which inspired this paper identify two of these threads.

The Crisis of Planning, Take One: Advocacy Planning and the Fordist Regime of Accumulation

This is not the first time that changing material conditions have led to a restructuring of planning. Already the local, state, and federal responses to the Great Depression drastically changed planning's colors. To begin with, its importance and scope increased from an activity largely limited to urban problems to the Roosevelt Administration's creation of a myriad of agencies that brought planning interventions to the forefront at both regional and national scales. Equally important, planning broke out of its limited concerns with the built environment to refocus on social and economic issues. To be sure, the slum clearance plans of the turn of the century and the City Beautiful and City Functional movements also dealt with social questions and problems. The New Deal, however, marks a shift of balance in planning: the organizing principle of planning changed from the view that intervening in the physical environment was the means by which planners could address all issues—physical or not—to the view that physical planning was just one among the many means that planners had at their disposal to address social issues.

The increased importance of planning, its expansion into new arenas, and its shift of focus did not occur in a vacuum. Nor were they simply a reaction to the Depression, an attempt to return to business-as-usual. They were an important factor in shaping and helping the emergence of a new socio-economic organization of American capitalism—what the Regulation School calls the "Fordist regime of accumulation."[2] This regime can be characterized by three major elements:

■ An industrial organization dominated by mass-production, which, in turn, is characterized by the expansion of internal economies of scale based on process-flow and assembly-line methods, a detailed technical division of labor, and by standardization of output. Mass production had already entered the American industrial system with Henry Ford's introduction of the assembly line in 1914.[3]

■ A mass market that is large enough, homogeneous enough, and expanding rapidly enough to absorb the standardized goods produced. A major cause of the Great Depression was precisely the absence of adequate aggregate demand vis-à-vis growing industrial productivity.

■ An appropriate mode of regulation; that is, a set of regulatory mechanisms able to: 1) ensure, even if uneasily at times, conditions of social and industrial peace for undisturbed continuity of production; and 2) stimulate the growth of an homogeneous mass market, pace its expansion, and direct its evolution on a course coherent with the productivity increases of the industrial system.

The type of planning that came to dominate the American scene from the depression onward—I would call it "Strong Planning," paraphrasing Gianni Vattimo (Vattimo and Rovatti 1983), to indicate the existence but also the marginalization of "other" plannings[4]— was integral to the development of these regulatory mechanisms. Strong Planning played a particularly important role in both staking out the boundaries of the mass market and in organizing the market around a *social norm of mass consumption*. Certainly, these were not the only areas that planning entered during the Roosevelt Administration. These were the areas, however, where intervention was most successful and its effects more lasting. In contrast, attempts to counter the overcapacity of the industrial system (recognized as the root of the crisis) by intervening on the supply side (such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930 that limited imports and lowered taxes) or by establishing an all-inclusive national system of economic coordination and cooperation (the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, that aimed at expanding the market by increasing wages, regulating prices, and reducing work hours as well as coordinating industrial activity between and within industrial sectors) did not succeed.[5] Even the famous Tennessee Valley Authority may have been successful in breaking the monopoly of private companies over energy production (thus lowering the cost of electricity for industry) but had little effect in overcoming the overproduction crisis.[6]

The lasting pattern and the regulatory function that emerged from the crisscrossing paths of the planning agencies and programs of the New Deal is, in my opinion, particularly relevant in two areas. First, the New Deal was instrumental in setting up a mechanism for the expansion of the consumer market. This goes beyond the simple creation of stop-gap employment measures and wage raises, although these were certainly goals and achievements of the Roosevelt Administration. It implies instituting a system geared toward a continuous consumer market expansion.[7] The key legacies of the New Deal in this respect are the financial planning programs such Social Security and, most importantly, the bank loan system reform initiated by the Home Owner Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration. These programs began a trend, continued after the Second World War (for example, by the Veterans Administration housing loans and, in general, by the spread of the credit system), toward an increasing socialization of finance. This not only helped to stabilize access to the consumer market for large sectors of the working population, but, more importantly, it also made an ever-wider range of mass-produced durable goods accessible to a large share of that population. These, even with the decline in prices due to standardized production, would have otherwise remained unattainable.

Second, planning also helped to create the infrastructure that gave direction to mass consumption. Many of the New Deal planning programs and interventions supported the market expansion of the two main commodities on which the Fordist mode of

consumption hinged—the single family home (the privileged site of individual consumption) and the automobile (the means of transport most compatible with the separation of work and single-family housing). The socialization of finance not only made access to homeownership easier. The mortgage system—together with other planning initiatives, such as parkway construction, subdivision planning, and the spread of land-use planning— also directed that access toward the type of housing that could be more easily standardized, that had a larger multiplier effect on the consumption of other mass-produced commodities, and that facilitated the social standardization of the family in its nuclear form. At the same time, the well-known practices of redlining and preferential financing of single-family houses also reinforced social and spatial divisions between those who had access to mass consumption and those who were excluded.[8] In this way, Strong Planning was able to control inclusion and exclusion from the developing mass society and to homogenize consumption in the public domain.

I do not intend to overestimate the function that planning (even if Strong) had in establishing or shaping the Fordist regime. To be sure, many of the forms that the Fordist mode of regulation took in the United States are less palpable and institutional than planning interventions (such as the cultural and ideological constructs of the American Dream of Home Ownership, or the American "love affair" with the automobile). Nor do I mean to suggest that all the planning initiatives of the New Deal were purposely aimed at expanding, regulating, and limit-

ing mass consumption. However, it seems to me that the regulatory aspects of planning from the New Deal onward and the tensions that inclusion or exclusion from mass consumption produced are an important aspect of planning practice in the United States, and are particularly relevant in understanding advocacy planning as a response to the social unrest of the nineteen sixties.

Radical planning, in fact, did not escape this regulatory function. Or better, it escaped it only as far as it withdrew from attempts to truly challenge it. Thus most radical approaches, such as the Marxist critiques, ended up as academic endeavors that while criticizing the practice of planning (and, later, its theorization), remained largely ineffective in providing alternative practices and were able only to advance half-hearted alternative definitions of planning such as "the planner can become the revealer of contradictions, and by this an agent of social innovation" (Castells 1978: 88). The accomplishments of advocacy, in its most radical version (i.e., seeking radical political change through alternative social organizations), were equally limited, leading to the formation of co-ops and communes that remained marginal to Strong Planning and unable to truly challenge it. The major practical success that radical planning could claim was in the form of "classic" advocacy, where "desirable processes of change are arrived at by a more inclusive pluralistic political process which incorporates into decision-making and intervention the ideas and interests of the broadest social spectrum of people concerned" (Peattie 1978: 88).

The many institutional arrangements and public programs that emerged from the 1960s drawing on "citizen participation," from the War on Poverty to the Model Cities Program, are a direct legacy of this. Despite the intentions of its proponents, if and when radical planning proposals managed to be implemented and recognized as legitimate planning, their intervention took place in forms that continued the process of regulation and homogenization of Fordism towards the inclusion of other social groups in mass society. Only later and probably without critical intentions, Davidoff recognized this aspect of advocacy planning, stating that "the *redistributive* outlook that is growing today in planning is only an expansion of the advocacy movements that were common to many professions in the nineteen sixties" (Davidoff 1978: 71; italics added). Roweis and Scott (1977) called advocacy planning an "imperfect negation" for its inability to exit the theoretical framework of the dominant planning paradigm. The imperfection of the negation, we may add, can also be seen in its practice, in its inability to propose alternatives, and in its actual support of the dominant regime of accumulation.

Certainly, it would give too much credit to planning to maintain that advocacy led to the crisis of Fordism. Advocacy, however, is indicative of the increasing difficulty that Fordism encountered in maintaining the connection between the expansion of production and consumption that characterized Fordism in its heyday. Although productivity gains, which allowed the spread of mass production in the previous decades, slowed down, the mode of regula-

tion, created for and geared towards continuous growth of the regime, continued to seek the expansion of its social base. As a result, mounting social costs (i.e., the costs of the public infrastructure necessary to support private production and consumption) were no longer matched by corresponding productivity increases. The Fordist regime, as the Regulation School tells us, had reached its limits to growth. If the emergence of advocacy planning can be linked, in whatever small measure, to the crisis of Fordism, the linkage is not to be found in terms of successful opposition, but of bad timing. Stimulated by the social movements of the 1960s, advocacy planning kept calling for social inclusion and expansion of consumption precisely when the Fordist regime could no longer sustain them.

Studies of post-Fordism are divided on whether the new regime requires new regulation mechanisms at all. Some writers (e.g., Hirst and Zeitlin 1992; Scott 1988) argue that the new "regime of flexible accumulation" no longer needs mechanisms to secure the growth and stability of the market, or even to establish a norm of consumption, since flexible production (based on multi-purpose machinery, small production units, short production runs, and variable patterns of work) can adjust the volume and characteristics of the commodities produced to adjust to market growth, decline, or differentiation. Others (e.g., Altvater 1992) posit that, despite the growth of flexible production systems, it is too early to talk of a new regime precisely because the new mechanisms of regulation necessary to guarantee sustained economic growth remain elusive. What seems to be sure, however, is that the regulatory infrastructure of Fordism

has reached the end of its usefulness. The growing social fragmentation and differentiation in most industrialized countries (and not only there), ranging from increasing segmentation of labor markets to the emergence of "gated" or "carceral" urbanization, where the city breaks down in a series of isolated and self-contained parts, to the increasing importance of "identity politics," seem to indicate that a tendency towards social differentiation has taken the place of homogenization. With it, the role of planning— mainstream or not, but Strong and Fordist, anyway— is drastically shrinking. Thus planners, if they are not to be left hoping for a return to the past, should be prepared to deal with these new conditions. They should engage in a process of restructuring of their own, trying to identify what kind of planning theory (or theories) and practice (or practices) are best suited to deal with the dangers that the new situation presents and to seize the opportunities it offers.

The Crisis of Planning, Take Two: Planning Theory and Postmodernism

Studies that, typically from a Marxist perspective, seek to connect the economic restructuring outlined in the previous pages and postmodernism generally link the flexibility of production, fragmentation of the mass market, and loss of relevance of regulatory mechanisms of post-Fordism with the cultural fragmentation and the proliferation of social and political identities of postmodernism as a cause-and-effect relationship. David Harvey, for example, argues that the postmodernist "emphasis upon ephemerality, collage, fragmentation, and dispersal in philosophical

and social thought *mimics* the conditions of flexible accumulation" (1989: 302; italics added). Fredric Jameson (1992) identifies postmodernism as a new "cultural dominant," reflecting the changes that occurred in the economic structure with the passage from one phase of capitalist development to another. Postmodernism, in these views, is the collective term for the superstructural modifications that follow from the restructuring of the economic base.

If we stop here, we are simultaneously looking at planning from a different perspective and being led back to the argument of the previous pages on the socio-economic context of planning. The different perspective rests on the shift of emphasis from the function of planning as a "material" activity to its ideological role of legitimization and rationalization. The claim that planning is not a "neutral" activity aimed at furthering the common interest by rational means, as mainstream planning theory maintained, and that this conception, in fact, gives a patina of neutrality and universality to ideological constructs is probably the most important legacy that radical planning left behind. Regardless of the limited success of advocacy to effectively lead to a truly different planning practice and theory, and to the Marxist inability to go beyond its negative critiques, they succeeded in arguing that common interest, rationality, and scientific knowledge are shaped, if not created, by specific material conditions. As Harvey says, "they are set according to the reproduction of the social order which is...a distinctively capitalistic social order" (Harvey 1978: 224). Precisely by presenting themselves as universal and neutral, the notion of com-

mon good and of the dependent principle of rationality fulfill the task of justifying and legitimizing dominant planning practices. Planning theory, or rather ideology, in other words, is part of the superstructure and, if it changes, it does so in response to modifications of the "capitalistic social order." Thus, according to this perspective, if we want to understand what new material and theoretical forms planning may take today, we should begin by turning (back) to the analysis to the economic restructuring in progress.

Postmodernism, however, does not limit itself to cultural, political, and socio-economic changes. It also claims that the increasing attention to social diversity is symptomatic of an epistemological shift, of a change in the way theory is constructed which, by rejecting modernist foundations, makes social diversity visible. The rejection is not limited to *some* modernist theories, but addresses the epistemological matrix common to all modern thought—what Foucault called the "modern episteme" and Habermas the "Enlightenment Project"— and whose limits Martin Jay (1984) summarized as its "latitudinal and longitudinal totalizations." These totalizations are at the core of all postmodernist critiques. Thus, Derrida's deconstruction shows the impossibility of any all-inclusive narrative; Baudrillard signals the end of modernism as "end of the phase of the mask" (where, although hidden and difficult to decipher, a true and universal reality was still knowledge's goal); Vattimo claims that the "strong thought" of modernism has made invisible other, "weak," histories and thought; Foucault illustrates the limits of mod-

ernism as a series of "doubles"—i.e., undecidable oscillations between the empirical nature of knowledge and its aspiration to universality, between origin as the source of history and history creating the need for an origin, and between the finitude of the human subject and its ambition to be all-inclusive. All of these views point out the futility of modernist attempts to identify the essential core of social experience (the latitudinal totalization, which seeks in the romantic Zeitgeist, or the Hegelian Idea, or in the Marxist dominance of class relations a unified social subject) from which all other aspects of social life depend and that, in the last instance, establishes the parameters within which an essential History (the longitudinal totalization) unfolds and progress is measured.

From this point of view, planning theory is not only the ideological offspring of the Fordist phase of capitalist accumulation, but also a specific expression of a longer theoretical bloodline going back to the faith in progress, rationality, teleology, and totalizations of the Enlightenment. John Friedmann (1987) has made this connection explicit, tracing planning back to that period and to the major intellectual traditions of modernism. The various paradigms of mainstream planning are rooted in the ideas of Bentham, Adam Smith, Saint Simon, and Comte, while their critiques and oppositional views go back to Marx and the anarchic and utopian movements of the nineteenth century. The variations of planning that emerged in the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies and that dominated discussions of that time were certainly inspired by different theo-

retical frameworks. In fact they show that, rather than one planning theory, we should talk of many theories of planning constructed according to different intellectual matrixes. At the same time, however, all these versions of planning participate in a theoretical discourse that is informed and limited by the epistemological tenets of their progenitors—a discourse that, in other words, shares the totalizing tendencies of the modern episteme.

A first round of postmodernist critique to planning attacks precisely its modernist theoretical foundations and, consequently, is not particularly different from the general critique of any modernist theory. Returning to Foucault, for example, planning theories suffer from all the oscillations that he mentioned as "doubles" of modernism. To begin with, both mainstream planning and its critical counterparts swing unsatisfailably between highly general and experience-limited definitions. In mainstream planning, one end of the oscillation is exemplified by rational models that, drawing from the positivist assumption of a natural social rationality (preceding the individual), propose definitions such as "planning applies rational decision-making procedures in order to reach desired goals" and achieve universality by de facto eliminating any substantive relation between their formulations and reality. This makes them as unassailable as they are vacuous. The other end of the double, the incrementalist paradigm, borrows its view of market rationality (where social rationality follows from the sum of individual ones) from neoclassical economics and sees planning as a tortuous process of "muddling through" political

and bureaucratic obstacles and compromises (Lindblom 1959). As a result, planning swings back to empiricism, denying the possibility of a true theorization altogether. We can recognize the same oscillation among oppositional views with, on the one hand, advocacy planners (and some Marxist scholars) claiming that, given the changes society had undergone since Marx's analysis, it is useless and counterproductive to try to fit the new reality in the obsolete categories of traditional Marxism and it is more useful for planners to adjust their views to the social movements that are emerging. On the other hand, orthodox Marxists emphasize the priority of the theoretical framework that Marxism offers and the need to insert social movements and interventions into it.

Similarly, to paraphrase Foucault's second double, "it is against the already begun that" the various versions of planning are "able to reflect on what may serve them as origin" (Foucault 1973: 330). Whether the origin (and the justification) of modern planning can be found in the natural rationality of man, or in the development of capitalism as Harvey stated, or in the appearance of Fordism as I claimed in the previous pages, it is not the origin that precedes the History of planning, but the conceptualization of a planning "that had already begun" that determines its starting point. To continue with Foucault, it is not "the origin that gives rise to" planning; it is planning "that makes possible the necessity of an origin" (ibid: 330). Thus, it is again the theoretical framework on which planning is grafted, emphasizing the transhistoricity of rationality, or the history of capitalism, or the Fordist restructuring, that determines its origin and gives legitimacy to the framework. This by itself does not mean that these views are wrong. It means, however, that their reliance on the origin functions as a means to justify their totalizing character. It is the selection of an origin that makes a particular version of planning strong and renders other planning histories and versions weak and invisible.

The Planner as Ventriloquist

Perhaps most importantly, both mainstream and radical planning also exemplify Foucault's third double. In the modern episteme the double of the subject is expressed by its attempt to encompass all social experiences and identities and by the simultaneous discovery that these Other experiences and identities have been transformed in order to be known—or, in fact, have transformed the subject itself. In other words, modern thought remains unable, despite its efforts, to avoid referring to an ordering subject. The existing subject may be able to include previously ignored or emerging interests and voices by defining and ordering them in such a way that they fit into its worldview. Or the "new" voices may lead to a new ordering, to the creation of a new center, and to a re-definition of the social subject. In either case, though, a subject still remains the ordering agent of the social totality. As in the double of the origin, the problem of modernist planning is not that its subject is wrong. Indeed there is enough variety among planning theories to supply a wide range of subjects from which to choose. Planners can be overseers qualified to identify and facilitate the

smooth working of social rationality and efficiency of rational planning; or they can be the brokers of market rationality from an incrementalist standpoint; they can "reveal contradictions" in the interest of the working-class when their views rest on Marxist theory; or they can be advocates, taking on different attributes depending on the interests they share with their clients. In each of these cases the identity of planners (and planning) changes. Even if they change, however, planning and planners are still the active subject (i.e., the agent determining a course of action or study). Even when particular attention is devoted to specific social groups, these groups remain passive subjects (i.e., the object that planning and planners discuss, study, or represent).

Planners, in short, act as intellectual ventriloquists, in a way, allegedly endowed with the ability to convey the message of other social groups and subjects, but in practice ordering the form and content of the message according to their own theoretical framework. Different planners/ventriloquists hold different worldviews. Addressing new issues, interests, and social groups, they may even change those views, say different things, and replace their dummies. What remains unchanged, however, is the relationship between the ventriloquist and the dummy. The latter remains passive, dressed up, and spoken for by the former. Actually, mainstream and Marxist planners have no need to change their views, since their Strong and all-inclusive theoretical frameworks can easily make room for the new issues and social groups that come to their attention. For example, the plight of the homeless (to mention a social issue

that has surfaced with increasing frequency over the last few years) can be slotted into their respective worldviews as the problem of a group unable or unwilling to participate in society and for whom (in the best hypothesis) the state should supply social services or lodging, or as a social group marginalized and made expendable by the logic of capitalism.

Advocate planners, by contrast, may be more sensitive to the specific characteristics of the group they are representing (or at least less determined to force it into a preconceived and totalizing worldview). Thus, they may pay closer attention to the needs of the homeless that might otherwise go unheard. Yet they too hold on to a preconstituted referential system: an accepted set of rules, practices, and provisions that can be called a "planning system"—similar to the legal system from which the tradition took name and inspiration— and which defines the needs of their "clients" (for housing, in my example). As Tosi put it, "needs speak the life of others....[since the user's actions] are not included in the representation of the system for meeting the needs .... [and] the user is present merely through the prescriptions of behavior incorporated in the provision"(1991: 597).

The metaphor of the ventriloquist is useful only up to a point, however, since it doesn't address the fact that planners not only present a "picture" of the groups and interests they deal with, but change them. Friedmann (1987) pointed out that the philosophical views on which the various versions of planning are based does not provide the "theoretical object" of the planning discourse. These views are borrowed from broader intellectual traditions whose

epistemic limits (and whose ventriloquism) post-modernism has already criticized *ad abundantiam.* The specific terrain of planning theory is defined by the attempt to link the knowledge that each planning paradigm derives from its worldview to action. Whether it is "system maintenance," or "system guidance," or "systemic change" (if I can borrow some more from Friedmann's definitions of types of planning), the discourse of planning theory is characterized by the changes that, under the guidance of knowledge, planning accomplishes in the real world. This linkage, as writers as different as Wild-avsky (1973) and Castells (1978) have told us, has not been particularly effective in eliminating the problems that planning set out to solve. In contrast, however, planning's actions have been more success-ful in changing those "problems" by ordering them and by making real the representation created of them. Returning to the example of the homeless, the knowledge and the actions of the planner have certainly not led to the elimination of the problem. They have succeeded, however—by assuming that the lack of shelter is the all-encompassing identity of the group and acting on this assumption— in trans-forming that assumption into reality, often by bull-dozing their camps and makeshift shelters (i.e., their homes). This does not mean that the homeless are not in need of (better) shelter. It means, however, that the action of planning is based on a two-fold ordering. It orders the "problem" by inserting it in its worldview and, simultaneously, it orders it inter-nally, by prioritizing the lack of shelter over other characteristics of the "problem" group, such as men-tal illness, alcoholism, or even lack of jobs.

These other characteristics, even if recognized, take a secondary position in the homogenized identity of the group.

In brief, the theoretical and epistemological limits of the modernist planning discourse are threefold. First, and directly linked to its epistemic grounding, the crisis of planning theory reflects the increasing diffi-culty of adapting its established theoretical frame-work(s) to the discovery of (or the encounter with) increasing numbers of social groups and identities that claim their right to be heard and their right to difference. The emergence of feminist, minority, or gay planning theories and histories is an indication of the weakening of the established forms of Strong Planning. Second, the strong character of modernist planning, even if it disappears in the sub-ject matter and in the theoretical frameworks, re-mains in the persistence of a "discipline" of plan-ning and of planners as "disciplining" agents who establish the parameters according to which an issue must be expressed in order to be accepted as ground for planning intervention. Appropriate objects for planning intervention may change and include new views and methods of dealing with the object and the arena of planning. But it is still the planner that stakes out the boundaries of the terrain where the discussion takes place and defines what issues, and in what form, are allowed on that terrain. Third, the issue of ordering and defining the object of inter-vention is particularly relevant in planning, since the specificity of planning lies in the move from knowl-edge to action. "Disciplining" in planning is not lim-ited to a representation of the object of planning,

but entails a material modification of reality to make it fit better in its representation.[9]

The Author is Dead: Long Live the Translator

The issue of the discursivity of knowledge and its ordering character (the second limit of planning mentioned above) is a theme dear to postmodernism from its beginnings (Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Order of Things*, for example). More recently, it has also made its way into the planning field both as a critique of dominant planning and as the basis for what Judith Innes (1995) called the new "emerging paradigm of planning." John Forester (1982, 1985) claimed that planning suffers from systemic distortions of communication, while Christine Boyer (1983; see also Tett and Wolfe 1991) identified the roles that (changing) discourses have on planning practices. More recently, Seymour Mandelbaum (1991) pointed out how conflicting historical narratives and the way of dealing with their incongruities lead to different planning approaches and Jim Throgmorton (1993; 1996) showed how planning is fundamentally a form of persuasive future-oriented storytelling.

Given the influence that Habermas has exerted on Innes' new planning paradigm—aptly called communicative action to make its Habermasian connection explicit—it is important to recall that, differently from Foucault or other postmodernists, for Habermas the communicative distortions that mar the Enlightenment Project can be eliminated and the unfinished project of modernism rescued. Similarly, communicative action planning wants to put mod-

ernist planning back on its tracks, by openly recognizing its discursive base and intervening on it. Like Habermas, planners in the communicative action paradigm believe in the possibility of a public environment that is all-inclusive and where different viewpoints, narratives, and knowledges can be effectively expressed, without distortions, and then mediated towards consensus (Healey 1993). In fact, undistorted communication and consensus go hand-in-hand, since dialogue requires, as a condition for its beginning, faith in the possibility of consensus; consensus, in return, requires a discussion "under conditions that neutralize all motives except that of cooperatively seeking truth" (Habermas, quoted in Young 1998: 435). Thus, theorists in this paradigm shy away from conceptions of planning based on expertise and technical knowledge and emphasize instead the role of the planner in facilitating public participation in the planning arena and in helping to articulate the experiences, needs, and problems of the public in the spirit of "cooperative truth-seeking". Rather than an expert or an advocate, the main role of planner is seen here as a mediator, a facilitator whose purpose is to move planning towards what Habermas called an "ideal speech situation." Communicative action planners are not the ventriloquist of the previous pages, but rather benign gate-keepers of the public sphere who do their best to guarantee free access to the planning table, and translators with the task of eliminating distortions from the public's statements in the progress towards consensus.

The assumption that a neutral public sphere may exist, that consensus is a legitimate goal, that com-

municative distortions can be eliminated, and that an ideal speech situation can be achieved are central tenets of Habermas' rescue effort and at the core of his critics' arguments. Nancy Fraser has contended that the public sphere where communicative action is to take place is never open to all; that the distortion is already embedded in the very definition of public sphere, or better in the assumption that an inclusive public sphere exists, since any conception of "public" inevitably ends up by making invisible some social groups and silencing some discourses, or at least by misrepresenting both (Fraser 1985; 1992).[10] Along similar lines, Iris M. Young has argued that the search for consensus and social inclusiveness rests on "the ideal of reason expressing an impartial point of view" (1998: 435). This is to say, beyond a veneer of social difference, society must be based on an "essential" homogeneity and sameness among its members for inclusiveness, universality of reason, and impartiality to exist. Thus, echoing Foucault's double of the subject, Young concludes that even if social unity "is not a starting point, but a goal of political dialogue," by "looking for what we have in common—whether as a prior condition or as a result— ..... we are not transforming our point of view. We only come to see ourselves mirrored in others" (1997: 66-67).

Fraser's and Young's arguments can be equally applied to communicative action planning. This new planning paradigm remains a modernist activity that finds its centering features in the existence of a universal public (and public sphere) and in the possibility of a consensus that can and should be built.

By the same token, the figure of the planner emerges, once more, as an ordering agent that, in assuming an all-inclusive definition of "public," necessarily operates implicit exclusions and that, in assuming and seeking consensus, takes on a maieutic role, with an unwittingly biased role in shaping both the dialogue and the planning discourse. We return, in other words, to Foucault's third double. The attempt to include the Other in the domain of planning results in changing the characteristics of the subject—the role of the planner. At the same time, this attempt also changes the Other, since the subject, in its attempt to encompass and understand all social experiences and identities, must inevitably transform them.

Epistemological Heterotopias
Towards the beginning of the previous section I mentioned that the limits of modernism are to be found in its "longitudinal and latitudinal totalizations;" that is, in an epistemology in which contradictory theories and philosophies (with different subjects and histories) find a shared base in the belief that society is ultimately a coherent unit, coalescing around a central social subject and a unitary history. Similarly, the centering aspect of modernist planning is not agreement (which does not exist) over what planning or the planner's role is, but lies in the assumption that there is something called planning, and someone called a planner, that are both identifiable independently from, and a priori to, the situation and the social groups to which planning is to be applied. This preordained character of planning

and planners rests in turn on the assumption that the planner is in a privileged position to "know" what has to be done. This knowledge can take the form of "hard" knowledge, as in the technical reason of the rational model, or be present in the "soft" version of communicative action, as the ability to help on the road to consensus. In any event, what persists is the position of the planner as expert who speaks for others, or at least interprets or directs what others have to say, and an epistemology of planning still anchored on a view of society as a knowable unity.

All this is not to say that planning is hopelessly enmeshed in the limits of modernism and planners should find themselves other jobs. It means, however, that to persist in seeking a once-and-for-all definition of planning and of the planner's role is a limiting starting point since it still maintains a conception of society based on unity and sameness. A better starting point may be to adapt to planning Linda M. Alcoff's statement that "anyone who speaks for others should do so only out of a concrete analysis of the particular power relations and discursive effects involved" (Alcoff 1995: 111). Thus, in some cases, as advocate planners well know, speaking for others may be the only way to give a voice, even at the risk of distorting it, to marginalized groups. In other circumstances being a facilitator/translator can indeed help to effectively articulate a social demand and even create consensus or, perhaps better, an alliance between social groups. In still other cases, speaking for others should take place not in order to define, represent, direct, and "order" a

subaltern social group, but in order to make room for a "countersentence" that originates from that group, and that "challenges and subverts the opposition between the knowing agent and the object of knowledge" (ibid.: 110). At the other end of the spectrum, the "will to speak" (even if only to translate and facilitate or to advocate) should be kept in check when it would silence other voices that otherwise could be heard and its effect would just reinforce the already dominant position of the speaker.

Thus, a first and relatively easy answer to the problem of speaking for others is that planners should be flexible enough to recognize when and how to talk. By the same token, the theorization and practice of planning, rather than seeking the supremacy of one planning paradigm (whether the rational model, advocacy, or communicative action), should be able to change and adapt according to specific situations, shifting and mixing models.

More importantly, Alcoff's statements about the need, under certain circumstances, to speak in order to stimulate a countersentence, or even to remain silent, in order not to cover other voices, suggest the potential for a more radical restructuring of planning. Both cases, in fact, refute the pre-established identification of who the planners are and what planning is. The willingness of the official planner to remain silent implicitly recognizes that there are different plannings, from different sources, with different knowledges, and different active subjects as valid, if not more, as the official versions. Speaking for a countersentence goes even further, since the planner speaks in order to be contradicted (or at least is will-

ing to be contradicted) in order to facilitate the surfac-ing of those sources, knowledges, and subjects. In both cases, silence and countersentences can subvert the preordained character of planning by proposing counter-characterizations of planning that reflect both the groups expressing them and the specific context in which they are pronounced. Countersentences and statements from within a group can be the continuation, in the realm of plan-ning, of the "incommensurable stories" with which Mandelbaum (1991) indicates competing narratives that cannot be synthesized into a unity and yet are equally truthful. They can lead to "incommensu-rable" plannings and planners' roles and be starting points for a "decentering" of the planning discourse that does not seek consensus and unity but is the ground for plannings (in the plural) for difference.

In this sense restructuring might lead not merely to the replacement of one form of Strong Planning with another (and to planners leaping from the old to the new). The restructuring of planning (and of planning education) could go in the direction of what James Duncan calls "a kind of epistemological heterotopia" (1994: 402), producing a plurality of sites—institutional (classrooms, universities, institu-tions for international development, planning agen-cies) or not (community organizations, nonprofit associations, union halls)—where different subjects, rather than determining epistemological primacy, seek epistemological differences.

Endnotes

[1] Foucault calls heterotopia "a site capable of juxta-posing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible" (Foucault 1986: 25).

[2] Antonio Gramsci used the term Fordism with refer-ence to the development of mass consumption in the United States. At about the same time, "Fordism" was also the proposed Encyclopedia Britannica entry describing Ford's new production methods. Following Henry Ford's suggestion, the eventual entry read "Mass-Production." The two sources, focusing respectively on the organization of consumption and of production, signal the two sides of the regime.

For an a complete explanation of the Regulation School's method and analysis of Fordism see Aglietta (1979) and Boyer (1990).

[3] For a detailed history of the development of mass production in the United States see Hounshell (1984).

[4] For alternative forms of planning –"weak plan-ning" to keep the parallel with Vattimo– see Sandercock and Forsyth (1992) and Sandercock (1998).

[5] Two years after their institution, the NIRA and the National Recovery Administration, the agency in charge to carry out the NIRA Programs, were de-clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

[6] The argument has been made that, since electricity production already exceeded demand, the TVA actu-ally exacerbated overproduction (Beaudreau 1996: 114).

[7]Concerns over the overcapacity of the industrial system were already present in the Hoover administration, whose chief economic strategist (Senator Reed Smoot) stated that low consumption levels by wage-earners "has brought about what may be called and oversupply or overproduction existing in many lines" (quoted in Beaudreau 1996: 31). The Roosevelt administration was even more clearly aware of the necessity to develop a mass market. See for example Roosevelt's address "A Discussion of Government Fiscal Policy in Relation to Consumer Purchasing Power" on May 23, 1939 to the American Retail Federation.

[8]For an accurate description of these practices see Jackson (1985).

[9]Recently a student offered me an example of this material change in relation to the establishment of Homelands in South Africa. There, the cognitive ordering of ethnic groups as excluded from the rights of true citizenship was materialized by creating "independent" territories and locating those groups in them. This resulted in making the members of the groups foreigners in their country, needing a passport to move through it, and with limited or no voice in the decision making process of the state. It resulted, in other words, in making real the initial conception.

[10]Fraser (1992) makes this case with regards to subordination of women, who in Habermas' characterization of the public sphere are relegated into the private and excluded from the discourse altogether.

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Can Complexity Theory Enter the World of Planning?

Seema D. Iyer

Fundamental questions in urban planning regarding the growth and decline of cities are akin to inquiries about, for example, the organic growth of a plant. Similarity stems from the fact that a causal or etiological study of the phenomenon has a rather arbitrary starting point, as the logic of the situation is not strictly linear. Perhaps, in the Kuhnsian sense (Kuhn 1996), the social sciences, and planning in particular, are currently experiencing a paradigm

shift away from explanations based on causation and toward ones based on the idea of "suitable conditions" (Eckstein 1998). This approach incorporates both the endogenous and exogenous elements of an entity and, hence, attempts to understand a phenomenon within its own context. For example, in the case of the plant, many things in the proximate as well as distant environment must fall into place for germination, photosynthesis, and succession to occur. Albeit latent and often intangible, suitable conditions or the milieu within which social, economic, and political processes occur determine the possibility of outcomes. Of course, suitable conditions are wrought with the messy issues of contingency and circumstance, so that while a phenomenon may be highly deterministic, given the particular initial conditions and subsequent paths available it remains unpredictable. Determinism without predictability is the trademark characteristic of *complexity theory*, which is widely becoming a new way of thinking about contingency and path-dependence. While planners may never themselves engage in the novel numerical simulations and agent-based models used to "build" complex systems (Axelrod 1997; Allen 1997; Axtell and Epstein 1994; Krugman 1996), the theoretical bases of this new framework may bring to the fore planners' inherent assumptions or biases that affect policy decision-making.

If complexity theory had to be boiled down to one word, it would have to be 'interactions.' The contingencies inherent to social and economic processes are the product of interactions that occur from person-to-person or person-to-environment. Complexity

theory provides a framework for understanding interactions in the aggregate without having to separately follow the path of each individual. A complex system can be fundamentally defined as one that consists of a large number of parts that interact with each other in some characteristic way. Depending upon the properties of the parts and the nature of their interactions, the system as a whole may assume qualities that cannot be inferred from analysis of the parts alone. A simple system, in contrast, can be understood at either scale, with each part a succinct representation of the entire system. Change within a complex system (or network or structure) mainly occurs due to a change in the nature of interactions that link the parts together. Therefore, complexity theory suggests that by focusing on interactions themselves, change in a system can at least be anticipated if not absolutely determined.

Cities, and the urban structures by which they are connected, can be viewed as complex systems. An urban system may be located within a geographical region or in a non-spatial realm that consists of the economic, political, social, and informational linkages between cities. More so today than ever before, urban areas do not function in isolation. Individual cities simultaneously interact with other cities, and the resulting national or global economy cannot be simply extrapolated from the happenings in any single city. Certainly, the analysis of urban systems is nothing new within the field of planning, however, there has been little attention to internal interactions. Instead, the predominant existing theories of spatial interaction make implicit assumptions about the network

of linkages between and within cities. Many of these theories have a disciplinary bias or emphasis, so that different units of action/actors and types of interaction are used in analysis of urban systems. Each disciplinary perspective envisions a different relationship among cities based upon the nature of connectedness between cities, and therefore, attributes different relative positions, prominence, or centrality to cities within an urban system. Centrality within a system is often associated with power or importance, and as will be discussed in this paper, the unstated assumptions of these theories have concrete implications with respect to policy formation.

Although several academic disciplines are engaged in urban systems analysis, few have developed approaches that consider multi-nodal systems. For example, economic-base theory equates trade volume between cities with urban centrality, which means that only the dyadic relationship between a city and its trading partners determines relative position within an urban system (Irwin and Hughes 1992). The three perspectives considered in this paper have developed theories about *direct* and *indirect* relationships between cities that incorporate spatial and non-spatial linkages. Within the field of geography, central place theory emphasizes the unidirectional flow between cities of the consumer to the supplier so that greater economic *in*dependence implies greater centrality. From the urban ecology perspective, interaction between cities leads to functional specialization via cooperative adaptation so that greater *inter*dependence implies greater centrality. Finally, theories from urban sociology stress the role of circulation and

distribution within spatial networks so that domination over the flow of resources within the system implies greater centrality.

These three perspectives can additionally be differentiated along the structural/agency spectrum as each assumes varying levels of causal influence between the urban network as a whole and the individual cities that comprise it. The conceptualization of the city as an agent/actor within the urban structure has received much criticism largely from two counterpoints. Firstly, at varying spatial scales, complex socio-economic relationships and organizations are simply condensed into "a spaceless node, the named city" (Gottdiener 1985). All of the richness of place is reduced to a featureless, acultural, and, most importantly, replicable part of the entire system. Secondly, in the context of developed urbanized industrial-capitalist societies, the city may not be a "significant economic, political, or social unit of analysis" since the distinctions between rural and urban lives have diminished (Saunders 1985). But according to classical writers such as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, the city is of immense historical importance precisely during an economic transformation. Arguably, around the world today there are many regions experiencing economic restructuring which could imply that the city is *the* important actor within the urban and global network. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has led to the transition from a command to a market economy for most of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and according to many authors like Manuel Castells and Neil Smith, the Industrial Revolution has given way to the dis-

tinctively unique Information Technology Revolution in post-industrial societies since the nineteen seventies (Castells 1996; Smith 1996). The major theoretical question within this secondary debate is whether the urban structure accounts for or somehow predicts the variability among cities or, conversely, whether the urban structure is simply the outcome of increasingly complex relationships between cities with unique local characteristics.

Together, the perspectives from the different disciplines provide an understanding of the relative relationships that arise within the urban system. Complexity theory does not replace these perspectives; instead, it offers a new way to visualize and compare them. By explicitly and empirically analyzing the interactions within an urban system, planners may be able to distinguish which perspective is most appropriate or most relevant for various planning agendas. The purpose of this paper is to explore the underlying assumptions of these perspectives, examine the urban system that emerges from those assumptions, and discuss the policy implications of each towards urban change.

Central Place Theory

Central place theory as posited by Walter Christaller (1966) is the outgrowth of a rich history of Germanic thought pertaining to location theory and economic geography. From the central-place framework, the distribution of towns in space emerges in a hierarchical urban landscape due to the nature of economic interactions between cities. The primary content of exchange between cities is the purchase of goods or services by the consumer, which means that access to consumer markets by suppliers dictate the location of and relationship between cities. For a specific good, there is a maximum range a consumer is willing to travel and a minimum market size necessary to support producers. The interplay between the maximum and minimum range of a good determines where it is offered (Irwin and Hughes 1992). Goods that require a relatively large market for profitability are located in cities with maximal access across the urban network. Only such cities can support a wide breadth of economic goods as well as a large constituent population. Assuming a continuum of inner and outer ranges for goods, cities are functionally differentiated, which results in the flow of consumers from less central places to more central places for the provision of goods not available. Consumers move between place of residence to place of purchase, culminating the interaction with the transaction. Interaction between cities, therefore, is implicitly assumed to be unidirectional. Centrality, from this perspective, is a function of independence from other cities; there should be no outflow from the most central place since all goods of the regional economy are available to its own constituent population.

Central places do not necessarily refer to the central spatial location, but rather to the central functionality of a place. The observed network of consumer flows in a fully developed central-place hierarchy is a reflection of the underlying spatial division of labor. The structure of the urban network defines which goods are available in each city and presumably the make-up of the city's residents. The resulting spatial

pattern is envisioned to be a densely packed lattice of lesser central places radiating from the core. According to Gottdiener, the system of cities in the central-place framework combines predominantly economic activities in the analysis of both the horizontal and the hierarchical integration of space:

Figure 1: The physical layout of a metropolitan rail line network constructed with central-place assumptions regarding movement patterns.

The regional economy was viewed as a hierarchy of urban places which comprised a functional matrix of marketing, transport, and administrative networks supporting a nest of cities from small outlying ones to larger, centrally located agglomerations (Gottdiener 1985: 48-49).

The network arrangements of cities are highly dependent on transportation costs so that spatial competition at inter-urban and intra-urban scales becomes the most important factor in the economics of location (Isard 1956). Mathematical refinements to the framework regarding the shape and size of market area resulted in a fractal-like landscape of nested hexagons (Lösch 1954). The conceptualization of the urban system as self-similar at all scales became the notion of the optimal, not necessarily the actual, configuration of cities in space. Optimal outcomes, however, are rarely ever achieved in reality precisely because of the path-dependent nature of city formation.

The hypothesis regarding the primal role of the historical central city in organizing urban space has become one of the limitations of this perspective on urban form. In particular, central place theory fails to account for the polycentric forms of metropolitan areas that exist in the US today, and the mismatch between theory and reality is most starkly noted in many metropolitan rail networks. Transportation planning seems to be heavily influenced by this perspective, especially with respect to the directionality of movement between cities. The implicit assumption is that movement occurs between cities of differing centrality, and since centrality increases with proximity to the central city, traffic patterns facilitate movement from the periphery to the core. The physical layout of the fixed rail infrastructure within and between metropolitan areas is a manifestation of these assumptions (see Figure 1). Central place theory is unable to account for movement between areas of similar centrality. There is no inherent impe-

tus for such movement from this perspective, as such areas offer similar (if not the same) goods.

Urban Ecology

The origins of urban ecology are based on the notion that spatial relations between cities have a certain degree of regularity, particularly with respect to the physical shape of cities. The theoretical roots of this perspective can be traced back to Émile Durkheim (1933) and then the prominent members of the Chicago School, beginning with Robert Park (1925) in the 1920s. The fundamental axiom in this collective work is that the urban landscape is a reflection of the society that maintains it, so that study of urban land patterns provides insight into collective societal action. Unlike the central place theorists' interest in the optimal distribution of cities and urban residents, the urban ecologists were mainly concerned with the growth and evolution of cities over time. One manifestation of this emphasis was Burgess's areal concentric zone model of metropolitan expansion, which depicted the areal morphology of socially distinctive urban areas (Friedmann and Weaver 1979). The emergence of cities and urban systems was theorized as the product of the symbiotic and 'biotic' competition for space among humans. The human struggle for space is mediated through the value-free property market, and the resulting geographical pattern of land allocation is presumed to "maximize efficiency for the community as a whole" (Logan and Molotch 1987). By the 1950s, Amos Hawley had become the dominant champion of the perspective, and the theory began to assume a much more ab-

stract formulation. The main proposition of the ecological approach became that a city's ability to adapt, grow, and evolve was a function of increasingly complex interconnections between cities (Hawley 1986). Hawley and other ecologists, however, have offered amorphous descriptions as to the nature of interactions between cities. The barometer for measuring increasing complexity within the system is the number and frequency of contacts between urban areas. Frequency of contact with other cities allows a city to adapt to the structural complexity of the overall urban system; the number of contacts contributes to the variety of resource and information inputs from the system as a whole, which forms a city's adaptive knowledge base.

The urban system develops until the maximum size and complexity is reached within and between cities. Growth is highly dependent on the given technology for transportation and communication that facilitates the formation of linkages within the system. Circulation of people and ideas throughout the urban system depends on the number of interrelationships and the frequency of contact within the system. Of course, as the technological capacity increases, the urban system can accommodate interaction in greater numbers and across longer distances. Technological innovation is viewed as an exogenous force that acts upon the entire urban system simultaneously and indiscriminately. The result of this external influence is a rearrangement or adaptation of the cities within the urban system. From the urban ecology perspective, cities are integrated according to mutual dependencies and function in support of the overall adap-

tive order within the urban network. Interaction between cities, therefore, is implicitly assumed to be uninhibited or multidirectional. Cities that are more accessible to the entire network, both physically and psychologically, are given greater importance as they facilitate network-wide interconnections (Gottdiener 1985). Cities with greater frequency of contact tend to develop complex economic structures that can lead to functional differentiation within the system (Irwin and Hughes 1992). Specialization of a city is a product of a limited amount of resources available from the surrounding network.

Urban ecologists clearly utilize many concepts from Darwin's theory of evolution to explain the functional role that interdependence among cities plays in increasing network complexity. An attempt within the central place framework to account for this increased complexity has simply proposed greater "nesting" of market areas that are still organized around the dominant central city. The ecological perspective's departure from central place theory lies in its introduction of adaptability and evolution within the system, which allow transformations of the dominant city itself. The emergence of a hierarchy is mainly attributable to the existing state of transportation and communication technologies, as these are the means by which adaptability is enhanced. However, relationships in the ecological network are viewed as cooperative rather than competitive, which implies that the unequal distribution of access to technology is simply a consequence of locational advantages within the system. One criticism of this view is that changes and outcomes of local areas are

dictated by the state of technology within the overall structure. Cities with similar accessibility throughout the system are assumed to be similarly adaptable to technological change. This approach cannot account for variation among similarly-categorized cities because local idiosyncrasies are not taken into consideration.

Much of urban ecology is, therefore, the study of convergence within the urban system to an eventual "equilibrium", as cities continually assume positions of relative centrality or importance. In essence, this perspective alleges the inevitability that cities will adapt to the overall urban structure along the path of least resistance, whereby technology is the leading indicator of change. Hawley's characterization of this equilibrial model, with exogenous shocks to the urban system through technological advances, has had direct and indirect influence on research policy, as the ecological perspective became more mainstream. The assumption that as technology shifts so too may the level of adaptability of a city has led to policy decisions that favor areas at the cutting edge of technology. Researchers adopting this perspective have tended to suggest that the duty of the government is to facilitate the expansion of burgeoning cities rather than ameliorate the social blight within collapsing cities. For example, based on a study of demographic and economic mismatch in New York during the 1970s, Kasarda and Friedrichs argue that if the government's position were to encourage local resistance to change:

...the outcome is ... increasing numbers of poten-
tially productive minorities [who] find themselves
socially, economically, and spatially isolated in
segregated areas of social decline... (1986: 223).

Flanagan suggests that this point of view had not been lost on federal policy makers (Flanagan 1993). In 1980, the Commission for a National Agenda issued a report that acknowledged the proposition that shifts in national development often meant that local populations would be economically displaced, but the government's primary responsibility was to retrain and relocate workers left behind. According to Flanagan, the federal government's hands-off policy regarding the economic and industrial shift from the North to the South was largely based upon the urban ecological bias.

At the intra-city level, gentrification has revived interest in the fundamental and historical origins of the ecological perspective, particularly in light of the obvious parallelisms with the "invasion and succession" thesis of residential areas (Mckenzie 1933). Of course, until the 1970s, this notion of invasion and succession mostly referred to residential turnover from more to less affluent households as neighborhoods became devalued. While there are ambiguities regarding the benefits and liabilities of affluent urbanites moving into inner city neighborhoods, there is consensus that gentrification does generate homelessness and loss of jobs for displaced residents. From the ecological viewpoint, this phenomenon is a reflection of an inherently rational process in which residents respond to the internal mechanisms of the property market. The conflict involved in the gentri-fication process is simply viewed as the means to the ends. Again, within this framework, the role of public policy is not to prevent the process from occurring, but rather to ameliorate the situation for those who are displaced. In the case of gentrification, planners should, for example, either help find alternative accommodations for the previous residents or ensure that low-income housing in the area is a viable option for potential real estate developers.

Urban Sociology
The historical roots of urban sociology are as varied as the issues that this perspective attempts to address. One theoretical strain comes out of the theories of urbanism and community championed by Simmel and Wirth in the 1930s. The sociological effects of urban life on people and communities were much debated during the rapid urbanization of pre-WWII Europe and the US, but Simmel and Wirth fueled an anti-urban bias by describing the urban way of life as superficial and isolating. Another strain focuses on Marxian urban political economy developed by Castells and Harvey beginning in the 1970s (Castells 1977; Harvey 1989). Although criticized for its emphasis on formal Marxist theory via class struggle analysis, urban political economy crucially highlighted the conflictive nature of spatial competition, as opposed to the benign competition of the urban ecological perspective. Many urban sociologists have identified a paradigm shift within the field since the 1980s that attempts to unify as well as challenge the fundamental assumptions and explanations in the field (Zukin 1980; Gottdiener and Feagin

1988). In particular, the assumption of a free market system with perfect competition has been replaced with a more sociological interpretation of how markets are organized (Logan and Molotch 1987). With respect to property markets, the interplay between use and exchange value of property serves as the crucial mechanism by which cities and systems of cities are organized. However, due to the pervasiveness of the ecological framework, empirical research of urban systems tends to ignore the role of the state itself in creating the urban structure. According to Zukin:

> ...it is impossible to find interpretations that either contradict state policy or offer alternative sets of assumptions on which policy should be based.... For most of their history, urban sociologists seemed to serve the needs of the state... (1980: 575).

In general, the three main issues that this perspective attempts to address, absent from the previous perspectives, include: 1) the increasingly interventionist role of the government has direct effects on the urban system; 2) change within the urban system occurs via conflict, which is attributable to the economic mode of production; and 3) the cause of regional variation is a function of the interrelationship between the structure of the urban system and the local characteristics within each city (Gottdiener and Feagin 1988). Although there is considerable theoretical diversity among urban sociological approaches, they collectively emphasize the importance of distributional transactions in socio-spatial systems. The fact that limited resources must somehow be distributed

within the system is the fundamental characteristic of the overall urban structure, although the content of the exchange between cities (labor, capital, information) and the controller of the resource (political elite, oligopolies, developers) varies within the urban sociology perspective. Centrality, or importance within the urban system, then becomes a function of access to resources by some cities and the corresponding exclusion from these resources by other cities.

Dominant cities are those that are able to control access to resources and exclude them from network-wide circulation. Domination or restriction, therefore, is the basis of interactions between cities. But unlike the previous two perspectives, this assumption is quite explicit. Urban sociology certainly privileges interactions within the system, but as the discussion of prominent authors below shows, change within the system is structurally determined. Change is still difficult to anticipate; once a city or area is able to dominate the flow of resources, only external forces can change the existing pattern of domination. Therefore, according to the urban sociology perspective, the overall system dictates the nature of interactions between cities. Complexity theory suggests that the opposite is true; the nature of interactions between cities determines the overall system.

Urban sociologists envision variation and hierarchy among urban spaces not as the outgrowth of natural or spontaneous processes, but rather as the manifestation of the inherent inequities and contradictions of imperfect competition in the capitalist mode of production. Unequal benefits accrue to social classes that are politically powerful or informationally privy

enough to manipulate the urban landscape and urban infrastructure (Zukin 1980). According to Smith, urban development within the capitalist state is influenced by the contradictory structure of capitalism, which tends towards both the "equalization of conditions" as well as their "differentiation" (Smith 1996). Equalization occurs as the economy expands in search of greater profits, and differentiation emerges out of the geographical variations prior to the introduction of capital. This dynamic involves various spatial scales, and Smith suggests that gentrification represents the confluence of both local and global forces at the urban scale. The local forces that influence the "invasion and succession" process refer to the history of investment and disinvestment at the neighborhood scale, whereas the global forces are connected by worldwide political and economic change. Smith views gentrification as a harbinger of spatial restructuring at regional and even global scales:

> And while the urban scale may in the end be the least significant in terms of the overall restructuring of the world economy, the internal logic of uneven development is most completely accomplished there (1996: 87).

The cyclical or circular logic of uneven development is visible at the urban scale—development of one area hinders further development in another, thus leading to underdevelopment that in turn creates opportunities for a new phase of development. Smith calls this geographic development pattern a "locational seesaw". The gentrifiers (or capital) occupy and are continually in search of the optimal

space for the domination of inner city residential areas. Clearly, this conceptualization of intra-city spatial competition is distinct from that envisioned within the urban ecology framework, where the people that are displaced cannot possibly compete with the gentrifiers.

For Zukin (1980), the two fundamental elements of urban sociology are: 1) the permeation of the local by national levels in both economy and polity; and 2) the coordination by an urban "matrix" of switches in investment strategy which relates consumption and production in fundamentally new ways. Similar to Smith, Zukin views the history of urbanization as intricately intertwined with national growth and national states. The rise of the capitalist city critically hinged upon its integration into first regional, and then national and even global, markets, and this interconnectedness of all scales in the urbanization process contributes to varying levels of centrality among cities. State intervention into city politics created a "fragmented" system at the local level in which the underprivileged classes contended for a localized set of resources while the privileged classes had access to a national set of resources. In this way, growth at either spatial scale perpetuates growth in the other. The second element within capitalist urban systems assumes that investment strategies have become the most important type of interactions between and within cities. Centrality among cities refers not only to the locus of decision-making, communication, or accumulation processes, but also to "setting a matrix for the transformation of investment strategies" (ibid.: 592). Zukin conceives of the term "matrix" as the "logical construct for organizing the economic,

political, and ideological structures of a given mode of production" (ibid.: 595). In other words, switches between types of investment strategies behave like levers and pulleys so that the city as a whole, rather than a particular neighborhood or sector, can facilitate a transition within the process of capitalist development. The interconnectedness of all parts of the capitalist urbanization process contributes to varying levels of centrality (uneven development) among cities. However, Zukin's view remains structural; she posits that the city situates and perpetuates the mode of social and economic control within the broader, national system.

The attention of urban sociology to interactions in an urban system is most explicitly articulated in Castells' latest work (1996). According to Castells, changes within urban systems are attributable to the "networking logic" of the new information technology economy and the resulting post-Fordist social and economic transformations. As opposed to the linear or serial set of relationships during the Industrial Revolution, epitomized by Fordist mass production, new information technologies are facilitating more complex interactions that are organized by networks. Castells argues that new information technologies, such as the internet, allow this organizational type to pervade social and economic processes. The network of communication among cities creates a new "space of flows" that is superceding the "space of place" within urban systems. This network of flows consists of three layers: 1) the connective structure; 2) the physical locality of "nodes"; and 3) the organizational structure. The first two layers alone are very reminiscent of the urban ecological perspective,

where interaction between cities is a function of the state of technology. The third layer incorporates the concept of domination as the architecture of the technological infrastructure as designed by institutional and social actors in the urban system. Segregation occurs both within cities between the elite and local communities and also among cities between those that can and cannot control network-wide flows. Although less so than Zukin's, Castells' formulation of the interaction within socio-spatial systems gives more authority to the structure of the network rather than to the agents. While the managerial elite attempt to position themselves for perpetual domination, they are at the mercy of changes within the space of flows itself.

Conclusion

For planners trying to understand the growth and decline of cities, the basic contribution of complexity theory is its focus on systemic interactions at various scales of urban systems. The basic implicit assumptions regarding interurban linkages within the three perspectives outlined in this paper are: 1) unidirectional flow in the central place framework; 2) multidirectional flow in the urban ecology viewpoint; and 3) dominated/restricted flow from the urban sociology perspective. By distilling urban systems down to the characteristic nature of interactions between cities, complexity theory suggests that macro-level phenomena can be viewed as emergent properties of those interactions, so that change within the system can be better anticipated.

The scale of analysis in this paper has mainly been at the level of inter-urban interactions, as opposed to

intra-urban interactions, mainly because at this spatial scale, the relativity of "top down" and "bottom up" forces acting upon cities and the urban system is most ambiguously felt. How local specificity and global generality intersect at this level is uncertain, and it is in this area that complexity theory can possibly contribute most. Certainly, the theories of socio-spatial interaction reviewed in this paper provide interpretations of intra-urban interactions as well. For example, each perspective offers insights into the impetus of residential gentrification. Central place theory assumes a unidirectional flow of consumers and commuters from the periphery to the core in order to access centrally located goods and jobs. By determining the geographic market size of goods according to time instead of transportation costs, people who place a premium value on time will tend to locate in the center to reduce travel. Gottman has recognized a new "quaternary" sector of economic activity (activities related to information and knowledge) that not only organizes highly specialized personnel into an interwoven community at work, but also has a market size that is more dependent upon time than space (Gottman 1990). Therefore, given the implicit assumptions of central place theory, geographers may attribute gentrification to the post-industrial informational economy. As discussed previously, from the urban ecology perspective, gentrification is the natural succession of capital over culture. Gentrifiers are the holders of capital, which is an indirect measure of technology and, hence, more adaptable to external innovation. And finally, from the urban sociology framework, the struggle between the use and exchange value for land in the inner city is a well-orchestrated attempt by developers to domi-nate the property market to ensure future profitability. Each interpretation of gentrification offers different policy recommendations: economic development planning that attracts high-tech firms to inner cities, or assistance to displaced residents in finding housing elsewhere, or anti-growth machine initiatives that help un-align local government from land speculators (Logan and Molotch 1987).

The data required to empirically measure or validate the nature of interactions between cities varies according to the type of linkages emphasized by each perspective. To identify a central place-type urban system, the most appropriate data would include the magnitude of exchanges along dyadic relationships, since the interaction between cities terminates with the purchase of consumer goods. For example, commuting patterns between cities can indicate either central city dominance within a region or a more polycentric metropolitan community (Giuliano and Small 1993). Data requirements for the urban ecology perspective need to incorporate interconnected flows of information or raw materials, since interdependence within the system implies greater frequency of contact. Some attempts to operationalize this perspective have relied on systems analysis in order to include the dynamic interaction between population, organization, environment, and technology. Airline passenger flows have been used to show the change in the global urban structure as the number and frequency of flights has increased worldwide (Smith and Timberlake 1995). Research based on the urban sociology perspective seems to be moving in the direction towards case study analysis in order to establish connections between the specific local characteris-

tics within a city and the global forces that interact with them. The new agenda for research in urban sociology is to identify those aspects of urban interaction that equip each city to uniquely respond to global forces and to understand how some cities are able to resist general regional trends (Giddens 1984; Flanagan 1993).

Although these perspectives follow a historical train of thought (albeit central place theory and urban ecology are mostly contemporaneous), their continued relevance is based on the fact that each emphasizes different yet vital aspects of the nature of interactions between cities. Changes, modifications, and contradictions from one perspective to another have occurred in order to reflect the ongoing, evolving process of urbanization primarily within the US and Europe. None of them is invalidated, as empirical examples of each type of urban system can be identified simultaneously not only throughout urban history but also across geographic locations. For example, there exist metropolitan areas dominated by the central city, for example Oklahoma City (Irwin and Hughes 1992), such that urban areas interact according to the central place model. Global cities that have transcended the purview of the nation-state are mutually dependent upon each other and are propelled or limited by available information and communication technology; these systems of cities can be described according to the ecological framework. And perhaps in the middle of these two extremes, where the local meets the global, is the network of urban areas that can be described according to the urban sociology perspective. The point for researchers and policymakers is that the nature of interactions within urban systems should

be explicitly examined in order to guide research and public policy.

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Home, Memory, and Beyond

Amy Shimshon-Santo

This brief theoretical review presents ideas and strategies central to feminist planning in order to reinvigorate feminist projects at the intersections of difference and place. Four themes are discussed including: 1) publicizing women's roles and concerns within planning and policy; 2) revisiting critiques of home; 3) reviewing challenges for socializing women's history; and 4) rethinking the connection between consciousness and agency. I argue

that transnational feminist debates remain at the periphery of planning, although better attention to this emerging scholarship could expand the production of planning knowledge and improve strategies for social action to better the lives of women, as well as men and children.

Publi(city)

Theoretical discourses about women's participation have often been hashed out in discussions of the public and private spheres, including the position of women and the household in the reproduction and production of the economy, the state, and community. Whereas androcentric theories viewed the household, and women, as outside the public realm of politics and the economy, many feminist accounts asserted that the public realm is an invention of bourgeois society. What in fact are the boundaries of the public? One might ask: aren't households often regulated and controlled by the state? Feminist criticism of the welfare state would answer this question affirmatively (Prügl 1999). Doesn't the household have broad economic significance? Feminist studies have argued that the household reproduces labor power fueling capitalist economies, and that many women labor at home through informal survival strategies (Lowe and Lloyd 1999). The boundaries of the public are in fact contested, or, as Rosalyn Deutsche (1998) suggests, a social construct rather than a scientific category. As a result, one can argue that mapping a public sphere simultaneously invents whatever is left outside of that space. Publicizing issues seen as private and/or marginalized is one way

to bring silenced women's issues into the realm of public debate and planning intervention.

However, can a generalized location, or women's place, be assumed for all women? Critiques of essentialized notions of gender suggest that although it is good to publicize women's issues, one cannot assume a universal position—or spatial location—for all women or men (Spivak 1994). Patricia Hill-Collins (1990) points out that the dominant conceptualization of "public" and "private" spheres is specifically complicated by race and class. But the line between stories that are publicized, or told, and stories that are silenced is constantly being contested and negotiated. For example, Rosa Linda Fregoso's (1999) article "Re-imaging Chicana Identities in the Public Sphere" finds that Chicanas have redrawn the imagined boundaries between public and private life through alternative cultural productions.

A closer look at housework, for example, elucidates just how inexact the spatial boundaries are between an imagined private or public economic life. Domestic workers leave their homes to labor in other households, effectively confusing the conceptualization of women's space as private since domestics often work for other women as wage workers in private spaces (Hill-Collins 1990). Rather than seeing domestics as removed from public life, Hill-Collins sees domestics as having a *broader* awareness of both private and public social spaces that privileged women tend not to see or know. The notion of women's space as private tends to inspire a vision of women's place as only recently proletarianized. In fact, working-class women, including many

racialized adults and children, have labored in the public realm for centuries without enjoying many basic "public" rights (such as voting and access to adequate education and health care for themselves and their families).

Women's participation in the "informal" economy is another example of how women are made invisible in economic policy and planning. Allison Freeman, Francine Pickup, and Lamia Rashid (1997) explain that women do productive work in and outside the home, yet policymakers consistently overlook the functioning of the informal sector in their interventions. These authors demand a new definition of work that includes formal and informal paid labor as well as dependency work. Although the notion of a split between public and private spheres makes little sense in terms of understanding the informal economy and post-Fordist flexible production, perhaps extending public rights to informal and underpaid labor is a more valid focus for publicizing the private economy.

Deutsche suggests that redefining the term "public" to avoid distorted conceptualizations and language is an important step towards constructing a politics of cultural space that does not relegate certain groups to the status of outsider, or other. "Rather than a real category," she explains, "the definition of the public, like the definition of the city, is an ideological artifact, a contested and fragmented terrain" (1998: 59). The argument that women's empowerment depends in part on positioning ourselves more favorably within the public sphere is common knowledge, but is complicated by understanding differences among

women. The simple notion of women at home and men in the workplace is not an accurate historical depiction either of working-class women's social location, or of women's role in flexible production schemes in a globalized economy.

Although many people have critiqued the notion of a private/public split, the assumption that women entering the official "public sphere" of work is somehow emancipatory is perplexingly resilient (Lowe and Lloyd 1999; Hill-Collins 1990; Deutsche 1998). A case in point is the Clinton Administration's violent reforms of the welfare system. These reforms were cloaked in the language of "moving people from welfare to work." This underscores a locational shift from home (seen as a place of rest, although not so for many women!) to "empowerment" through paid labor. What ensued was the misrepresentation of poor single mothers as free riders, and misdirected blame for their inability to obtain a livable wage. This reform visualized "work" as something that happens *outside* the home. *Moving* poor women out of the house into the public realm of "work" (i.e., paid labor) was defended by welfare reformers as increasing women's independence. This would benefit the state by decreasing the national debt, and women by fostering their independence.

However, policies like "welfare to work" have not adequately addressed the broader issues affecting this vocational—and locational—transition for women. How can poor women making unlivable wages sustain a family? Who will provide flexible work schedules to allow more parent/child contact? Who will care for the children left at home when mothers are

out working? Who will support mothers trying to gain an education in order to expand their life opportunities as they sustain their children inside and outside the home? Who will calm the stress brought on by a double workday consisting of unpaid work at home and poorly paid work outside the home? Who will transport the children to school and doctor when mother is working? Who will involve other adult partners in the home to help share household and financial responsibilities? How might public and private institutions such as schools, neighborhood organizations, public health providers, and the media best support poor households—whether they be headed by one or two adults, male or female, gay or straight? A better approach to welfare planning and policy would have asked these and other questions important to different women, and included clear mechanisms to address these concerns. After all, the well-being of mothers is linked to the well-being of households, and the health of broader communities.[1]

Iris Marion Young (1998) asks for a reconceptualization of the importance of dependency work by recognizing that one cannot assume an ideal of independence as embodied in a paid job. There are people who cannot achieve that standard of independence, such as children and the elderly. Those who care for these dependent people provide an important social service. Young suggests a new standard for autonomy where dependency workers (such as mothers) are guaranteed subsistence, and depicted as helping society rather than being free riders. Valorizing women's public service is one important arena for publicizing and understanding the role of the household in the social, political, and economic life of communities.

Home

Elisabeth Prügl, a feminist scholar in international relations, makes the important point that "although public-private distinctions constructed women as outside of politics, gender relations were never purely domestic" (1999: 3). This section addresses the metaphoric representations of gender through the built environment—specifically in the idealized "woman's space" called home. Perhaps no metaphor better demonstrates how the imagined and the material, the cultural and the spatial, are intertwined than the notion of the American Dream as embodied in a single-family home.

Iris Marion Young critiques the notion of the American Dream as sustained in a private dwelling when she recalls, "the dream of a house in the suburbs became my mother's nightmare" (1997: 144). Young's discussion of the inability of her mother to meet the standard for housewives in her neighborhood—despite what her daughter considered good parenting skills—dramatizes how maintaining the dream house requires rigid standards of conduct by parents and children. Standards for cleanliness and hygiene accompanied the invention of a home as a space of capitalist consumption. This standard asserts itself at the most intimate level—the disciplining of the body itself. This notion is so prevalent that even I could not help keep my jaw from dropping open when my mother-in-law once counseled

me with the words of an old cliché: "You keep your man by what you do in the kitchen and in the bed." For Young, women's place is not only seen as in the home, but women are seen as *being* a home to the men and children in her household by the attention she provides them.

Daphne Spain argues that the home functions as a metaphor exposing the social relations residing both within, and beyond, its walls. "Spatial and social relations mutually reinforce one another, and if status differences are engendered within the home, they are likely to be expressed outside it also" (1992: 111). Emphasizing housework as unrecognized, unvalorized, and either free or underpaid leads many feminist accounts to reject motherhood and marriage as inherently oppressive for all women. Young writes:

> Many cultures historically and today equate women with home, expecting women to serve men at home and sometimes preventing them from leaving the house. If house and home mean the confinement of women for the sake of nourishing male projects, then feminists have good reason to reject home as a value...Women serve, nurture, and maintain so that the bodies and souls of men and children gain confidence and expansive subjectivity to make their own world. This homey role deprives women of support for their own identity and projects. (1997: 134)

Martin Heidegger asserts that the dwelling symbolizes a human way of being composed of two qualities: building and preservation. However, privileging building over preservation is androcentric, and assumes that women have no architectural history—effectively erasing all women who design, plan, or build. Heidegger sees the preservation of home embodied in women's work as inward and nostalgic, in contrast to the outward focus of building as reflective of male identity. Young posits that woman is "assigned to be place without occupying place. Through her, place would be set up for man's use but not hers" (1997: 139).

However, I find more compelling the arguments claiming that there can be no universal interpretation of the meaning of home for all women since women are not a homogeneous group (Hill-Collins 1990; McDowell 1999). For example, not all women labor in their own homes; many labor in other women's homes. Many people have found their lives torn apart by forced labor, expulsion, exile, or travel in search of a paid job, and many have encountered themselves in the position of raising the children of others in exchange for wages while their own children live at a distance. Young argues that the social relevance of caring for those incapable of independence suggests the validity of financial support for dependency workers.

Another realm of feminist critique has been the myth of home as a place of harmony and safety. But home can arguably be seen as a location of violence against women just as much as it can also be a haven from the violence of public life. Many women have struggled to build a home as a space for cultural and economic survival—an activity that has been impeded by institutionalized racism such as restrictive covenants, the former illegality of inter-racial marriage, and the present illegality of same-sex marriage. Consider the recent passage of Proposition 22 by

California voters to deny public marriage rights to lesbian and gay couples, or the demonization of female-headed households in recent political discourse about welfare programs and poverty. These cases suggest that redefining the household and making space for alternative family formations is an important realm of struggle. What does this mean for feminist critiques of home? Clearly, the significance of home for women is differentiated and ambiguous.

Young concludes that there are qualities of home that reflect powerful feelings and social relationships.

> Despite the oppressions and privileges the idea historically carries, the idea of home also carries critical liberating potential because it expresses uniquely human values. (1997:134)

Lucy Lippard sees the pursuit of a "home place" as the search for a center, "for some place to stand, for something to hang on to" (1998: 27). The discussions about home demonstrate the institutional limitations on women over their *supposed* location of power—the home. The privatization of space and institutionalization of private ownership of property have made home a privilege, while the pursuit of a home space ought to be a human right. People without places to live are given their own social category: homeless. A myriad of social, economic, political, cultural, emotional, and environmental factors have formed and transformed the very structure of family life and the organization of human dwellings. Given the diverse meanings of home for different women in different contexts, how might one orga-

nize programs, policies, or research to favorably impact women's home lives? De-essentializing feminist discourse is an appropriate beginning place to move beyond one standard for all households and families. Nuanced connotations of home expose how different women turn to the home as a source of power, while others flee from it to expand their choices, yet others want to approach home life in alternative constructs that redefine the traditional nuclear family.

Memory

Much of feminist planning practice has focused on recalling or reconstructing lost histories through historic preservation and/or public art efforts. Why has so much emphasis been placed on resurrecting women's place in the past? One motivation is to claim women's presence; carve a place; garner visibility. Many feminist public art strategies in the US set out to reconstruct and re-insert silenced urban histories into public view. Although Franz Fanon (1994) and Leopold Senghor (1994) suggest that an important realm of de-colonization practice is to reconstruct misrepresented histories, they also see limits to a purely historical focus. Young finds reconstructive histories for oppressed groups as problematic. She claims that a focus on history, memory, and nostalgia does not easily lend itself to the idea of space as "supporting the individual subjectivity of the person, where the subject is understood as fluid, partial, shifting, and in relations of reciprocal support with others" (Young 1997: 141).

I argue that the recognition of historical erasure and misrepresentation of women and people of color in the official memory of places requires a rebuttal in some form of cultural reconstruction and valorization. However, as Paul Gilroy (1993) suggests, one must be aware of the problems with imagined traditional authenticity. Addressing the context of black liberation movements, he suggests that overemphasizing historical reconstruction often suggests the idea of reclaiming a lost *pure* cultural authenticity, whereas in fact, there is no cultural purity for anyone to *return* to. Gilroy also claims that a critique of nostalgia and authenticity is particularly pertinent to gender:

These crises are most intensely lived in the area of gender relations where the symbolic reconstruction of community is projected onto an image of the ideal heterosexual couple. The patriarchal family is the preferred institution capable of reproducing the traditional roles, cultures, and sensibilities that can solve this state of affairs. (1993: 194)

History, suggests Gilroy, ought to link historical reconstruction with contemporary struggles against inequality. Identity struggles are best seen as related to political and economic struggles, and stories from the past ought to be tied to the making of history in the present.

Does restoring women's history to the public realm through public art address these dilemmas? Dolores Hayden's Power of Place Project sought to sustain the memory of Biddy Mason, an African American founding foremother of the city, through a public art project. The delightful monument in Los Angeles honoring Biddy Mason's life communicates far more to the public about Mason's ingenuity and leadership than a mere plaque, or the once popular "man-on-a-horse" monument common in many older public spaces.

However, I was taken by the monument's physical location on an unassuming and almost hidden path, facing a parking structure in downtown Los Angeles. While the Power of Place Project successfully avoids romanticizing the past, or over-emphasizing masculinity over femininity, other spatial problems still demand attention. First, both the material and cultural landscapes of downtown LA have changed so dramatically that Mason's monument seems almost *out of place* as she claims her own place—her former homestead. The environment surrounding the monument almost overwhelms her claim to that grounded memory. But maybe that was the point of the monument: to juxtapose the past with the present to dramatize how cities change over time.

Maybe the momentary rupture of meaning at the encounter between what came before and what is now is the liminal moment created by the historical monument. However, given the dramatic changes in urban LA, one might question whether the monument might have better informed contemporary African American historical education if it were located in a *less* authentic place (i.e., not necessarily her homestead). Might Mason's memory have been better recycled if the monument had been located somewhere like the First A.M.E Church, where it could be linked to ongoing community educational efforts?

Although I don't think that there is one correct answer to locating a monument to women's history, I mention this dilemma to illustrate a point. How can one approach intervention in historicizing place in the built environment when people (the location of communities) are constantly shifting? In the context of global cities like LA this problem requires greater attention. This dilemma challenges planners to think about historic preservation not as resurrecting the ruins but as linking historical memory to the invention of history today.

Idea / Action

Feminism can be seen as both a social movement for women's emancipation, and a subject of social inquiry (Lowe and Lloyd 1999; McDowell 1999). This basic assertion is fundamental to any interpretation of feminist planning. Most importantly, it sets a standard for social research that informs social action, and action that is informed by critical thinking. In this section I argue that the question of how to organize for women's emancipation begins with a notion of membership and location. In addition, I discuss critiques of the link between consciousness and agency.

Oftentimes the location of action, or women's mobilization, has been visualized as one universal women's movement. However, much feminist research has discussed the need to differentiate women's mobilization given the specific contexts of women's lives. Divergent feminism(s) have critiqued racism or class privilege within the women's movement, and projected new ways of approaching feminist social mobilization (Perez 1999). Women have often chosen to organize within and around different social movements from identity politics to immigrant and/or labor rights. Emerging research in transnational feminism has documented the diversity of social movements that are linked to issues of gender, race, and class (Lowe and Lloyd 1999; Kaplan, Alarcon and Minaloo 1999).[2] Audre Lorde suggests that seeing identity as complex and multi-layered helps to understand the linkages between different axes of power regimented through representations of gender, race, sexuality, age, and class. In addition to critiquing social research and action that overlooks diversity within the group called "woman", Lorde suggests that valuing difference can open new opportunities for alliances between different groups around shared issues (see Young 1998). Norma Alarcon argues that post-structural decentering of subjects, and ethnic women's critiques of the essential woman, have been crucial to reconceptualize and improve women's social mobilization efforts.

I would like to posit that understanding multiple identities and memberships can inform better strategies to address a broader range of issues related to gender, race, class, sexuality, and nation. The notion of multiplicity encourages analysis and action that move beyond the idea of pure authentic identities, and embraces more flexible notions of culture and membership. This suggests that planning show more seriousness in analyzing and responding to sexism, racism, and classism. This challenges planners to think and act in a more multi-vocal way. There is not room to prioritize one axis of power

over another since race, class, nationality, sexuality, and belief all intersect.

A second dilemma arising from the notion of feminism as social inquiry and social mobilization is the relationship between thought and action—a key problem in the field of urban planning. Gayatri Spivak (1993) argues that a major contradiction within Marxist and Feminist theory is the idea that consciousness will organically result in meaningful agency. However, one might ask if a powerful idea always suggests an appropriate action? Certainly planners are aware that ideas and plans with the best of intentions do not always result in positive outcomes. On a more positive note, feminism's dual responsibility of judging good scientific inquiry not only by the knowledge it produces alone, but on its practical relevance, is a fabulous standard for academia. Although McDowell (1999) is ambiguous about this, I believe that challenging essentialism in feminist planning, or in the women's movement, does not necessarily dissolve a place to organize around women's many concerns. In fact, Gayatri Spivak argues that complicating the understanding of women's lives is necessary for better social projects. She writes:

It is not that deconstruction cannot found a politics, while other ways of thinking can. It is that deconstruction can make founded political programs more useful by making their in-built problems more visible. To act therefore is not to ignore deconstruction, but to actively transgress it without giving it up (1993:121).

Sandra Harding argues that feminism implies a new approach to social research. She states:

If one begins inquiry with what appears problematic from the perspective of women's experiences one is lead to design research for women...The goal of such inquiry is to provide for women explanations of social phenomena that they want and need, rather than providing for welfare departments, manufacturers, advertisers, psychiatrists, the medical establishment, or the judicial system answers to questions they have. The questions about women that men have wanted answered have all too often arisen from desires to pacify, control, exploit, or manipulate women. Traditional social research has been for men (1987: 8).

When applied to planning, Harding's argument notes that women enter the realm of planning from the outside, from the margin. Since, for the most part, planning history in the US has been erected by privileged Anglo men, a concern for the intersections of gender, race, and class within planning represents a broader aperture, a more inclusive beginning. However, feminism has needed to problematize the intersections between gender, race, class, nation, and place. While Harding's comments correctly historicize the chasm between the production of social science and women's lives, she uniformly locates women *outside* of various institutions that oppress or neglect other women. This universal position of women *outside* is questionable. Spivak (1993) tries to go beyond essentializing women's place by shedding the term woman for *subaltern* to address gender, class, and race at the local level with attention to global relations. Given the context of globalization, she find the term

subaltern preferable since it is free from the limitations of the national imaginary, and the tendency to see feminism as focusing only on white middle-class women's issues.

Can greater numbers of "subaltern" women and men involved in planning from different class, ethnic, or national backgrounds organically restructure planning theory and practice? I believe that broader participation and questioning will positively impact planning inquiry and practice. However, "new" participants ought to value what everyone brings to planning (i.e., the questions and ideas important to our experiences) or assimilation can result in lost opportunities for planning for multiple publics. By assimilation, I refer to people who strive for inclusion without transformation. Spivak suggests that identity is complex and hybrid, and that local power structures are formed through both local and global relationships. Harding's assertion posits that being feminist requires asking questions important to women and applying one's research to tangible action. In simple terms, the challenge of constructing an non-biased society requires the informed critical participation of multiple groups with multiple perspectives.

Concluding Thoughts

I began this paper by critiquing simplistic notions of a public and private sphere as it relates to different women's lives. However, despite problems with conceptualizing economic activity as a public or private construct, struggles to expand the rights and opportunities for multiple publics, and to appropriately

valorize dependency work in relation to other aspects of the economy, remain important issues for many women and children. Contradictory thoughts about home as simultaneously a woman's "nightmare", and a more loving place, suggest that there is no universally correct analysis of the meaning of home for all women. Any understanding of the significance of home requires opening space for alternative family formations, and appropriately militating for financial support for dependency workers. Reconstructing distorted, or silenced, histories through public art or historic preservation will better address the current crises of women who suffer from poverty, racism, and sexism by moving beyond a conception of spatial inequalities as the simple repair of a symbolic identity crisis. A more powerful approach to women's history would link historical preservation with the invention of new histories by linking the past to contemporary struggles for social justice through ongoing educational and outreach efforts, and critical analysis of space which accounts for demographic changes in place in the context of globalization. As an expression of social movement(s), and a realm of social inquiry, feminist planning ought to set a higher standard for academic research that is useful for social action to better women's lives, yet embraces critical thinking to expand and improve its grounding knowledge.

In conclusion, I turn to the work of Brazilian geographer Milton Santos who touches on the specific challenges for the organic intellectual in way that I find appealing. Santos suggests that one way to subvert the reproduction of racist and sexist practices is

to expand participation of people excluded by what he terms "bodily" characteristics (i.e., racialized and gendered bodies). However, he also suggests that in addition to inclusion, critical thinking is crucial. Santos argues that:

> the moment that an intellectual serves the establishment he/she is no longer an intellectual. An intellectual's job is to be critical (1998).

I end this discussion with Santos' potent thoughts and the suggestion that one's ability to remain critical can open spaces for expanding consciousness and agency. This includes the questions that planners ask and attempt to explain, and the actions people enact to transform their realities.

Endnotes

[1]Policy reform might have begun by historicizing the relationship of women to the state, as Prügl (1999) and others have done. She argues that the welfare state has played the gendered role of "protector" to women as "protectees."

[2]See Lowe and Lloyd (1999) and Kaplan, Alarcon and Minaloo (1999). In addition, Hill-Collins' *Black Feminist Theory* (1990) suggests different ideas and approaches to black women's mobilization. Shirley Hune (Cole 1998) notes that despite differences among Asian Pacific Island Women, Asian Women in the United States suffer from the same stereotypes imposed by dominant culture.

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M. Christine Boyer and Recent Debates over Virtual Public Space

Liang-yi Yen

Urban public spaces—plazas, parks, streets, and public buildings, among others—have long been essential settings for activities of urban public life, including those related to communication, entertainment, identity framing, and political participation. However, as advanced communication technology has gradually invaded our daily life in the past two decades, a great portion of urban public life has increasingly migrated from the physical space to the realm of virtual space, i.e., media and computer

networks. The emergence of this new virtual public life, especially after the rise of computer technology, has not only produced new forms of public space, (e.g., internet chat rooms), it has also challenged urban public space in the material world by competing for users. In response to this new dynamic, many urban theorists have turned their attention to the issue of the impacts of virtual public space on urban public life. Among others, architectural historian and urban critic M. Christine Boyer has made some of the most insightful critiques of the transformation of public space in the age of electronic communication, including the tensions between public space and private space, and virtual space and real space.

Linking the experiences of virtual space and material space by looking at the visual perception of the urban landscape in cities, Boyer's interpretation of virtual public space is theoretically insightful to the current debates on urban public life. Boyer theorizes the complicated relation between the physical urban space and the virtual space characterizing the experience of the contemporary cities. As images and fantasies are rapidly transmitted with the aid of electronic communication instruments, blurring the distinctions between the material city and the immaterial city, Boyer's pioneering works are highly pertinent to
the research agenda of critical urban studies.

Recent debates about virtual public space have focused on two questions. Is physical space still significant for contemporary urban public life? Will the newly emerging virtual space be the promised land for the revitalization of urban democracy? In general,

two opposing viewpoints relate to these issues: technological utopianism (which celebrates the coming of the new virtual space), and, technological dystopianism (which harbors skepticism about the future of virtual space). For technological utopians who look to public spaces in terms of privatization or commodification by corporate bureaucracies, cyberspace is seen as very appealing for the construction of genuine public space that is open to different social groups (see Benedikt 1991; Rheingold 1994). In contrast, for the technological dystopians, virtual space can even further undermine the larger public sphere since it can *more* easily be censored and controlled by the state and corporations (see Dewey 1997; Graham and Aurigi 1997; Graham 1998).

This essay presents Boyer's critiques of virtual public space and situates her critiques within the recent debates of virtuality and public space. Through a critical assessment of Boyer's position, we can arrive at a better understanding of the potentials and limitations of the virtual public space. I will first review Boyer's academic project on urbanism over the past two decades and illustrate her theories on public space and cybercities. Then, I will examine the different perspectives of virtual public space in recent debates and compare them with Boyer's perspective. Finally, I will examine contributions and limitations of Boyer's model of virtual public space, concluding with a discussion of the implications on urban public space debates.

Boyer's Project: Critiques of the Visual Perception of Urban Landscape

Boyer has written extensively on the history of city planning in the United States, preservation planning, and the influences of communication technology on cities. A brief review of her career reveals that her interests have shifted back and forth between virtual space and physical space. In her early scholarship, Boyer was devoted to computer science, focusing on the development of programming languages. Witnessing the dislocation and eruption of many subaltern communities as the result of federal policies on urban renewal and interstate highway construction in the 1960s, Boyer abandoned her work on computer programming because there was "something missing from the cool abstractions and symbolic processes of computational theory" (Boyer 1996: 7). For Boyer, the abstract computer programming languages had little to do with the social issues developing in the material urban space, and since these social issues were important to her, she decided to dedicate herself to the field of architecture and urban history.

Since 1983, Boyer has published a series of books on city and planning history, including *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (1983*), Manhattan Manners: Architecture and Style 1850-1900* (1985), and *The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments* (1994). These books have increasingly become influential in the field of architecture and planning history, particularly *The City of Collective Memory*, which has won the Lewis Mumford Price for the Best Book Published in American City and Regional Planning

History 1993-1995. Interestingly enough, almost thirty years after Boyer abandoned her programming work constructing the virtual world, she returned to this topic once again in 1996, although in a very different manner, by publishing *CyberCities: Visual Perception in the Age of Electronic Communication*.

The critique of the visual perception of the urban landscape is a fundamental theme underlying Boyer's entire academic project. Boyer's analysis has dealt with the perception of cities at different historical stages ranging from the early nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. By paying attention to the way people look at the city instead of just the morphology of the city itself, Boyer has produced unique and compelling perspectives on understanding the relationships between cities and their residents. In her earlier works, *Dreaming the Rational City* and *Manhattan Manners*, Boyer examines the structure of planning thought from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s through a critical assessment of the production of urban landscape. She argues that planning theory and practice failed to recognize the "humanistic order" in cities, imposing upon them a visual order of streetscape based on the principle of abstract rationality dominated by the ideology of "a technical utilitarianism and functional organization"(Boyer 1983: 282-3). Furthermore, under the guise of a rational city plan and regulatory controls, early twentieth century planning ideas have been a major facilitator of the "maintenance and reproduction of capital accumulation within the city" (62).[1] Through an historical analysis of the urban landscape, she reveals the desire of planning discourse to regulate visual per-

ception of the city and demonstrates the power and necessity of visual perception.

In *The City of Collective Memory*, Boyer extends her critique of the visual perception of city space to both modern urbanism and postmodern urbanism. Boyer identifies three major prototypes by which urban publics compose their images of cities: the City as a Work of Art, the City as Panorama, and the City as Spectacle. Until the late nineteenth century, cityscape was designed and viewed as a theatrical stage for displaying monuments that "spoke of exemplary deeds, national unity, and industrial glory" (Boyer 1994: 34). The traditional city was conceived as a work of art. In contrast, the modern city of the early twentieth century was impacted by developments in transportation systems; the "new experience of moving through the city tended to erase the tradi-tional sense of pictorial enclosure as the cityscape was transformed into a series of fleeting impressions and momentary encounters" (40-41). Thus, the modern city was conceived not as a static image, but as a pan-orama. Finally, a new form of the city emerged in the 1980s in which appropriations of historical styles and restaged scenographic allusions now became bounded nodes within an urban composition criss-crossed by highways and invisible electronic circuitry (47). In the City of Spectacle, the "collective mem-ory" of the city is replaced by manipulated historical images that only articulate messages of consumer culture. It is mostly with this last type of city that *The City of Collective Memory* is concerned, and Boyer sets out to "recall, reexamine, and recontextualize memory images from the past until they awaken

within us a new path to the future" (29).

Adopting a similar theoretical framework, Boyer ex-plores the issue of urban public life in the new infor-mation age in her *CyberCities*. She tackles the problem of the visual representation of the city by linking city images to the rise of new information technologies, maintaining the primacy of technology in determin-ing the way we perceive the city—including what she calls the modern Machine City and the postmodern CyberCity. Boyer contends that "by distributing bod-ies/uses in space, allocating each individual/function to a cellular partition, [and] creating an efficient ma-chine out of its analytical spatial arrangement," the Machine City of modernism deployed disciplinary control of modern subjects (Boyer 1996: 17). In the CyberCity, however, modern disciplinary spaces are being broken down by the global network of com-puters, and "disciplinary societies that molded be-havior are being replaced by numerical societies of modulating control facilitated by computer technol-ogy" (18). Boyer argues that the evolution of the metaphor from machine to computer has affected the way we think, imagine, and organize information in the city. As a result, the major focus of modern-ism is gradually disappearing from critical debate as "cyberspace pulls the user into the receding space of the electronic matrix in total withdrawal from the world" (11). As our bodies become distanced from the material world, our sense of social responsibility dissolves into cyberspace.

Throughout Boyer's academic project, visual percep-tion of urban landscape has been her analytical pro-cess of uncovering urban history. She sees visual per-

ception of the city (the mental construct of the built environment) as a determining factor in the production of spatial organization and urban social life. While Boyer's approach might have placed too much stress on the discourse and perception of the city, therefore neglecting solid analysis of the material socio-spatial world, she has nonetheless developed a particular perspective on virtual public space.[2] What follows is an exploration of Boyer's thoughts on the issue of the public space in the new information age and her contribution in the recent debates over virtual public space.

Public Space, Democracy, and CyberCities

Urban public space is generally considered as an essential spatial element of the realization of democratic social life. Public space has traditionally been seen as a meeting ground where people congregate, exchange, and share with each other, thereby expanding on their personal experiences and overcoming their private isolation (Arendt 1958; Sennett 1977; Brill 1989; Lofland 1989). In an ideal public space, people with different viewpoints would sit side-by-side and freely interact in a manner that no individual viewpoint or philosophy would dominate or outweigh another. An ideal public space is also an important arena for political participation in a democratic society. Jürgen Habermas contends that the deliberation of public affairs in a public sphere is physically and socially independent of the supremacy of both the state and the market is essential to modern democratic society (Habermas 1989). A final way in which public space is vital to urban life is that it

functions as a visual representation of the city, which in turn shapes the definition of publicness in the city (Zukin 1995).[3] Thus, an ideal public space is of substantive importance for achieving a democratic urban public life.

In the last few decades, however, as the ideology of privatization has become dominant in discourses of the city, the concept of "public" is in crisis, and most cities are experiencing what Boyer calls "the inversion of public and private space" (Boyer 1994: 7-8).[4] City space is gradually becoming controlled by the corporate culture as corporations increasingly "sponsor museum exhibitions, theatrical performances, sports events, national celebrations, and ... media entertainment and the news" (65). Additionally, corporations "control many architectural spaces of the city, theme parks, and shopping malls, in short they have underwritten the very sites of cultural expression" (65.). Consequently, most projects seeking to improve city space have resulted in inner city gentrification, creating privatized "public spaces" that only allow "a select group of people to stroll unimpeded along their corridors and spaces of power" (9). At the same time, the city's public is "fragmented into marginalized groups, many of whom have no access to or voice and representation in the public space of revitalized and gentrified cities" (9). Moreover, "[a]s attention is focused on the upscale urban environment, it is simultaneously withdrawn from impoverished and abandoned territories, abandoning them further and making them even more impoverished" (Boyer 1995: 107).

Under the current conditions of prevailing corporate culture in the city, some commentators have proclaimed that cyberspace harbors the potential to become a space in which a genuine public life can be created. Howard Rheingold contends that the building of virtual community is due to "the hunger for community that grows in the breasts of people around the world as more and more informal public spaces disappear from our real lives" (Rheingold 1994: 6). Rheingold sees virtual space as a new world where undesirable social problems, social hierarchies, and social controls can be eliminated. As Michael Benedict puts it, virtual space is a

> realm of pure information, filling like a lake, si-
> phoning the jangle of messages transfiguring the
> physical world, decontaminating the natural and
> urban landscapes, redeeming them, saving them
> from...all the inefficiencies, pollution (chemical
> and informational), and corruption (1991: 3).

In other words, thanks to the advance of communication and information technology, democratic public life can be realized in virtual space, space that is independent of the forces of control and degradation that operate in physical urban space.

According to the technological utopians, in the new virtual space created by computer networks, individuals or groups can freely exchange ideas and information, thereby challenging the hegemonic discourses circulated in by the existing traditional media and revitalizing citizen-based democracy (Rheingold 1994). Virtual space can offer new interactive public spaces, especially for the most marginalized groups in society who have been most negatively impacted by economic restructuring and increasing urban pri-

vatism (Schuler 1995). Above all, technological utopians contend that by carefully designing and planning telecommunication networks, we can build what Rheingold calls an "electronic agora" controlled by a variety of citizens (Rheingold 1994).

In contrast to the technological utopians, other commentators are less optimistic about the promise of new communication technology in bringing about democratic public life. From this counter point of view, the rise of virtual space will lead to uneven geographical development, therefore exacerbating existing problems of unequal distribution of social resources. In their empirical study, Graham and Aurigi point out that those who could most benefit from building a public space in the virtual world—the economically and culturally marginalized—often have the least access to it (1997).[5] Consequently, cities and regions are becoming divided along the lines of "homes that have access to the information highway, and those that do not... Thus the city, the region, and even the world can be grouped into information-rich or information-poor societies" (Boyer 1996: 229).

Moreover, far from being a public space for dialogue and debate, technological dystopians see virtual space, like real space, as being rapidly privatized and commercialized as communication networks become dominated by global corporations and markets. In this regard, virtual space does not necessarily lead to a more democratic city; rather, it makes social control and surveillance even more efficient (Graham, 1998). As the transfer speed and quantity of information dramatically increases in virtual space, the ideology of market and consumer culture can travel faster and

further than ever before. Thus,

> [w]e are...witnessing the growth of a global system of mediated communications—an increasingly privatized and commercialized information society....The privatization of public television, school systems, research institutes, and communication networks means that market profitability becomes the sole criterion for the production of culture (Boyer 1996: 229).

Both technological utopians and dystoypians have tried to provide a glimpse of the future of virtual public space. While the former group celebrates the potentials of virtual space as alternative democratic public space, the latter attacks virtual space for its tendency to increase spatial inequality and facilitate social control. What both technological utopians and dystoypians share, however, is a neglect of the dialectical relations between virtual space and physical space. It is on this issue that Boyer has made her most prominent contribution to the debate.

According to Boyer, the essential element of cyberspace lies in its power to mediate public life in both virtual space and material space. Virtual cities threaten the existence of urban public life because they turn away our perception from real cities toward virtual life, thus blinding us to the urban social problems taking place in the physical world. According to Boyer, in the age of electronic communication our perception of the city is not coherent but fragmented. Therefore, "we have to develop new nodes of perception that enable us to navigate between, to explore and question, the framework of pre-digested and pre-selected nodes of data that represent highly mediated forms of communication" (Boyer 1996: 8).

Whether traveling in the material city space (e.g., highway, shopping mall, and supermarket), or navigating the virtual space (e.g., television, video games, and computer networks), we are constantly forced to choose between pre-programmed nodes. Moreover, because our everyday experience of the city is disconnected and disrupted, representation of the city becomes very similar to a computer matrix, where the disjunctions between the columns and rows are natural. In other words, in CyberCities, the unprogrammed nodes—the abandoned and impoverished spaces that surround gentrified commercial spaces of the urban core—are out of our sight, absent because our perception of the city is largely pre-edited by the representations of it circulated in virtual space. Thus, as Boyer maintains,

> [t]hese partitions, cuts, and interruptions in urban imaginary allow us to deny our complicity in the making of distinctions between the well-designed nodes of the matrix and the blank, in-between places of nobody's concern...Disavowed, overlooked, marginalized, left out of our accounts, these are the center's truly invisible spaces...that have been rendered absent and forgotten (1996: 20).

Thus, Boyer concludes that in the information age,

> ...the city and its public sphere become increasingly virtual as we move toward interpersonal systems of communication and the netropolis at the expense of face-to-face communication in physical and public space (Boyer 1996: 229).

Consequently, city residents are absorbed into their private spaces, rendering the outside physical space empty and invisible from their sights. "Cyberspace," as Fred Dewey puts it, "for all its novelty, represents the suction of the impeding world away into nothingness. By convincing us to turn away from our own world, cyburbia throws us into an infinite regress" (1997: 271). Therefore, in the current historical condition, it is too optimistic to anticipate that the expansion of virtual space will necessarily bring about opportunities for all social groups to freely communicate and become empowered.

A Critical Assessment of Boyer's Model

From the technological utopian point of view, the rise of virtual space has provided cities with a new territory in which a genuine democratic public space can be built. From the technological dystopian perspective, on the other hand, virtual space is less democratic than the "old" material urban public space because social activities in the virtual space can be more easily censored and controlled by the state and corporations. While Boyer's position is closer to that of the technological dystopians, her unique contribution is to get at the relationships between virtual and material space: becoming overwhelmed by the former, the latter is being expelled from the visual representation of the city. By looking at the issue of virtual public space and virtual public life from this angle, we can understand the nature of public space in the new information age in two ways. First, since social inequality is still firmly embedded in material cities, any virtually-based democratic public space is

an illusion that can only obscure social reality from our perception. Second, conversely, since the perception of the city is highly mediated by information technology, the discussion of democratic public space and public culture in the city cannot ignore the powerful and, for Boyer, often negative influences of the images and messages that travel through virtual space.

There is, however, a major limitation inherent in Boyer's analysis of virtual pubic space— her failure to come up with progressive strategies to improve virtual space. Like most technological dystopian thinkers, Boyer's understanding of virtual space often stems from a mistrust in the advance of new information technology. However, it seems apparent that virtual space is here to stay. Given this, simply to reveal the negative side of virtual space and reject the possible virtues of a virtual public life does not deal with the complex relationship between virtual world and real world. Instead, it seems far more constructive to think critically about how we can take advantage of the space created by new informational technology. Through a technological dystopian perspective, however, Boyer tends to see the virtual world only as an obstacle in the struggle for urban publicness, unable to recognize the potential ways in which virtual space might facilitate and enhance democratic public life.

To be sure, without a concern for material space and its preservation, the utopia of virtual public space is merely an illusion. However, it is equally true that communication technology is becoming significant to struggles for democracy taking place in material

public spaces, since it has the potential to enlarge the scope of public space from local to city to region to nation and even to the world. For example, in the protest over Tompkins Square in New York City in 1988, through the medium of television, the site of a local park became a public space for all New York residents to debate the issue of homelessness (see Smith 1993). Likewise, in the student protests in China's Tiananmen Square in 1989, through intensive television reporting and the mass of information spreading across the internet, the square became a global public space for struggles over democracy and freedom (see Hershkovitz 1993). These two events illustrate that it is important for theorists of public space to see both the limitations and potentials of virtual space. Only in this way can they properly theorize the rising phenomenon of information technology and propose efficient strategies that might lead to a democratic public realm in the city.

Conclusion

After a discussion of the strengths and limitations of Boyer's critique of virtual public space, I conclude this essay with two implications for the future of studies of public space. First, virtual space is neither a new world where a genuine democratic public life can be constructed, nor a fantasyland that only distracts our attention from real social issues taking place in tangible material space. Rather, virtual space extends the battlefield of struggles over the democratic public realm from material cities to cybercities. It is a terrain that cannot be embraced or rejected outright, but one that requires our imagination and effort in order to affirm the public good in the city. Second, because

of the growing ambiguity between the material and the virtual in our visual perception of the city, critical urban theorists have to develop new discourses for comprehending and theorizing the nature of public life in the new information age. Boyer has introduced a possible agenda for future research of public space, but it will require greater efforts in order to fully develop sufficient knowledge and strategies to realize democratic public space in the new information age.

Endnotes

[1] According to Boyer, the City Beautiful movement—a planning narrative that aimed to regulate cityscape through Beaux-Arts classicist architecture and urban design—was introduced to the United States in the early 1920s and radically changed the urban landscape of New York. Thus, by returning to Beaux-Arts classicism, architecture in New York "retreated backward, utilizing the representational images of sovereign power that it believed could be localized in and deduced from scenographic ensembles inserted into the order of the city" (Boyer 1983: 62).

[2] In his review of *Dreaming the Rational City*, Christopher Silver points out that planning discourse was not the only element that influenced urban practices in the twentieth century. Silver argues: "In some respects, planners were far less influential than is suggested by Boyer. At the same time, they operated from an ideological base that lay beyond the bounds of the rational city's model" (Silver 1989: 345-46). Likewise, Mark Bouman also criticizes that the social history is missing from Boyer's analysis in *The City of Collective Memory* and therefore the history of the

city is reduced to her own "view" of the city. In his discussion, Bouman contends that "one will not find much social history at play in her notion of what the "collective" is; her tendency is to use the first plural and to assume that some sort of collectivity exists although it is obviously plural in nature" (Bouman 1995: 487).

[3]Sharon Zukin has represented her idea about public space this way: "Public spaces are the primary sites of public culture; they are a window into the city's soul. As a sight, moreover, public spaces are an important means of framing a vision of social life in the city. As both site and sight, meeting place and social staging ground, public spaces enable us to conceptualize and represent the city to make an ideology of its receptivity to strangers, tolerance of difference, and opportunities to enter a fully socialized life" (Boyer 1995: 260).

[4]According to Boyer, the concept of democratic space arises in the late nineteenth century, however, it is being altered in the late twentieth century. Before the end of nineteenth century, urban public space is usually designed as a ceremonial place to represent the power and sovereignty of the ruling class. After the political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the conception of urban public space is transformed from space that symbolizes authority into space that symbolizes democracy, a place where public gathering and debate become possible. At this time, however, users of the public sphere were restricted to the bourgeois class, who dreamed of building a "rational bourgeois public sphere." At the end of late nineteenth century, the bourgeois notion of public space is challenged by the unrest of the working class, who demand public access to the political process and redistribution of social resources by the state. Thus, public space came to be regarded as the "public sphere of the welfare state," accessible not only to the middle class but to other social classes in the city. By the early twentieth century, cities in the Western world had established civic space by constructing municipal buildings, public libraries, railroad stations, public parks and parkways, bridges, and statuary, for these were seen as embodying the ideal of democratic public sphere (Boyer 1994: 7-8).

[5]In their research, Graham and Aurigi (1997: 28) found that there are three different groups using computer networks: the elite groups, the less affluent and powerful urban consumers, and the marginalized groups facing poverty and structural unemployment. Among the three groups, only the first can take full advantage of the interactive nature of the Internet; the middle group tends to passively accept information available on the Internet, whereas the latter is altogether excluded from access.

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Why
Spatial Mismatch
Still Matters

James Spencer

Two major characteristics of American
socio-economic relations are the geographic isolation of
the poor and the related phenomenon of disproportionate
minority poverty. Economic and racial segregation has
frequently led to what researchers term a "spatial mis-
match" between low-skilled minority workers and available
jobs. This paper identifies unemployment as the most
pressing current problem of geographic isolation of the
poor that demands policy attention, assesses evidence

for a spatial mismatch, and considers critiques of this evidence in asking questions relevant for antipoverty policy. Partly due to data constraints, and partly to political relevance, much of this literature focuses exclusively on African Americans, although it likely has significant relevance for concentrations of other groups of the minority poor.

Spatial Isolation: Concentrated Poverty and the Underclass

Concentrated poverty has been on the political and policy agenda since the mid-1980s after a hiatus from the end of the War on Poverty through the end of the Reagan Administration—when the popular press drew attention to the growing problems of the inner cities: violence, chronic unemployment, single-headed households, and a growing drug trade and incidence of addiction, for example. There have been many micro-explanations for these trends. Growing gang problems were used to explain the resurgence of violence, welfare dependency to explain unemployment and single-motherhood, and the lack of strong social institutions such as neighborhood watch groups and afterschool programs to explain the persistence of the drug trade and addiction. These causal factors, while important and often true on a micro level, seem not to look at systemic problems that shape the environment in which low-income neighborhood residents live and consequently have led to isolated policy responses with questionable effect.

Where there were attempts to look at cumulative effects and causes of these problems, analysts offered the "culture of poverty" as the main driver (as described in Lewis 1968 and Banfield 1970). This thesis interpreted the problem as cultural practices determined by the *spatial concentration* of high poverty areas rather than as individuals' inability to earn enough income. Because of its "cultural" focus, this point of view has been used with racist undertones and a laissez faire implication that offered policymakers and intellectuals a rationale for ignoring spatial concentrations of poverty. Combined with a policy focus on deindustrialization and recession during the1980s (as described in Harrison and Bluestone 1988), urban poverty dropped on the list of policy priorities.

In the mid-1990s, due in part to the 1992 urban unrest in Los Angeles (Kain 1992), popular attention refocused on a changed urban poverty and the characteristics of an urban "underclass" left out of the economic recovery.[1] In sum, definitions of the underclass built on the culture of poverty thesis by accepting the interrelated problems of violence, drugs, poverty and welfare dependency, but differed sharply from it in definition of the central problem. Rather than a general cultural environment, their focus was on unemployment as the driver of the set of interrelated problems.

The Dispersal of Opportunity

Building on an assessment of interrelated ghetto phenomena, Wilson (1996) asked why stable black institutions were not factors for mitigating concentrated poverty. To answer this question, he described a debilitating segregation of low-income urban labor and appropriate job opportunities exacerbated by the exit of black middle-class families from the ghettos.

In part following blue-collar manufacturing jobs relocating to the suburbs, and in part escaping the negative influences of the ghettos, this middle-class flight was the logical manifestation of successful and educated African Americans pursuing the "American Dream" of employment, homeownership and quality education for their children. In the absence of mitigating policy interventions, the process had significant negative effects on the neighborhoods they left.

Jargowsky (1997), in his exhaustive study of 239 metropolitan areas, documents the effect of this phenomenon on the increasingly concentrated poor. His statistical analyses of 1990 Census data show that neighborhood poverty rates, as defined by the proportion of a metropolitan area's residents living in high-poverty census tracts [2], are 17.1 percent for blacks and 1.3 for whites in all US metropolitan areas. Moreover, that concentrated poverty rates, as defined by proportion of a metropolitan area's poor people living in high poverty tracts is 33.0 percent for blacks and 8.4 percent for whites. These differences are stark, and show that African American poverty is *highly spatial* in metropolitan areas. As with Wilson, Jargowsky identified the migration of employment opportunities to suburban regions in the metropolitan economy as a key driver of the concentration of poverty.

Others have extended this analysis by looking beyond census data at the regional distribution of public and private resources in the relationship between ghettos and economically growing suburbs, specifically connecting concentrated poverty and a drastically decreased inner city tax base with the out-migration of both the white and black middle-class, employed workers and economic opportunities to the suburban fringes. These studies can generally be categorized into those assessing regional governance inefficiencies that isolate poor communities (for example, Rusk 1995; Bollens 1997; Orfield 1997) and those identifying economic trends that indicate a shared interest and inter-dependency between job-poor central cities and job-rich suburbs (Savitch et al. 1993; Barnes and Ledebur 1995; Voith 1998; Pastor et al. 1999; Goetzmann, Spiegel and Wachter 1998; Persky and Wiewel 1998).

If we understand jobs and unemployment to be the primary cause of current concentrated poverty, and we understand that job growth is occurring primarily outside of ghettos in suburban areas, then we should revisit debates about the metropolitan-regional labor market experience of ghetto residents. The spatial mismatch hypothesis is a long-standing debate within the academic literature that explores this political-economic relationship by analyzing wages, unemployment, and commute times and distances. A review of its key points and critiques will lead to questions of prioritization for anti-poverty policy.

The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis
Basic Claims

Since the late 1960s, with Kain's (1968) seminal analysis, researchers have been debating the relationship between housing segregation, employment opportunities, and labor market performance.[3] The following statements are key elements of the original spatial mismatch hypothesis: 1) there are fewer jobs

per eligible worker in inner-city African American neighborhoods than in white ones; 2) the main explanation for higher black unemployment rates, lower wages, and longer commutes than whites with similar job qualifications is geographic isolation from jobs; 3) black unemployment is mostly a result of unequal allocation of poor minority population within metropolitan regions rather than a result of discrimination, educational status, or lack of skills; 4) spatial proximity of employment opportunities and poor people, through information networks and physical contact, would necessarily link the two; and 5) that housing segregation exacerbates labor market disadvantages of the urban poor. As a corollary point, although the standard spatial mismatch hypothesis analysis rarely addresses concentrated poverty directly, given the literature linking unemployment to concentrated poverty previously discussed, analysts have often used the hypothesis as the basis for urban minority poverty reduction policy recommendations. In part, the spatial mismatch hypothesis is hotly debated because of its implications for urban policy.

The literature shows some association between housing segregation and African American participation in the workforce. The original spatial mismatch hypothesis rested on the dichotomy between job growth in the suburbs and job-poor inner cities. Kain's (1968) study of Chicago and Detroit examined the distribution of employment for each of the two cities and tested three hypotheses: 1) higher commuting costs between inner cities and suburban jobs lowers the net wage of inner city labor market

participants; 2) greater distance between inner cities and employment opportunities might lower the possibility that information concerning jobs would reach job seekers and potential job seekers; and 3) employers located outside black residential neighborhoods may discriminate disproportionately against blacks (Kain 1968: 179-80). Overall, Kain found that there was a significant negative relationship between distance of jobs from the ghetto and ghetto employment, that the skills required of jobs outside of ghettos were not significantly different from those required within black neighborhoods, implying that information and discrimination play more important roles than skills, and that there was a positive relationship between racial composition of neighborhoods and the amount of employment of the particular race within that neighborhood. Based on these data, Kain hypothesized that housing discrimination was the key to understanding indirect employment discrimination and a significant constriction of employment opportunities for low-income urban African Americans. Thus, he concluded that spatial segregation drives black unemployment—or that there is a "spatial mismatch" between the unemployed black labor force and new job opportunities outside of distressed black neighborhoods.

Subsequent to Kain's analysis, Mooney (1969) studied the twenty-five largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), and concluded that the geographic separation of the black ghettos from the burgeoning suburban job market negatively influenced African American performance in the labor market. However, he importantly noted that the

overall unemployment rate of an SMSA played a more important role (309). Thus, he expanded Kain's spatial analysis to the twenty-five largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA), but unlike Kain stopped short of prioritizing housing segregation as the most important variable explaining black unemployment.[3]

Since the late 1960s many studies have attempted to clarify the relationship between residential segregation and labor market opportunities and performance. Kasarda (1989), for example, describes a national trend for job-growth in expanding suburbs and exurbs, linking it to increased unemployment in central cities and limited mobility options that constrict poor people's opportunities to take advantage of these new jobs. Hughes and Madden (1991) investigated the spatial mismatch hypothesis for Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia, incorporating intra-metropolitan variations in rents and wages. They found that the economic status of blacks could be significantly improved by changing their residential location. However, these residential changes did not significantly alter physical accessibility to better jobs. Rather, they conclude that a lack of information in ghetto neighborhoods about suburban jobs may be the most significant aspect of a spatial mismatch.

Stoll (1999), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990; 1991), Leonard (1985; 1987), Mayer and Jencks (1989), Danziger and Weinstein (1976), Farley (1982), among others conducted analyses of urban minority employment and wages, and each concluded that location and proximity to job opportunities are sig-

nificant variables—among several—in explaining either lower wages or unemployment. Thus, most researchers would, at least to some degree, find evidence for a spatial mismatch affecting African Americans, and to some degree Hispanics. This evidence confirms Kain's original claim that housing segregation plays a role in urban minority unemployment.

The real question, however, is the *relative significance* of this correlation and the strength of the causal relationship. As Goldsmith and Blakely (1992) reasonably state,

[O]n the one hand, it would appear absurd to claim that physical isolation in the ghetto or barrio does not hamper residents' ability to search for and keep jobs. On the other, it would be equally absurd to plead for dispersal of the ghetto or barrio as a solution. 'Dispersal' of the ghetto or the barrio does not really make sense: the ghetto and barrio represent problems, transmit inequality, and serve as proxies for many other social processes that seem aimed toward the creation and reinforcement of separate societies (135).

Reviews of the Field

In part to achieve consensus on this debate, and in part as a response to recurrent urban unrest manifest in Los Angeles in 1992 which was similar to that which stimulated Kain's original study, several comprehensive literature reviews of the spatial mismatch hypothesis have surfaced in the1990s. In one review of the field, Holzer (1991) looked at twenty studies of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. From this work, he concludes that: 1) population and manufacturing are declining in the central cities; 2) residential segre-

gation has been declining slowly for blacks, but not as quickly in the large industrial areas of the Northeast and Midwest; 3) black residents of the inner city have less access to employment than either blacks or whites in the suburbs; and 4) there seems to be a decline in earnings for blacks with job decentralization in the metropolitan area (117-8). Overall, he found eight studies clearly describing a spatial mismatch that negatively affects the black residents of ghettos, and five that found no evidence for a spatial mismatch.

Wheeler (1990) reviewed fifteen studies and found six that supported the spatial mismatch hypothesis, three that found no evidence of residential effects on employment outcomes in the labor market, and three positive relationships that were overshadowed by other factors such as racial discrimination or the metropolitan unemployment rate (Wheeler 1990: 15-30). Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) have conducted a similar review of twenty-eight newer studies of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, and found that twenty-one support the hypothesis and seven find little support or reject it outright. Thus, they conclude that there remains no significant debate over the validity of the spatial mismatch hypothesis.

As we can see, the spatial mismatch literature is not unclear for lack of studies. There have been a number of attempts to test whether residential segregation has negatively influenced the labor market performance of blacks living in ghettos, and each suggests areas of research that might provide more clarity. Holzer ends his overview with a call for more research on the direction of causality and *relative im-*

portance of location affecting the outcomes of black performance in the labor market regarding employment rather than wage levels or earnings (1991: 118). His suggestion is to focus on controlling for individual characteristics (e.g., skills and human capital endowments) and a better understanding of why the labor market conditions deteriorated for black job seekers during the 1980s to gain more clarity on the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Wheeler, on the other hand calls for a better analysis of policy responses to the spatial mismatch hypothesis and a more nuanced controlling for gender and race factors. Similar to Holzer, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) call for more work on the underlying causes of spatial mismatch rather than on further attempts to document that it exists. Despite this call, they go on to discuss policy options for mobility strategies, explaining some of their benefits as a short-term strategy, even though the results of an examination of the underlying causes of spatial mismatch may well imply that mobility itself has very little effect in reducing unemployment in the ghettos.

Finally, Kain (1992) himself conducted perhaps the most comprehensive review of the literature, and found that "housing market discrimination and the particular pattern of racial residential segregation... are important causes of low employment levels of the Afro-American residents of central cities" (Kain 1992: 436). His suggestions for further research are illuminating. He claims that the magnitude of spatial mismatch effects is the most important area for future research, calling for more detailed analyses of labor market participants in particular places, in-

depth interviews of black migrants to predominantly white suburban neighborhoods, and analyses of firm personnel records and labor market demands. Given that the spatial mismatch hypothesis literature has 1) often assumed all cities will exhibit similar processes; 2) has relied almost entirely on statistical methods of analysis; and 3) generally lacks detailed analysis of labor market *demands* in favor of labor *supply-side* approaches, Kain's suggestions may offer productive avenues of future research.

Despite relative consensus on the existence of a spatial mismatch there remains significant debate over the degree to which spatial policies should be promoted over others. The following overview of the major refinements and critiques of the spatial mismatch hypothesis may help policymakers weigh alternative policy interventions as well as challenge them to develop integrated programs and institutions.

Policy Prioritization: Refinements and Major Critiques of Conventional Spatial Mismatch Studies

Despite the number of studies testing the spatial mismatch hypothesis, there remain significant questions about the *relative* strength of correlations between housing segregation and employment opportunity regarding employment rates and real wages paid to minority workers living in enclaves. Prior to defining the refinements and critiques of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, it is important to note that relatively few writers claim that spatial isolation is the *only* influence on minority employment patterns. The majority test the spatial mismatch hypothesis in

relation to other factors that that may drive employment outcomes. While less consequential from an academic perspective, this attention to relative priority is very relevant to the development of policy for greater minority employment and poverty reduction. Each analysis of spatial mismatch has implications for anti-poverty policy.

To date, the most significant policy intervention based on the spatial mismatch hypothesis that has been systematically evaluated is Chicago's Gautreaux Housing Mobility Program, which "randomly" relocated low-income urban African Americans into either suburban or other urban neighborhoods. The effect of this relocation was an improved likelihood of employment and educational attainment for suburban movers, but evaluations also found that other factors (such as the number of children) were equally or more important (Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991; Rosenbaum 1995).

Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) Section 8 voucher program is a policy with significant implications for the spatial mismatch hypothesis. In sum, under the Section 8 program, HUD contracts with local public housing agencies to provide vouchers for low-income families. These vouchers can be used in the private housing market and serve to subsidize poor people's residential mobility. In his analysis of California data[5], Ong found that Section 8 vouchers may offer the poor "greater residential choice and mobility, improving opportunities for employment" (1998: 779). Ong concludes not only that residential mobility can help low-income minorities gain a greater attachment

to the labor market, but that a housing program should go beyond simply the provision of shelter to promote other desirable outcomes such as employment opportunities where possible. The following critiques are intended to help policymakers think about such types of coordinated programs and multiple outcomes.

Gender Bias

Most traditional spatial mismatch studies address only men, and usually just African American or perhaps Hispanic minorities.[6] However, increasingly the urban poor population is comprised of single women and/or immigrant women who are at least equally constrained through housing discrimination to enclaves and ghettos yet have different labor market experiences from men.

Few families conform today (if they ever did) to the patriarchal model of a working adult male and an adult "homemaker" female. In fact, women nearly work at levels on par with men, yet also contend with particular constraints such as daycare and household responsibilities. Overall, the literature on spatial mismatch and women workers shows different spatial constraints from those for men. In particular, women often search for jobs within a more confined geographic area, have shorter commuting routes, and are therefore more influenced by a lack of availability of local jobs (Hanson and Pratt 1991; McLafferty and Preston 1992; Gordon, Kumar and Richardson 1989). This spatial mismatch, moreover, varies among women of different ethnicities. In a study of northern New Jersey, for example, McLafferty and

Preston (1992) found that white women have the greatest spatial access to jobs, experiencing generally localized labor markets and lower commuting times. African American women experience the greatest mismatch, as evidenced by the longest commute times and heavy reliance on mass transit. Localized labor markets, however, do not necessarily imply better employment conditions, since they found that Latina women experience relatively good spatial access to jobs, but are severely limited in wealth accumulation by occupying the lower tier of a dual-labor market. This finding opens an interesting set of questions on job characteristics, as yet unaddressed by spatial mismatch hypothesis researchers.

From the gender evidence on spatial mismatch, we can make no categorical conclusions about whether, and to what degree, housing segregation undermines employment outcomes of minority women. However, we can say that women tend to have a smaller work search area than men (this is likely because of child-rearing and other household-based responsibilities). Given the ongoing process of suburban-ization, the lack of new job opportunities in central cities implies that women are affected disproportionately negatively by spatial constraints. In some cases, this may be negative regarding employment chances, however, in other cases—because of labor market segmentation—high numbers of "women's work" opportunities cluster precisely within minority neighborhoods (e.g., low-wage garment industries). These jobs do offer local access and in some cases the greater flexibility that female workers want in order to perform other traditionally female work. On the other hand, it would not

be correct to assert that these jobs are an effective avenue for reducing poverty, since these jobs constitute the "working poor" labor market (Thompson 1997; Hanson and Pratt 1991; Wheeler 1993; Rutherford and Wekerle 1988).

The policy implication of this refinement of the spatial mismatch hypothesis are that programs based on employee mobility (either through housing relocation or improved transportation) should account for female employees' tendencies to work closer to home than males and the local availability of services such as daycare.

Skill Mismatch

Unlike other critiques of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, preliminary analyses of "skill mismatches" have taken into account industrial history, the historical evolution of inner city poverty, and ongoing class differentiation within many black urban populations (Wacquant and Wilson 1989; Wilson 1987). Such analyses build upon existing research on the globalizing economy that show many American metropolitan regions (not just the central cities) shifting from centers of manufacturing goods to centers of information exchange, administration, and financial transactions (Kasarda 1976, 1985, 1993; Noyelle 1987). Thus, these critics claim that the problem of urban poverty is more structural than spatial.[7] Structural economic shifts that change the nature and range of jobs have been the result of both technological change and foreign competition, both of which result in a loss of US low-skilled jobs through the siphoning off of manual labor through greater automation or overseas outsourcing.[8]

Kasarda (1989) has shown that indeed the composition of jobs in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia changed drastically between 1970 and 1980. Clerical, sales, and blue-collar jobs left central cities for suburban areas while professional and managerial occupations moved into central cities, thereby relocating the job market for low-skilled blacks out of reasonable commuting range. Thus, while the number of available jobs remained relatively stable in central cities, their composition changed drastically for the worse for low-skilled African Americans.

Kasarda's skill mismatch findings are supported by the industrial change literature more than from the urban policy and poverty literature. Berman, Bound, and Machin (1997), for example, studied specific industries across the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and found that most industries experienced "skill-biased technological change" that required workers with higher education levels and greater knowledge of new technologies such as microprocessors. Furthermore, D'Costa (1993) found that technological change in the steel industry placed American firms in a less competitive position, whereby they had to reduce their blue-collar payroll. Simultaneously, more competitive Japanese steel firms with new production techniques relocated to the US and required blue-collar labor with a high knowledge of and ability to learn new skills. Similarly, Deskins (1996) has found that black workers in Detroit were severely affected by auto plant layoffs for blue-collar workers because of changes in the occupational structure of the industry.

In essence, the skills mismatch argument states that urban black ghetto residents may not be qualified for the new jobs in suburban areas even were they to know about them or have spatial access to them. In his national assessment of urban poverty, Kasarda (1995) has been one of the few to directly relate these changes in industrial occupations to the spatial mismatch hypothesis and the problems of concentrated poverty and unemployment.

This critique poses the question of education and training approaches to poverty reduction. In weighing priorities for poverty policy, are schools (as argued by Levy 1998) the most important "equalizing institutions" for dealing with the urban poor? In what ways are the strength of educational institutions related to spatial mismatch and concentrated poverty?

Transportation Mismatch

The transportation mismatch critique also compares the experience of residents living in concentrated poverty conditions to the larger American and global economy. Analysts from this perspective contend that despite poor people's spatial isolation from new economic opportunities, the separation of work and residence is not specific to poor neighborhoods (Ellwood 1986; Leonard 1987; Gordon, Kumar and Richardson 1988; Kasarda 1985, 1989; Rutherford and Wekerle 1988; Taylor and Ong 1995). In fact, most American workers have experienced increased commute times and huge increases in the spatial separation of work and residence. Thus, they argue, to say that spatial mismatch is the cause of unemployment ignores the

fact that *most workers experience some kind of spatial mismatch*, not just urban minorities.

In looking at national commuting times and distance data from the Nationwide Personal Transportation Studies from 1973-83/4 (rather than the traditional measures of wages and unemployment), for example, Gordon, Kumar and Richardson found that "neither minorities nor low-income workers have longer commutes" than other categories of workers (Gordon, Kumar and Richardson 1988: 315). They found that commuting patterns were remarkably similar across income and race/ ethnicity lines, and used this as evidence of no disproportionate spatial mismatch affecting low-income or minority workers. Although this measure tells little about why there are large pockets of unemployed in ghettos or whether the wages per time spent during the commute is higher or lower based on residence, it does seem to refute two core spatial mismatch concepts: that urban minorities are less likely to live close to their work, and that they are required to make longer commutes than other workers.

Kasarda (1989) looked beyond commuting times and included "mode of transit" in his explanation of the effects of spatial isolation on black employment. He found that in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, high percentages of unemployed black males lived in households without a private vehicle. This preliminary finding that low rates of auto ownership may be associated with negative labor market outcomes leads him to the conclusion that automobile ownership is increasingly a necessary

component of finding employment in a suburbanizing economy. Thus, he uses the existence of an automobile mismatch as evidence of a spatial mismatch.

Taylor and Ong (1995) combine the findings that commute times do not vary according to income or race, and the findings that automobile ownership is a critical component of employment and the search for work. Unlike Kasarda, however, Taylor and Ong use the importance of the automobile to coin the term "automobile mismatch". Looking at data from the American Housing Survey in 1977-8 and 1985, they found (similar to Gordon, Kumar and Richardson) that the commute *distances* were converging over time for blacks, whites, and Hispanics, with minorities experiencing higher growth rates of commute distance. This same data set (unlike Gordon, Kumar and Richardson) showed that the commute *times* for these three groups were not converging, but rather that blacks maintained higher commute times with respect to whites, despite the fact that commute distances were still shorter than whites.

Thus, it seems that blacks and Hispanics are covering greater distances to get to work and catching up to levels of white commute distances, but their time spent in transit is not approaching parity with whites. This result, Taylor and Ong point out, is largely due to transportation mode and speed, with minorities depending on slower, cheaper public transportation in much higher percentages. Based on these findings, they conclude that space can hardly be the primary barrier to employment since black commutes did indeed continue to increase over time (i.e.,

they are finding and taking distant jobs). Like Kasarda, the main difference they found was the lack of automobile ownership of workers in poor neighborhoods. Thus they perceived an "automobile mismatch" more than a spatial mismatch. According to these researchers, the problem is one of poor people's inability to overcome increasing commute distances, and more importantly commute times, with the range of transportation options available. Here, the problem with housing segregation is that in lieu of viable, efficient, vastly extensive and affordable public transit serving poor neighborhoods, residents cannot afford the only other option: private automobiles to take them to work.

What this line of reasoning implies for policymakers is that inner city residents are indeed able to *find* jobs, but not able to improve their lives through employment because of disproportionately increased time spent in transit. These transportation studies ask the question: could results similar to those achieved through housing mobility programs such as Gautreaux or Section 8 be achieved for more individuals at less cost through either improved transportation or through increased auto ownership?

Urban Reinvestment

The spatial mismatch hypothesis is based on a locational-economic model that identifies job opportunities in growing suburban areas. There are significant arguments to be made in favor of reorienting or refocusing the demand side of the labor market rather than the supply side. In other words, the literature shows some evidence that efforts to promote job opportunities within ghettos and other kinds of poor

neighborhoods -or, altering the suburban-ization of employment trends - may be an effective way to link the un- and under-employed to jobs with firms that are locating and growing in the suburbs.

This critique comes out of two bodies of place-based research: the ethnic enclave economic literature and the community reinvestment/community development literature. Analysts of ethnic enclaves argue that spatial isolation from new employment opportunities has not disabled poor but industrious immigrants isolated from the mainstream economy in enclaves from building on ethnic relationships to pool financial and other resources to promote local business development and jobs (Light and Karageorgis 1994; Waldinger 1986).

Despite the controversy regarding the ability of enclaves to provide stable employment for low-income residents (e.g., Ong 1986), there is some evidence that, despite racism and spatial isolation, Jewish, Japanese, Korean, and Cuban ghettos have been able to provide employment for low-income residents despite high levels of residential segregation and low levels of capital available for investment (Portes and Manning 1986). One need not adhere to the idea that ethnic enclave economies are a failsafe mechanism for providing local employment to understand that spatial isolation has not incapacitated low-income racial minorities from creating labor market opportunities. Thus, to maintain, as the advocates for spatial mismatch do, that residential segregation is the major force denying the urban African American labor force jobs is to ignore empirical evidence that local capital and employment opportunities can be generated *within* enclaves isolated from the mainstream. In other words, why have urban blacks not formed capital pools and indigenous "ethnic specialty" industries to the same degree that other ethnic groups have?

The second category of urban reinvestment critiques relates to the first in its focus on efforts to capitalize ghettos. The so-called community reinvestment/ community development literature focuses on the existing assets of residentially segregated urban minority neighborhoods (primarily black and Hispanic) and makes the case that indigenous business development can provide economies of scale to increase neighborhood employment. Promoter's arguments of such community-based capitalism come from urban policy research (Harrison 1974a), social activist and justice literature (Foster-Bey 1997) and, surprisingly, business literature (Porter 1997). These analysts also base their ideas on the concept that local social and entrepreneurial capital can be made to stimulate economic activity significant enough to provide employment. As with the ethnic enclave literature, this approach to urban minority unemployment is controversial—here because of its reliance on initial public funds in the form of Empowerment Zones, community capacity-building grants, and other investments that are seen to run counter to conventional market trends.[9] However, there is enough evidence to indicate that capitalistic initiative within ghettos can shift some of the burden of employment from the distant suburbs to the ghettos themselves. For this reason urban reinvestment has been the major place-based anti-concentrated poverty alternative to residential dispersal programs such as Gautreaux and Section 8.

Unlike residential mobility programs, Empowerment Zones have not been systematically evaluated. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that their effect is largely political and economically unsustainable. However, the urban reinvestment critique suggests to the policymaker that infill development, by attracting both businesses and middle-class residents, could play the inverse role of housing dispersal. Policies that include both processes would be based on matching preferences, and could possibly address the brain-drain problems that Wilson(1996) identified without resorting to policies to constrain successful inner city residents hoping to leave the ghetto.

Non-Spatial Discrimination

Discrimination in hiring practices is a logical and compelling argument to explain the high unemployment rates of inner city residents that some claim overrides any spatial disadvantages that urban minorities face. However, this kind of discrimination should be distinguished from housing discrimination, which *is* a central element of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Moreover, it should be seen as general societal discrimination rather than discrimination based on unfamiliarity, which was tested for by Kain (1968) and others. Compared to the time when Kain wrote his initial analysis, explicit and categorical racism and discrimination in the labor market have likely diminished in importance. However, the case has been argued persuasively that non-housing discrimination still may play at least as great if not a greater role than housing segregation in the labor market outcomes of urban blacks and Latinos.

Stoll (1999) found that having a suburban residential location does improve labor market opportunities for all young males, yet more for whites than comparable black youth. From his findings he concludes that racial discrimination is at least as important as suburban location in labor market outcomes for young black men, and advocates for policies that integrate residential mobility programs with antidiscrimination enforcement efforts in suburban labor markets. While similar to Kain's (1968) finding, Stoll argues for policy prescriptions that integrate explicit antidiscrimination efforts with residential mobility efforts, rather than assuming, as Kain seems to, that increased mobility will *de facto* reduce discrimination in employment. Stoll's finding is also similar to Harrison's (1974b), who found that suburban minority residents experience greater unemployment and lower earnings than similarly skilled urban minorities, and claimed that discrimination plays an important role in explaining this difference.

Cohn and Fossett (1998) found that in Detroit and Atlanta, discrimination played a significant role in the labor market by looking at the effect of racial composition of a given tract on the percentage of black employment within that same tract. They claim that suburbanization of jobs from cities has negatively affected blacks not so much because it has increased commuting time, but rather because the process has shifted jobs to locations where black workers are more likely to be discriminated against.

The most effective critic of the spatial mismatch hypothesis on the basis of discrimination is Ellwood (1986), who coined the term "race not space" based

on his study of urban black youth unemployment in Chicago.[10] After finding that race contributed to unemployment more than did location, Ellwood stated that preliminary indicators showed that the case would likely be replicated in other major metropolitan areas. Ellwood's position is corroborated by Leonard (1985) in his study of Los Angeles, where, like Ellwood, he found that the racial composition of a census tract accounts for more of the variation in employment-population ratio than does either personal characteristics or location.

Other kinds of discrimination factors may also play a role in limiting opportunities for inner city residents. Western and Beckett (1999) have documented the important effect that high rates of inner city incarceration have on: 1) the measured rates of inner city unemployment; and 2) the future employability of primarily young black and Hispanic men. Their analysis links racism in the criminal justice system to labor market opportunities, and like Stoll, implicitly asks the policymaker to prioritize the relative roles of societal racism and locational disadvantages, and to think about labor market discrimination against individuals that embody a particular combination of race/class/age/location rather than categorical race discrimination.

Poverty Reduction Critiques

The spatial mismatch hypothesis analyzes the labor market experience of low-income minority urban residents. In doing so, it seeks to explain some of the primary causes of urban and concentrated poverty. Its underlying assumption is that a lack of jobs is the main cause of minority poverty. Although this assumption seems valid, there is emerging research on the causes of poverty and wealth inequality that undermines spatial mismatch as an effective theory for developing anti-poverty policy.

Oliver and Shapiro (1995) have been the most prominent advocates of an assets-based approach to wealth inequalities between African Americans and European Americans. Rather than looking at the incomes of poor people, which measure the day-to-day income and expenditures of a household, they choose the net worth and net financial asset portfolios—i.e., homeownership, savings, stock portfolios, car ownership, and other investments—measures which imply an ability for capital accumulation and transfer to others. This perspective questions the labor market focus of the spatial mismatch hypothesis on the basis that the measure of an individual's access to a job may not even be the most important factor in his/her well-being.

Similarly, McMurrer and Sawhill (1998) downplay the importance of income in measuring the well-being of an individual and his/her opportunities for permanently escaping poverty. Their focus on long-term trajectories of individuals through social classes, educational experience, home environment, and even genes as important influences in an individual's well-being implies that a narrow focus on job opportunities is simply a measure of potential income, or day-to-day spending money, and not wealth. These two critiques, while certainly related to the importance of jobs and unemployment, do question the priority placed on locational relationships between home and work.

These critiques of the narrow focus of the spatial mismatch hypothesis as an anti-poverty policy are extended by Bernstein's (1999) analysis of the economic value of urban neighborhoods and purchasing power that accounts for space, non-work-related mobility, and consumer price indices. Bernstein found that non-work-related trips increasingly outnumber work commutes and therefore any analysis of spatial mismatch and its relationship to poverty must include an analysis of access to necessary non-work-related services such as daycare, groceries, health care, leisure, and a whole constellation of other services that ghetto residents pay for. Unwittingly, his call for an analysis of spatial mismatch in non-work-related trips opens an interesting set of questions about cost-of-living. Presumably, the costs associated with living in segregated housing ghettos are different from the cost of living in job-rich suburban neighborhoods. It is not clear which would be higher, but before the spatial mismatch hypothesis can be confirmed as an effective basis for anti-poverty policy, such an analysis would need to show that the change in personal costs associated with either gentrifying existing ghettos with job-rich firms or dispersing ghetto residents to the suburbs would not significantly rise.

Although none of these researchers directly confront the question of spatial mismatch, each provides compelling alternatives to the spatial mismatch hypothesis as an appropriate basis for minority poverty reduction policy. Again, it should be reiterated that this critique is not of the spatial mismatch hypothesis' role in labor market outcomes directly, but of its importance in poverty policy.

A Policy-Relevant Research Agenda

The purpose of this essay has been to use the spatial mismatch hypothesis as a springboard for a policy discussion on the relative position of location (place) in determining labor market opportunities and anti-poverty policy, and to ask policy-relevant questions about relative priorities based on number of critiques of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Ever since the concept of a spatial mismatch was defined by John Kain in the late 1960s, the claim that location and relative proximity of residence and labor market opportunity plays a role in the labor market outcomes of low-income, urban minority residents has never been seriously disputed. The fact that many of the above critiques of the spatial mismatch hypothesis come from overall advocates of incorporating locational and proximity characteristics in policy recommendations (e.g., Kasarda 1989; Stoll 1999) is evidence that the issue is not *whether* spatial mismatch matters for segregated and poor urban minorities, but rather how concerned should policymakers be about the implications of spatial mismatch and the degree to which it should drive public policy. In sum, the evidence shows clearly that there is a spatial mismatch related to concentrated urban poverty, and that this finding should be a central tenet of any anti-poverty policy. However, anti-poverty policy should not be spatial to the exclusion of other relevant factors.

The spatial mismatch hypothesis literature seems to be at a crossroads, where its relevance will depend on researchers' abilities to update its core concepts to several new conditions and concretize general policies

that incorporate simultaneously the spatial and non-spatial aspects of urban poverty. As the American economy and the structure of minority employment and residential opportunities changes significantly, and the physical layout of urban areas is transformed, the tenets of the spatial mismatch hypothesis are challenged. For example, the most popular relevant and current debate is over the role of electronic information and communication in the increasing irrelevance of location. Does spatial mismatch no longer matter if most people will be telecommuting in the next ten years? Perhaps most importantly, however, amidst a national economic boom there is growing evidence of general inequality and social isolation in the United States (Bernstein et al. 2000; Frank and Cook 1995). Even though this disturbing trend is likely both a cause and a result of the location of opportunities, it is important for a policymaker to know what drives what. Is the locational segregation of urban growth simply one of many current inequalities driven by external, policy-immune forces, or does locational segregation create and exacerbate other kinds of inequality?

Three trends inextricably bound to increasing inequality are only lightly touched on in the conventional spatial mismatch literature: trade integration, changing urban spatial regimes, and governmental devolution. First, the national and global economy has undergone significant changes over the past twenty-five years, many of which have been particularly detrimental to urban unskilled minorities. Fordist production systems have, in many cases, been replaced by clusters of firms based on flexible specialization; many lower-skilled jobs have been upgraded through technological advances within and across industries; global trade relationships have opened American labor markets to more competitive production markets; and the proportion of service-based sectors has grown in importance.

Second, the number of major American cities has increased significantly since the seminal first generation of spatial mismatch studies were conducted. However, these cities do not necessarily represent a multiplication of the same urban regime that dominated in the 1970s. Phoenix, Denver, and Miami all have significant populations of concentrated low-income urban minorities. However, since many of these cities are themselves large agglomerations of suburban growth, it would be difficult to characterize their problem as the migration of blue-collar job opportunities out of the reach of central city minorities through suburbanization.

Finally, the political and policy environments of the US have also changed significantly since the 1960s, when federal programs were a preferred method of alleviating employment and income problems, with mixed effects (see Anderson 1964). Today, a strong devolution trend is underway that may influence the spatial mismatch hypothesis' relevance in policy analysis. On the one hand, since the evidence of spatial mismatch seems to be somewhat uneven based on what city is studied and what variable is measured, devolution of decision-making to the state level may open a window for spatial mismatch-based policies to be implemented only in cities and regions

where it clearly makes sense. On the other hand, devolution may simply mean the withdrawal of most anti-poverty policies.

The three examples I have noted are only the starting point for longer lines of inquiry that concerned researchers—and specifically urban planners—can productively take. Such lines of inquiry could move the debate beyond the simple question of "does residential segregation negatively influence job opportunities and poverty?" to the more relevant questions of "what policies and institutions can be influenced and developed to coordinate spatial and non-spatial programs for poverty alleviation?" For example, can policies for public transit development be matched with tax incentives that attract labor markets in which women traditionally succeed? Can skills training be targeted toward inner city residents and combined with job placement and automobile access? In what ways can antidiscrimination laws or police reform be linked to anti-poverty policy? Some governments and community-based organizations have already begun to develop such innovative programs to fight concentrated poverty. Often, however, these efforts require systematic analysis beyond the institutional capacity of the involved institutions. Thus, the opportunity for researchers to conduct applied studies on these integrated policy approaches is a natural area for those interested in concentrated poverty and spatial mismatch to explore with clear relevance for policy.

Endnotes

[1] See, for example, Frey and Fielding 1995; Galster and Mincy 1993; Jargowsky 1997; Kasarda 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Mayer and Jenks 1989; Sawhill 1988; Wacquant and Wilson 1989; Wilson 1987, 1996.

[2] A high-poverty census tract is defined as those having greater than forty percent of the population living below the poverty line.

[3] Kain's original study in 1968 grew out of the need for a better understanding the urban crisis of the 1960s, which became manifest in widespread riots in Los Angeles and around the country (Kain 1992). Thus, much of the attention given to the original spatial mismatch hypothesis can be attributed to heightened public awareness of urban problems and the ability of the spatial mismatch hypothesis to appeal to non-experts in the public realm.

[4] Although concentrated poverty affects many urban minority populations, the spatial mismatch literature has historically focused on African Americans and occasionally on Hispanics. As I mention in the conclusion, this is a current major shortcoming of the hypothesis as cities fundamentally shift in their demographic characteristics.

[5] Counties assessed were Los Angeles, Alameda, San Bernardino, and San Joaquin.

[6] For example, Kain 1968; Stoll 1998, 1999; Kasarda 1989; Cooke 1993; Johnson and Oliver 1991.

[7] As defined in Ehrenberg and Smith (1997) to be a general shift in the labor market privileging one skill-level of worker over another.

[8]It is important to note here that 1) these shifts are relatively unavoidable since international competition and technological change fall largely outside of effective governmental action, and 2) such shifts often lead to price reductions in basic consumer goods that disproportionately benefit the poor.

[9]Although based on the model of ethnic enclave economies, this line of reasoning admits to the need for initial capital to enable indigenous development.

[10]It should be noted that Kain (1992) himself felt that Ellwood's criticism has stood as one of the most effective against the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Perhaps it is telling of the close interaction between the theoretical research and the political process that pithy, reasonable and clear statements oriented towards non-expert consumption have been a very real part of the importance of the debate.

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Regional Development and Institutional Lock-In:
A Case Study of Richards Bay, South Africa

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The South African Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) policy seeks to attract investors to specific regions (DTI 1997). In a country where the official unemployment rate is over twenty percent, and may be as high as thirty-seven percent (RSA 1998), the effectiveness of this ambitious program is open to question. However, it is too early to evaluate the program in terms of job creation or other quantifiable outcomes. In the absence of such outcomes, this paper presents an institutional analysis of the SDI policy.

National industrial strategies are influenced by the regional institutional dynamics operating in the places where the policies are to be implemented, since national policymakers require local support to implement policy. This may lead to uncritical acceptance, outright rejection, or modification of the policy, with a variety of possible unintended outcomes. My case study of the growth pole bulk-export port of Richards Bay illustrates the first of these possible outcomes; here the SDI policy has been incorporated into the existing regional institutional structure.

Richards Bay's existing regional institutional structure has advantaged a particular form of development in the past, and continues to influence current and future development plans. Development in Richards Bay is locked into the tight relationships between the Port, the local government, and a few large extractive industries. The local economy faces considerable problems. The dominant industries are capital-intensive and thus provide few appropriate job opportunities, have minimal connections to the local economy, and exact a heavy environmental toll on the surrounding area.

In reflecting the underlying institutional structure, the SDI program has been unable to address the root causes of this distorted development trajectory, the result of which is that alternative trajectories have been precluded. These alternatives might have included substantial economic diversification, the creation of an entrepreneurial and innovative business climate, a shift in the operating environment for small business, the development of a new skill base, or the strengthening of rural-urban economic link-

ages. Instead, the SDI program reflects the institutionalized belief that inward investment on the back of substantial infrastructural investment is the only way for Richards Bay to develop.

In the first section of the paper I briefly describe the concept of regional institutional structure, defined as the formal and informal relationships between agents which come to constitute the environment within which people make decisions and act. Because economic behavior is embedded in this structure, economic interventions need to pay attention to regional institution issues.

In the second section I introduce the South African SDI policy and show that it is an attempt to address national industrial strategy concerns in a spatial manner. However, the pursuit of this goal is constrained by current restrictive macroeconomic policies, and the partially federalist new South African constitution. These constraints prompt national implementers of the policy to work with local agents, thereby inreasing the salience of local institutional factors in shaping the policy and its implementation.

In the third section I present a case study of Richards Bay. Here, the regional institutional structure is distinguished by close relationships between local government, the port authorities, and a few large raw material-processing industries. In Richards Bay, the SDI policy has been quickly and enthusiastically adopted by local organizations and interest groups, however, the adopted policy reflects rather than challenges the existing regional institutional structure.

Regional Institutional Structure

A useful starting point for understanding the implementation of national industrial policy is Peter Evans' suggestion that "variation in (development) involvement depends on variations in states themselves" (1995: 11). Evans' work on "embedded autonomy" suggests the need for grounded research into the nature of policy development processes, and it focuses our attention on the way in which political, bureaucratic, and economic interests are able to form coalitions around particular approaches to development policy.

However, regional policies are not merely reflections of national government strategies. Differences in regional implementation of a national program reflect regional differences in the outcomes of negotiation and bargaining processes between national and local interests (Selznik 1984). This highlights the importance of research that explores how the values and imperatives of national programs, such as the SDIs, are communicated to, and mediated by, regional actors and institutions. In this paper I will connect this approach to policy analysis to recent work by regional scholars that attempts to explain regional growth performance in terms of institutional factors.[1]

Institutions can be defined as the guiding norms or frameworks for human action that are the outcome of regular human interactions and relationships, and that may or may not be formalized in organizational, legal, contractual, or some other conscious form. Such a relational view of institutions situates economic behavior, what we seek to influence in re-

gional development practice, in networks of interpersonal relations (Granovetter 1985). Institutions are thus historically path-dependent to some extent— that is, they are hard to change—in the sense that they develop through repetition, and they are shaped by pre-existing relationships.

This understanding of institutions has particular relevance for planners because it has an implicit spatial component. By concentrating upon human relationships in the formation of institutions, particularly repeated face-to-face contacts, we are alerted to the importance of proximity (Storper 1997). This idea has been used to argue that regions, the predominant spatial scale of such relation-based institutions, have a special place in learning and innovation. Amin notes that "in a world in which codified knowledge is becoming increasingly ubiquitously available, uncodified knowledge, rooted in relations of proximity, attains a higher premium in delivering competitive advantage owing to their inimitability" (1999: 369). This attention to learning is closely related to the view that innovation is central to the process of regional development. This view follows in the tradition of Marshall (1892), Schumpeter (1950), Perroux (1950), and Hirschman (1958), and is distinguishable from neo-classical and trade-based theories of regional growth.

Proximity, however, confers a premium only insofar as this uncodified knowledge has some value. While institutions are importantly localized, strong institutions do not necessarily lead to desirable developmental outcomes. Institutional structure may in fact unfavorably constrain the development options that

are considered in a place—what is often described as institutional lock-in.

Although some institutions are not formally and consciously created, formal organizations and legal/administrative frameworks can and do play a key role in defining the nature of the regional institutional structure. Particular contractual relationships and industrial structures, professional associations, and communication structures shape both human relationships and informal institutions. Political agents operating from the national to the local level shape these formal organization's legal and administrative frameworks (Polanyi 1944). Thus social institutions are deeply affected by politics and policy.

In summary, regional institutional structure includes both the formal and informal relationships between agents that emerge from different production activities, patterns of ownership, administrative systems, and decision-making forums. This structure is important because it constitutes the environment within which people make decisions and engage in action with real development consequences. It has the power to filter policy interventions, but is at the same time an arena for policy intervention. In the Richards Bay case, I will argue that this filtering has taken the form of incorporation of the national SDI policy into the existing regional institutional structure. The lack of attention to institutional lock-in has resulted in a policy that may reinforce the existing—and problematic— development trajectory. The concept of regional institutional structure thus provides a framework for understanding the actual implementation and potential effects of the Spatial Development Initiative.

Spatial Development Initiatives In Theory and Practice

The SDI policy is a spatially explicit component of South African national industrial policy. However, the policy is fiscally constrained by the current macroeconomic policy context, as well as by the constitutional framework that requires national-local cooperation on key development issues.

In the words of Paul Jourdan, coordinator of the SDIs within the Department of Trade and Industry, the SDI policy is "a package of measures that aim to attract investors into a bundle of economically sustainable projects in a region with the potential for growth" (Jourdan 1997). However, due to fiscal constraints, "governments' financial investment in an initiative is limited to less than ten percent of the total amount." Thus "areas where initiatives are set up identify themselves. They must have a proven economic base because the program simply aims to loosen constraints and allow them to grow to their maximum potential." The idea of inherent potential is an important part of making the policy politically acceptable within the macroeconomic policy and constitutional constraints; it serves to justify both the limited number of places selected as SDI projects[2] and the limited public resources applied in each case.

Spatially, the SDI projects have taken the form of corridors linking the inland mineral-industrial heartland of the country to the coast, and of export-oriented production nodes in the port-industrial cities

of Durban, Richards Bay, Cape Town-Saldahna (Fitschen 1998), and Port Elizabeth-East London (Driver 1998). In these SDI projects, transportation, infrastructure, and industrial development concerns predominate, and thus the Departments of Transport and of Trade and Industry have played the leading role. In the more rural Wild Coast and Lubombo areas, the SDI projects have been targeted towards rural development through agriculture, tourism, and transportation-oriented investments.

The preparation and marketing of investment projects is the key publicly-funded activity of the SDI policy. In the infrastructure field, investment opportunities include various public-private arrangements for toll roads, port upgrades, telecommunications systems, and urban/industrial services. In the industrial SDIs, there is heavy emphasis on projects that involve manufacturing of semi-processed raw materials for export, while in the tourism SDIs, there is an emphasis on hotels, game parks, and other similar developments.

The SDI program, which is coordinated from an SDI Office within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), relies extensively upon various mechanisms of cooperative governance to achieve its goals. An Overall SDI Coordinating Committee (OSDICC), chaired by the DTI, provides a forum aimed at ensuring horizontal inter-departmental cooperation. OSDICC includes representatives from most national government departments, parastatal finance and investment agencies, the national transport enterprises, parastatal Research Councils, and the managers of the individual SDI projects.

The SDI Office, in consultation with regional organizations, appoints managers to implement the various SDI projects. There is some variation in the implementation procedures of the various SDI projects, but officials in the SDI Office of the DTI do speak of a generalized "SDI Methodology." In each of the SDI projects, vertical or inter-governmental cooperation is sought through local "champions" and stakeholders to provide the program with legitimacy. Local cooperation is also sought to ensure that an organization remains after the "exit phase" to continue the investment promotion work. Individual SDI managers thus rely heavily upon the use of political capital and informal cooperative mechanisms to do their work.

The SDIs combine notions of polarized and infrastructure-led development (Gore 1984) with an assumption that considerable informational gaps exist in the investment arena. Hence, the SDIs emphasize concentrated investment promotion activities and spatially targeted infrastructure investments. However, the SDI policy does not appear to be informed by a strong theoretical basis, and SDI managers admit that they are learning by doing.

If the SDIs do not derive directly from regional development theory, what is the origin of this national policy? At the national level, the SDIs reflect the pursuit of two goals— industrial policy and spatial redistribution (Lewis and Bloch 1998)—constrained by the two structural factors of macroeconomic policy and the constitution.

First, the SDI policy has been motivated by the industrial policy objectives of the national govern-

ment, as implemented by the DTI. Platzky(1998) summarizes these as export orientation and earning foreign exchange, sustainable job creation, better utilization of existing infrastructure and resources, and broadening the ownership base of the economy. The attraction of foreign direct investment and the reorientation of production and key infrastructure towards the export market are key components of this industrial strategy addressed by the SDI policy.

Second, the spatiality of the SDI policy reflects recognition of the unequal historical pattern of spatial development in South Africa. In particular, apartheid-era spatial development and import substitution industrial policies advantaged the mineral-industrial interior of the country, while systematically disadvantaging peripheral homeland regions and coastal cities, including their connections with neighboring states.

The SDIs thus reflect the pursuit of industrial policy and spatial development goals, however, the pursuit of these goals is constrained by two factors.

The first factor is the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic policy that was begun in early 1996. In seeking to improve foreign investor confidence, the GEAR policy was made fiscally restrictive (RSA 1996a), and its development philosophy export-oriented. One of the very few pro-active policies it does allow is industrial policy. GEAR includes a reorientation of the industrial incentive system towards labor-intensiveness, industry preference, and spatial location (DBSA 1999). However, the implementation of the GEAR policy limits the possibilities for spatial redistribution through

public spending, and thus provides the context for the orientation of the policy around private investment.

Second, the framing of the SDI policy cannot be understood without reference to the new, partially federalist South African constitution. The constitution establishes provincial governments and local authorities as equal spheres of government (RSA 1996b). Harbors and municipal planning are concurrent local-national responsibilities, while industrial promotion, regional planning, primary and secondary education, and public transport are concurrent provincial-national responsibilities. By moving certain important regional development decisions into the intergovernmental arena, the constitution forces national policymakers to enter into relationships with local agents. It is this factor which then opens up the possibility of important regional variations in the implementation of national policy, and makes it necessary to look within regions to understand how the SDI policy is implemented in practice.

Richards Bay's Development Trajectory
In this section I first describe the Richards Bay economy in conventional analytical terms, highlighting the prominence of the Port and a few large processing industries. Various problems associated with the current development trajectory are highlighted. I then describe the local economy in institutional terms, highlighting the tight regional institutional structure that reflects and reinforces the problematic development trajectory of the town. The local SDI program reflects this institutional context, and thus

the SDI policy is currently unable to fundamentally shift the development trajectory of Richards Bay.

Richards Bay occupies a special place in the minds of many South African regionalists and is regarded as a successful growth pole. A promotional brochure reminds us that "until the 1960s, Richards Bay was a small fishing village nestling on high ground overlooking the natural Mhlathuze estuary and wetlands" (RBTA, nd). By 1997, the population of Richards Bay and the nearby township of Esikhaweni was an estimated 98,000 (Richards Bay, 1998). Richards Bay accounted for around one percent of South Africa's GDP in 1993.

The Port of Richards Bay was developed in the early 1970s by Portnet, the national transport agency, as a response to rising traffic in other South African ports, particularly Durban. Richards Bay was selected because of the suitability of the Mhlathuze lagoon for dredging, the availability of large tracts of flat land for urban development, the ready incorporation of Richards Bay into the existing rail links to Durban, and its proximity to the coal fields in the eastern part of the country (Fair and Jones 1992). The impetus for the development of the port was provided by the Transvaal Coal Owners Association (TCOA), which in 1971 was awarded a contract to export 2.5 million tons of coal per year to Japan (Aniruth and Barnes 1998). The TCOA owns the Richards Bay Coal Terminal.

When it was officially opened in 1976, the harbor included four clean- or general-cargo berths and two private bulk-coal berths. It had been dredged to accommodate ships in the 150,000 deadweight ton range, and was connected to the interior coalfields by a largely purpose-built rail link of 525 kilometers. Since then, various infrastructural additions have been made, including: 1) the expansion of the privately-owned Richards Bay Coal Terminal, which now has four berths; and 2) the addition of a private chemical terminal, four dry-bulk terminals which handle a range of minerals, fertilizers, and woodchips, and a bulk-metal terminal.

The Port of Richards Bay is a highly successful development, approximately eighty-one million tons of cargo per annum, more (by weight) than all other South African ports combined. However, approximately sixty million tons of this cargo is low-value coal and the general cargo capacity of the port is limited. For example, even though the port is able to move containers in the general-cargo terminal, the port has no dedicated container-handling facilities. In 1997, the port handled only 13,471 twenty-foot equivalent units (PORB 1997), less than one percent of the national total. As a bulk-export harbor, the Port of Richards Bay is not on the regular route of any container shipping line. Since one firm is unlikely to fill a container or general cargo vessel alone, most local companies make use of the Durban hub, which offers a wide variety of destinations at comparatively low cost.

Gross geographic product provides an initial way of understanding the structure of the local economy, which for statistical purposes is defined as a district that includes the agricultural service center town of Empangeni and surrounding sugar cane and forest plantations, in addition to Richards Bay. In 1993,

manufacturing accounted for fifty-seven percent of the $.5 billion of local output, while the transport sector accounted for eighteen percent. In the national economy, manufacturing accounted for twenty-four percent and transport for eight percent. The dominance of these sectors is remarkable considering that the statistical region also includes significant agricultural lands. These statistics also point to the undeveloped local tertiary sector, although this has changed to a small degree with some successful shopping center development in the past five years.

Although Richards Bay has grown rapidly, there are considerable structural problems in the local economy. It is dominated by a few low-value-adding large firms which offer limited employment opportunities and limited backward and forward linkages (Lewis and Bloch 1998), while small firms are underrepresented. The local economy is subject to boom-bust cycles that are associated with the construction of mega-projects. For example, the local housing market collapsed following completion of the Billition Hillside aluminum smelter in 1995.

Most local actors believe that the development problems of Richards Bay are the result of various infrastructure shortcomings. A document prepared for the Launch Workshop of the Richards Bay SDI (RBSDI 1997) identifies a number of infrastructure deficits that should be addressed in order to make the area more attractive to inward investment. These include a dedicated container-handling facility at the Port, cheaper land and utilities, a water supply unaffected by drought, improved road connections, a toxic waste dump site, and improved policing.

Some commentators have pointed to an institutional basis for Richard Bay's development shortcomings. Aniruth and Barnes (1998: 840) argue that "there appears to have been very little exceptional coordination between the various institutions in the historical development of Richards Bay, except in the initial phase." They go on to argue that while individual organizations had been efficient in the execution of their own duties, coordination was lacking: "It is therefore quite probable that greater coordination between the various institutions would have accelerated development within the locality." The problem with this argument is that it tends to view institutions in de-politicized and formal organizational terms only. In fact, we find in Richards Bay a very tight institutional structure concentrated in the relationships between the Port, local government, and the largest industries.

For Lewis and Bloch (1998: 744), Richards Bay's institutional problems result from this area having not "endogenised a capacity to attract industrial investment." Thus, the policy challenge (for the SDIs) is that "if specific effort is not made, and institutions not designed to develop local civic and technical capacity in the early phases, important learning opportunities will be sacrificed and patterns of interaction will be established which will skew the industrial development of the region(1998: 746)."

It is true that a capacity to innovate has not been developed in Richards Bay, but I argue below that the challenge is not simply to create a new institutional structure; rather, it is to reconfigure the existing relationships between various actors. While all sorts of

relationships have contributed to the town's particular development trajectory, especially the relationship between capital and labor, I will concentrate on port-industry relationships and the role of local government, since these are what differentiate Richards Bay from other places in South Africa.

Port-Industry Relationships

The relationships between the port and the large industries that dominate the local economy are strong and close. In many cases, the relationships involve considerable investment in infrastructure on the part of both the Port and large firms. This requires cooperation in technical operations, as well as long-term contractual relationships.

For example, Billiton developed the Bayside and Hillside smelters to import bauxite and produce aluminium ingots for the domestic and export markets (Aniruth and Barnes 1998). The port has invested heavily in specialized terminal equipment to handle this cargo. In the case of the older Bayside smelter, the bauxite is transported from the port on a dedicated rail link built by the national rail transport agency on which Billiton (then Alusaf) used to operate its own rolling stock. In the case of the newer Hillside smelter, bauxite is transported by a conveyor belt owned and operated by Billiton. In both cases, Billiton and the Port have essentially made joint investment and technical decisions that depend on the cooperation of both parties. Similar close contractual and technical relationships exist between the Port and Indian Ocean Fertilizers, Richards Bay Minerals, Mondi Paper Company, the Central Timber Co-operative chipping mill, and the SilvaCell woodchip plant.

There are a few firms that depart from this pattern. Bell Equipment produces heavy articulated equipment for sugar cane, mining, forestry, and construction industries. The firm relocated to Richards Bay from Empangeni in 1984 to gain industrial incentives on offer at the time (Aniruth and Barnes 1998). Even though over ninety percent of its material inputs (by value) are imported, and over forty percent of its revenue comes from exports, virtually all shipments are handled through the Durban Port because of the container facilities and shipping routes available there. Bell has exclusive use of two articulated trucks for hauling goods between Durban and Richards Bay. The few other local firms of note mostly produce for the domestic market. Similarly, the undeveloped small firm sector has a limited relationship with the Port.

The relationships between the large industries and the Port are reinforced at many levels. Although over twenty transportation intermediaries operate in Richards Bay, due to the specialized nature of the cargoes handled, generally only one such agency mediates the relationship between the Port and individual large industries. For example, the Billiton smelters have a long-term relationship with the Strange-Rennies shipping agency to handle all its aluminum exports.

The relationships between large industries and the Port is reinforced by other relationships outside the immediate port environment. First, the local port manager is a member of the large industries group of the Richards Bay branch of the Zululand Chamber of Business, which provides a forum for deepen-

ing the relationship between the Port and particular business concerns. Second, Port management facilitates a series of regular meetings with key clients, including an annual client conference. There is also a history of joint port-industry working groups addressing specific sectoral issues; for example, the Ferro-alloy Producers Association currently meets with the port in a regular working group. This level of local involvement by Portnet management is unusual.

Third, there are regular but unscheduled forums for the building of relationships at non-executive level. For example, since the vessels that visit Richards Bay are generally chartered for specific cargoes, each ship visit becomes an occasion for at least one meeting between mid-level management and technical staff of the producer, Port, and shipping agents.

The relationships between the Port and key local industry sectors are facilitated by the scale of the Port operation, the nature of the goods handled, the attitudes and behavior of key individuals within Port management, and particular contractual and technical relationships. These relationships have facilitated joint problem-solving and have ensured proper operation of the considerable capital investments by both the Port and private industry.

The Role of Local Government

There is also an important political basis for the tight institutional structure being described here. Unlike many local governments in South Africa, local government in Richards Bay has played an explicit and important role in shaping the development trajectory of the town. It seems likely that this institutionalized role will continue. Development in Richards Bay is guided within a very ambitious and clearly defined Structure Plan framework that is compatible with long-term port expansion plans, and a forecasted residential population of over one million people in thirty years (RBTLC 1997).

Aniruth and Barnes (1998) suggest that in the past, local government has not played an active role in pursuing development, pointing to the fact that the incentives that attracted key industries to Richards Bay were administered by national government. Similarly, some local respondents have commented that the local authority discouraged certain industries from locating within the town. However, this view is incomplete, because it misses some of the key areas in which local government has positively shaped certain forms of local development, while discouraging others.

First, the local council has large land holdings and has used these in an entrepreneurial way. All the land within the town of Richards Bay was granted to the municipality in the nineteen seventies (Aniruth and Barnes, 1998). The council actively markets a portfolio of industrial land that includes some large sites adjacent to the harbor and Richards Bay-Empangeni highway. By including a clause in the sale of industrial land, the council compels industrialists to purchase water and electricity from the council, thus ensuring an important income stream. While there has been some debate about the pricing of these utilities, it is unclear whether this arrangement has deterred investors.

Second, local government cooperates closely with the Port authorities in a set of relationships that have a long history. Currently, every two months there is a port liaison meeting. The meeting includes the port manager and town clerk, the Port and City engineers, the Port and City property/estates managers and the Port and City electricians. The connection between the Port and the City is thus largely professional and technical. The current meeting has a long history, growing out of the original South African Railways-Council meeting which apparently started with the first port construction in the 1970s.

The effects of this political aspect of institutional structure can be seen in the compatibility of long term port and council planning frameworks. Similarly, the council has not subdivided the largest properties adjacent to the Port, arguing that these may be needed for large processing industries. Apparently the SilvaCell wood chipping plant struggled to secure its location near the Port because it wanted a relatively small site. This reflects the privileging of large extractive industries that enhance the utilization of existing and planned port infrastructure investments.

Local government in Richards Bay has not been left unaffected by the political changes in South Africa. However, there are reasons for arguing that the new balance of political forces is unlikely to rapidly or dramatically change the relationships described above. Local government reorganization resulted in the amalgamation of the historically white town of Richards Bay and the black dormitory township of Esikhaweni in order to ensure joint administration of the two functionally linked, but spatially dislo-

cated, places. However, due to various factors, the town of Richards Bay did not amalgamate with the nearby agricultural service center town of Empangeni, nor were the city boundaries extended to incorporate adjacent Inkatha Freedom Party-controlled semi-urban tribal areas.

The result is that the largest party (without an absolute majority) in the current Richards Bay Transitional Local Council— the African National Congress—represents an essentially urban working-class constituency. It seems likely that the new council, while concerned with living conditions in the black residential areas, is unwilling to fundamentally challenge the development agenda of the old council. Jobs in large industries, rather than other development agendas, are likely to continue to have political appeal.

The institutional analysis adds new insights as to why Richards Bay has developed in a way that privileges large extractive industries, and connects to other analyses of the limitations of growth pole development.[3] The analysis highlights the ability of local actors to attract resources from national government and parastatal agencies, to seek and attract investors, to efficiently and rapidly develop land, and provide certain well-run infrastructure. But the Richards Bay port authorities, city council and large industries do these things so well that they preclude other development trajectories.

The Richards Bay Spatial Development Initiative
Richards Bay, as a growth pole, has grown on the basis of inward investment of large manufacturing

concerns and infrastructural investment. Given this history and the associated regional institutional structure, it should be no surprise the SDI program has been enthusiastically received in Richards Bay. Even Richards Bay's vocal environmental lobby appears to be satisfied with the program, while perceptions of exclusion in the neighboring town of Empangeni have apparently been muted. The SDI manager has support from key local actors. It is interesting to note the sharp contrast to the SDI in Durban, which was initially resisted, and then substantially modified, by local government and other local actors.

It is thus clear that the Richards Bay SDI program has been absorbed into, and in many ways has come to reflect, the existing institutional structure. An SDI Trust has been formed to implement the program, and the Port and Local Council have jointly chaired the Trust to date. Other important local economic actors are also represented in the Trust.

The Trust has identified a series of infrastructural projects that need to be undertaken in order to improve the investment climate of the area. These include improving the John Ross highway that links Richards Bay and Empangeni, increasing the bulk water supply and securing supply during drought periods, reducing crime through improved policing, improving refuse removal facilities and securing a toxic waste site, and developing a dedicated container-handling facility at the Port. At the time of writing, the SDI Trust and manager had

succeeded in convincing the South African Police Service to build a new police station, and were negotiating financial packages for the water and highway developments. However, it seems likely that lobbying by Durban-based shipping firms has stopped the container terminal proposal.

The SDI Trust is now marketing a series of investment projects, most of which concern processing raw materials produced in the large local extraction industries (Richards Bay 1998). Investors are also being sought for a dry-dock and ship repair complex that has been planned for several years. The Trust has also been working to attract tourism investment through the development of a passenger terminal at the port and waterfront facilities near the mouth of the Port. These developments would be linked to tourism investment possibilities being marketed under the auspices of the Lubombo SDI. There are proposals for the establishment of a Richards Bay Investment Center that would be responsible for information dissemination, a one-stop investor service and regional marketing center, and for an Industrial Development Zone adjacent to the port. A more recent update of the SDI investment website also identifies some business opportunities for small, medium and micro-enterprises.

The Richards Bay SDI is regarded as one of the more successful SDIs. A local organization has been created with demonstrated local legitimacy, and implementation has thus far emphasized real infrastructural improvements rather than moving prematurely to investment promotion. However, it

is likely that these infrastructure improvements will at best only succeed in attracting more of the same kind of investors that currently populate Richards Bay. The problem is that the SDI program reflects, rather than challenges, the institutional structure of the region and thus the decision frameworks of agents. It envisages more of the same development trajectory, and precludes other potentially desirable alternatives.

Conclusions

The central argument of this paper is that national industrial strategy is influenced by the regional institutional dynamics operating in the places where the policy is implemented. This finding suggests an important general hypothesis about national development strategies in the current context of government devolution. If national industrial strategies ignore regional institutional structure, they risk being uncritically incorporated and thus being unable to address the problem of institutional lock-in. Alternatively, they may be rejected outright, or they may be modified with resulting uncertainty and unintended consequences. Whichever is the case, a more appropriate development strategy has to pay close attention to the problem of institutional lock-in.

The case study of the Richards Bay SDI provides an example of a national industrial strategy that was incorporated into an existing regional institutional structure. Richards Bay's particular regional institutional structure reflects its history as a growth pole. It has successfully advantaged some forms of development while actively excluding others, and there is an institutionalized notion that Richards Bay can only grow through external investments of the kind that have been made previously. Thus, the acceptance of the SDI policy in Richards Bay reflects the fact that the policy matched the development philosophy embedded there. This has undermined the prospects for a fundamental shift in the current problematic development trajectory. Despite the attentions of the SDI program, Richards Bay will continue to lack an endogenous growth dynamic.

This reasoning begins to suggest a more appropriate role for national policy in regional development. An underdeveloped theme in this paper is the role of national-local relationships in shaping elements of regional institutional structure. In the case of Richards Bay this includes agencies such as the national departments, the national conglomerates operating locally, Portnet, and the Industrial Development Corporation. The challenge for the SDI Office in the DTI is to convince these agencies to provide the correct incentives for changes in the relationships between the various local organizations and actors. This view is compatible with Lewis and Bloch's suggestion that the "SDIs need to design programs with a considerably clearer focus on strengthening regional agglomerations and clusters" (1998: 753).

However, the argument of this paper also suggests limitations to the most appropriate of national programs, since the dilemma is not simply to create new institutions, but rather to work with those that already exist. The institutional approach outlined here highlights the importance of actions by local agents

that shift the decision-making premises of other actors in the regional economy (Amin 1999). The difficulties of achieving this should not be underestimated, but there is good news in this regard. Apparently the discussions leading to the formation of the SDI Trust have already prompted local actors to think critically about the development trajectory of the town, an examination that needs to be carefully nurtured and supported.

Finally, the institutional approach to regional development speaks directly to local planners. Local planning frameworks and processes have an important role in ensuring that cherry-picked infrastructural and industrial investments are integral components of a wider and more inclusive development agenda. In other words, planners need to realize their potential for impacting social power relations through the form and content of the planning institutions they structure (Bryson and Charby 1996). Attention to institutional lock-in would be a good place to start.

Endnotes

[1]For a succinct summary of the theoretical genealogy and key arguments of the institutional turn in regional development studies, see Amin (1999). For a more fully elaborated institutional perspective that identifies systems of technology, organization and territory as the key sources of institutional variation, see Storper (1997). Both authors stress the differences between the institutional approach and the neo-classical economics paradigm.

[2]In a classic passage Albert Hirschman (1958: 190-2) notes the tendency for regional development policies to be diluted, and thus often rendered ineffective, by the political pressures on national governments to extend programs to many regions. The SDI policy has resisted such pressures with some success.

[3]Gore (1984) discusses growth pole policies in the context of wider debates about regional development. For a more recent retrospective view of growth pole strategies, see Parr (1999a and 1999b).

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
Broadway Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 1999 *Peter Aeschbacher*

Global City-Regions:
A Conversation with
Allen Scott

Kathleen Lee

The Global City-Regions Conference was hosted by the School of Public Policy and Social Research at UCLA in October, 1999. The conference included an opportunity for academicians and policymakers to engage in a dialogue around various economic, political, and social challenges posed by globalization and its intersection with urbanization and regional development processes. During the short three days, October 21-23, 1999, the conference proceeded with intellectual seriousness, controversy, and also genuine

conviviality among old and new friends. The conference proceedings will be published by Oxford University Press at the end of the year as a book, *Global City-Regions*.

Recently, I talked with Professor Allen Scott, the principal organizer of the conference, about the concept of global city-regions and some of the issues related to the project.

Lee: The conference theme paper suggests that the global city-regions concept builds on and goes beyond the earlier ideas of world cities and global cities. The earlier concepts assumed a certain geometric hierarchy that is based on a historical accumulation of different factors (e.g., transportation nodes, corporate headquarters, concentration of leading industries, etc.). In what respect do you see the global city-regions concept as more relevant or central to today's social and economic processes?

Scott: There has been a long development of the idea of large cities in relationship to the world economy, beginning with Peter Hall's *World Cities* in 1966, going through the work of John Friedmann in the 1980s, and Saskia Sassen's work in 1980s and 1990s, i.e. on the phenomenon of hyper-developed cities with global interconnections. Most of that work in the past has focused on the city as the center of command and control, and on global cities as centers of

high-level financial services. The concept of the global city-region builds on that work but tries to take the concept forward in the sense that we are looking at the general phenomenon of extended, polarized regional complexes often extending over a quite large geographic territory. What is particularly new about the concept as we tried to develop it is the notion that these complexes, in the context of globalization, are developing strong forms of political identity and of political action, independently of national governments and national politics. In other words, city-regions are emerging not only as economic motors of the world economy but also as political entities with distinctive capacities for action.

Lee: Could you elaborate on the political role of global city-regions? What kinds of political actions and political connections are you referring to?

Scott: One of the consequences of globalization is that the city-regions find themselves faced with many new kinds of threats and also opportunities. And, in a dominantly neoliberal world, where national governments are retreating from many of the responsibilities that they formerly had, whether it be in regard to particular regions, sectors, or demographic groups, regions are faced with a rather stark alternative. That is to say, either do nothing and face the conse-

quences in terms of intensifying competition, or try to build a local capacity for action that will enable the region to face up to and take advantage of the new rules of the game that are emerging. That includes serious efforts to boost local competitive advantages and agglomeration economies.

Lee: Would you agree that the power of the global city-region comes from its ability to explain both the sustained prominence of established large urban regions in advanced capitalist economies and at the same time allow for a more flexible and dynamic reconfiguration of economic and political geographies? In your opinion, what are the realistic possibilities for large urban centers in the periphery to achieve a global city-region status?

Scott: One of the theses of the global city-regions idea is that these regional entities are based on a particular set of localized economic relationships constituting a local economy in the form of a complex or agglomeration of specialized but complementary activities, and in such a way that there are high levels of local synergy in the economic dynamics of these regions. Hence, these regions become focal points or motors of the whole developmental process. And in fact, we have seen former Third World areas accede to high levels of prosperity through the development of particular regions. For

example, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and to some extent Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, and so on. These city-regions become focal points through which the development process is mediated. Hence, I believe that there are possibilities for continued development in the world's periphery via development of global city-regions. To a large degree, this depends upon the extent to which local urban and regional governments in the world periphery can put together policy packages capable of harvesting the increasing returns and the competitive advantages that will enable these cities to function effectively on global markets.

Lee: What kinds of development policies do you think are relevant to these tasks?

Scott: These are policies that involve various institution-building efforts around the training of labor, for example. Others include investing in research activities relevant to local forms of regional development, building up effective collaborative networks of firms in order to increase the synergies in those networks, building local institutions and partnerships that can do jobs like marketing and export promotion, and trademarking of regional products. In other words, forms of partnership between business, labor, and local government that can take given sets of economic assets and resources

and build an economic complex that can begin to contest world markets.

Lee: You describe the development process as a diffusionary model of some sort. There is a ripple effect, in connection with the policy packages, that brings the periphery into the development process. However, the opponents of globalization would argue that in fact the development process follows a more circular and cumulative causation logic and that there is a backwash effect on the periphery.

Scott: First of all, I would not describe it as a diffusion process, though there is a question of timing. That is, there are city-regions that get ahead first and those that lag. I am sympathetic with those groups that see globalization as an increasing threat, particularly in peripheral areas and cities. But, I think it is important to make the point that globalization is currently associated with the neoliberal agenda. It need not necessarily be associated with that agenda. I think it is correct to say that, in the context of neoliberalism, globalization poses some very serious threats to both developed and the less developed places. But there are viable political responses. They seek to work with globalization to get the best possible advantages in the form of local development, of exchange, and of gener-

ally rising income levels. In my opinion, this calls for a social democratic consensus, in terms of local policymaking, national policy-making, and global policymaking. So, the political task for me is not to oppose globalization as such, but to oppose a particular political form of globalization that is taking place at the present time.

Lee: There are two opposing perspectives on the urban question. On one extreme, the city, because of its density and diversity, is the center of human development and progress (e.g., Jane Jacobs). On the other end of the extreme, the city emerges as an outcome of capitalist relations (e.g., Castells). Where does the global city-region fit in this scheme? Does the global city-region concept provide an alternative answer to the urban question?

Scott: Castell's version of the urban question was essentially to see the city as a locus of social conflicts over collective consumption. In the context of the modernist forms of urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s, Castells—and Harvey who was pretty much involved in the same project—correctly and with great insight dealt with that particular problem. It seems to me, however, that the urban question has changed in the sense that the underlying social and political realities have changed. Castells and Harvey more or less neglected the urban

economy. The capitalist system is there in their work as a background but they didn't problematize the urban economy as such. In the post-Fordist economy, particularly in a context where the state is retreating from many of its former obligations and in a context where the market economy is becoming much more open and intense, a new set of urban questions is appearing. These questions involve, in part, how we build institutions that can foster systems of competitive advantage able to secure growth and development of the local economy and at the same time bring with them distributional advantages for all local social groups. At the present time, by contrast, what we see in cities is a widening of the income gap. One of the tasks we need to face is to develop institutions that not only sustain competitive advantages but that also narrow the income gap.

Lee: A coalition of environmental, labor, women's, and religious groups is protesting the policies of the World Bank and the IMF in Washington DC. They oppose what they call a corporate globalization process, which they believe is the cause of the widening gap between rich and poor. They claim that international institutions like the World Bank and IMF are essentially serving the interest of large corporations and thus contributing to this gap. What is the political relevance of the global city-regions concept in this debate?

Scott: First of all, I am sympathetic to these groups and the political position that they are pushing. My feeling is that the IMF is more to blame than the World Bank. In fact the World Bank is making some definite efforts to bring development down to the grassroots. I don't think it is entirely correct to characterize the World Bank as simply being in the pockets of multinational corporations. Perhaps that particular charge might have been sustained ten or fifteen years ago, but I think that given recent policy changes at the World Bank, it is less sustainable at the present time. In any case, the combination of globalization and neoliberalism is indeed sharpening many political conflicts and inequalities both within city-regions and between city-regions. In our conference paper, one of the points we tried to make was that there are political alternatives that don't involve what I take to be the impossible task of turning back the clock on globalization, but that do involve harnessing globalization within a more politically progressive agenda. Those alternatives involve one version or another of social democracy.

Lee: Well, the opponents of globalization in Washington DC were pointing to the World Bank-sponsored oil extraction programs in West Africa. To some extent, isn't this another instance of international institutions facilitating corporate interests and

Scott: also an instance of the core draining the resources of the periphery?

Scott: I am not by any means trying to whitewash the World Bank. I am merely saying the World Bank is now trying to develop a set of policy initiatives that are much more focused on the grassroots and on poverty as such. There are undoubtedly programs all over the world sponsored by the World Bank that are not terribly progressive in the way they are organized. But there has also recently been a sea change in the thinking of the World Bank about how it approaches policy and its implementation. One big change in recent years is that the World Bank has backed off from dealing with the national governments and now it seeks to do business directly with local governments and relevant community groups.

Lee: Do you think that that is an improvement? I mean, we are talking about places where political restructuring is just as necessary as building up economic competitiveness. And part of the problem is really political and that applies to local governments as well.

Scott: For example, in Latin America over the last ten years, there has been a tremendous resurgence of democratic movements at the local level. And, there has been a real willingness on the part of the World Bank to seek out representatives of these movements and work with them.

Lee: Can you elaborate on what you mean by opportunities associated with globalization as opposed to corporate globalization?

Scott: As globalization proceeds, we are seeing a re-scaling of political life in the sense that the sovereign state is no longer quite the monolithic and centralized set of institutions that it was. If you like, there has been a certain disarticulation of the political away from the nation-state, that is, up the scale to the global and the plurinational and down to the regional. In other words, new levels of the articulation of economic and political activity are appearing as globalization proceeds. Now, I would argue that at each of these levels, there are political and regulatory tasks that need to be carried out. In fact, there is a democratic deficit at almost every level. Why? Because political institutions and existing institutions of democracy have been calibrated with respect to nation-states and most certainly not with respect to the regional or the supra-national levels. One of the consequences of this is that multinational corporations, which by definition operate in the space of the supranational, escape in very significant ways from any effective regulation and control. Hence, important problems of the re-regulation of capitalism exist at virtually every level of scale. That includes, by the way, regulating

the emerging problem of inter-regional competition and rivalry at the world scale.

Lee: In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the success stories of regions measured by their competitiveness, their share of world output, control over innovation, and so on. How does the concept of global city-regions help us understand inter-regional structures of uneven development between the successful and the less successful regions?

Scott: I don't know if the concept of global city-regions adds anything to what we already know about the problem of uneven development. Uneven development is an endemic characteristic of capitalism. We know that under competitive capitalist economic relationships, there is a tremendous tendency for some regions to grow and develop and for other regions to languish. At the same time, there is a tendency for various kinds of exploitative relationships to appear between the better developed regions and less developed regions. The idea of global city-regions really fits into the existing theoretical schema that we have about spatial and regional development. But, on the basis of what I said earlier, I would add that the global city-regions argument makes it possible for us to think a bit more optimistically than we have in the past about the possibilities of development in underdeveloped regions.

Lee: Can you be more specific about the relative optimism and the reasons for that?

Scott: What I am saying is that there is probably much more opportunity for development to occur today than was allowed for in the more traditional theories of uneven development and exchange. People like André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin more or less proclaimed that in the capitalist system, underdevelopment was inevitable and that underdevelopment would only intensify in that system.

Lee: In some sense, they left out the will of the people and the dynamic interaction between the core and periphery.

Scott: Right. And at the same time, I think they were arguing with respect to a particular situation. Remember, this was the period of high Fordism with its culmination on the international front in the so-called new international division of labor. In fact, at this time, there was some empirical evidence in favor of the development of underdevelopment thesis. It seems to me, the rules of the game have changed significantly both in terms of the kinds of sectors and forms of regional development that prevail. By focusing on their existing assets,

even where these consist only of traditional forms of industry, and by pushing collectively toward flexible learning-based agglomerations, at least some underdeveloped areas are able (and have been able) to contest export markets and to move into a more dynamic growth pattern.

Lee: What is the relevance of the global city-regions concept to urban planners today?

Scott: Can I rephrase the question? We might ask, what new questions and tasks does the concept of global city-regions pose to urban planners? In addition to the traditional tasks of urban planners like dealing with land use, transportation, housing, neighborhoods, urban demographics, and so on, there is also a whole series of new questions about the structure of the urban economy, the dynamics of business in the urban system, and the tasks of institution-building vis-à-vis business and labor in city-regions. The traditional planning programs in the US universities need to recognize more fully the new set of problems that urban planners are facing. We need to rethink urban planning programs to take account of the problems posed by city-regions in a context of globalization and by the new economic and political problems that this situation raises.

Lee: One of the traditional domains of action for urban planners is the public sphere. And, planners have tried to act in the public interest. However, globalization has transformed the city, and planners are faced with a much more heterogeneous public and interests. What role can planners play in the new heterogeneous public sphere?

Scott: They have to understand the very intricate details of the economic organization and structure of the urban economy and in what ways the collectivity can intervene effectively in these domains. In building competitive advantages and fostering agglomeration economies, planners need to engage in the construction of institutions like research development organizations, labor training organizations, regional marketing and export promotion centers, collaborative industrial networks, and so on. The questions are how to go about constructing these types of organizations and how to bring various social groups into effective dialogue with one another, including business, labor, and any kinds of community groups whose interests are at stake in this process.

Lee: So, you see the planner primarily as performing a broker function.

Scott: Yes. That is one of the functions. The traditional tasks of planning remain. On top of those tasks, there is a whole series of new challenges, not only about creating and sustaining the new economy as it is manifest in regional industrial clusters, but also about how to construct a new kind of urban political system that ensures local economic efficiency and competitiveness while at the same time securing democratic accountability. By the way, I would add one of the other challenges that is being raised by the development of global city-regions is in fact the reconceptualization of citizenship itself, and ensuring that the citizenry at large, including those who are not nationals of the country, are brought into the process of consultation, dialogue, and collective decision-making.

Lee: Based on the discussions that occurred at the conference, what do you see as the future direction for the debate on global city-regions?

Scott: One of the things that came up dramatically at the conference was a general consensus that city-regions really constitute an important new kind of phenomenon in the contemporary world. People from all different political viewpoints seem to accept that, even though there was clearly a big divide between those who, like Kenichi Ohmae, for example, took a stance that was very sympathetic to the neoliberal position, and those, like Michael Keating, who took a much more skeptical and critical view on the neoliberal position. It strikes me that one of the major questions for the future is how to establish effective and progressive political movements to deal with the interrelated questions of globalization and city-region development. And that involves in part establishing an effective analytical description of what is going on in the global city-regions, both in terms of their internal and external dynamics and in terms of their relationships to one another across the world.

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Cities and Cultural Diversity in France and the Francophone World

This multidisciplinary conference was organized by the chair of the Department of French and was held at UCLA in February 2000.[1] More than twenty scholars met to explore Francophone urban cultures and cultural production in a multicultural setting. Among the topics discussed were some that opened a debate on urban and cultural policies from a culturally diverse perspective: What forms of local and regional cultures are becoming more prominent in various national contexts?

What contributions do immigrant groups as well as national minorities make to the French and Francophone public spheres?

The first panel of the conference, moderated by A. Babak Hedjazi, was dedicated to the place of the city in the debate of cultural diversity and how public policies have reacted to the increasing flows of migrants to the cities. Liette Gilbert presented a paper for the panel, as did Professor Rémi Baudouï, whose paper has been translated here. In *Bâtir la ville du troisième millénaire*, Baudouï examines *la politique de la ville* (policy of the city) enacted in France in the last fifty years to deal specifically with the question of social diversity in housing, as well as in the larger society.

Hedjazi and Gilbert are grateful to Professor Rémi Baudouï for giving them permission to translate and publish his text.[2] They also wish to thank Professor Françoise Lionnet, Chair of the UCLA Department of French, for convening the conference.

Endnotes

[2] The translators have annotated the text to provide some context for American readers.

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Building the Third Millenium City

Rémi Baudouï

translated by A. Babak Hedjazi and Liette Gilbert

This essay examines *la politique de la ville* (the urban policy of the city), enacted in France during the last fifty years to deal specifically with the question of social diversity in housing, as well as social diversity within the larger society. The essay provides an overview of immigration and public housing policies in France in the context of the large increase in immigration that occurred starting in 1956, and shows how the traditional French republican ideal has dominated these policy responses to the challenges of the new multicultural society.

The Birth of the *Grands Ensembles*

New neighborhoods of public housing, commonly referred to as *grands ensembles*, first appeared in France in the 1950s. Social psychologist René Kaës defined a *grand ensemble* as "an entirely new collective habitat responding to a new and particular economic, technical and demographic situation" (Kaës 1963: 39-40). Although it appeared to Kaës as "artifical" in the sense that it had not yet "matured historically," the *grand ensemble* had both objective considerations (as a response to a completely new situation) and normative considerations (as an ideal of collective stability for both the family and the individual, itself defined by the socio-cultural imperatives of society).

The origin of the *grand ensemble* can only be understood in the context of the unstable economic and social conditions of the post-war period. With the ending of wartime shortages and under the decisive impetus of the Marshall Plan, France was to enter a significant period of expansion in the early 1950s. Appreciable yields were recorded in the national agricultural sector while the industrial sector was also showing an important increase in productivity. This new economic prosperity translated into an overall improvement in the living standards of the French population, and stimulated unprecedented demographic growth. The total population of France rose from 40 million in 1946 to 53 million in 1975. Over that period, the rural character of France was inexorably replaced by predominantly urban conditions. While some 26.1 percent of the work force was employed in the primary sectors (agriculture and mining) in 1954, this percentage dropped to 11.3 percent in 1975.

As an accompaniment to this unprecedented transformation, public collective housing became a national priority. The *grand ensemble* appeared then as the best response to the new housing crisis. From 1950 onwards, Eugène Claudius-Petit, then Minister of Reconstruction and Urbanism, was to encourage the implementation of public policy for collective housing through industrial rationalization of the building sector and the provision of fiscal and financial aid. In 1953, the Courant Plan inaugurated the beginning of mass housing in France, with a goal to ensure the construction of several hundred thousand housing units. The so-called "construction framework law" of 7 August 1957 initiated a long-term financial scheme based on the concept of priority development zones to maximize public investment by concentrating on housing projects with a minimum size of 500 units.

Immigration Policy in France

The revival and profound transformation of the economy were also accompanied by radical changes in immigration policy. While the period from 1946 to 1956 was characterized by a low rate of immigration, between 1956 and 1965 there was a marked increase in the immigration of workers from Spain, Morocco and Portugal. With the end of the Algerian war in 1962, the repatriation of French nationals also contributed to the exceptional increase in the French population. From 1962 to 1965, immigration figures for the working population amounted to a net 718,000, of which 324,000 were repatriated nationals and 394,000 were "foreigners" (including 111,000 Algerians). During the decade ending in 1965,

France's foreign-born population increased by approximately one million people. Immigration continued at a similar rate after 1966 until it was completely suspended in July 1974. Despite the complete closing of immigration, France's foreign-born population continued to increase. In the early 1970s, the number of foreign-born residents of France had reached 2.3 million.

Today four million foreign-born people are settled permanently in France. Since 1975, government has increasingly lifted the immigration interdiction for purposes of family reunification (as instituted by the Law of 3 July 1974). This informal policy was formalized under the terms of the decree of 4 December 1984: any foreign national lawfully established for a period of one year was given the right to send for a spouse and any children under 18 years of age, providing he/she had sufficient economic means for the support of the family.

The Making of a Dual City

Having long been a policy focused solely on importing adult male labor, the policy of immigration has had little consideration for the larger process of social integration. Other than the housing for individual workers provided in industrial regions (particularly in coal and steel industries), immigrants of the 1950s were housed primarily in collective quarters. Due to the scarcity or lack of rental housing, immigrants lived, at best, in cheap furnished accommodation in the towns, or at worst in shantytowns outside in the suburbs. The first of these shantytowns to go up was located in the Parisian suburb of Gennevilliers

as early as 1952. Eugene Claudius-Petit, then Minister of Reconstruction, created the National Construction Company for Algerian Workers as an attempt to resolve the immigrant situation. Transit towns were built with public funding and were gradually replaced by permanent developments of affordable housing. In spite of their anti-segregationist aims, these housing projects led to a high level of spatial segregation. In practice, segregation patterns developed all the more easily because there was no real coexistence between immigrants of European origins and Maghrebine or African immigrants. These segregation effects of housing projects were not to disappear in spite of the general improvement in French living conditions throughout the 1960s.

Later, this relatively unsuccessful attempt to reduce social and spatial segregation through the *grands ensembles* was further deflated by the reorientation of housing policy introduced by Albin Chalandon, Minister of Housing and Public Works. In 1970, Chalandon's scheme of grants and advantageous loans enabled wage earners to consider buying their own homes; and 1973, Chalandon's successor Olivier Guichard opposed the continuation of municipal quotas for public housing construction. Both of these policy changes encouraged the better-off residents of the *grands ensembles* to leave and become private homeowners, while the least fortunate households remained, with their numbers continually swelling.

The problems of the *grands ensembles* today are in many ways the result of the segregation that intensified during the 1950s under existing public policies

and increasing poverty and unemployment. Cities are split into separate spatial entities, differentiated by their respective economic, social and cultural characteristics. Suburban *grands ensembles* constitute second-class environments, societies of outcasts where unemployment, school drop-out rates, and crime remain above the national average. The widely experienced feeling of rejection by the host society causes these communities to withdraw into themselves, engendering greater similarity to the ethnic enclave than to their conceptual origin, the village society.

Factors Specific to France: Integration and Rejection of Communitarianism

Facing this divide between the haves and the have-nots, what type of policy should be adopted between urban cores and their peripheries? First of all, the recognition of problematic social conditions emerging from a divided society is nothing new. Under the government of Valery Giscard-d'Estaing (1976-1980) the *VIIième Plan* was instituted, aiming at the rehabilitation of public housing in "immigrant" neighborhoods. In 1977, a financial program known as *Habitat et Vie Sociale* (Habitat and Social Life) was launched. These two public programs sought to group together investments designed to improve the quality of construction and the comfort of accommodation in public housing projects with the creation of more open spaces and new public amenities.

However, the lack of participation by residents, the insufficient mobilization of various officials, and the heavy administrative bureaucracy led the newly elected

Socialist government of François Mitterand to redefine new forms of action in 1981. The timeliness of such reform became all the more apparent when the malaise of the *grands ensembles* exploded for the first time into violence and anti-social incidents in Vénissieux and Les Minguettes, two suburbs of Lyon. According to President Mitterand, the real challenge for equality and fraternity was to ensure that cities in France were no longer divided into poor and rich, and that no one felt his/her own neighborhood or his/her own city to be a place of exclusion.

At a time when an effort towards the decentralization of regional, country and district administration was taking effect (enacted by the Law of 2 March 1982), the government wished to create a mechanism whereby, in the words of Hubert Dubedout, socialist mayor of Grenoble and one person responsible for a governmental mission on the *grands ensembles,* "France would avoid the example of the United States and Britain, with their neglected neighborhoods and their zones of uncontrolled social explosion" (Dubedout 1983: 5). The *politique de la ville* (urban policy of the city) was to take shape through the creation of several interdepartmental initiatives, such as the *Développement social des quartiers* (Neighborhood Social Development), the integration of young people, the prevention of delinquency and the "Suburbs 1989" scheme. In July 1988 an interdepartmental delegation for cities and for public urban development had been set up to bring together these different initiatives. At the "Suburbs 1989" meeting in Bron, François Mitterand underlined the need to "appoint either a member of government, a senior

minister or a minister to the Prime Minister, solely to implement urban policy." In December 1990, Michel Delebarre, Mayor of Dunkerque, was officially appointed to this post. His assignment was "to promote the growth of social, economic and cultural life in cities, improve urban living conditions and eliminate exclusion."

Rather than elaborate here on the background of the public policies and the institutional measures taken to resolve this crisis in the suburbs, it seems more useful to recall the spirit in which they were, and still are, devised. This context rests on the originality of the French approach, particularly when compared with the orientations and solutions arrived in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The French approach is unequivocal: the republic is declared one and indivisible. The republican ideal forged in the eighteenth century in the spirit of the Enlightenment—and, above all, by the political philosophy of Rousseau and Condorcet—postulates a double political and social contract for every citizen. An individual's adherence to the republic cannot be proclaimed without a statement of faith in and adhesion to the republican ideal of social advancement based on merit, and the total acceptance and adoption of certain cultural traditions and ways of life. Membership in the French society involves the leveling of all cultural differences and particularities, the intrinsic meaning of which is thus purely and simply incorporation of each individual into the republican mold. It cannot allow the juxtaposition of separate national and cultural identities.[1]

Over the years, the status of immigrants in French society has improved. A law of 17 July 1984 granted a ten-year residency permit, automatically renewable, to long-stay residents, as well as to relatives of any French national, irrespective of their employment situation. Therefore, as Catherine Withol de Wenden, a researcher at the National Center for Scientific Research, points out, "an immigrant's legal status no longer depends on his/her status as a worker, but on the length of his/her presence in France" (Withol de Wenden 1995: 65). Furthermore, by putting an end to the statutory law of 1939 requiring foreign associations to receive preliminary authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, the Law of 9 October 1981 has encouraged the public expression of ethnic and religious identity. It is against this background that Islam has become in the last few years the second-largest religious community in France.

In spite of this communitarian evolution, urban policies still speak in terms of integration, and reject an ethnic division of urban space. Social cohesion represents a public challenge in which urban policies remain a national public concern and a state responsibility. The creation of a Ministry for Urban Affairs has served to underline the inherent limitations of decentralization and financial crisis of the welfare state. Thus social cohesion remains, in the same way as national defense or even social security, within the undisputed domain of state authority. This is another reason why urban policy is primarily centralized and public, favoring community solidarity rather than competition between groups. The Law of 32 May 1990 (the Besson Law) giving the right to housing stipulates that "any person suffering from lack of resources or poor living conditions has the right to

public aid in order to maintain her/himself in decent housing." The Law of 13 July 1991 set down the guidelines for the right to affordable housing and for an equitable development of urban housing. In order to guarantee every city dweller housing conditions and an environment favorable to social cohesion, while eradicating the phenomena of segregation, various tax measures have been devised to encourage financial solidarity between poorer and richer neighborhoods. For any housing program that does not take into account the diversity of supply in such a way as to ensure every citizen freedom of choice in the types of housing, the local authority must pay a financial contribution to one or several state-designated agencies responsible for the construction of public housing. Such a program allows the state to maintain a fiscal means of supporting public housing projects throughout the country, while important measures have also been taken to preserve existing public housing.

Specific Politics of Integration

After twenty years of existence, the *politique de la ville* has not prevented the phenomenon of exclusion. The urban question still remains linked to this equation: *grand ensemble* of public housing equals exclusion. In reality, there is always a relationship between the collective social housing of the *grands ensembles* located in the periphery of the city, and unemployment rates, the failures of the education system for children and youth, and the spread of delinquency. Social mobility is problematic, because there is no residential mobility that allows for a social escape from the *grands ensembles*.

After twenty years, the time for evaluation has come. An assessment of the gains of the policy justifies the reconsideration of more audacious public actions by public authority; the rhetoric supporting a Marshall plan for the suburbs has become more adamant. Arguments for changing these neighborhoods have shifted towards the idea of a physical and social dis-enclaving: an opening towards the outside, the development of a de-fiscalization system (such as duty-free zones), and other incentives designed to encourage private and public operators to set up new services and improve existing ones. However, although important, these attempts have been more effective in revealing the precariousness of the conditions of existence in peripheral residential zones than in changing the conditions of these neighborhoods.

The paradox of the *politique de la ville* rests on the sum of unexamined contradictions within the political agenda. The most obvious contradiction arises when we consider the necessity to better target the homogenous population, a coherent urban ensemble to develop more efficient policies and political actions, and consequently to better control the risks of marginalization produced by a public process that forces residents to the margins of society. But any urban public policy produces a counter-effect of stigmatization and therefore victimization. To be stigmatized by the rest of the city residents makes difficult the individual process of social and professional reassertion. It is for this reason that urban policies have successively attempted to broaden the field of intervention by replacing the management of specific areas in crisis with a larger encompassing

and integrating perspective. In his 1983 report, Hubert Dudebout condemned the program *Habitat et Vie Sociale* for being too "focused on improving the internal comfort of housing units to the detriment of the larger environment of housing and infrastructure." It is to bridge this "artificial separation" between housing and the rest of socio-economic life that the *Développement social des quartiers* (Social Development of Neighborhoods) program was developed. The intention of this program to better articulate the social welfare policies of physical and morphological improvement of the *grands ensembles* neighborhoods as an attempt to connect the rehabilitation of buildings and the improvement of public spaces. Moreover, the goal was also to redefine the "image" of the suburbs. But the redefinition of the image has been very limited. Beyond the superficiality of intervention, the DSQ activities have themselves contributed to the stigmatization of populations because of the restricted parameters of intervention. The DSQ has therefore been replaced by a new program of *Développement Social Urbain* (Urban Social Development) primarily defined at the scale of the entire city.

This question of the appropriate scale of intervention for urban policy is back in the public discourse. In the debate over scale, new ways of thinking about and renewing urban space are part of the terminology. Jean-Pierre Sueur, mayor of Orléans, was asked in 1998 by the Prime Minister to lead a consultation on the future of cities. In *Demain la ville* (Tomorrow the City), Sueur argued for the renewal of the *politique de la ville* based on a new urban model ac-

counting for the juxtaposition of spaces but creating more links, interpenetration, fluidity, and mix of different spaces. Sueur's fifty recommendations for the future of cities included considerations for the reshaping of spaces—how to construct urbanity given the fact that many problems are not physical—but also the affirmation of the right to mobility for each citizen, since the right of movement is a crucial element of urban cohesion. Because urban problems cannot be solved at the scale of the village, Jean-Pierre Sueur suggested the creation of a new political institution at a more appropriate geographic scale—an elected metropolitan-regional assembly.

Although the government did not endorse Sueur's proposed constitutional reform (which would have been unprecedented in the French republican system) it has nevertheless accepted the metropolitan region as the pertinent scale of urban policies. The inter-ministerial committee of 30 June 1998 articulated the following four objectives: support of the republican ideology, reinforcement of social cohesion, mobilization of citizens around a collective project, and finally, construction of a new democratic space for citizens. These objectives consolidate the full endorsement of the republican discourse, therefore rejecting the communitarian and multiculturalist hypotheses.[2]

Conclusion
Beyond continuity in the development of urban policies, new public measures seem to reinforce an ideology favoring cultural integration and the rejection of communitarism and multiculturalism. Social cohesion in the city of the third millennium rests on

the ideal of the French model of acculturation and republican integration of various cultural groups into the dominant society.

For these reasons, it is without a doubt that the *politique de la ville* brings attention to the (re)constitution of a public space in the projects of housing rehabilitation and urban renewal, since public space is thought to be the necessary focus of republican acculturation. The will to maintain this principle against all odds attests to a certain backlash in society and speaks of the permanence of the republican postulate of equality for all in the same unit of time and place. In this sense, the privatization of public space (Davis 1997) and the formation of "edge cities" (Garreau 1991) are experienced as a major increase in fragmentation of the national collective (Lopez 1996). For public space to become a place of exchange and citizen-dialogue, the *politique de la ville* attempts to institute exemplary conditions of resident participation in the definition of living space.

Facing the omnipresence of private space, this redefinition of public space must be accompanied by a deep reflection on the social and spatial mobility that are among the conditions of citizenship today. In a society marked by temporal fragmentation and rapid flows of information, the mobility of a person in space signifies social-economic adaptability and integration. This new debate of mobility, speed of movement, also implies a rethinking of time more globally—whether one is speaking of the time of a project, its successful conditions, its sustainability, or its urban-ness. By denying the existence of individualities, urbanism has divorced past and present to an-

chor itself in a future of mastering social relations. The time of personal experience has been denied. Jean Chesneaux described this paradox when he observed that the modern city has signified the degeneration of the axis past-present-future (Chesneaux 1996).

How to rethink time? First, as Paul Ricoeur (1985) contests, by renouncing Hegel and his presumptions of time as a linear construct represented as a singular collective located outside all dialectic and diachrony. Hegelianism has been increasingly questioned by twentieth century history and has naturally lost ground in disciplines that attempt to understand the city and its transformations, but it is far from being completely eradicated. The attempt by functionalist architects to suspend time can be supplanted by a vision that reintegrates time as a project value. In works on the morphological history of cities by Jean Castex, such as Philippe Panerai and Antoine Grumbach's concept of the palimpsest city, the central hypothesis is that urban space is never decreed but is the product of time and history. When real estate investment is viewed as a race against the clock because time is synonymous with uncertainty and financial risk, the logic of production must be modified to reincorporate historical time, a time slower than the street temporality of the construction process of a building or neighborhood. One must then go beyond the rhetoric of interface, operationalizing performance, and immediate functionality in order to reintroduce the principle of responsibility as promoted by the philosopher Hans Jonas in his response to Karl Jaspers (Jaspers 1963). Between experiences of the past, priorities of the present, and the exigencies of the future, it is vital

to build a theory of mutual responsibility, of one towards the other, or the present towards future generations (Jonas 1995).

Endnotes

[1]The republican model of the nation-state endorses a universalist ideology in which equality and social protection by the state constitution is based on the *individual* rights of all residents, therefore denying *groups* as legal categories recognized by the state. With its focus on the individual, the state offers necessary corrective programs to overcome individual discrimination (in unemployment, education, housing, legal system, public services and so forth) but does not recognize group-based discrimination, and no consideration is given to cultural rights. Thus, despite the cultural pluralism of its population, the state aims at integrating disparate groups into a single national culture. The result is the marginalization of existing minorities and newcomers by the dominant population on the very basis of cultural difference. Hence, the universal recognition of individual social rights of equality and justice does not necessarily translate into social equality and justice. The lack of political and cultural recognition by the nation-state prevents mobilization on an (ethno)cultural basis.

[2]The multiculturalist model of the nation-state rests on the recognition of the cultural diversity and collective rights of differentiated groups. Institutional recognition of cultural pluralism involves public measures (language rights, regional autonomy, land claims, guaranteed representation, veto rights) aimed at protecting and promoting ethnic and national identities.

The multicultural state financially supports and legally protects cultural rights, and encourages the participation of newcomers in social and political life. Resting on the concept of recognition of systemic discrimination, the multicultural state, contrary to the particularist state, seeks to engage in a socialization process geared towards the transformation of behaviors of the state and civil society (Helly 1996).

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
Oakland, CA 1999 *Gaby Wlnqvist*

Policy/History Briefs

The mission of the Critical Planning Journal is to give students an opportunity to publish and to participate in intellectual and theoretical discussion. The majority of our contributions come from graduate students. We welcome this opportunity to broaden our reach to the undergraduate community.

The following three short papers were written by undergraduate students from two different courses. The first, Urban Policy and Planning, taught by Dr. Evelyn Blumenberg at UCLA, requires students to write biweekly policy briefs and an in-depth policy paper, and to argue from imaginary participant identities and positions in mock planning sessions before a fictitious "student city council" that then evaluates the arguments on specific issues. The second class, "Evolution of American Cities and the Planning Movement" at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, is taught by UCLA alumna Assistant Professor Gail Sansbury. Her class emphasized the importance of historical precedent and planning movements in understanding and interpreting current planning issues.

These short pieces are printed here to create a bridge to and open space for undergraduate participation in planning discussions. Alexandra Howard is concerned in her paper with the dilemmas of the metropolitan versus the local in governance, for the specific case of San Fernando Valley secession, while Flor Barajas shares her ideas about gentrification, community identity, and disappearance/displacement. The essay by Tom Townsend was originally a response to a midterm exam assignment to re-imagine planning history. He chose to create an imaginary settlement in Southern California and re-write a bit of planning and urban history. Given the benefit of hindsight, he allowed his alternative community to pick and choose from the various social movement of the twentieth century. It was a wonderful opportunity to forecast future possibilities with the aid of history— without the interfering influences of reality!

A Criticism of Valley Secession

Alexandra Howard

In this essay, I argue against the proposed secess-ion of the San Fernando Valley from the City of Los Angeles on the basis that this secession is an isolationist maneuver which will, in the final analysis, contribute to further economic inequality, racial polarization, and an acceleration in the already decreasing sense of civic community in Los Angeles.Before we can proceed with this argument it is necessary to agree on a definition of secession. For the purpose of this discussion we will use

the definition set forth by Christopher Wellman:

> Secession is an effort to remove oneself from the state's authority, not by moving beyond the boundaries of that authority but by redrawing the boundaries so that one is not included within them. (1995: 144)

My essentially moral argument against secession is based on statements of Valley residents which suggest that the main impetus towards secession is the idea that Valley residents are not receiving their "fair share" of government funds and city tax revenue (Newton and Bustillo 1999).

The term "fair share," which is the basis of much secession discussion, sets up a dichotomy of "us" versus "them;" in this case, it is an oppositional relationship between Valley residents and all others within the Los Angeles city limits. Although this is a linguistic opposition, if we were to apply this to the physical places under consideration, we would discover that the "us" in the Valley discussion is a predominantly privileged population while the "them" is a predominantly underprivileged population. We begin to see that secession is not simply about receiving a fair share of services; it is about not having to provide services to adjacent areas with a weaker tax base. As interviewee and Los Angeles resident Christopher Moore said in the aforementioned *Los Angeles Times* article last March, you can't just run away from a situation just because you don't like it (Newton and Bustillo 1999). Secession, under the aegis of greater local control, is simply isolationism and an attempt to protect wealth at the expense of neighboring communities.

Desire to separate from the economically weaker section of one's city demonstrates the lack of civic community that plagues many American cities today. Isolationism and localism, even on this grand scale, is an indicator that people increasingly see themselves as individuals and not as a part of a greater civic community (Harkness 1996: 79). The fact that Valley residents do not recognize that services rendered in other parts of their community are, in effect, services rendered to them, is indicative of the fact that people do not see themselves as citizens but as customers who expect immediate tangible services for money paid (Doherty and Stone 1999: 168). This attitude exposes an astounding lack of community in a grand sense.

Isolationism has dire consequences. If secession were to proceed, Los Angeles would very likely become one of the inelastic cities described by Rusk (1995)—a city that, without the support of suburban communities to keep its tax base up, would be unable to provide an acceptable level of services to its citizens. This is not to say that the San Fernando Valley should support the entire city of Los Angeles just because it is nearby. Rather, the city should remain unified because Los Angeles and the San Fernando Valley are linked not only historically, but also economically and socially. While the city of Los Angeles needs the suburban tax base, the Valley needs the economic base of Los Angeles to provide jobs to support its suburban lifestyle.

Secession will not improve the Valley, as proponents like Howard Husock suggest (Husock 1998). Instead it would merely serve to exacerbate the existing stratification that exists in our city today. But, perhaps

more importantly, San Fernando secession would set a precedent and a trend of abandonment and isolation which would legitimize an attitude of refusing to care or show compassion for one's fellow citizens.

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Without a sense of community, and a sense of history
As a community, people become vulnerable to the plans
And whims of the dominant group, which cannot only
Displace them but control them in other ways.
   –Rodolfo Acuna

POLICY   BRIEF

Is Gentrification a Necessary Evil?

Flor Barajas

Many African American residents of Oakwood,
a neighborhood in Venice, California, believe that there
is a conspiracy to displace them from their homes. They
attribute this gentrification in part to the fact that Oak-
wood has become a trendy place to live; the evidence,
they say, lies in the condos springing up.

Gentrification implies the displacement of low-income
residents—often Latino or African American—who lack
the means to revive their own neighborhoods, and are

therefore easy prey to the vision of redevelopment agencies. In order to construct Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles during the 1960s, for example, the many Mexican residents of the Chavez Ravine neighborhood were displaced, yielding to the upscale recreational desires of the managerial class. More recently, the creation of the Staples Center in downtown Los Angeles has left numerous residents of the former neighborhood without affordable housing.

Cordova discusses the causes of gentrification and identifies the need to identify the primary actors in the gentrification process. Are they urban professionals moving into more affordable neighborhoods? Or are they agents of development and financial institutions? She argues that neighborhood reactions to gentrification come too late to halt the process, and advises community organizers and residents that unless they rehabilitate their *own* neighborhoods, someone else will (1991: 30). Taking a more positive view of gentrification, Lampe (1993) and Gratz (1989) point out that gentrification, through development, brings much-needed jobs to abandoned central cities. Gratz believes that without a constant flow of new business, a community stagnates (63), she qualifies this with a recognition that the rate of change, the level of inclusion of local residents, and respect for place are also important aspects of the process.

One result of this continual uprooting brought on by redevelopment and gentrification has been a di-minished community historical consciousness. The preservation of buildings in redevelopment schemes has almost completely been limited to those built by Euro-Americans, as if the genesis of the built environment in Los Angeles can be traced only to their hands. To compound the problem, those who designate areas as blighted—a requirement for redevelopment in most places—often devote little time or energy to learning the history of a neighborhood, often excluding underrepresented groups with a long history in a place. Gentrification is dangerous because it both comes from and results in the poor being made invisible, and denied a sense of place and a sense of history.

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A Revisionist Evolution of City Planning: What Might Have Been?

Thomas Townsend

Picture the idealistic standards of planning being raised and then implemented with little opposition. Southern California at the turn of the twentieth century did just that in the imaginary coastal community of Metopolis.

Five tribes of the original Allawanna tribe owned the land. There were thousands of acres of natural vegetation consisting of shrubs and chaparral on low-lying hills. The nearest American towns were over forty miles away. Most trade was carried out by ship; however, the five tribes

preferred to keep trade among themselves as much as possible.

Tribal chiefs were aware that the San Francisco population had exploded from 550 to 30,000 over a two-year period just prior to 1850 and that Los Angeles had done likewise after the 1870s. Many changes were on the horizon at the turn of the century. The tribes had witnessed the infighting of European settlers over their stated beliefs regarding what was best for everyone, while actually operating in their own self-interest. The chiefs' goal was to disseminate information to their residents in order that they could see for themselves the magnitude of decisions that needed to be made. The chiefs felt there was much strength in their social heritage. So inspired, they focused on the social structure of their communities, to play to the strengths of that foundation.

The founders of Metopolis had their own ideas of how growth should occur. The five tribal leaders were family elders who wanted their philosophy of respect for land to carry into the future and to be privileged above social issues. They believed serious attention needed to be paid to quality of life issues in their community. While presiding over people, they were respectful of the fact that changes would be met with resistance, but were necessary nonetheless. One interesting factor unique to these tribal communities is that the leaders were all women.

Each time they had a meeting with the consultants involved in the larger city planning processes in American cities, such as Daniel Burnham, Harland Bartholomew, and Frederick Olmsted, they felt that the City Beautiful and City Practical concepts should be given precedence over the City Social. In later years, their descendants listened politely while Robert Moses tried to convince them of the importance of highways (he had been planning them in New York). They knew better.

City Practical supporters insisted policies be implemented and city officials be elected because that electoral process had worked so well in the US. However, the chiefs knew their own settlements' organization would be hard to beat. Their five-tribe City Social network had outperformed all the johnny-come-lately movements. Extensive correspondence with Mary Simkhovitch in New York City over these last several years had had a great impact in preventing unwanted consequences of increases in density. Unsafe working conditions and childcare issues were resolved before they became a health and welfare issue. Consistent with the respect exhibited by the chiefs, the population had always been able to work toward a common goal of higher quality of life as industry and populations both grew at steady rates.

Goals were set and monitored for progress by large community gatherings that met on a quarterly schedule. Alternatives were collected at these meetings and the chiefs would go later to visit the leaders for small group discussions on the proposed alternatives. Grievance issues never escalated from a shared perception that any group of individuals were being denied rights, opportunities, proper respect, safety, or some other form of social good simply because of who they were.

In what proved to be a great learning tool for the government of Metopolis, the City Beautiful movement helped them to look beyond the political motivations that generated it in Chicago by researching the writings of Daniel Burnham to discover his intentions for the project and the statistical basis for his designs. The tribal families' interest led them to reflect on the multilayered, interdisciplinary approach to planning. They also learned a great deal by following the writings of Harland Bartholomew. Bartholomew supplied the missing link by convincingly defining the planner's job as one of applying innovative means to implement realistic goals.

The Allawanna used information gained from the many organizations that were forming at the time to aid in planning their region. They read published books: for example, *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* by Ebenezer Howard. They believed they were in a position to implement the social visions of a society based on voluntary cooperation in a self-governing commonwealth.

In conclusion, the groundbreaking methods orchestrated by the Allawana government provided for the development of a healthy and prosperous community. Exhibiting social responsibility revealed the strength of their social foundation. They continue to consult with major players of the emerging American economy in order to maintain a strong base of taxes and growth-sustaining income generation, while carefully maintaining their fundamental social goals.

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Eden by Design:
The 1930 Olmsted-Bartholomew
Plan for the Los Angeles Region
Greg Hise and William Deverell

Kathy A. Kolnick

Part of our purpose in reprinting *Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches* is to remind people that both the Olmsted and Bartholomew firms, as well as their associates and affiliates, played a significant role in shaping the urban West. With these design professionals as our guides, we needed then to imagine what the Los Angeles region would have looked like had the report been adopted and the recommendations implemented as planned. And because the report met with such focused and effective opposition, we needed to consider what it was about the plan that so worried the very same Los Angeles elites who had requested it in the first place. (Hise and Deverell 2000: viii)

History traditionally has been the domain of the victor rather than the vanquished, of the more powerful members of a society over the weaker, of the successful endeavor over the failed effort. More recently, a re-examination of histories has accelerated, leading to the

[re]discovery of other aspects, other people, other groups, other places and other events, along with their contributions to the shaping of space and process. There is a growing concern to create a more nuanced, expansive and complex reading of the past that better mirrors and explains the present. Planning history is no exception to this re-examination: numerous such explorations have enhanced our knowledge and expanded our understanding of the development of particular cities, the actors involved, and the processes and circumstances of urban development in general.

Eden by Design is such an exploration. It is the story of a lost opportunity, of a Los Angeles that might have been. It is a sad story in many ways, of abandonment, and confidence lost. At the same time, it is a celebration of a too-little known plan from the firms of Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. and Harland Bartholomew. It is also an examination of the reasons for its minimization and near-disappearance, and a re-placement of the plan within the contexts of Los Angeles, planning history, and American urban development, where it might again influence and educate those interested in the improvement of urban space. Authors Greg Hise, associate professor at the University of Southern California, and William Deverell, associate professor at the California Institute of Technology, have done a great service in offering contemporary readers a view of the plan within these contexts.

The centerpiece of the book is a reproduction of the 1930 report *Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches for the Los Angeles Region* by Olmsted Brothers and Bartholomew & Associates. This bold planning report—commissioned for a citizens' committee formed through the prompting of the well-organized and powerful Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce—described in great detail the existing open space, parklands and beaches in the Los Angeles region; the shortcomings of the status quo and the changes needed to ensure and enhance the future social and economic well-being of the city; the legislation and political reorganization necessary to effect these changes; and the financing necessary to acquire and maintain the proposed system of parks and beaches.

Remarkably comprehensive in scope and range, sensitive to both extant proposals in Los Angeles and open space developments in other American cities, and replete with detailed charts, maps and appendices that graphically demonstrated the paucity of parklands in Los Angeles and the possibilities for great improvement that were within reach, the Olmsted/Bartholomew plan is a gem. It demonstrates both a sensitivity to the environment and an aspiration towards a regionalism with which many current readers can identify.

The authors call their effort "urban archeology." In an extensive introductory essay, they place the unearthed plan within the political, social and economic context of late 1920s Los Angeles, and begin to make sense of the impetus for its creation and the reasons for its subsequent abandonment. Their narrative is a reconstruction from archival records and newspaper accounts, in particular a very thoughtful use of the minutes of the Los Angeles Chamber of

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   UCLA Department of Urban Planning
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3. Endnotes, not footnotes, should be used, and should be kept to a minimum. Endotes should not be used for citation.

4. References should be cited in the text using the author's last name, year of publication, and page numbers when appropriate. Complete references, should be listed alphabetically at the end of the article.

5. Tables, illustrations, and photographs should be titled, referenced, and numbered. Electronic versions of these items must be submitted in separate files.

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