CRITICAL PLANNING



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CRITICAL PLANNING
Journal of the UCLA Department of Urban Planning

a note from the **EDITORS**

This third issue of *Critical Planning* is the product of a rewarding collaboration among a great number of students in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. With the assistance of over twenty graduate students, and submissions from another twenty-five students and alumni, we now feel comfortable calling ourselves, after three years of existence, a journal representative of the myriad interests of the urban planning community at UCLA. And what a collection of interests it is. Articles in this issue cover topics as diverse as transportation policy, domestic and international housing policy, community and regional development and environmental planning. Despite the range of topics, however, the majority of papers are united by a common theme -- the relationship between urban planning and the politics of race, ethnicity, gender and class. UCLA is situated in one of the world's most pluralistic cities, at the forefront of grappling with attempts to create an environment that moves beyond merely accommodating the diverse demands placed on Los Angeles' physical, social, economic and political infrastructure. Given this, members of the planning community at UCLA would be remiss not to place these concerns at the core of their thoughts and actions.

We hope that future issues of *Critical Planning* will continue to explore the very complex dynamics of life in the modern -- and/also at times postmodern -- city. As the Department of Urban Planning continues to carve out its role in the new School of Public Policy and Social Research, it will be the responsibility of student, faculty, and alumni to continue the commitment to social justice.

Liette Gilbert & Mirle Rabinowitz Bussell, Editors
June 1996

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAITH-BASED DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT IN LOS ANGELES

Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews

Over the past decade, there has been a startling growth in the number of African American churches involved in human resource and economic development projects. Simultaneous to their increased involvement in the faith-based development movement, church leaders have witnessed the toll that problems associated with economic restructuring, dwindling government resources, and poor housing have had on their constituents. Researchers are sharply divided in their opinion about the suitability of the black church for a community development role. Underlying this debate are different interpretations of the historical role of the black church when compared to its contemporary role (Ellison 1993; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). I propose that the black church, as supported by a literature review of four periods in African American history, has consistently provided social welfare support in the absence of outside resources. Today, the myriad of problems require churches to choose projects within the scope of their interests and resources. This paper explores the role of African American churches in the faith-based development movement by examining the types of projects some Los Angeles churches pursue, as well as the kinds of barriers they encounter.

Background

The black church has been applauded and criticized for its work in the African American community. Church members and non-members alike praise the black church for working with inner-city residents to rebuild some of the most impoverished and neglected neighborhoods in the country (Chittum 1993). In 1993, ardent supporters of church-based development called for the Clinton

Administration to model future governmental policies after the community development efforts of an African American church in Brooklyn, New York and another in Baltimore, Maryland (Keating 1993). Many pastors, laypersons and researchers seem to agree that the church is the logical choice for improvement and renewal in African American communities because of its enduring institutional presence. Indeed, within the last decade this legacy has manifested itself in the form of growing pastoral and congregational support for human resource and economic development projects (Clemetson and Coates 1993). This growth is exemplified through the expanding participation of black churches in the Chicago-based Christian Community Development Association (CCDA). Since its inception in 1983, the CCDA movement, now comprised of 175 ministries and churches, has been committed to addressing the spiritual and economic development needs of the poor. In just over ten years participation in the CCDA has spread to seventy-five cities and thirty states (Perkins 1993).

Despite the rise among black churches involved in human resource and economic development projects, some scholars and church members question the church's suitability for this role. Scholars from the fields of sociology and political economy argue that a more suitable role for the black church is that of counselor to the psychological and emotional needs of its members (Frazier 1974; Mukenge 1983). Similarly, some church members question the community development role on the grounds that activities associated with this function can cause the church to stray from its focus on spiritual and religious matters (Colson 1987). A preliminary review of the literature on the black church challenges the perspective of academic critics by providing numerous examples of the historical and contemporary involvement of black churches in community development; activities that continue to be embraced by many African American churches and communities.

The source of the debate surrounding the suitability of the black church in a community development role may be related to the researcher's interpretation of why churches mobilize. Some researchers may interpret the church's actions as a response to charismatic leaders, such as Marcus Garvey, who are able to mobilize people and generate resources (Meier et al. 1985). I will later discuss the activities of the church during the Civil Rights Movement and the leadership of the Reverends Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Leon Sullivan, who are often associated with this charismatic movement. This type of movement is criticized because it only lasts as long as the charismatic figure is around. I argue that the community and economic development activities of the African American church today is not tied solely to the charisma of any single leader, but is instead related to the increasing ability of church leaders nationwide to mobilize resources. In his book on blacks and the civil rights movement, Morris describes resource mobilization theory in the context of the black church. The types of resources mobilized can include, "formal and informal organizations, leaders, money, people, and communications networks" (Morris 1984: 279).

To explore the evolution of the African American church in the faith-based development movement, I have looked at changes in its involvement through four eras, including: Reconstruction (1865 to 1877), the Great Migration (1916 to 1930), the Civil Rights Movement (1950 to 1970) and the Post Black Power Movement (1980 to present). I constructed a survey to assess the level of involvement, and to identify barriers, of the contemporary church in the faith-based development movement. This survey also serves as a way to explore whether there were shifts in the types of programs pursued by churches between 1984 and 1994, since this decade saw a sizeable loss in government support for human resource and economic development programs.

Definition of Terms

Various terms will be used throughout the paper to discuss the role of faith-based development in the African American community. The "church" can be interpreted to mean a Protestant affiliated, denominational body. The term "church" will be used in reference to the African American church, a religious body that was founded and is primarily attended by African Americans. The terms "African American church" and "black church" are used interchangeably throughout the paper and should be construed as representative of at least seven denominations, including: the African Methodist Episcopal (AME); the Church of God in Christ (COGIC); the Christian Methodist Episcopal (CME); the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Incorporated (NBC); the National Baptist Convention of America, Unincorporated (NBCA); the Progressive National Baptist Convention (PNBC); and the African Methodist Episcopal Zion (AMEZ) (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990).

The term "development" as defined herein means human resource and economic development projects initiated and/or supported by the African American church. Human resource projects may focus on the development of individual educational and personal skills, as well as an array of programs to improve the quality of life of individual church members and community residents, including the development of affordable housing. Economic development projects will include those related to jobs, enterprise, business and infrastructure.

Another term used throughout the paper is "African American Community." This term is meant to indicate the racial group most often the beneficiary of church-based development efforts. The African American community also can be defined as the residents living within a set of geographic boundaries which are currently or in the past have been populated by African Americans. The physical boundaries of this study will be limited to the city of Los Angeles. The report will reference church development activity within the African American community nationwide, but original research was conducted primarily within the city limits of Los Angeles.

In the city of Los Angeles the black community is numerically identified as those areas with the heaviest concentrations of African Americans,

namely the community planning areas of West Adams, South Central and Southeast Los Angeles (City of Los Angeles 1993). In the Los Angeles metropolitan region, the African American population in the 1960s settled in three neighborhoods, Central Avenue-Furlong Tract, Watts, and West Jefferson. Then, over the next two decades blacks moved into the adjacent communities of West Adams, Crenshaw, Leimert Park and Mid-Wilshire (Grigsby 1991). The Crenshaw Cluster of the Coalition of Neighborhood developers reports that the Crenshaw Community remains a predominantly black area, with that ethnic group represented in approximately 74 percent of the population. South Central, on the other hand, has undergone more severe population transitions. Oliver, Johnson and Farrell report that during the last two decades South Central Los Angeles has been transformed from a predominantly black to a mixed black and Latino area (Oliver et al. 1993). Today, nearly one-half of South Central's population is Latino. These population demographics provide the backdrop to the work of churches in Los Angeles. Before I discuss the results of my research on pastors who work in some of these neighborhoods, I will summarize the history of the church's work in the life of the community.

The Historical Role of Church-Based Development

This section is provided to establish the historical context within which I will later review the nature of church-based development in the African American community. Although its primary focus is the efforts of Christian churches, history books are replete with accounts of the community and economic development practices of other black-led religious organizations. One such group is the Nation of Islam. A sect established in 1930, their message of black nationalism and self-help finds strong support among urban blacks. Muslims, as the group's adherents are commonly called, are recognized nationwide for their practical programs of building up black business through an ethic of hard work, thrift and racial unity (Meier et al. 1985). This examination of the Christian churches, however, is divided into four periods: Reconstruction, the Great Migration, Civil Rights, and the Post Black Power Movement. Each of the four parts in this section offers a brief overview on the role of the church during significant milestones in the social and economic development of the black community in America (Sernett 1985). Reconstruction is the term used to describe the process whereby, after the emancipation of black slaves and the ensuing American Civil War, the states which had seceded from the Union were restored to their normal relations. The Great Migration is the period in American history when blacks moved in record numbers from the rural South to the urban North. The era of Civil Rights was a time when African Americans and others successfully fought for the passage of legislation that would protect blacks against racial discrimination in employment, public accommodations and voting. Finally, the last period is one that I have identified and call the Post

Black Power Movement; an era when African Americans, impacted by today's changing global economy and declining government allocations for social services, have responded by strategizing collectively about ways to provide buffers for poor black urban areas against the negative impacts of these structural transformations.

Reconstruction

During Reconstruction (1865 to 1877), the pattern for the black church's central and dominant institutional role was secured as it became the center of numerous black communities in the South. With the advent of Jim Crow laws that effectually perpetuated the inequities of slavery, many of the newly emancipated slaves, both in the South and the North, viewed the church as a religious and social venue that was all their own (Du Bois 1989). One of the immediate requests made by freed slaves was for full participation in formerly segregated worship services and church governance. In some instances, white Christians complied with the demands for integration, but in most cases blacks had to forcefully persuade whites to turn over the titles to church buildings; ones constructed by the former while still in slavery (Foner 1988). In other instances blacks left white churches in great numbers and built or purchased their own. Credited with being the first social institution fully controlled by black people in America, the church served multiple functions during the era of Reconstruction. The church not only provided a place for spiritual worship, but also housed schools, social events and political gatherings (Mitchell 1989). And, although the efforts of churches during this time were prompted and hindered by widespread segregation and blatant discrimination, scholars, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, call the activities of these churches the first forms of economic cooperation among black people. This observation is supported by the accounts of church members in the South who, due to limited financial resources, would build a single church and use it in rotation among various black denominations. In larger cities, the church was able to expand its efforts to include sponsoring banks, insurance companies and volunteer organizations such as fire companies (Rabinowitz 1982).

The Great Migration

Following Reconstruction, religious and secular historians note two periods of mass migration of blacks from the South to the North, the first between 1916 and 1930, and the second between 1930 and 1970. This section will examine the activities of churches which occurred during the first period, a time commonly referred to as the Great Migration (Marks 1989).

Upon arriving in the North, many blacks settled with or near relatives and friends in urban areas that had already experienced a great influx of black migrants. In order to make smoother what for many was a difficult transition from rural to urban living, blacks turned to the church. Therefore, as blacks moved away from the South, thereby fleeing both the region's Jim Crow segregation and its denial of legal rights to blacks, churches in the

urban centers of the North experienced sizeable gains in membership (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). While blacks were transferring their memberships from Southern churches to Northern ones, they were also bringing their needs for social interaction, employment and sometimes emergency services.

Church leaders primarily responded to the growth and needs in two ways. On the one hand, the membership gains led some enterprising pastors to flex their spiritual muscles by purchasing new church buildings. On the other hand, pastors of large congregations responded by using church resources to provide the newcomers help with food, shelter, clothing and jobs.

When the Great Depression of the 1920s wreaked havoc on American society, the leaders of black churches were not spared the devastating impact of the Stock Market crash on the country's economy. For the churches whose pastors competed to build new edifices, many were forced to close their doors because of the financial ruin brought about by their indebtedness. Other churches, however, pooled their seemingly meager resources to keep their churches open for worship and service to the community.

Civil Rights

Notwithstanding the successful efforts of some churches to maintain operations during the great depression, the closure of others between the 1930s and 1950s seemed to parallel a modest decline in those urban blacks who considered themselves closely affiliated with the church (Frazier 1974). This small but steadily growing population was explained as a phenomenon that occurred mainly among black men who wanted to break free from the confining church traditions they were forced to observe in rural areas. The departure of some members, however, apparently did not weaken the church's impact on the black community. This is evident in the earnest and all important contributions church leaders and lay persons, both in the North and the South, made to the Civil Rights Movement between 1950 and 1970 (Morris 1984).

In the South, black church leaders organized and participated in boycotts, marches and other mass action demonstrations. Much of this energy was harnessed by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), a para-church organization that was established during the 1960s to coordinate Civil Rights activities through black churches in the South (Oates 1982). The organization's first well-known president, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote prolifically about the need for churches to take the lead in the pursuit of social equity in his celebrated *Letter from a Birmingham Jail.* To his credit, the SCLC and the church began a partnership that to this day represents an enduring legacy of advocacy on behalf of blacks and other oppressed groups; a legacy which has resulted in increased social and economic opportunities, as well as more equitable laws.

Another group that initiated and implemented community development efforts in the South during the 1960s was the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Originally a student-led

civil rights organization that patterned itself after the non-violent philosophy and practice of the SCLC, the group eventually emerged as a more militant organization. When SNCC worked to increase voter registration and political participation in Mississippi, they were joined by former sharecropper, devout Christian and eventual civil rights organizer, Fannie Lou Hamer (Mills 1993). Ms. Hamer, adept at rallying grass roots participation for SNCC and other civil rights groups, exemplified the skillful organizing and support roles played by many women of the black church during this and previous eras (Martin and Martin 1990; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). When speaking on the same platform with Ms. Hamer during a political fundraising bus tour, Malcolm X, the celebrated Muslim leader and black nationalist, called her "the country's number one freedom-fighting woman" (Mills 1993: 144).

In the North, black church and para-church groups were also contributing to the gains made by civil rights workers. For example, the SCLC began its "Operation Breadbasket" program in Chicago, Illinois in an effort to expand economic opportunities for African Americans. In 1966 Dr. King appointed the Reverend Jesse Jackson to be in charge of this boycott against merchants and employers in black communities, especially targeting those who failed to hire and promote black people (Hamilton 1985). Basing his strategy on a similar effort in Atlanta, Georgia, the Rev. Jackson enlisted a network of African American preachers and their churches to conduct selective buying campaigns. The Rev. Jackson and Dr. King attributed the early success of the program with producing nine hundred new jobs for blacks, thereby increasing income in the black community by an estimated $6 millions (Oates 1982).

In addition to expanded Civil Rights legislation during the 1960s, other victories of the era included an increase in community-administered, anti-poverty programs. One such program was the Opportunities Industrialization Foundation (OIF), started by the Rev. Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia. An active participant in church-led demonstrations in the South during the early stage of the Civil Rights movement, the Reverend Sullivan was challenged to organize a boycott against Philadelphia employers who allegedly discriminated against blacks (Haas 1992). This initiative, known as the "Selective Patronage Campaign," led to increased hiring of blacks in the boycotted companies.

Following this success, Sullivan, along with various associates, began a vocational job-training program called the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC). Using his own money, the resources of his Zion Baptist Church, and contributions from a variety of private corporations, Sullivan successfully launched the OIC in 1964. The widespread public support of the OIC programs generated considerable media attention and spawned OIC training centers nationwide. During the early 1970s, Sullivan and his church oversaw several ventures, including an aerospace program, a non-profit charitable trust, and an investment corporation (Sullivan 1969). According to one

study of the OIC centers, at its height in 1980, the program's success was evident by its operating in more than 160 cities and training and placing in jobs close to 700,000 people (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). Sullivan associated the success of these enterprises to careful prayer, discussion and planning (Haas 1992).

Post Black Power Movement

While Dr. King was galvanizing church members to participate in mass action demonstrations, and Ms. Hamer was galvanizing grass roots political participation, and Mr. Sullivan was investing church resources into economic development ventures, a powerful ideological movement began to sweep through America's black community.

The "Black Power Movement" reached its height during the late 1960s. Art and literature produced during the time reflect the movement's emphasis on self-help, self-love and black unity (Burkett and Newman 1978). The influence of the movement was also evident in the writings of black church scholars, the substance of which came to be known as Black Theology. Although embraced by intellectuals, this race-specific approach to religious study and practice did not at that time gain widespread support from black church leaders, many of whom thought its rhetoric too divisive (King Jr. 1985).

It was not until 1980, long after widespread academic appeal for the movement had diminished, that signs of its influence among black churches began to reappear. I describe this recent activity as the "Post Black Power Movement." In this period there are examples of churches throughout the nation which, (1) preach an Afro-centric message to address problems in the inner-city; (2) provide economic development opportunities to offset problems such as lay-offs and unemployment; and, (3) strategize collectively to buffer inner-cities against these and other structural transformations. One example of this is the Imani Temple, a predominantly African American Catholic church in Chicago, Illinois which infuses both liturgy and worship with an Afro-centric message. Since the late 1980s the church has carried its message into the inner-city through a variety of community development programs.

A second example of a black church influenced by Black Theology is Hartford Memorial Baptist Church of Detroit, Michigan. Since 1985, this church has turned a blighted predominantly African American neighborhood into a bustling community brimming with economic development opportunities. The various economic development enterprises owned by the church include several fast-food franchises and a supermarket (Gite 1993). The church considers its work to be a buffer against the onslaught of factory lay-offs that have hit hard the region's African American communities.

On the West Coast, San Francisco's Glide Memorial United Methodist Church has a reputation for being independent, and Afro-centric, in its approach to addressing the problems of the inner-city. Led by its outspoken pastor, the Reverend Cecil Williams, the church has taken an activist approach

to fighting the national crack cocaine epidemic. Calling himself the "minister of liberation," the Rev. Williams goes about the business of helping blacks to become free of the twin bondage of drugs and the poverty by working with a national network of churches (Billingsley 1992).

Case Study: The Church of God in Christ

The activities of the African American church in this movement are also evident in Los Angeles. In this section I will discuss the results of a survey I conducted of pastors from the Church of God in Christ (COGIC). The COGIC denomination was included in the study because there are numerous examples of COGIC churches engaged in human resource and economic development projects. Furthermore, the COGIC denomination publishes a manual which outlines its teaching on the role of the church regarding human resource and economic development issues. The manual was used as the basis for the survey instrument administered to thirty-three pastors from the Southern California First Jurisdiction of the COGIC denomination.

This denomination operates primarily in the United States, with several international affiliates. The headquarters is in Memphis, Tennessee and it is from here that the Presiding Bishop of the denomination administers the affairs of the denomination.

Table I
COGIC Organizational Hierarchy

Presiding Bishop
of the General Board

First Assistant Presiding Bishop /
Second Assistant Presiding Bishop
(General Board Members)

Other Members of the General Board

Jurisdictional Bishops
District Superintendents

Local Pastors

The Presiding Bishop governs a board of twelve bishops, each of whom is elected by the general membership, serves a four-year term and oversees the affairs of his region as they relate to the national denomination. On a smaller scale, bishops are appointed to oversee the activities of local jurisdictions. The geographic boundaries of the Southern California First Jurisdiction, for example, are five counties: Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego and Ventura. To make this large area more manageable, the day to day business duties as they relate to the jurisdiction are handled by district superintendents. Jurisdictional bishops and district superintendents also have the duty of collecting "reports," or monetary contributions for

the national denomination and insuring clergy are appointed to the office of pastor at regional churches. In addition, these officers of regional churches are responsible for insuring that pastors preach and teach in line with church dogma.

Survey of First Jurisdiction Pastors

The following is a description of the survey results that I gathered in June of 1994. The survey instrument was comprised of four parts: Part A: church background; Part B: church programs in community and economic development; Part C: program barriers; and, Part D: the church's role in community and economic development. Participants in the survey were pastors attending a meeting of the First Jurisdiction of the Church of God in Christ. They represented the following geographic areas:

Table 2
Church Location

City of Los Angeles	52%
County of Los Angeles	45%
Other	3%

N = 33
Source: Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews (1994)

Of the 33 churches represented, 17 (52 percent) were from the City of Los Angeles, 15 (45 percent) were from other cities in Los Angeles County, and 1 (3 percent) did not say.

The Instrument

The survey consisted of 62 questions, with 10 open-ended and 52 close-ended questions. Part A of the survey included questions about the background of each church. I wanted to find out where the church was located, the number of people who attended it, the ethnic/racial composition of the church members and community residents, and the ways that the church is used outside of worship service.

The next two sections of the survey, Parts B and C, were multiple choice questions designed to assess several points. In Part B, respondents were asked whether they had been in the past, are currently, or in the future would like to be involved in the various community and economic development projects listed. Part C then asked respondents to circle one or more barriers that each has encountered while trying to achieve community and economic development goals. Respondents could select any number of barriers ranging from a lack of human or financial resources, to the high cost of land, to dangerous neighborhood conditions.

The last section of the survey, Part D, was mostly comprised of open-ended questions that asked respondents to discuss their views about the involvement of the local and the national Churches of God in Christ in community and economic development activities. These questions were designed to assess the respondent's views on: (1) the involvement of the local and national church in community and economic development over the past ten

years; and, (2) the involvement of the local and national church in community and economic development since the city of Los Angeles' Civil Unrest in April of 1992. The last question asked respondents to describe any other ways that they were involved in community and economic development.

Part A: Church Background

The importance of researching the background of each church is that each is unique. All of the churches belong to the First Jurisdiction, yet each has its own profile. One of the most interesting findings to the questions on church background was about the racial/ethnic composition of the church membership and surrounding community (see Table 3).

Table 3
Church and Neighborhood Ethnic / Racial Composition

Congregation	
African American	97%
Other	3%
Community (2 mi. radius)	
African American	49%
Hispanic/Latino	18%
White (Non Hispanic)	3%
Other	30%

N = 33

Source: Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews (1994)

As expected, many of the pastors surveyed indicated that their congregations are mostly represented by African Americans (97 percent). On the other hand, fewer than half (48 percent) said that African Americans represent a majority of the residents within a two-mile radius of their churches. Ten pastors (30 percent) said that the surrounding neighborhood is racially mixed ("other"). This finding is important because of the rapidly changing ethnic/racial composition of Los Angeles' historically African American communities. Further, churches must deal with the tension between the apparent contradiction between saying they serve the "community," while in actuality serving primarily African Americans.

Researching the background of each church also has important ramifications because one can more clearly understand the many uses of the church edifice (see Table 4).

Table 4
Church Uses

Education	30%
Social services	26%
Recreation	9%
Other	35%

N = 33

Source: Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews (1994)

For example, 13 (30 percent) use their buildings for education, 11 (26 percent) use their buildings for social services, and 4 (9 percent) use their build-

ings for recreation. On top of this, 15 (35 percent) use their buildings for other purposes, including (but not limited to): storage, fellowship hall for public use, book store, housing for low-income residents, and voting. This multiplicity of uses is an important demonstration of the church's ability to use its resources in such a way as to go well beyond the simple use of the facility for worship services. Indeed, it seems to be a public, multi-faceted institution. This demonstrates the centrality of the church to its members on not only a spiritual, but also communal/institutional level.

Part B: Church Programs in Community and Economic Development

To begin Part B of the survey, I defined the terms "community development" and "economic development." Please note that although I defined these terms, the pastors supplied me with the meanings in conversations I had with them prior to constructing the survey. "Community development" is defined as community outreach programs; namely programs related to the educational and personal development of church members, as well as community members. "Economic development," on the other hand, can be programs related to job creation, enterprise development, and housing construction.

The nature of the questions included in this part of the survey were status-oriented. That is, I wanted to assess whether the programs listed were past, current, or future endeavors. Respondents could also answer "not applicable," thus revealing their lack of involvement. This is important because I chose the programs from the COGIC denominational manual. In the end, their participation could support or refute the idea that actual individual church programs reflected the recommendations for community and economic development programs outlined in the denominational manual.

When asked about the status of their programs in community and economic development, the respondents indicated that they wanted to begin 16 of the programs listed at some time in the future; a majority are currently operating 4 types of programs (see Table 5). Among the four most common types of programs currently operating, 64 percent (21) of the respondents provide emergency assistance, 88 percent (29) offer pastoral counseling, 91 percent (30) give marital counseling, and 76 percent (25) have some form of youth services. These answers reflect the traditional modes of helping one might expect from the church. That is, help in times of crisis, youth outreach, and psychological counseling. In order to identify areas that I may have overlooked when constructing the survey, I asked respondents to describe the programs they would be willing to begin in the "next six months." One pastor said his church would like to begin, "...a 24-hour day care center, [and a] complete youth center for teenagers, after school." This answer reflects similar answers given to this question by other pastors. For example, they described plans to start programs in early childhood education, adult education, youth recreation, and child care. A few respondents described economic development programs. One respondent wants to begin a job

training program. A second wants to start a home for pregnant and abused women. Finally, a third respondent hopes to establish a drug rehabilitation home. I would venture to assert that these pastors mentioned these forms of economic development because they seemed the most viable. That is, they can be established with public funds, can operate with money collected from clients/residents, and require little direct contribution from church coffers. Many of the pastors chose to leave this question blank. This can be interpreted to mean two things: (1) they are already too busy due

Table 5
Church Programs in Community and Economic Development

Program	Past	Current	Future	Not applicable	No answer
Emergency assistance/funds*	-	64%	24%	3%	9%
Legal aid service/information	-	21%	49%	24%	6%
Individual pastoral counseling	-	88%	12%	-	-
Marital counseling	-	91%	9%	-	-
Planned parenthood counseling	-	30%	42%	27%	-
Teen pregnancy counseling	-	30%	58%	9%	3%
Adult education	-	21%	49%	27%	3%
Childhood education	-	36%	49%	12%	3%
Youth service	-	76%	21%	-	3%
Housing assistance/referral	-	36%	42%	18%	3%
Housing construction/rehabilitation	-	9%	36%	52%	3%
Job referral	-	30%	52%	15%	3%
Job training	-	15%	61%	21%	3%
Credit Union	-	-	46%	52%	3%
Bank/loan referral	-	-	55%	42%	3%
Medical information/referral	-	18%	42%	36%	3%
Health care clinic	-	6%	61%	30%	3%
Alcoholism treatment	3%	24%	61%	12%	-
Tobacco use prevention	3%	21%	52%	21%	3%
Drug abuse treatment/prevention	6%	30%	58%	6%	-
Crime prevention	-	30%	42%	24%	3%
Gambling prevention	-	21%	39%	36%	3%

to their existing programs; or, (2) they are uncertain or pessimistic about the outlook or possibility of beginning new programs. (For Table 5 on preceeding page, * "-" = no respondents, N=33, and the source is Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews [1994]).

Part C: Program Barriers

To explore the reasons why church programs in community and economic development were pursued or not, I asked respondents to identify barriers they had encountered when trying to implement programs. The seven barriers in the close-ended questions fell into three main categories: (1) a lack of resources (congregational, denominational, governmental, or banking/lending), (2) a lack of skills, or (3) high land costs. I also asked if dangerous neighborhood conditions were a barrier (see Table 6 in Appendix I).

An interesting finding is that for all the programs listed, the majority of respondents said the barriers were "not applicable." My interpretation of this is that: (1) they have sufficient resources to meet their programmatic needs; or, (2) they are not pursuing the programs listed and therefore have not encountered any barriers to implementing them.

To further investigate this preliminary finding, I analyzed the second highest rate of responses to each question about program barriers. Interestingly, in the majority of these answers, respondents said the biggest barrier was a lack of experienced or skilled staff. By answering in this manner, the pastors seemed to be saying that they are not hindered by a lack of financial resources, but rather they are impeded by a lack of skills resources. The programs which they identified as having these barriers included: planned parenthood counseling, teen pregnancy counseling, adult education, job training, bank/loan referrals, medical information/referrals, health care clinics, and alcoholism treatment. It is evident from this list that the most common barriers impede community development services, such as counseling information referrals, as well as economic development services, such as job training and bank/loan referrals.

Some respondents listed several barriers for one program category. For example, in the category "childhood education," church leaders identified with nearly equal frequency a lack of congregational resources and a lack of experienced or skilled staff. A second set of interesting results came in the form of barriers identified in two other categories. The first category, "housing assistance referral," is noteworthy because in addition to the frequency with which respondents identified a lack of congregational resources and a lack of experienced or skilled staff, came the frequency of a third barrier -- a lack of governmental resources. This is important because unlike other programs, housing assistance programs seem to be viewed by pastors as needing government support. Of course, this raises the issue of the legislation that decrees the separation of church and state. One can ask if the provision of housing is an acceptable circumstance under which the church and the state can work in concert. The barriers identified in a second category, "housing construction," revealed that

respondents frequently noted barriers such as: (1) a lack of congregational resources; and, (2) the high cost of land. The second barrier, the high cost of land, is not surprising in the expensive Southern California real estate market.

Part D: Church Role in Community and Economic Development

The objective of Part D was to identify trends in the church's involvement in community and economic development over time. The time frame spanned the ten years between 1984 and 1994. This decade was chosen because of the decline in public investment in inner-cities during the period, and the necessity of finding alternativemeans by which to meet their needs. I also included a question about involvement since April 1992 to determine the level of activity following the civil unrest in Los Angeles that year.

My initial finding was that the overwhelming majority of respondents in each category indicated that the denomination and local churches had become more involved in community and economic development both during the decade and following the civil unrest. In the first of two questions about the involvement of the national church in community and economic development, I asked about national activity during the last ten years and since the civil unrest. The majority of respondents attributed the national involvement to leadership and increased education, learning and awareness. When it came to answering the second set of questions about their own involvement in church-based development, respondents answered in similar ways.

Lessons Learned

The findings of this study can be useful in guiding other black denominations in managing human resource and economic development projects. For one, church leaders can employ the methods of the COGIC denomination to build coalitions around projects that are perceived to be a threat to existing resources. This is especially true when trying to convey the merits of these types of activities to those who reject the notion of the role of the church to be that of community developer. These methods can also convince church members to expand the intervention focus of the church from individual churches to denomination-wide projects.

The findings of the study also raises several issues that are instructional for changes in government policy. For one, the government can acknowledge the critical role that churches play in addressing problems of entire communities, thereby creating a safety net in the absence of government programs or resources. This is particularly true when one considers the emphasis that the COGIC denomination places on providing services for the homeless and the unemployed. The government can provide incentives to churches that contribute to community improvement through human resource and economic development projects. These incentives can be in the form of sweeping change, that is lessening some of the prohibitive rules governing the separation of church and state. Or, they might be in the form of more incremental approaches to change, such as changes to existing tax and business operating laws. Furthermore, the government can enforce punitive measures against financial

institutions if their lending practices reveal patterns of discrimination against churches.

Finally, this study is relevant to the urban planning field because it demonstrates how the black church has the capacity, through non-profit enterprises and programs, to be a viable player in the community development field. Other studies have shown the apparent relationship between the issues addressed by churches and doctrinal instructions for community development (Hinesmon-Matthews 1994). One area for future research is to investigate the influence of ideology, particularly of a religious nature, on a community's acceptance or rejection of a community development plan. This study was designed with the history and characteristics of the African American community in mind, but its methodology can be applied to other ethnic and religious communities. For example, the influence of the Catholic Church and liberation theology on development activities within predominantly Latino/a communities could be researched (Smolich 1992). In this way, the approach and methods used to develop plans for and/or with ethnic communities with strong religious ties can be cognizant of the perspectives they represent (Leavitt 1993).

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Appendix I, Table 6
Barriers of Church Programs in Community and Economic Development

Program	Lack of congregational resources	Lack of denominational resources	Lack of governmental resources	Lack of experienced or skilled staff
Emergency assistance/funds	21%	-	3%	6%
Legal aid service/information	12%	6%	-	15%
Individual pastoral counseling	6%	-	3%	6%
Marital counseling	3%	3%	3%	9%
Planned parenthood counseling	* -	3%	3%	21%
Teen pregnancy counseling	3%	-	3%	24%
Adult education	15%	3%	3%	15%
Childhood education	15%	-	6%	21%
Youth service	24%	-	6%	6%
Housing assistance/referral	6%	-	6%	3%
Housing construction/rehabilitation	9%	-	6%	3%
Job referral	6%	3%	6%	6%
Job training	6%	-	3%	12%
Credit Union	6%	-	3%	6%
Bank/loan referral	9%	-	-	12%
Medical information/referral	3%	-	-	15%
Health care clinic	3%	-	3%	15%
Alcoholism treatment	3%	-	3%	12%
Tobacco use prevention	3%	3%	-	15%
Drug abuse treatment/prevention	6%	-	3%	6%
Crime prevention	3%	-	3%	9%
Gambling prevention	3%	-	-	6%

* "-" = no respondents, N=33

Source: Lezlee Hinesmon-Matthews (1994)

Lack of banking/ lending sources	High cost of land	Dangerous neighbor-hood conditions	Combination of two or more barriers	Not applicable	No answer
3%	-	-	30%	33%	3%
-	3%	-	21%	36%	6%
3%	-	-	6%	61%	15%
-	-	-	9%	61%	12%
-	-	-	15%	46%	12%
-	-	-	12%	42%	15%
3%	3%	-	12%	36%	9%
3%	3%	-	18%	15%	18%
-	3%	-	9%	36%	15%
9%	3%	3%	24%	39%	6%
-	9%	-	27%	33%	12%
3%	3%	-	24%	39%	9%
3%	3%	-	24%	36%	12%
9%	3%	-	24%	42%	6%
12%	-	-	18%	39%	9%
3%	3%	-	18%	42%	15%
3%	3%	-	15%	46%	12%
-	3%	-	12%	52%	15%
-	3%	-	9%	42%	24%
-	6%	-	18%	55%	6%
-	-	-	12%	64%	9%
-	-	-	12%	67%	12%

THE INVISIBILITY OF AMERICA'S NATIVE COMMUNITIES: ABSENT IN THEORY, EXCLUDED IN PRACTICE

Craig S. Keys and Kacy A. Collons

In the arena of planning theory, practice, and education, particularly here at UCLA, we as planners attempt to focus on planning for diverse publics. Ours is an effort not simply to apply traditional planning models based on economics, scientific analysis, or simple tradition, but to expand our horizons and engage in "radical planning" (Freidmann 1987), which focuses on the structural transformation of industrial capitalist society, towards the eradication of oppression through self-empowerment and a sharing of common global concerns.

Whether the particular effort be housing, transportation, economic development, or environmental policy, we as planners have an obligation to consider the effects of our ideas and our practices on all members of society. Even in our attempts to do so, we have been trained to think in terms of categories such as black, white, gay, straight, male or female, rather than acknowledging a richer diversity than these dichotomies can represent. There are those, however, who do not fit neatly into such categories because they are neither black nor white, nor any one single ethnicity; nor are they heterosexual or of traditional gender. Theories acknowledging the complexities of individuals and the difficulties of categorization, although often marginalized in the daily practices of professional planners, have been a source of empowerment to oppressed individuals and communities. Recognition and a reckoning with individual and group variance from the dominant society is a key element of empowerment and of critical planning. And these are tasks which graduate education must strive to prepare us if we are to succeed in advancing the goals of inclusion and equity in planning practice.

Theory has come far in terms of acknowledging social difference in the abstract[1]-- as a condition that exists among groups and people in society,[2] and as it applies to those familiar manifestations of race, class and gender. We have been less successful in the application of difference theories to the interactions between these categories in resource planning and policy. The problem may be viewed as an institutionalization of the rejection of difference. We have entrenched patterns of selectively recognizing difference "[b]ut we have no patterns for relating across our human differences as equals" and "[a]s a result those differences have been misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion"[3] (Lorde 1984: 281-282).

However, regardless of the difficulties of categorization, there is one group which has been perhaps more conspicuously absent from consideration in planning theory and education than most others: Native Americans.[4] To the extent that planning and planning education are concerned with advancing sustainable resource management and community development, they are unavoidably tied to the well-being of those who first peopled the nation. A measure of good planning, particularly in a multicultural society, is the successful integration of the needs of diverse peoples. Any attempt to address the special needs of a community is well served by an informed understanding of the community's's culture and history. While no one should expect to become an expert on all the cultures comprising the diversity of urban centers and rural lifestyles, every planner should endeavor to learn the historical facts pertinent and necessary to understanding the special problems facing indigenous tribal communities.

A Pertinent But Incomplete History Of Native Americans

Native peoples share a history of oppression, the understanding of which is indispensable to any effort to design equitable and effective social policy. The conditions currently confronting Indians in the urban setting, and in fact the very existence of relatively large Indian populations in urban centers today, may be traced to the unsound economic policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other auspices of the United States Government.[5] Attempts to apply urban development dogma to culturally diverse communities will inevitably undermine the self determination and survival of communal cultures, as exemplified by the histories of colonized peoples around the world.

From the earliest European contact and colonization of the United States, Native peoples posed much opposition and fought many wars to maintain their aboriginal territories and way of life. As expansion through warfare came to a close, and despite treaty agreements defining tribal rights to continental lands, further encroachment upon Native territories persisted in the form of legislated taking. By the 1830s, two Federal Court cases had defined what the United States saw as its role with regard to Indians. Lacking the support of established law, the judiciary proffered the legal fictions necessary to create federal claim to Indian lands:

> Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestioned right to the lands they occupy... [t]hey may... perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession, when their right of possession ceases (*Cherokee Nation v Georgia* 1831).

and with respect to Indian peoples:

> [The Indians] are in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection, rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father (*Worcester v Georgia 1832*).

Originally, this so-called trust relationship was to last for twenty years, after which time the Indians would be civilized. However, after several extensions, this relationship has been extended indefinitely. In theory, a trust relationship means that the guardian must act in the best interests of the trustee. However, history shows that this trust relationship has often been used by the United States as a source of unlimited and unchecked power for exploitation, especially with regard to natural resource management on Indian reservations.

The federal government initiated formal treaty-making with Indian tribes with the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789. Usually, treaties provided that in exchange for surrendering rights to the use and possessions of vast tracts of land, the Indians would receive supposedly exclusive rights to smaller tracts on which they would then be expected to reside. In 1871, the Indian Appropriation Act withdrew U.S. recognition of tribes as sovereign nations. In 1877, the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act, broke up Indian communal lands and gave 160 acres to each Indian family.[6] This legislation was passed in an attempt to break up the collective power of Indian tribes and introduce private rights to land, a principle anathema to traditional Indian culture. Additionally, the General Allotment Act decreased Indian land holdings from 138 million acres to 48 million acres. The lands not allotted to Indians were open for settlement by non-Indians.[7]

Federal policies which undermined traditional Native subsistence led to a migration of Indians off the reservation. Then in the 1950s, the Bureau of Indian Affairs fashioned the Indian Relocation Program, which, through children's boarding schools and job placement offices in large cities, moved over 85,000 Indians from reservations to urban areas between 1952 and 1967.[8] Aside from allegations that the relocation program was an attempt to dismantle Native nations and communities by geographic separation and assimilation, some feel that the program was an effort to terminate the Federal government's trust responsibility by moving Indians off the reservations.

In 1934, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was established under the Indian Reorganization Act. This

institution, housed within the Department of the Interior, replaced traditional, consensual forms of tribal government with constitutions and councils overseen by the BIA. The relationship between the BIA and tribal governments has been a source of conflict and concern among tribal populations almost from its inception. Many are concerned with the impact that the federally imposed tribal government system has had upon the ability of tribes to maintain their traditional culture. In some cases traditional tribal leaders have been co-opted by the BIA, and in other instances many traditional leaders who have resisted the influence of the federal government have been replaced or circumvented by the imposed system. Not surprisingly, collaborating tribal chiefs and the BIA are subject to considerable criticism and mistrust by the very persons whose interests they are entrusted to represent.

In the areas of land use and natural resource management, BIA must approve all leases of reservation lands and allotments. Although the trust responsibility of the government requires the government to act in the best interests of the tribes, BIA has had a history of negotiating leases without consulting or considering the wishes or best interests of the tribes. Native lands hold some of the richest resources in the world, including timber, minerals, fish, and game. This resource abundance could be a source of economic development for tribes. However, a history of unfair government practices at the expense of the tribes has made them weary of economic development projects. In the past, the BIA has granted several leases for timber extraction without considering that such forests might be sacred to the tribes and instrumental to the survival of their cultures, and without utilizing traditional sustainable yield practices. Additionally, most of the money from such leases went not to the tribal people, but to the BIA trust fund and to tribal councils.

When federal environmental laws were passed in the 1960s and 1970s, Indian lands were overlooked. Legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Superfund provided funds to state governments to establish environmental infrastructure and monitoring systems. Indian reservations did not receive such funding and did not fall under state jurisdiction for regulation. In addition, the BIA has funded several mineral exploration and nuclear testing activities on reservation land under the auspices of land leases and possible economic development projects.[9]

BIA is also heavily influenced by regional and national special interest groups, which often see Indian lands as prime locations for natural resource exploitation and experimentation since Indian reservations are exempt from state legislation due to their sovereign status. This exemption was temporarily eliminated with the passage of the Indian Termination Act (1953), which essentially declared that certain tribes were no longer considered "domestic dependent nations."[10]

This arbitrary termination effectively eliminated any federal funding, on the basis of tribal status, to terminated tribes while simultaneously making those tribes subject to state property taxes.

Disenfranchised tribes became even more impoverished as a result of termination, and subsequently were more susceptible to environmental and resource exploitation and degradation from outside actors. Desperate for money to pay property taxes in order to avoid the loss of their lands altogether, many tribes agreed to BIA land leases that were environmentally harmful and even hazardous to the health of those living on the reservations.[11]

Native Americans in Contemporary Society

Indians' territories make up the largest land holdings within U.S. borders, after federal government holdings (Davis 1993: 24) though only one percent (but over 1.5 million people) of the United States' population is indigenous (Keys 1992). In addition to reservation populations, nearly two million recognized[12] Natives live in urban centers (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990). Federal policies aimed at assimilating Indians into mainstream America, have simultaneously disenfranchised Natives by acquisition and exploitation of their land and by separation of Natives from their homes, their families, and their traditional cultures.[13] Furthermore, under the present tribal government scheme, Indians suffer the lowest standard of living, the highest unemployment rate (over 50 percent), and the worst poverty of any ethnic group in the United States (Greenpeace 1992). Within cities, Indians are among the poorest and most disenfranchised. A report prepared by the National Indian Justice Center concluded that:

> In the [San Francisco] Bay Area . . . the Indian poverty rate is almost twice the rate for non-Indians. At 18%, Indian unemployment was at least twice the jobless rate for non-Indians in the Bay Area. Official regional figures, however, mask the local realities. According to recent records of the Bay Area Indian Health Clinic, 86% of their 28,000 patients are unemployed (National Indian Justice Center 1994: 6).

Despite their significant numbers and the centrality of many Native issues to urban problems in general, the presence of Indians and Indian culture within urban centers is largely unmentioned and/or ignored. As a result of the dichotomy between Indian assets (land, resources, legal protection) and Indian social conditions, Indian lands and communities are often targeted for development projects.

Traditional notions of economic development, when applied to Indian communities, present a set of complex policy issues as an underlying purpose for Native sovereignty -- the preservation of Indian culture -- confronts the countervailing influence of commercial development and consumerism. Tribal concerns for economic development and Indian culture necessarily come into conflict. The federal government's responsibilities to act in the interests of tribal people are often at odds with the current economic policy interests on Native lands.

Native Americans, with their unique history and special legal status, pose complex issues for planners, which must be adequately addressed.

Without a knowledge of both the legal and cultural history of Native Americans, it is nearly impossible for planners to sufficiently address or include Native issues in their implementation of urban, regional, or development policies.

The same can be said of almost any oppressed group, but the social history of Native Americans presents, perhaps, the most distinct set of contentions with dominant planning theory and practices. The exclusion of native issues from planning education is not unique, but rather common among education in the social sciences and in the professions as a whole. As a result of Native marginalization in many disciplines, there is a lack of understanding of subsistence economies and culture. This, coupled with the unique economic relationships that Indians have had with natural resources on and off the reservation, has in many cases rendered their communities and needs invisible to theorists, and to policy makers.

Planning Theory and Resulting Policies

It is important to note that both traditional and current regional development theories focus on the consumer/industrial relationship and presume participation in a consumerist culture (Scott and Storper 1990; Bingham and Mier 1993). The preservation of traditional tribal cultures, however, is in many ways incompatible with the presumptions of a capitalist social structure. In particular, the practice of traditional hunting and fishing customs are at odds with the instrumentalist and unsustainable orientation towards natural resources that characterizes contemporary development practices.[14] The fact that contemporary planning theory and practices now grapple with the difficult problem of integrating sustainability into modern consumerist cultures, may lead to tremendous improvements in the quality of life for the conventional categories of the oppressed such as the urban poor, women, Latinos, or blacks, but they are largely irrelevant to the plight of many Native communities and the imperatives of subsistence economies. The planning decision to integrate market-economics into traditional Native cultures is often made out of necessity, in order to maintain Native communities in the face of resource depletion and degradation -- the loss of the traditional subsistence base due to the excesses of modern consumption economies.[15]

In policy decision processes, whether it be natural resource management or land use development, the common assumption by planners and policy makers is that those affected are commercial actors and market participants. In the area of environmental policy, market-based solutions seem to be an increasing trend (Pearce and Turner 1990; Hanna and Munasinghe 1995). Additionally, in urban land use decisions, economic considerations often take priority over cultural or environmental ones (Collons 1995: 30).

Many in planning theory and education have rightly criticized the strict application of an accumulation economy, and have advocated for inclusion of the poor and oppressed in planning decisions. In *Empowerment*, John Friedmann argues for an alternative development which includes

the involvement of the poor "in actions that will lead to their own empowerment," pursuing the "transcendent goals of an inclusive democracy, appropriate economic growth, gender equality, and sustainability" (Friedmann 1993: 164-65). Friedmann further points out that alternative development policies must pursue change at the national, as well as the local level.

This idea is particularly salient to Native Americans, with their unique legal status in relation to the federal government -- Native nations are supposedly sovereign, and yet they are subject to some state and federal laws; Native Americans are supposed to be U.S. citizens, and yet they may not be treated as such when applying for government services.[16] Planning policies seeking to address Native issues, or include Natives within their policies, must be pursued at both the national and local level to be successful. Furthermore, while alternative development policies aimed at the poor and minorities may speak to structural oppression, such policies can never address the paradoxical legal status of Indians without specific knowledge of their history and current situation.

Examples of Native Invisibility

When Natives are Invisible... Threats Posed by Domestic Fishing Policy

One compelling example of Native invisibility to environmental and economic planners is the area of fishing resources management. The decline in fish stocks threaten a number of Native tribes for whom fishing has always been an essential aspect of traditional culture and survival. Today, much of the traditional culture of Indian life has been lost to economic and cultural encroachment. Consequently, the role of the fish in modern Indian life has assumed an even greater significance for many tribal cultures. As one tribal member explain: "How can I tell you what the salmon are worth? The salmon define who I am. What else can I say?" (Anton Minthorn quoted in Jensen 1986: 368-369)

Tribal subsistence economies are often fragile and rely on the perpetuation of hunting and fishing practices that have defined tribal cultures and tribal self-determination. These economies are threatened wherever planning decisions fail to account for traditional tribal hunting or fishing activities. Subsistence economies face potential conflict with recent policy developments which grow out of a larger trend towards privatization in environmental policy making. In particular, recent policies enacted to establish and reallocate property interests in domestic fishing rights present serious threats to tribal cultures, sovereignties and subsistence economies. One such mechanism used in Alaska is Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Individual transferable quotas are tradable fishing rights created specifically to control limited access commercial fisheries and to result in necessary fleet downsizing, which resulted initially from subsidies and overcapitalization of fishing fleets in the 1970s.

Native Americans have struggled for hundreds of years to retain their cultural identity, tribal lands, and increasingly to protect their rights to

self-determination and self-government. Reliance on fish has been an integral part of Native Alaskan life. Since the earliest known times, local fish stocks have figured prominently in Indian religious life, trade, and culture, and were the primary source of food for Northwest tribes (Johnson 1991). Historically, fish hasprovided 80 to 90 percent of the diet of many of the tribes; even today, fishing provides a vital part of the subsistence, livelihood, and remaining culture for many Indians in the Northern Pacific (Miller 1991).

Historically, Native subsistence rights have come into conflict with the sport and commercial fishing interests, which have contributed significantly to the decline of fish populations worldwide (Safina 1995). Recent environmental policies seeking to conserve fisheries, such as ITQs, have reflected larger trends towards privatization in American domestic policy. The persistent decline of domestic fish stocks, despite regulatory limits on permissible fishing gear and the duration of fishing seasons, has prompted new conservation approaches. The various experimental ITQ systems that are currently in place in several American fisheries have presented differing threats to tribal subsistence economies.

In a fishery managed under an ITQ system, each eligible participant is granted rights to a specific percentage, or quota share, of the annual harvest limit in that fishery. Harvest limits are referred to as the total allowable catch (TAC)[17] for a specific fishery. One unique feature of the Halibut and Sablefish ITQ system is the Community Development Quota (CDQ) program.[18] The program is structured to reserve a certain percentage of TAC for purposes of economic development in Western Alaskan Native Communities.[19] The stated goal of the CDQ program is to bring Natives into the industry as major participants:

> In contrast to their traditional subsistence and small boat commercial fisheries, western Alaska residents will now have opportunities to work on factory trawlers... in shoreside processing plants, and in related seafood industry operations (Bering Sea Fishermen's Association 1993: 3).

Currently, six CDQ groups comprising 56 communities in Western Alaska have received quota allocation.[20] These groups hold an aggregate of 7.5 percent of annual quota share (State of Alaska 1995). In order to receive allocation, all applicants must develop detailed business plans and programs for developing self sustaining and independent fisheries. The content of these plans emphasizes the apparent necessity of available financing for the survival and growth of actors in the fishing industry. All six groups which received CDQs have stated that financing and access to lending is imperative to participation in the industry.[21] The fact that financing is such a concern to smaller actors may rightly raise concerns for the ability of tribal fishing operations to survive. One of the goals of the CDQ program is to afford Western Alaska Natives a "fair and reasonable opportunity to participate in

the... fisheries which have been closed to them because of the high capital investments involved" (Bering Sea Fishermen's Association 1993: 3).

While the CDQ program is relatively new, and therefore data is limited, initial statistics indicate that the program is having some success. Prior to implementation of the CDQ program, unemployment was as high as 31 percent, the majority of jobs were with federal, state, and local governments, and virtually none of the value of the fishery was captured by Native Alaskans (State of Alaska 1995: 1). In the first two years of the program, local jobs have doubled with 57 percent of all non-government related jobs being associated with the CDQ program. Furthermore, CDQ wages and benefits represent a 2.4 percent increase in regional income (State of Alaska 1995).

The success of the CDQ program has been measured, thus far, on labor statistics, yet it is clear that this is not how most Native Western Alaskan communities themselves would measure success (Schwalenberg 1996). It is not uncommon for Western Alaskans to value subsistence harvest participation as a priority over wage labor, since "the one sector that has always been self-sustaining is subsistence" (State of Alaska 1995: 4). Furthermore, the jobs held by Natives are rigorous both in terms of hours and physical labor, with most having no future prospects for management positions, and the promise of badly needed infrastructure development has not been fulfilled (State of Alaska 1995).

While a stated goal of the CDQ program is eventual self-sufficiency of Native communities, the reality of reaching this goal is questionable given the current means in which Native groups must be in partnership with (and therefore dependent upon) corporate entities in order to be eligible for quota allocation. Julia Kitka, President of the Alaska Federation of Natives, points out that Alaska's Native people are at risk of, "permanently losing the capacity to self govern [if current policies continue] the historical evolution of a self-destructive culture of dependency and powerlessness that is killing our people and destroying our communities" (Kitka 1995).

Urban Economic Development

In urban centers, issues of economic development are just as pertinent. Consideration of Native Americans is conspicuously absent from economic policy decisions *except* where Native Americans, themselves, stand to make a profit. Recently, in efforts to pursue economic development, a number of tribes have attempted to use their sovereign status to their advantage becoming involved in gaming and hazardous waste storage, for example. Even these efforts have invited controversy, with states like California, New Mexico, and Arizona trying to deem tribal gaming illegal under state law, and environmentalists ostensibly pitted against tribal self determination.[22]

A recent example of the exclusion of Natives in urban planning is that of military base conversion. In the base conversion process, federal law often requires that "other federal uses" receive first consideration in reuse, and yet the federal trust responsibility owed to Indians has been neglected:

> The Federal government, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), has a trust obligation to Native Americans to acquire and maintain land in the best interest of the Indians. In base conversion, it seems that there is a complete lack of consideration for cession of former base territory to the BIA (Collons 1995: 30).

Closed military bases are first made available to the military for purposes of other military re-use. The type of use receiving second priority is re-use for all other federal agencies including the BIA.[23] Urban Indians, who suffer from poor housing, poor health, poor education, and unemployment could benefit greatly from the use of some of this land.

History has demonstrated repeatedly that the Federal government is often inattentive to its trust responsibilities. The complex process of military base reuse, in which there is federal, state, and local level participation, is unfortunately no exception. In 1994, United Indian Nations, in cooperation with the National Indian Justice Center and the Urban Habitat Program, attempted to propose legislation (sponsored by Senator Ron Dellums [D][Berkeley, CA]) reaffirming the federal government's trust responsibility to both reservation and urban Indians (National Indian Justice Center 1994). This proposal emphasized the legally required consideration that Indians are supposed to be receiving in the base conversion process.

Given political realities and the historical unreliability of legislative enforcement of Native rights, planners have a heightened ethical responsibility to be cognizant of, and committed to, such concerns. The successful integration of Native development issues into urban development practices requires local planners with a knowledge, of the special history and legal status of Native Americans, that few presently possess.

Concluding Remarks

The above examples are intended to demonstrate that Native community development might benefit from planners' expertise, but only if planners come to the table with a knowledge and respect for Native history and cultural values. Progressive planners committed to Native sovereignty and economic rights could provide a check on environmental resource exploitation and political exclusion. In order for planners to adequately address the needs of a diverse public they must know the history and experience of Native Americans (as well as other minorities), something that is not well addressed in planning education. When addressing issues that impact Native American communities in particular, planners should be aware of potential conflicts between traditional planning practices and the special planning imperatives of local cultures -- the most obvious example being the imposition of market-based policies (CDQs, etc.) on non-market cultures. The pursuit of commercial development may suit the needs or desires of some Native communities, while posing a grave threat to the continuance of others. In addition, individual Natives within some tribal communities may disagree on the appropriateness of commercial development. However, if Native communities,

as autonomous nations, freely choose to pursue profit-based or market-based ventures, that is their right under self determination. This scenario differs importantly from forced acceptance of such policies.

If planners are to play a positive role in the development and implementation of policies affecting urban and rural Indian communities, there must not only be a knowledge of historical and present realities of Indian oppression, of Indians' sovereign legal status, and of the federal government's trust responsibility, but also a respect for Native culture and a commitment to integrate that culture into any planning decisions which affect Native Americans, either on or off the reservation. One report notes that:

> American Indian cultures have an integrated view of human well-being -- the physical, mental, spiritual, and emotional aspects are balanced through proper education, cultural practices, productive work, and healthy ways of living... [They are] a people with rich traditions of environmental stewardship, honor, dignity, and respect for all life (National Indian Justice Center 1994: 13).

Until planning theory and education specifically address the unique history and special conditions of Native Americans, planning practice will never be able to adequately address Native development issues in either the urban or reservation context.

Notes

[1]For example, the category of race, now a well recognized basis for theorizing, has been in some of the founding works in modern sociology, such as Max Weber's *Economy and Society*. It is difficult, for instance, to explain Weber's' exclusion of racial groups from discussions of social action. Perhaps it results from an interest in the rational motivations, particularly the instrumentally rational motivations ascribed to actors in under a pure bureaucratic form of domination. Weber's conception of social action divided the possible motivations of social actors into four orientations: traditional (custom), affectual (emotional), value rational (aesthetic/ethical beliefs) and the instrumentally rational (the logical pursuit of interests based on expectations/knowledge). Neither racial identity nor belief in inherent racial characteristics fit neatly into these categories, however political competition between racial groups would seem as instrumentally rational a motivation for social action as would the competition between economic classes.
Legal theorists Richard Delgado and Kimberle Crenshaw have been among those attentive to the interconnectedness of race and other categories, such as gender, in shaping oppression. Delgado writes that: "...Crenshaw points out that a Black woman plaintiff, until very recently, had only two options. She could sue for racial discrimination, in which case she would be able to use statutes and case law developed with Blacks generally in mind. Or, she could sue for sex-based discrimination, invoking laws framed with women in mind. There was no legal category for Black women who experienced discrimination on account of their Black womanhood. So, they could either place themselves in a class of women dominated, numerically and in other ways, by white women, and use remedies framed with them in mind. Or,

they could sue for racial discrimination, in which case they ended up lumped in a category containing Black men. In either case, they wound up in a group -- white women or Black men -- with more power, prestige, influence, and standing than they." (Delgado 1993:650-651)

[2]Lynn Chancer has attributed exploitative social interactions to a sado-masochist dynamic: "The white worker powerless on the job may vent racist, homophobic, or anti-Semitic feelings on a steady basis, perhaps displacing dissatisfactions subordinately onto others he or she sees as possible scapegoats, as even more powerless" (Chancer 1992: 91).

[3]For discussion of stratification and ideology see Bowles and Gintis (1986).

[4]Note that throughout this article the following terms will be used interchangeably: Native, Native American, American Indian, Indian, Native, indigenous.

[5]Consider specifically the General Allotment Act of 1887 which imposed assimilation upon Indian communities by appropriating Indian lands and instituting compulsory boarding schools; and the BIA Relocation Program of 1947 which moved approximately 85,000 Native Americans off of reservations by 1967 (National Indian Justice Center 1994).

[6]See Appendix A of National Indian Justice Center (1994).

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Strip mining, which started in the 1950s, is one of the most notorious examples of environmental exploitation and degradation on Indian lands. Many Indian territories are rich with non-renewable resources such as uranium, coal, and oil, and mining companies were willing to pay significant lease fees to extract these resources. Because environmental laws, for many years, did not apply to reservation lands, mining companies were able to extract minerals and then abandon the mines leaving significant toxic and radioactive wastes behind.

[10]The number of tribes that were terminated is too great to list here. However one example is the Menominee tribe in Wisconsin, which had shown signs of autonomous economic development through forestry management and processing.

[11]See discussion below.

[12]In order to be eligible for federal Indian benefits one must register with the federal government and be certified as "Indian."

[13]See Chapter 2, "Federal Intervention: A History" in National Indian Justice Center (1994). The report discusses the following policies: General Allotment Act, Indian Reorganization Act, Bureau of Indian Affairs Relocation Program.

[14]See *infra* the discussions of Community Development Quotas and military base conversion.

[15]For Native communities, subsistence means more than sustenance, and is part of an overall culture, helping to maintain Native communities.

[16]Local, state, and federal social service agencies have been known to deny service to Native Americans, telling them that they must use Indian (Bureau of Indian Affairs) Services instead, which may not be as readily available.

[17]TAC is derived from a scientific analysis of what the minimum sustainable population of a given fishery is, and what level of catch can be allowed in order to maintain that minimum population.

[18]50 C.F.R. §676

[19]The community must be certified under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601.

[20]In order to be eligible for CDQs, Native communities must be in partnership with corporate actors and must establish separate community development organizations specifically for the purpose of designing or implementing community fisheries

development plans (50 C.F.R. §676.24; Bering Sea Fishermen's Association 1993).

[21]See Bering Sea Fishermen's Association (1993) and State of Alaska (1995) in which CDQ groupplans are outlined.

[22]For discussion of the waste facility site shortage and the proposed storage of High-Level Radioactive Waste by the Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians see Gerrard (19).

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THE STATE THEY'RE IN: HOW NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS

Rachel N. Weber

As planners, geographers and community organizations search for the magic formula which will explain why some regions are more or less economically vital, they confront complex questions about the interplay between economics and space. Recently, a diverse multitude of scholars and policy makers have rallied around the same conclusion: that *industrial districts* composed of networks of small, flexibly specialized firms are the key to a region's viability. Localized production sites are in and of themselves nothing new; industry has always relied on location decisions to aid market competitiveness, often clustering in the same geographic area as their supplier firms and final markets. Contemporary industrial districts, however, differ from the districts of yore in many respects. They are comprised of firms rooted in a milieu of trust and reciprocity that derives from the firms' smallness, geographical proximity, and financial interdependence. These firms are flexibly specialized in that they are organizationally equipped to reconfigure themselves to meet the rapidly changing demands of global markets. They are the antithesis of the centralized hierarchies which dominated the corporate landscape for most of the twentieth century.

The industrial district has been prescribed as a miracle cure for various ailments. Scholars believe that agglomerations of firms produce more exports, perking up sluggish national economies (Storper 1992). State and local governments, such as those in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Michigan, view embedded and interdependent firms as palliatives to the increasingly destructive power of mobile capital (as described in Harrison 1994). Small firms, many believe, produce highly-skilled,

highly-paid jobs with better prospects for security than the IBMs of the world. Cooperative consortia of firms are also thought to be more technologically innovative than dispersed, bulky multinationals (Gilder 1989). In the 1980s and early 1990s, countless conferences were sponsored to compare stories about industrial districts in various nations in hopes of assisting regions to "grow their own."

Despite such enthusiasm, many criticisms have been leveled at the concept of industrial districts. First, critics claim that the abstraction of industrial districts is rooted in very exceptional case studies. They assert that the industrial district is a restricted phenomenon, confined to places such as the Emilia Romagna region of Northern Italy, and that it resists meaningful generalization beyond specific contexts and histories (Henry 1992). Second, this area of inquiry is plagued by tautological confusion; it is unclear if proponents are positing a social totality with causal powers and necessary relations between phenomena such as agglomeration, innovation and flexibility. In many cases, the causal links are very tenuous and are unsuitable for any attempts at empirical verification (Appold 1995). Third, scant attention has been paid to issues of identity, power and class conflict at the points of production (Harrison 1994; Hattam 1993; Taylor 1993). Flexibility as a management strategy, for example, often has negative consequences for workers who must adapt to productivity levels and concession bargaining in order to retain their jobs.

In the following article, I present yet another criticism -- not of industrial districts per se, but of the prospects for their development in the United States. If we accept that (a) regional economies are the outcomes of deeper, structural processes of capitalist accumulation and investment, and (b) that there exists a tremendous diversity of capitalist development across nations, then we can expect some nations to be better equipped to nurture this specific form of regional economic development than others. Market economies are organized in very different ways, depending upon legal rules and informal practices that make up financial institutions, labor-management relations and industrial/technology policies. At the heart of these investment rules are very different conceptions about property and contract, which, I maintain, condition forms of regional development.

In the rush to extol the virtues of industrial districts, there seems to have been significant confusion about what is or is not an industrial district. In the second section of this article, I lay out three different models or paradigms which will serve to sort out some of the confusion. These three paradigms are not in any sense wrong, but they are all lacking a critical piece of the puzzle: reference to a national level of market regulation and investment rules. As such, my third and fourth sections describe a fourth paradigm -- one which examines the industrial district in light of national institutions. I conclude that the property and contractual relations which characterize the system of capital allocation in the United States are not conducive to the type of network-based cooperation and technological learning associated with industrial districts.

What Are Industrial Districts and Why Are They Important?

There is wide agreement that the organization of production in capitalist countries has changed dramatically over the course of this century. Most notably, we are told that the vertically-integrated corporation engaged in mass production has been and is still in the process of being replaced by enterprises engaged in small-batch, craft production. A breakdown of internal economies of scale and scope in the production process has produced a system of smaller, more flexible contractors.[1] How does business organize itself spatially in this new era?

Many have noted a resurgence of the regional economy, a strong pull for local production in the face of the pressures toward globalization. Although these industrial districts have been characterized as spatially concentrated networks of small firms relying on inter-firm linkages, most attempts to chart out the locational implications of post-Fordism have been stymied by a lack of consensus regarding the definition of an industrial district. In an effort to unpack this concept, I distinguish between three distinct but interrelated paradigms following Storper's lead (1994). Each of the three paradigms has emphasized different characteristics, origins and benefits of these spatial forms. Moreover, each of the three paradigms would lead local economic development planners to recommend a different set of policy prescriptions if they were interested in growing indigenous districts. Therefore, understanding these three strands as distinctive models will allay some of the confusion surrounding the current boosterism for industrial districts.

The first model, the *transaction cost* paradigm, combines a Coase/Williamsonian approach to industrial organization with concepts from neoclassical location theory. Associated with the California school of geographers (Scott 1988; Schoenberger 1988), this paradigm assumes that firms contract out and disintegrate in order to meet the demands of rapidly changing, uncertain product and factor markets. This deepening division of labor increases the number and complexity of external transactions. In order to minimize the costs of these frequent transactions, which are often associated with spatial distance, firms tend to cluster and converge locationally.

This division of labor immunizes firms from the risks of overcapacity and technological lock-in as well as maximizing the benefits of specialization. It also creates what Alfred Marshall called "external economies of scale" to refer to the sources of productivity increase that lie outside of the individual firm. Through repeated transactions with specialized firms, producers derive external benefits by sharing the fixed costs of such common resources as infrastructure, services, a skilled labor pool and common knowledge base. These often intangible factors of production, referred to by Storper (1993) as "untraded interdependencies" and as "positive externalities" by other economists, tend to be spatially concentrated. Once established, these agglomeration benefits become self-reinforcing through a dynamic process of increasing returns.

In summary, this first paradigm assumes that industrial districts -- synonymous with agglomeration economies -- are the outcome of firms' minimizing transaction costs and maximizing the benefits of external economies. They are defined as localized networks of producers bound together by a spatial division of labor. What defines an industrial district is its common causal process, not necessarily its personality as an agglomeration of firms (Henry 1992). Seen through the lens of transaction costs, industrial districts are desirable because these localized networks of firms are essential for the ongoing adaptation of the regional economy in the face of uncertainty (Storper 1993). Uncertainties are present in the acquisition of resources (factor inputs), the internal processing of resources (manufacturing, R&D, and training) and the delivery of products (marketing, demand patterns and services) (Kitschelt 1991).

A second paradigm focuses on the local institutions that both foster and result from the development of industrial districts.[2] The success of particular regions is often attributed to the sophisticated local regulation which encourages inter-firm cooperation; local institutions facilitate sharing market information, providing access to capital, jointly purchasing materials and conducting research (Christopherson and Redfield 1993; Harrison 1992; Piore and Sabel 1984). Whereas the transaction cost paradigm assumes that a division of labor in an uncertain environment will naturally create untraded interdependencies, Saxenian (1993; 1991) and others have determined that theories of external economies alone cannot explain particular regional differences, such as those she observed between Route 128 (outside of Boston) and Silicon Valley.[3] In response, the *institutional* paradigm examines the specific forms of sectoral and regional regulation that facilitate the provision of communal assets necessary to the success of the flexible production complex. This approach often emphasizes non-economic institutions, such as trust, which serve to sustain collaborative relations between firms.

From the perspective of this second paradigm, industrial districts are desirable not only because they are correlated with economic growth and minimize transaction costs, but, more importantly, because they promote cooperation, learning and mutual adjustment among specialist producers of complex and related technologies (Saxenian 1993; Harrison 1992). The dense institutional fabric and strong ties of certain regions encourage entrepreneurship and experimentation. According to this paradigm, industrial districts are also desirable because of their wider implications for civil society. The cooperative organizations, universities, trade associations and unions which offer services andcoordinate collaborative relations are viewed are part of the vibrant "middle ground" between the state and the market. These institutions specify the rules of interaction among players but also blur the boundaries between individual, atomized firms (Saxenian 1991). These institutions do not fall neatly into the pluralist model of political lobbying, where firms join in order to advance business

interests; instead, they are integrative organizations that have created a framework for competition and collaboration in a flexible production organization (Saxenian 1991).

A third model, the *technological* paradigm, is an offshoot of both the transaction cost and institutional approaches. It assumes that technological systems determine the locational form and governance structure of firm relations (Piore and Sabel 1984). For example, Fordist mass production techniques required considerable standardization of output in order to capture economies of scale (Schoenberger 1988). The technologies used in production did not permit frequent upgrading and modification, and, as a result, competition was based on superficial product differentiation. This technological system was characterized by wage bargaining, national-level regulation, vertically-integrated firms and branch plants. In contrast, the newer programmable and computerized technologies which characterize the post-Fordist era enable firms to rapidly reconfigure themselves to meet fluctuating demands of highly differentiated product markets (Harrison 1992). This system expresses itself organizationally in flexible networks of exchange and reciprocity.

The classical product cycle model points out that firms will disperse standardized operations away from centers of innovation (Vernon 1966). Because new flexible technologies and work organization involve craft-like customization and investment in rapidly changing, specialized processes, these production units tend to cluster in space.[4] Although it may be possible for flexible firms to interact with each other using modern tele-communications and frequent flyer miles, adherents of this paradigm emphasize that the technological learning required to sustain relations between firms requires geographical proximity. Storper (1993) and others have emphasized how tacit knowledge is uncodifiable and that innovation relies on face-to-face interaction between customers and suppliers.[5] Gertler's (1995) empirical study demonstrates just how important "closeness" is for capital goods producers, who service their customers frequently in order to ensure that they adapt technologies successfully. In summary, industrial districts are desirable from the third perspective because of their positive effects on technological innovation and diffusion.

Each of the three paradigms I have set forth stresses different attributes of industrial districts. For Scott (1992) and other transaction costs adherents, the process of agglomeration is the key defining feature of an industrial district; whether or not a region can boast of a high level of innovation or a unique form of cooperation and competition is insignificant. Others employ a less inclusive definition, using more selective criteria to distinguish between "true" industrial districts and mere agglomerations of firms. Those who adhere to the more institutional or technological paradigms search for the existence of particular market institutions and industrial forms, particularly types of craft production, or require that firms compete and cooperate with their neighbors more on the basis

of quality and technique and less so on the basis of price (Harrison 1993; Saxenian 1993). For the purposes of this argument, I will adopt their less inclusive definition of an industrial district as a region in which firms rely on quality-based linkages and intermediary institutions not simply to minimize transaction costs but to foster reciprocal technological learning. This definition places a premium on cooperative relations between firms and on the existence of untraded interdependencies.

The National System of Investment Paradigm

None of three paradigms I have just described recognizes the importance of national institutions in conditioning locational outcomes. Once the synergistic dynamism of industrial districts is in place, it is as if the region operates as a self-standing microcosm, immune from the organizational idiosyncracies and regulatory environment created and bounded by the state. Most proponents of industrial districts believe that only local institutions are significant, or for those in a more neoclassical vein, that the price mechanism, or transaction costs, alone determines the economic success of regions. The absence of national level variables can be explained by the general lack of crosstalk between regional economists and comparative political economists, a fact indicative both of their distinct goals but also of a reluctance to take the other's point of reference seriously. The regional economists who study industrial districts have paid only lip service to the rules and informal practices that govern national capital markets and that they associate with the previous period of Fordist production. In turn, the comparative political economists who study national level institutions have paid scant attention to the regional effects of national institutions.

In an attempt to rectify this situation, the remainder of this paper is devoted to describing a fourth paradigm through which we can view the phenomenon of industrial districts. This fourth paradigm examines national institutions comprised of property and contract rules that govern investment strategies. In looking at the spatial expression of capitalism as it varies across nations, this approach allows us to ascertain whether or not a particular nation is well suited for a particular type of regional development.

Regional particularities are due not only to resource endowments and factor prices but also to the structural sediment of investment rules. These rules are the legally codified outcomes of the broader historical development of national institutions meant to govern the economy (Taylor 1993). The system of allocating investment capital within and across firms is regulated by such rules, originally designed to protect shareholders from management abuse, and to prevent monopolistic tendencies among corporations (Roe 1994; Porter 1992; Sklar 1988). More specifically, these rules condition patterns of ownership, investor expectations and the availability, types and uses of information regarding investment and firm performance (Christopherson 1993).[6] Rules also establish network membership and grant status and legitimacy to agents (Taylor 1993).

For my purposes, institutions for organizing and allocating capital take center stage, and many have tried to explain cross-national variation in economic performance through understanding what kinds of long- or short-term relations these institutions embody. Zysman (1983), for example, distinguished credit-based financial systems (e.g. Germany) where banks have substantial ownership interests in firms, from equity-based systems (e.g. the United States) where there is a greater reliance on dispersed/passive shareholders and prices are established in competitive capital markets. The open and competitive structure of capital markets provides no coordinating or "system-steering" mechanisms to govern firm behavior (Christopherson 1993). Favoring equity over debt, American firms adjust individually to changes in product, consumer and financial markets; coordinating functions are achieved only through informal social networks (Saxenian 1991). As such, American firms have only fragmented, arm's-length relations with the financial system. Publicly-traded companies with a transient and diversified ownership base comprised primarily of institutional investors characterize this system (Lorsch and MacIver 1991).

The separation of management from shareholders, control from ownership, creates a wide information asymmetry between these two groups. As such, shareholders rely on index funds rather than company attributes or behavior to monitor and evaluate firm performance. In addition, shareholders have few means of communicating preferences to managers other than rather ineffectual proxy voting or by selling shares. This is in keeping with Zysman's observation that in capital based systems, "influence is determined by exit not voice" (1983: 272). Easy exit and diversified ownership provides no incentive for investors to become involved in the day-to-day functioning of the firm or its long-term performance (Alexander 1993). As many political economists have pointed out, the rules governing financial markets have encouraged a conception of investment as a way to quickly realize profits from firm assets rather than as a way to increase the productive capacity of these assets (Blair 1995; Christopherson 1992; Bluestone and Harrison 1988).

Internally, the American corporate governance and managerial reward systems are almost entirely focused on short-term returns. Central among these mechanisms is the shareholder-management relationship, based on a legally-codified fiduciary duty of management to maximize returns on the shareholder's investment.[7] Current stock price, rather than long-term shareholder value, increasing market share or corporate performance, is the basis of measuring whether or not managers are upholding this duty to stockholders; if they are not, they run the risk of derivative law suits or costly takeovers. Parties with long-term interests, such as banks, are forbidden by law from owning shares of companies they finance and are unable to exert much influence over investment decisions (Roe 1994). Instead it is the responsibility of managers and directors alone to interpret signals from the

external capital market and to maintain short-term returns on their investments. The practice of rewarding managers with stock options further rivets management's attention to short-term returns. As bonus systems that link managerial rewards to firm profitability, stock options provide a way of making management's goals more consonant with those of shareholders (Lorsch and MacIver 1991).

The Locational Implications of the National System of Investment

The investment rules and practices that I have just laid out are not conducive to unconcentrated property relations and inter-firm cooperation. As such, I hope to demonstrate in this section how the possibility of industrial districts is hampered not because firms are lacking entrepreneurial ability or trust, but because the national regulatory regime is not geared toward the longer time horizons required to solidify reciprocal relations between firms and develop untraded interdependencies (Christopherson and Redfield 1993). The American system of capital allocation is biased toward underinvestment in those activities, such as inter-firm linkages and shared assets, which cannot promise short-term, tangible returns. Corporate investments involving long-term and diffuse pay-offs will be poorly understood by the market and hence, undervalued.

Property Relations

New investment in economic activity is distributed unevenly across regions, contributing to what geographers refer to as spatial inequality (Massey 1984). However, the degree to which national firms rely upon or use spatial inequality in order to maximize profit varies. As Massey rightly points out, but does not develop, the reliance on space depends upon the structure of property ownership which also varies across nations. In other words, property relations characteristic of American-style capitalism have important consequences for the dynamics of regional development. In the United States, property rights are geared toward absentee stockholders, workers lack property rights in their jobs, and market and technological information is heavily guarded and privately owned. This structure of ownership fosters competitive bidding wars between states and municipalities vying for industrial location rather than clusters of firms involved in relationships of reciprocal exchange.

The United States is characterized by the high degree of autonomy it gives to corporate managers as fiduciary agents for shareholder owners. Property and contract vest managers with the almost unilateral power to select production techniques, make locational investments and initiate lay-offs. Ideally, ownership is supposed to create an unfettered, private sphere of action, insulating private firms from any public sector or labor influence. This insulated position can be contrasted with nineteenth century America where the distinction between public and private corporations was not as rigid; incorporation was viewed as a special privilege conferred by the state for public purposes and which justified the public regulation of property (Frug 1980). This notion of private property can also be contrasted with contemporary Western Eu-

ropean nations and Japan where the ideology of market competition is not as strong and where the property rights of others (labor, the state) dilute absolute control by owners. In Japan, for example, equity ownership by banks and related corporations creates a complex blend of ownership claims with less of an emphasis on shareholder returns (Kester 1991).

Regional economists tell us that the development of industrial districts requires multiple and continued investments in communal property. Marshallian external economies rely on a set of firms sharing access to an expanded "commons" of technical services, information and untraded interdependencies. Indeed, Saxenian attributes the success of Silicon Valley to the porous boundaries of local firms and to the existence of communal assets generated by non-market institutions. However, the competitive position of individual firms vis-a-vis the market precludes such investments unless each firm can be convinced of personal gain or if each firm can take advantage of the commons as a "free rider." In the absence of property regimes that facilitate new investments, the potential risk to firms (for example, in aiding competitors) will rule out the development of such a commons. Christopherson (1993: 284) notes that non-defense public investment ranks lowest among industrialized countries at .25 percent of the GDP in comparison with 5.75 percent in Japan and 4.8 percent in Italy.

National rules also define property rights in information which influence the degree to which firms can "share" tacit knowledge and mutually innovate (Nelson 1988). Complex legal rules protect intellectual property rights from infringement so that firms can fully appropriate returns from their innovations. Harrison (1993) notes the increasing amount of litigation in Silicon Valley primarily involves fears of copyright infringement. Such lawsuits may disrupt the cooperative relations necessary for technological learning. As such, information sharing may occur informally through individuals and their social networks but not generally through cooperative firm networks. Information asymmetries between banks and firms also limit access to long-term capital for risky ventures in breakthrough technologies.

In addition, workers are so removed from investment decisions that their hands-on or tacit knowledge is rarely utilized to improve the competitive situation of firms (Stone 1988). Unless there is an express private agreement to the contrary, non-shareholder constituents have no common law property right in a corporation, and thus managers do not owe them any duty of loyalty or concern (Beerman and Singer 1989). Legal rules, particularly those outlining the parameters of "at-will" employment, make it almost impossible to bargain for job security, and increasing labor flexibility has exacerbated this situation. Without assurances of security, workers lack incentives to engage in wealth-creating activities.

Contractual Relations

The technological and institutional dynamism of industrial districts can be partially attributed to their unique blend of inter-firm cooperation and

trust. Cooperation (sharing information, bidding on contracts together, and refraining from wage competition and labor poaching) is thought to reduce the risk of investing in specialized production techniques, R&D and the common infrastructure (Lorenz 1993; Putnam 1993). These cooperative relations are maintained without binding contractual commitments but through an informal background of common beliefs and trust. In the United States, however, cooperative relations may fail to take hold for reasons of short-term interests, monopolization and competitive cost-cutting. Lacking other formal institutions to facilitate trust (such as sectoral business associations), American firms rely on year-to-year arm's-length contracts to govern their relations with suppliers, consumers and workers (Soskice 1993).

Firms manage their affairs by shifting property and production relations through a mixture of ownership, contract and alliance (Storper 1993). Following in Williamson's (1985) footsteps, proponents of industrial districts believe that firms acting in uncertain environments are likely to contract out to other firms if transactions costs and risks are not prohibitive. Unlike Williamson, however, these advocates credit informal alliances and trust with holding the system together. Economic transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges (as in markets) or through administrative fiat (as in hierarchies); instead, network forms of exchange entail incomplete contracts within a general environment of reciprocity (Grabher 1993). In his study of subcontractors in Lyon, for example, Lorenz (1993) discusses the development of informal ties that are "deeper" than detailed contracts. His observants emphasized notions of loyalty, morality and mutual trust rather than formal written documents. Likewise in his studies of Italian, French and German regions that contain industrial districts, Sabel (1990) speaks of the role of trust in the wage determination process. These implicit contracts allow parties to customize their agreements and adjust quickly to exigencies.

From whence does such trust emanate? Trust is reproduced over a period of time through repeated formal and informal contracting, informal deal-making and personal interaction. Such interaction is likely to be enhanced by geographical proximity, revealing the confusing tautology surrounding the role of trust in the development of industrial districts; in other words, trust is a both necessary condition *and* an outcome of industrial districts. However, many authors point to additional prerequisites for trust: common heritages, cultural practices, and social networks, or what Harrison (1993: 476) calls the "cultural vestiges that contribute to localized thickening."[8] Although they have not explicitly made connections to issues of identity and regionalism, their assertions would limit the phenomena of industrial districts to areas which are relatively ethnically, racially or even politically homogeneous, such as Emilia Romagna (Powell 1990). Others have downplayed issues of identity to focus on a common "civic culture" which can facilitate the development of these areas (Storper 1993).

Trust plays an important role in securing the cooperation associated with industrial districts operating in increasingly uncertain environments. Firms still compete with each other, but primarily on the basis of quality and technique, rather than on price. Harrison notes:

> As an expression of trust, customer-supplier relations are believed to be characterized typically by single sourcing. And when they are not, when customer firms feel they must practice multiple sourcing to hedge against inaccurate pricing or opportunistic behavior by suppliers, this is done with the social acceptance of all firms in the district (Harrison 1993: 478).

In Germany and Japan, firms rely on many non-contractual safeguards against opportunism, such as close relationships with banks, cross shareholding agreements, extensive information sharing and trust (Kester 1991). Kester notes that these safeguards allow German and Japanese assemblers to operate at lower levels of vertical integration and to rely on fewer primary parts suppliers than their American counterparts.

Unfortunately, deep structural instabilities work against the institutional construction of trust and cooperative inter-firm relations in the United States.[9] The short-term horizons of American firms are incompatible with the long-term relationships with suppliers, consumers and personnel required for cooperative networks and technological learning. In countries where there is high degree of labor mobility, trust is not likely to take hold. In the United States, for example, average job tenure is 20 percent lower that in Europe (Ergas 1986).[10] American corporations favor highly contractualized buyer-supplier relations and arm's-length price-oriented transactions with a large number of competitive subcontractors. Harrison (1993) portrays the Silicon Valley electronics complex as an area fraught with legal conflict over intellectual property rights, a different picture than Saxenian paints. The number of lawsuits, Harrison asserts, is evidence of the erosion of the social basis for reproduction in this region. Lorenz (1993) also concedes that firms that use subcontracting as a means to respond to short-term capacity constraints are unlikely to succeed and forge tight ties with other firms.

Instead of creating horizontal relations with subcontractors for mutual benefit, American firms develop vertical relations where risks and costs are passed down through backwards linkages (Christopherson and Redfield 1993). Firms try to cut costs, discriminating between customers and limiting distribution to those who can provide the fewest risks and the largest potential profits. State and local governments know that American firms are prone to "low road" restructuring strategies, and are more organizationally equipped to cut costs rather than invest to increase revenues. These governments offer generous subsidy packages and aggressively recruit firms to build or expand in their regions (LeRoy et al. 1994). In nations with more

substantial welfare states, the national provision of services eliminates an area of potential competition among firms and regions; whereas in the United States, firms have the power to bid down benefits and wages to cut production costs. Withdrawing from high risk activities and markets, managers lack the tools to evaluate embedded capabilities such as inter-firm linkages (Baldwin and Clark 1991). In summary, short-term profit and performance considerations and cost-conscious supplier relations preclude firms from sharing risk, information or assets.

In addition, pressures from within and without these districts orient firm relations towards more concentrated, asymmetric and unbalanced forms of organization (Taylor 1993). Harrison (1994) asserts that small firms are being gobbled up by larger firms in the Third Italy and that large firms are suing smaller entrepreneurial companies in Silicon Valley. Leveraged buy-outs and frequent mergers and acquisitions work against the distribution of economic power and force down subcontractors' prices. In these corporations, economies of scale are just hidden by superficial network relations. In addition the various debates about firm size, market concentration and technological innovation have implications for industrial districts (Scherer 1986). If large firms are coming to dominate in these regions, the technological dynamism associated with industrial districts may in fact atrophy. Although there are empirical cases demonstrating how large producers are prone to spinoffs, innovation and outsourcing activity (e.g. large aircraft firms in Southern California), theorists have limited their definition of industrial districts to small producers (Scott 1992).

Conclusion

The preceding discussion has demonstrated how nationally-specific property and contract rules mediate relations between firms, thus influencing geographical outcomes. Does this mean that flourishing industrial districts are an unattainable fantasy for the United States? Although I have identified certain institutional obstacles that may impede the development of industrial districts, I do not wish to deny the possibility that vibrant agglomeration economies already exist or that they can be fostered in this environment. It is important to recognize that these rules and institutions are not as fixed and determinate as economists and institutional political economists would lead us to believe.

Regulatory reform at the national level may serve to offset intense cost-cutting competition among localities for new private investment and among firms for market share. In order to cooperate, firms and regions must agree to a set of institutional rules, including provisions for third party enforcement. Streek, notes that:

> unlike flexible specialization which is based on communitarian-cultural-contractual-voluntary bonds, organized conflict and formal institutions like unions, employers associations, the law and state continue to play a constitutive part in the generation and operation

> of quality diversified production. It requires rational pursuit of economic advantage embedded in and constrained by institutionally enacted and enforced social obligations (Streek 1990: 6).

One uplifting step in this direction has been the flurry of Congressional activity addressing issues of job insecurity and corporate short-termism. Senator Bingaman (D-NM) has recently proposed a bill that would reform securities regulation and rewrite corporate tax codes in an attempt to more closely align the interests of firms, workers and communities (Bingaman 1996). The bill imposes a sales tax on stocks, bonds and other investments held for less than two years. It also creates a lower tax bracket for "good guy" corporations who invest in substantial on-the-job training, provide health benefits and pensions, and keep 90 percent of new plant and equipment investments inside the United States.

In the absence of more robust national institutions to induce trust, cooperation and the diffusion of technological knowledge, local governance may enable U.S. firms to engage in more coordinated, collaborative practices. If local institutions can help firms to build enduring relationships and to invest in specialized, localized assets, they may be able to fend off national pressures to engage in myopic cost-cutting (Clark and Wrigley 1995a and 1995b). In this way, state and municipal governments must convince firms of the virtues of sunk costs. Sunk costs are essential for developing technological expertise and can represent an investment that is difficult to recoup. Local economic development policies should seek to encourage sunk costs, providing the highest-quality infrastructure and highly-skilled labor and enabling firms to participate both in regional and global networks.

Although many of the dynamic forces in contemporary capitalism are localized and territorially specific, this article has demonstrated how space is also transformed by national institutions. The dialectic between national institutions and regional characteristics is complex and is just beginning to be adequately theorized (Clark and Wrigley 1995a and 1995b; Harrison 1994; Christopherson 1993). Local politicians, active technical assistance programs, or coalitions of civic-minded residents, can all act to insulate localities from debilitating national impulses. Through strong sectoral associations, for example, Silicon Valley's industrial system was able to mute and weaken the influence of military procurement imperatives whereas Route 128 was predisposed to exploit and capitalize on the national pressures for their short-term advantage (Saxenian 1993). In this manner, regions are well situated to act as filters or intermediaries between national institutions and industrial outcomes.

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Notes

[1] Piore and Sabel (1984) contend that Fordism was not as widespread a production system as was thought. Many regions sustained a system of craft manufacture alongside more standardized production techniques.

[2] Comparable to what the Regulation School refers to as the "mode of social regulation," institutions are viewed as the codification of power relations between the state, market and civil society (Lipietz 1986). Adherents of the "new institutionalism" share a commitment to the socio-political construction of interests and to the belief that institutions are the loci of political power (Evans 1995; Hattam 1993; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Katzenstein 1985). Particularly popular with comparative political economists, the institutional paradigm helps to explain national differences within similar trajectories of capitalist development.

[3] Saxenian (1993) found that in spite of their common origins, Silicon Valley and Route 128 responded differently to intensified international competition in the 1980s. Whereas firms located in Silicon Valley responded quickly with increased product differentiation and risk- and cost-sharing arrangements, firms around Route 128 rigidly maintained dedicated machinery, secrecy and centralized authority. She attributes the dynamism of Silicon Valley to its "local industrial system" which is composed of three interrelated dimensions: local institutions and culture (universities, business associations, local government and other fora for social interaction), industrial structure (division of labor, degree of vertical integration, linkages between customers, supplier and competitors in particular sector) and firm organization (degree of hierarchical and horizontal coordination, centralization, and the specialization of tasks).

[4] A parallel argument is put forth by Markusen (1985) and other skeptics of product cycle theory who claim that large oligopolies are able to short circuit the maturation stage by recycling resources, differentiating products and relocating phases of operations to more profitable sites. In this way, innovation need not depend on constant reseeding of small firm start-ups because large corporations can internalize the product cycle themselves. As such, spatial agglomeration may depend on the existence of large firms (Scott 1992).

[5] Block (1990) and Baldwin and Clark (1991) note that this point is especially difficult for Anglo-Americans to grasp because they expect to extract the full capabilities of technologies merely by installing them correctly and flipping on the switch. European and Japanese firms place more emphasis on tacit knowledge and appreciate the necessity of social interaction for effective machine production.

[6] In order to soften the inherent determinism or structuralism of the national systems approach, it is important to recognize the socio-historical evolution of these rules, the role of individuals in interpreting rules and the possibility of resistance (Clark 1985; Unger 1983). Only certain types of firm relations and locational arrangements are compatible with a sustainable system of investment. In this sense, rules can be perceived as a kind of loose natural selection mechanism, ruling out certain possibilities but not necessarily determining those which survive.

[7] Fiduciary duties are legal-institutional mechanisms for corporate accountability; they include the duties of loyalty, care and concern, and obligations that the agent work for the exclusive benefit and in the best interest of the principal (Easterbrook and Fischel 1993).

[8] "Too much" embeddedness, Grabher (1993) points out, may result in a lack of technological innovation

("lock-in") because of old, petrified linkages and an absence of competition.

[9] Although firms may cooperate through exclusive personal connections and back-room deals, these types of relations are not always part of the public sphere; they are not sufficiently monitored or accessible to function in the same way as a trade association.

[10] This high labor mobility is substantially different from the voluntary, proactive Japanese practice of "management swapping," which is employed to increase collective knowledge about new technological developments.

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IMPACTS OF PLANNING AND BUILDING REGULATIONS ON THE PROVISION OF LOW-INCOME URBAN HOUSING IN KENYA

Dafton G. Njuguna

The prevailing mismatch between the collective capacity of the existing housing options (public and private) and the mounting demand for low-income housing at affordable rates both monetarily and environmentally is one of the greatest dilemmas facing the urban housing development in Kenya today. For instance, the current urban population growth rate of 6.5 percent per annum is increasing housing demand to more than 65,800 units annually. The industry is only able to provide less than two thirds of this demand, and the shortfall is met through squatting, unplanned settlements and overcrowding (Republic of Kenya 1994). While the demand has been increasing, real gross fixed investments (total capital formation at 1982 prices) in modern housing from both private and public sources have been declining, falling from Ksh. 2284.8 million (US$39.4 million) in 1989 to Ksh. 1513.8 million (US$26.1 million) in 1992 (Republic of Kenya 1993).

While a number of variables, such as the nature, availability, cost, suitability and location of the urban housing land, and sources and cost of finance, are significant in the production and distribution of low-income housing stock, this paper examines the role played by regulations in housing development in Kenya, especially their capacity to impede production and distribution of affordable shelter for the urban poor. However, regulations, as important as they are, should always be seen as a subset of this larger group of constraints.

The impact of regulations upon the provision of affordable housing for the urban poor depends to a large degree on whether they encourage or hinder actions which are consistent with and supportive of the national housing objectives. In Kenya

"decent housing within the reach of each income strata is recognized by the government as a major contribution to family and community health and the morale of the working population" (Republic of Kenya 1994: 237). Affordable housing is therefore viewed as a vehicle for attaining health and productivity. It is also a yardstick for measuring equitable development. What is the role of housing regulations in attaining decent and affordable housing for all?

To identify and evaluate some of the impact of applying and enforcing the current regulations on the capacity of the housing industry to deliver affordable housing, two housing projects intended for low-income people are examined. In each case two issues are analyzed: first, how controversies over the standards delayed project implementation and consequently increased construction costs, and second, the success of each project in terms of the proportion of the housing units that did not end up in the hands of the target income group as a result of any of these construction cost increases. It is found that the current regulations constrain development of low-income urban housing. A case for reviewing and disseminating revised regulations is made.

Characteristics of the Prevailing Housing Regulations in Kenya

Although the provision of urban housing in Kenya is regulated by a number of Acts of Parliament such as the Housing Act, the Building Societies Act, the Local Government Act, and the Town Planning Act, in practice, it is the Public Health Act and the Building Code that have been the source of constant controversies. The Public Health Act regulates matters that may affect public health generally (Republic of Kenya 1986). With respect to housing it mentions: construction and materials to be used; height of building chimneys; environmental conditions; use of temporary or movable buildings; aspects of fire; and drainage and sanitary conveniences. It does not define the standards of design and construction in connection with these issues but requires the local authorities to set them. However, its power to control the contents of the housing regulations lies in the fact that any proposed bylaws by a local authority can only be approved by the Minister for Local Government with agreement of Minister for Health.

Notwithstanding these Acts, urban housing in the country is largely regulated by the Building Code (Republic of Kenya 1968). Its British origin helps explain the conflict between its bylaws and the local effort to promote low cost housing.

> In the early years of this century, a British colonial administrator in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, decided that the city needed a set of bylaws. A native of the Lancashire town of Blackburn, he wrote to his hometown torequest a copy of its bylaws. When they arrived in Nairobi, the administrator gave them to a typist and said, 'Copy these out just as they are, except whenever you see the word 'Blackburn', type 'Nairobi' (Madeley 1994: 1).

Despite a number of changes over the years, it still contains many bylaws that do not reflect the socioeconomic and technological conditions prevailing in a developing country like Kenya, not to mention that it does not address the local climatic conditions.

The Code contains two statutory orders which regulate housing standards. Although the two orders are adoptive and not mandatory, i.e., local authorities may adopt them or make their own, they have been adopted across the country. The first order is the Local Government (Adoptive By-Laws) Building Order 1968, which is widely called Grade I By-Laws. These bylaws specify high quality standard of houses and apply in all urban areas, except in those areas which are scheduled for Grade II By-Laws application. The second is the Local Government (Adoptive By-Laws) Grade II Building Order 1968, which is often referred to as Grade II By-Laws. These bylaws apply to areas scheduled by the local municipal council and approved by the Commissioner of Lands. Although in theory they are supposed to allow for a more relaxed construction approach and are intended to facilitate provision of affordable housing for the lower-income groups particularly in peri-urban areas, in practice their interpretation has been very controversial.

The nature of any planning and building regulations and the mechanisms used to enforce them have significant impact upon housing development because they provide guidelines and controls that define the quality and quantity of the built environment. They define, for instance, the level of infrastructures and services to be provided as well as the type of building materials, modes and construction techniques to be applied. The degree of their influence on the quality of the built environment depends on the type of standards adopted. There are two types, specification and performance standards. In the building industry, specification standards are used to determine the structure and form of buildings by prescribing materials and building techniques. Performance standards, on the other hand, tend to set functional limits on building components and establish norms of the physical quality of the built space. With respect to low income housing prescriptive standards tend to be restrictive while performance standards are more flexible (UNCHS-Habitat 1981). The capacity of the industry to deliver affordable housing cannot be increased unless the building regulations are flexible enough to be low income-friendly.

The Kenya building code is specification-oriented, and contains standards and regulations that prescribe use of unaffordable materials and planning practices. Therefore, these regulations are especially constraining in the provision of low-income urban housing due to the inherent conflict between interpretation of the prescribed building materials and infrastructure standards on one hand and affordability considerations on the other. This characteristic limits its flexibility, making it less accommodative of innovations, and consequently unable to address new problems such as those emanating from informal urban settlements. As a result, designers and developers are often reluctant to specify

or use planning approaches or materials or construction methods that are not prescribed in the code even when the approach or material or technique promises to be appropriate and cost effective. Housing regulations and standards are therefore needed in order to encourage research into local building materials and construction techniques as well as alternative innovative planning approaches.

Case Study One: The Dandora Community Development Project

Dandora Community Development Project, a site and services housing scheme in Nairobi, helps to illustrate the kinds of problems introduction of low cost innovative designs faces in the housing industry. The concept of site and services schemes refers to the development and allocation of serviced plots to individuals where the allottees can build their own houses according to approved plans. General services provided include water, drainage, sanitation, paths, roads, electricity, telephones and minimum community facilities. In addition, a range of alternative levels of services is provided to each plot before allocation. In Kenya the most common initial plot developments include: a site with only a manhole connection; a site with a wet-core (toilet and shower); a site with a wet-core and a kitchen; and a site with a wet-core, kitchen and a room (Chana 1979).

The Dandora project was conceived to meet the housing needs of the low-income groups occupying the 20th, 30th and 40th percentiles in the city's income distribution curve as outlined in a report to the Nairobi City Council on Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy by the Nairobi Urban Study Group in 1973. The World Bank had been involved in discussing Nairobi's urban problems with the Government and the City Council of Nairobi since 1969 with a view to addressing the growing needs for housing for the low-income earners and alleviate the problems associated with squatting.

The project preparation period was from January 1973 to May 1974 while project appraisals occurred fromJune 1974 to May 1975. Project implementation was undertaken in May 1975 and the first phase, which consisted of 1038 plots, completed and handed over to the allottees in November 1976. When the project was completed in 1982, it consisted of 6,000 serviced residential plots and community facilities (which included six primary schools, two health centers, two multipurpose community centers with day-care facilities, one sports complex and 400 market stalls).

Constraints in the Dandora Project were clearly evidenced by delays in the implementation process. The project took eight years to complete, three years behind schedule. Many factors caused the delay, not least of which was the limited experience of the parties involved including the World Bank, in handling a project of this size, but the most often cited cause of the delay was the disagreement over the building standards (Njuguna 1989).

The Grade II By-Laws of the Building Code were adopted for the project area, which was zoned as a special high-density zone after a detailed analysis during the project preparation stage. How-

ever, no sooner had construction begun in Phase I than dissatisfaction and disapproval of Phases I and II were voiced by the City Engineer's and Public Health Departments. This was the first time Grade II By-Laws were being applied in a large scale project, and there was some elitist reluctance by some people both in and out of the government to accept standards they felt inappropriate for the nation's capital.

Design and Construction Standards

The conflict over standards concerned the following three issues.

Infrastructure and Wet-Core Design Standards: Disagreements arose over sewage design standards, and the location of the branch sewer in relation to the wet-cores, i.e., kitchen, toilet and shower. The initial layout of Phase I comprised plots averaging 120 square meters, laid out with wet-cores arranged in blocks of four, and sharing an inspection chamber plus two walls. The sewer ran in an unbuilt area in front of the wet-cores but on private plots. Both the City Engineer's and Public Health Departments argued that there would be maintenance problems. Fortunately, Phase I went ahead as scheduled but the controversy greatly affected Phase II. The plans of Phase II had to be changed to reserve a 3-meter wayleave (a right of way) along the sewer at the back of one of the two rows of the back-to-back plots. This also affected the design of the wet-core blocks resulting in groups of two (instead of four) with one shared wall (instead of two walls). This conflict halted implementation for about a year. Additional costs totaling about Ksh. 25 million (US$0.43 million) due to design changes and an increased cost of construction due to inflation compounded the execution of Phase II. Consequently, the target income groups were priced out. Today a significant part of this housing is owned by higher income groups. Whereas 90 percent of Phase I allottees eventually completed the required building on their plots, at least 35 percent of those originally allocated plots in Phase II failed to build and ultimately abandoned the project (Lee-Smith and Memon 1988). This allowed income groups above the specified target income groups to occupy the plots in Phase II, thereby defeating one of the objectives of the project and frustrating the national housing program.

Construction Standards of the Community Facilities: Here the dispute was mainly limited to the health facilities. In the first phase of construction, Nairobi County Council built a health center of very high standards, again on the insistence of the Public Health Department, without the approval of the World Bank. The dispute was intensified on the design of the second health center. The conflict arose over: the use of a pitched roof instead of a flat one; the use of cement-plastered floors instead of terrazzo; and the use of oil-painted plaster on corridor walls instead of the terrazzo or tiles being taken up half the wall height.

Finally, the case for the lower-standards' design prevailed and was built in 1983, but not before the construction cost had skyrocketed 400 percent. Sadly, the health center complete with a maternity wing remained closed until 1987 in a community that desperately needed medical care.

Construction and Use of Temporary Shelter: The Dandora project consisted of two options plots. Option B plots had a wet-core of kitchen, store, W.C. and a shower by the time they were handed over to the allottees. The allottees occupied the kitchen while they built the rest of the house. Option A plot's wet-core consisted of a W.C. and a shower only. The allottees of these plots built temporary structures which provided accommodation during the period of construction of the permanent house. The erection of the temporary shelter was determined by the allottee, usually from cheap materials (often reused ones) such as cardboard, polythene, mud and wattle. Although By-Law #17 of Grade II By-Laws allows the relaxation of the By-Laws to permit construction of a temporary shelter at the discretion of the council, the Public Health Department objected strongly to the construction despite the council's approval. Finally, the allottees were granted permission on condition that the temporary structures be demolished at the end of 18-month period allowed for the construction of the permanent house.

By using the temporary shelter, the allottees saved on the rent for their previous residence. This arrangement allowed the allottee to be at the site during the construction period, and also provided a storage space for building materials and equipment (Soni 1981). Option B allottees occupied the kitchen and built their houses faster than the Option A allottees (who had finally to construct temporary structures to occupy while building the rest of the house). Temporary shelter is not as bad as the Public Health Department portrays it to be and plays a crucial role, particularly in the absence of a better alternative.

Lessons Learned

There were several lessons learned in this housing project. The most obvious lesson was that Phase I epitomized success while Phase II was largely a failure, mainly because it bypassed the low-income groups and ended up being owned by the upper-income groups. Technically, Phase I site layout and services were designed to standards which made housing available to relatively low-income earners. This was due to innovative designs features (such as shared drain inspection chambers) which made significant cost savings possible. If wet-cores were provided and designed as required by the code, housing in Phase I would not have reached the lowest income groups (as was the case in Phase II). This demonstrates that with enough ingenuity Grade II By-Laws can be used to provide low cost housing.

While the planning, design, and implementation of Phase I was a success story, maintenance and operational costs of the infrastructure and services have been high. Studies of such housing schemes elsewhere show that the cost of providing infrastructure and services are greatest at very high densities (a thousand persons per hectare) since the cost of maintaining and operating each plot is high (Chana 1979). Costs are, likewise, high at very low densities (100 persons per hectare) since the development, maintenance and operation of these

services are for a limited population. The range of average desirable gross densities in the site and services schemes is estimated to be between 300 and 600 persons per hectare. In the Dandora Project one hectare comprises 50 plots, and each plot was supposed to have an occupancy of ten people. This yields a density of 500 people per hectare and falls within the desirable density range. But according to a survey done immediately after completion of Phase I, a plot occupancy of 13 people (650 people per hectare) resulted in a density above the desirable range. The current population of the whole project is estimated at 100,000, well above the initially projected figure of 60,000 (an excess of 40 percent). This has placed a stressful load on the community facilities, especially the schools, health center, and recreation areas. While not much can be done at the planning level to avoid future overcrowding, planning regulations ought to allow planning of communal facilities and services on an improvable and expandable basis to meet needs of an increasing catchment population.

The greatest merit of the house designs relates to the fact that they were extendable on a room-by-room basis. The allottee could begin by building one room and adding more rooms as income allowed, to an average maximum of four. The average room area is nine square meters. Given that the projected plot occupancy was ten people (i.e., two to three people per room) and that the code requires an area of 3.72 square meters per person, the room size was just enough. Experience has shown the code's prescribed seven square meters per room results in overcrowding or wastage of space. A seven square meter room can easily accommodate two beds and among low-income people, it is likely to be used that way, making the requirement of 3.72 square meters per person unrealistic. On the other hand, using it as a sleeping room for one person is underutilization of useful space. Another important new design approach used in Dandora was the designing of rooms as autonomous general purpose rooms, opening to a corridor or veranda instead of the common conventional one-activity room designs. This design facilitated subletting, which is an important means of earning additional income. In most of the low-income housing schemes the pressure for subletting is such that the plot owner and tenants end up each living in a single room in which they carry out all their household activities. Given the housing scarcity, a new design approach is necessary, one which accepts the fact that more and more households will be living in single rooms.

Separating the sanitary unit from the habitable structure, and separating further the toilet from the shower was a good design approach because of the high occupancy rate (and therefore intensive use) foreseen. But there was inadequate provision of these facilities due to the higher than the expected occupancy that occurred. Thirteen people (the current occupancy rate of one plot) sharing one toilet during peak hours is not practicable.

The houses were designed envisioning concrete blocks as the walling material, but as it turned out many allottees ended up using natural stone instead of the blocks. The natural stones were readily

available from nearby quarries and were cheaper than the concrete blocks. Unfortunately, the emphasis on conventionally defined "permanent" materials continued to stifle opportunities to experiment with other materials such as stabilized soil blocks.

Since Dandora a number of projects have been built in Nairobi incorporating the lessons learned in Dandora. One such project is Umoja II in Nairobi which was designed to test standards that were supposed to be subsequently approved by the Nairobi County Council (NCC) if the project was successful. Despite its success the standards that were used were never adopted by the NCC; instead the Council has proposed higher standards for adoption illustrating how resistant to change the status quo is.

Case Study Two: Nyahururu Tenant Purchase Housing Scheme.

There have also been other pilot projects built in other major municipalities under the Second and Third Urban Projects using varying degrees of relaxed standards. Additionally, sites and services, and core housing projects have been built using relaxed standards in secondary towns around the country. One such pilot project in Nyahururu town used both relaxed standards and materials innovatively resulting in affordable housing for the targeted income group.

Planning of this project, which is one of the Small Towns Projects sponsored jointly by the Government of Kenya and the US AID, started in 1983 and construction of all the 116 units was completed by 1987 with the funds coming mainly from the US AID. Apart from providing housing, the primary objective of this pilot scheme was supposed to demonstrate how the local authorities in the secondary towns could provide decent and affordable housing to the low-income groups through use of relaxed planning standards and innovative building materials. The main actors were the National Housing Corporation (for the central government), Public Health Officer (for the District), Nyahururu Municipal Council, and US AID.

There are two sites in the scheme with one of the sites having 90 houses constructed of conventional materials (galvanized corrugated iron sheets and dressed natural stones), and the other site 26 houses built of innovative materials - sisal fibre concrete tiles and cement stabilized soil blocks. Sisal fibre concrete roofing tiles are made from cement and sand mixed in the ratio of 1:3, and chopped sisal fibre of 12.5mm in length. Cement-stabilized soil blocks are made from good quality soil, cement and sand. The percent of the cement content depends on the quality of the soil, required strength of the blocks and the climate of the area. Both of these materials are easily made on site by trained local artisans using locally fabricated equipment.

Three cost-reducing strategies were adopted in the site with the 26 non-conventional houses. These strategies included use of modest infrastructural standards such as low cost roads and ventilated improved latrines (VIPs), house designs

that enabled house owners to sublet some of the rooms, and use of on-site-produced stabilized soil blocks and fibre cement reinforced tiles. Also, since the plots are unserviced, water is provided communally at a central point.

Each house has three rooms of varying sizes: 12 feet by 10 feet for the largest room, 10 feet by 10 feet for the medium-sized room, and 10 feet by 8 feet for smallest. These houses are designed to be extended by constructing two more rooms, and gradually upgrading them to waterborne sanitation as and when the owner's finances allow.

During the planning and implementation of the project several constraints were encountered. Some of the problems were of regulatory nature; regarding use and suitability of the proposed standards and use of alternative materials as well as pit latrines. The other problems related to quality control during the preparation and use of the soil blocks.

Regulatory Problems: The proposal to use relaxed standards, particularly the use of the pit latrines, prompted a disagreement between the various actors. On one side, the Ministry of Health officials contended that, first, the Public Health Act prohibits construction of pit latrines in a gazetted Municipality, and second, the absorptive capacity of the soil on the sites was inadequate to support a latrine. On the other side, the Municipal Council of Nyahururu argued that a waterborne sanitation proposal would increase the cost of a housing unit by 25 percent making it unaffordable by the target income group. The council also argued that the absorptive capacity of the soil is not a significant factor in the performance of the proposed "dry" latrines.

Implementation of the project was halted while actors went to court. By the time the project was finally constructed, the projected cost per unit had risen from Ksh. 26,000 (US$448.3) to approximately Ksh. 32,000 (US$551.7). Despite these cost increases, the units were, however, cheaper per square foot than the conventionally built units in the same scheme, and the targeted income group was still able to afford the cost (Omayi 1993).

Quality Control Problems: Construction of a durable stabilized soil block wall depends on many factors such as: the quality of workmanship; the quality of the soil blocks used; the strength of the mortar used to bind the blocks together; protection against dampness and mounds; and protection from the elements particularly the rain. Stabilized soil blocks had not been used before in a project of the Nyahururu scale and inexperience led to initial production of poor quality blocks. Initially, the main problem was poorly compacted blocks, and this was attributed to inexperienced artisans, poor supervision and a faulty block press. These problems had to be overcome as the project progressed. A field survey has revealed a number of problems. First, walls were beginning to show signs of wear and tear four years after completion. Second, the houses were designed without adequate roof overhangs to protect the walls from wind-driven rains. As a result, cement coating has begun peeling-off. Third, damp proof courses, which are

necessary with all other masonry wall constructions, were omitted during design and construction. Field investigation by the author in 1994 revealed widespread instances of dampness in the walls of most of the 26 houses.

Current Status of the Review of the Regulations

Every attempt to relax the planning and building regulations has been accompanied by controversies which are characterized by posturing and "defending of territory" as demonstrated in the preceding case studies. While most of the decision makers in the industry agree, for instance, about the need to change the regulations, they do not agree on the pace and extent to which they should be changed, particularly with respect to those that affect their individual departments. Despite these controversies a lot of studies and seminars have been conducted in preparation for both eventual legislative reform and diffusion of these low cost design principles.

Since 1979 when the Kenya government and the World Bank embarked on the first comprehensive study of the regulations, a number of important studies and attempts to review them have been undertaken. These efforts have been in accordance with one of the national housing objectives: "to formulate and adopt realistic and performance-oriented building standards especially in the area of low cost housing" (Republic of Kenya 1984: 164-165). These attempts include: (1) the Kenya Low Cost Housing By-Laws of 1980 which was funded by the Government and the World Bank and written by Saad Yahya and associates; (2) the Kenya Low Income Housing By-Laws Review of 1986 which was prepared by an inter-ministerial committee; (3) the Statutory Building Regulations Study - a Situational Analysis and a Tentative Agenda for Action of March 1990 which was commissioned by the Intermediate Technology Development Group and done by Elijah Agevi of the Housing Research and Development Unit; and (4) the national seminar on Building By-Laws and Planning Regulations of November 1990 which was sponsored by the Intermediate Technology Development Group and hosted by the Ministry of Lands and Housing in collaboration with Housing Research and Development Unit. However, none of these efforts has resulted in a comprehensive review of the regulations' to-date.

Through these efforts it has been "finally realized that what was needed were not scaled-down standards with prescribed materials that everyone should build up to, but minimum standards that everyone could start with. The standards had to be related to the performance of the materials used, without excluding the rough and ready materials that most people used. They had to allow people to start with a very basic structure, and to build and add on as and when they wanted to and could afford to" (Agevi 1994: 6-7). This realization is beginning to bear fruits: the government has promised to publish some of the revised technical by-laws relating to building and drainage as well as rules with respect to pit latrines in the Kenya Gazette (the official periodical news organ where the government notifies the public of changes in statutory rules and orders). Once gazetted it is hoped

that these standards will be flexible enough to allow use of alternative low cost building materials and techniques, and affordable infrastructures and services. Also, promised is a comprehensive review of all the building bylaws and planning regulations (Standard on Sunday 1995).

Conclusion

This examination of the planning and housing regulations, and their application to urban housing reveals that they constrain low-income housing development in three ways. First, implementation of projects is often delayed considerably due to controversies surrounding use of relaxed standards in the planning, design, construction, and use of innovative materials. Meanwhile, costs escalate making the housing unaffordable by the low-income groups. Second, since the level of planning and design standards has direct impact on the cost of the houses, low-income housing built to the stipulated standards in the current Building Code and the Public Health Act end-up being unaffordable by the target groups. Third, because infrastructural services have an impact on the physical layout of the plots and community facilities, they can and should be planned for initially. But since they contribute significantly to the overall cost of the housing unit, their construction in the lowest-income housing schemes should, with the exception of the absolutely essential sanitation, be part of an upgrading program instead of requiring them at the initial stages of a project.

The results of these studies imply a need for a shift in planning and design paradigm; it is necessary to shift our approach to housing regulations from a narrow definition to a wider basic-needs approach. In the face of limited resources, this holistic approach makes it possible to trade off between various needs and standards. Reduced indoor space, for example, can be compensated for by an outdoor sheltered open space next to the house to provide relief from indoor overcrowding. Or initial poor quality structures can be compensated for in security of plot tenure. This approach also supports the rationale behind squatter upgrading programs, i.e., the physical structure, taken in isolation, may not be as important as we used to think it is. As Kenya and other developing countries review their housing regulations, the challenge for the planners and architects is to recognize and explore further the benefits of such a shift in the paradigm.

To effect such planning and building approaches a new set of performance oriented planning and housing regulations that accommodate low cost design and material innovations need to be enacted. The new standards should be simplified in a form and language that are easily understandable by professionals and users alike who may lack a legal and technical background. An enabling professional, political and economic environment is needed as well in order to diffuse these regulations successfully.

Active governmental involvement in the provision of support services and infrastructure such as availing lowcost credit, appropriate land and land tenure is necessary. To promote maximum use of the revised standards, the government can use their adoption and application as a policy variable,

i.e., avail low cost credit and tax relief only to the developers and individuals who adopt them. While a significant number of non-governmental organizations are already actively financing and technically supporting housing development, their effectiveness is often reduced by bureaucratic requirements and duplication. More effective non-governmental participation can be achieved by creating a well-defined legal and practical framework that allows non-governmental organizations to assist local communities directly without going through the central government as is currently the case, and a coordinating umbrella organization to reduce potential for duplicating efforts.

Additionally, professional attitudes toward these regulations and low-income housing in general need to be improved. As a result of their western-derived training, professionals are often inadequately prepared and less inclined to handle projects that lack glamour such as low-income housing. For a start, a number of initiatives can be taken to change these attitudes: introduce adequate content and emphasis on low cost techniques for solving shelter and infrastructure problems in the curricula; require a knowledge of low-income settlements in professional licensing examinations; and, provide continuous professional education in conceptual and practical aspects of dynamic community participatory process so that professionals are prepared to augment self-help efforts. Since craftsmen and artisans play perhaps a more crucial role than other professionals in the construction phase of low cost housing, special programs would be required to upgrade their skills. Such programs should also prepare them to perform as "barefoot professionals" in glamour-less projects where other professionals may be unwilling to participate. Additional research is needed to establish what other incentives are needed to motivate professionals, craftsmen and artisans to upgrade their skills.

Finally, active community involvement in the planning, implementation and evaluation of these changes is going to be very crucial. Besides empowering the users in planning their environments, community participation programs should also aim at reducing peoples' expectations of the government's beneficence. Individual participation can be either at the community planning level or at the house design and construction level. There are already emerging models of participation at the community level from other developing countries which can be adapted easily to the Kenyan context (IIED 1994). Self-help construction practices already exist in the country, and can be enhanced further by studying the impact housing standards have on self-help house-building activities. Similar studies should be conducted to examine the economic circumstances that are likely to influence public and private decisions to adopt the new standards.

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THE CAPABILITIES OF A BUS THAT CAN'T TURN AND AN ALTERNATIVE VISION: RAIL TRANSIT'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF LOS ANGELES

Ryan Snyder

Rail transit has been the centerpiece of transportation plans for Los Angeles County since the passage of Proposition A in 1980. The Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) and its successor, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), have generally held the Proposition A plan for a rail transit network as the Bible of transportation planning and policy. The new MTA 20-Year Long-Range Plan continues the rail development course. As the MTA plan slowly unfolds, the leading transportation experts in the region argue that rail transit is not suitable for Los Angeles County. Primarily from the academic community, these experts opine that rail transit works well in dense, compact cities with channeled trip patterns, a dearth of parking and low rates of auto ownership. They say Los Angeles lacks the density needed for rail transit, has scattered trips, has plenty of parking compared to rail cities, and that nearly every adult here owns a car.

Rail proponents have countered that while Los Angeles may not be well-suited today for rail transit, it will be in the future. They take their argument even one step further to say that the presence of a rail network will recreate Los Angeles into a rail-conducive city. MTA officials justify their investment in rail transit on the need to plan for the future.

An efficient transit system should strive to meet four goals:

- To improve mobility for transit-dependent people
- To reduce congestion
- To reduce mobile source air pollution emissions
- To reduce energy consumption

As an auxiliary benefit, investment in a transit system can stimulate job creation. Policy-makers should ask, "how can we best meet these goals given the available funds?" MTA has chosen to invest heavily in rail transit. It is unclear whether their vision shares all these goals. But MTA officials repeatedly claim that the rail system is a necessary remedy for congestion.

This paper argues that MTA's vision of the future is unlikely to unfold. It presents an alternative vision of the future of transportation in Los Angeles that holds more promise for an efficient, attractive transit system well into the future.

Ten Reasons Why Investing in a Rail Transit Future Is Bad Policy

1. Los Angeles County Won't Have Rail Density for the Foreseeable Future. The MTA's 20-Year Long Range Plan bases growth estimates on Southern California Association of Government (SCAG) data which project a 35 percent increase in population and a 29 percent increase in employment by the year 2015 in Los Angeles County. However, little growth will occur along planned intra-urban rail lines. Most of the growth is expected in outlying areas, such as the Antelope Valley and fringes of the San Gabriel and San Fernando Valleys. The Long Range Plan cites a projected 11 percent growth in the central areas of the County basin.

This type of growth doesn't bring us anywhere near rail density. Rail density can be found in Manhattan, Tokyo or London. This type of density is of another order of magnitude of that expected in Los Angeles. Some transit specialists use a threshold of 15,000 to 20,000 transit passengers per hour as sufficient to justify a rail investment. Whether or not planners use this criterion, at least the investment should bring roughly the same achievements towards the transit goals, as an alternative investment, say in buses.

Rail transit in Los Angeles County will not meet either of these criterion. For example, the Blue Line is the most successful of the rail lines in Los Angeles County. Yet, each ride requires a subsidy of about $11 as compared with $1 and some odd cents for each bus ride in the County. The Blue Line's daily ridership of 39,000 would have to increase to 150,000 or 200,000 in order to become comparatively cost-effective with the bus. This magnitude of increase won't occur with a clever marketing campaign. Even if everyone who travels that corridor every day used the Blue Line, the numbers would fall far short. Only an increase in density on the order of 300 or 400 percent would achieve this. The scenario is much worse for the Green Line which now averages just over 12,000 daily riders, or the Red Line which captures about 19,000 daily trips with much higher costs than the Blue Line (MTA 1996).

2. Existing Land Use Planning Isn't Compatible With Rail Lines. It is possible for cities to reshape around rail transit over time, but only when compatible land use planning accompanies rail lines. Such land use planning would concentrate virtually all new growth in the County to rail station areas. If centers with the square footage of

Century City containing a full mix of commercial, residential and retail uses developed around stations, rail transit would be much more viable. These centers would have to be highly compact and contain very little parking for autos. A small handful of these centers wouldn't create a rail-conducive city. Many of them would be necessary so that large numbers of people would live near a station and have destinations near other stations.

This type of planning is not occurring in Los Angeles. The draft Los Angeles City Plan Framework, which is the planning blueprint for the next twenty years, makes only minor attempts to plan for growth around rail stations. For example, in the San Fernando Valley only two of 13 planning districts lie along the proposed East-West Valley Rail Line. Today 78 percent of all residents, 77 percent of all jobs and 74 percent of all commercial space in the Valley lie in planning districts that would not be served by the line. With the Framework, 79 percent of all *new* residents, 77 percent of all *new* jobs, and 76 percent of *new* commercial space in the Valley are expected in planning districts not be served by the line (Ryan Snyder Associates, Inc. 1995). Clearly, little attempt is being made to concentrate growth around stations. Similarly, the joint City of Los Angeles/MTA transportation policy that was prepared with the specific goal of planning transit and land use together, creates centers around a few rail stations, but nothing of the type that would reshape Los Angeles into a rail city. For example, the attempt to plan rail density at the Sunset/Vermont Red Line station (one held up as a model) is far too modest. It allows for a small increase in the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and a reduction in the parking requirement from 2 spaces/1,000 square feet to 1.5 spaces/1,000 square feet. This much parking would still entice the majority of visitors to drive to the new buildings. Compare this with Toronto where FARs were increased as much as from 2:1 and 3:1 to 12:1 and parking codes were reduced to as low as 0.25 spaces/1,000 square feet.

3. Planning for Rail Density is Politically Difficult. The recent trend in community planning is down-zoning, not up-zoning. Any attempt to dramatically upzone station areas would likely be met by stiff opposition from local residents. This has become especially clear as the City Plan Framework advanced through public hearings. Conversely, commercial and multi-family residential property owners outside station areas would strongly oppose any severe down-zoning of their properties that would be necessary to concentrate growth around rail stations.

4. Rail Stations Aren't Necessarily Major Attractors of Development. Even if technical and political barriers were surmounted, no strong evidence shows that new construction would gravitate to station areas. Many factors go into developers' locational decisions and the presence of a rail station is only one. Rail stations rank far behind land costs, building codes, local markets and other factors where ridership is low. The experience of metropolitan areas with new rail transit systems across North America, such as Atlanta and the San Fran-

cisco Bay Area, has not demonstrated rail stations to be strong magnets for developments. In these cities, and even in Toronto which uses stringent land use planning tools, most new development occurs outside rail station areas. In Los Angeles, with over five years of Blue Line experience and a few years of Red Line experience, no evidence indicates that the stations have become major attractions for new development. The trend in cities across the nation, withor without rail transit, is toward more dispersion of land use. In any case, it is unlikely that development would conform to the vision embodied in rail-oriented land use planning not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of land use mix and urban design.

5. Other Forces Are at Work Shaping Los Angeles. As our economy transforms from a manufacturing economy to a service-based economy, real estate forces have spread the urban area by bringing office buildings into suburban communities. Los Angeles has no dominant downtown. While some commercial centers are located throughout the region, most employment and housing are scattered throughout. Just as this economic change has helped to shape Los Angeles, telecommunications equipment such as telephones, fax machines, computers, modems, multi-media and on-line services may play a role in shaping the city. The capabilities of these technologies may reduce the need to travel and could disperse our communities further. The real impact these technologies will have on urban form is unknown.

6. Long Term Growth Patterns Are Unpredictable. The best look we have to the future of land use in Los Angeles (SCAG forecasts and the Los Angeles City Plan Framework) only extend the planning horizon 20 years. Neither of these show that Los Angeles will be close to a rail-conducive city by the year 2015. Beyond that is anyone's guess. We don't know that Los Angeles won't go the way of Cleveland, St. Louis, and most older American cities and *lose* population. Unforeseen economic changes could have a dramatic effect of our growth. Or, a severe oil shortage or the realities of global warming could force us into different living and travel patterns. We do know that for many decades most of Los Angeles residences and jobs will be spread over a vast area. It is possible that 50 or 60 years from now, parts of Los Angeles will have rail density. It is unlikely that we will have rail density much before that.

Last, if Los Angeles ever develops density that comes close to supporting rail transit, the rail should be built at that time with the latest technology. Today's trains will be outdated and in need of replacement as faster, more economical, more flexible or more user-friendly technology evolves.

7. The MTA Is Out of Money to Build a Network. When Proposition A passed voters were promised that 35 percent of the half-cent sales tax revenue would be sufficient to build and operate 11 rail lines in Los Angeles County. Today the rail network consumes:

- all of the dedicated portion of Proposition A
- large portions of local Prop A revenue
- large portions of dedicated and discretionary Proposition C revenue

- Propositions 108 and 116 revenues (1990 state rail bond measures)
- federal rail capital funds
- federal ISTEA money

After spending this much money, the MTA can only show the first portion of the Blue Line, the Green Line, and the first segment of the Red Line. In order to build even this much the MTA has had to cut bus service by 20 percent and raise bus fares. The construction debt is so deep that the MTA won't have the money to begin another line for at least 10 years. The 20-Year Plan depends on federal funding for completion of the Red Line and the East-West Valley Rail Line. This looks overly optimistic, as Congress becomes increasingly reluctant to spend money on new rail lines. The only possible line that MTA could start is the Pasadena Blue Line, but not without further robbing the bus system. The rail network is about as complete as it is going to get for at least several decades. The rail vision cannot be realized without a dependable network.

8. The Complete Proposition A Network Leaves Most Trips Unserved. Even if all the technical, political, and financial problems mentioned were overcome and the Proposition A rail network completed, most trips would be unserved. If MTA were able to build the entire Proposition A rail network in the next several decades, it is forecast to carry some 500,000 daily riders. This is close to the number of transit riders that have been lost since rail investment began. It is also a very optimistic forecast. Many riders would be former bus users so the total number of transit riders in Los Angeles County would be less than when the rail investment began in 1984. Further, if it were completed by the year 2015 and it met its projections, ridership would amount to about 1 percent of the 50 million daily trips Angelenos are expected to make then. Thus, using MTA's own numbers, completion of their envisioned system would make a negligible contribution to expanding mobility for transit-dependent people, relieving congestion, improving air quality or reducing energy consumption.

Moreover, people generally walk only ¼ to ½ mile to a transit stop. Only those living near a transit stations would be served. Only a small fraction of those would have destinations near other rail stations. For example, only 9.7 percent of the people living near a planned East-West Valley Rail station, work within ½ mile of any station along thatline, or along the Red Line with which it would connect. In contrast, 48 percent of these people work elsewhere in the San Fernando Valley (U.S. Bureau of Census 1990). The work trip has the highest likelihood of capturing rail riders since other trips are even more local. The number of people served could be increased with park-and-ride and feeder bus lines. However, most trips are short - less than five miles. Very few of the trips beginning away from a rail station would end near another station. Serving the local trip is much more important that the trip to a train station or beyond. Policy makers should concentrate on developing quality local service.

9. We Should Invest in The Most Likely Growth Scenario. The odds of Los Angeles evolving into the city that the MTA envisions are small. Eight arguments are presented here that MTA's vision of

the future is unlikely to occur. If time shows that the MTA is right, and this author is wrong, on seven of the eight points, the rail vision still fails. Only one weak link in the chain will spoil the vision. Why should we sink the majority of our transit improvement dollars into an unlikely scenario? Why should we do this when we know the drain of funds from the bus system destroys our present transit system? More prudent policy would develop a transit system that works today and can evolve as the shape of Los Angeles evolves.

10. People Need Service Now. MTA's strategy to develop a transit system that will serve Los Angeles 100 years from now has come at the expense of people who need service today. MTA buses serve 1.1 million trips are made every day. The people who ride the buses usually have no other options. They *need* the bus to get to work, to school, to the store, to the doctor, to visit friends and relatives, and to worship. For many people, cuts in bus service and increased fares mean lost jobs, forgone medical care, and long expensive shopping trips. Many parents taking long bus rides home from work have no choice but to leave children unattended. They cannot wait for decades for decent transit service. MTA officials carry out their strategy with the luxury of having other choices, while telling those who don't have options to wait. This has profound implications well beyond transit. Los Angeles' abilities to address poverty, crime, economic development and racial tension are intricately woven with mobility of people at the bottom of the income ladder.

An Alternative Transportation Vision for Los Angeles

Can Los Angeles County spend its transit dollars in another way to better meet our mobility and environmental goals? Since people usually walk only ¼ to ½ mile to a transit stop, transit service must be available in close proximity to nearly all residences, jobs, stores and other destinations. In order for transit to be dependable, it must be ubiquitous. In a dispersed urban area, *point-to-point flexibility is paramount.* This is why the auto is so successful here. In order for transit to be attractive, it must mimic the convenience of the auto.

One major problem with fixed rail transit is just that - it is fixed. It can't pick us up close to our homes and take us close to our destinations. In one sense, a train may be thought of as *an expensive bus that can't turn.* We may also describe a train as *a series of connected buses along a fixed guide way.* The only advantage of trains is that they operate on their own rights-of-way and don't get caught in traffic. The same can be done with buses that have dedicated lanes. Let's take the magic out of rail. In Los Angeles, steel wheels hold no advantages over rubber wheels, and steel tracks have no advantages over dedicated asphalt lanes. Buses and other forms of flexible transit are faster, because of the greater point-to-point capabilities, and much cheaper because they use existing rights-of-way.

By focusing on rail transit as *the* solution to transportation in Los Angeles County, resources have been drained from other more effective solu-

tions. There is no single solution to our transportation future. Rather, a mixture of buses, jitneys, smart shuttles, vanpools, carpools, bicycles, schedule adjustments and telecommuting can best serve the dispersed trips that Angelenos make. The flexible transportation vision contains the following:

- Carpool lanes are needed to make buses, vanpools, carpools, and other paratransit more attractive. The freeway system should become the express transit network for regional trips. Park-and-ride lots are needed to make freeway transportation options available to more people.
- Worksite and activity center ridesharing programs and parking management offer opportunities and incentives for people to travel in all non-drive-alone modes.
- Transit service, whether it be buses, jitneys, or shuttles, should run on more streets, especially on arterial streets approximately every ½ mile.
- Some buses should run radially to important commercial / retail / entertainment centers.
- Express bus service should operate conveniently to important centers such as downtown Los Angeles, Westwood, Century City, LAX, downtown Long Beach, Warner Center, Glendale, Pasadena, etc.
- Buses should run more often. During waking hours, ten-minute headways on local lines should be the maximum. Five minute service should be the norm. On the busiest lines, service should run every minute or two. Midnight service should run at least every 30 minutes. Express service should run at least every 10 to 20 minutes.
- In outlying areas, on-demand smart shuttles using modern communications technology should replace regularly scheduled buses.
- Busy arterial streets should have dedicated bus lanes and traffic signal preemption.
- Bus stops should be made safer and more pleasant. At a minimum, they should include a bench, a shelter, lighting, a bus map and a line schedule. Well-used stops should have police call buttons, telephones and news racks. Larger stops should have small bus stations with more amenities.
- Fares and the cost of passes should be lowered. As technology improves, an electronic debit card system should be used for convenience, and to reduce waiting times at bus stops. Electronic debit cards can be used to offer fares based on distance, time of day (higher at peak hours), and cost of service. They can also conveniently encode special discounts for seniors, disabled people, students, etc.
- In Curitiba, Brazil, bus stops are equipped for passengers to pay fares prior to boarding buses. The wide-door

buses pick up passengers quickly and move on. This technology might have some application here.

- Buses should operate on clean fuels. Clean-fuel buses would improve air quality as well as improve the image of buses.
- Buses should be kept clean and graffiti-free.
- Transit information should be readily available at transit stops, via telephone and computer.
- The bus system should have more security officers. Deployment should be apportioned to the level of crime on each line.
- Jitneys should be permitted to operate. Jitneys might replace marginal bus service, such as nighttime service, less densely populated suburban areas and service on smaller streets. This would allow bus service to concentrate on the lines with higher demand. Taxis can help fill in other gaps.
- Jitneys might also be used to help serve the higher demand for service during peak hours on busy bus lines.
- Paratransit operators for disabled people should offer on-demand service that is affordable and convenient to use.
- Telecommunications equipment should play a large role in allowing people to work from home and reduce shopping trips. It should also allow travelers better information about the transportation modes that are available and make it more convenient for people to ride transit, shuttles, carpools or jitneys/taxis.
- A complete network of bikeways, coupled with public bicycle parking, bicycle access to transit, and other strategies that enhance the safety and convenience of bicycling are needed to make bicycling more attractive.
- In the long run, new highway user fees will be needed to replace existing user fees (gasoline taxes) as gasoline tax revenue fails to keep pace with highway use. The fees should be structured to provide financial incentives and/or subsidies to those traveling via transit, jitneys, carpools, etc. They should also be structured for income equity.
- Land use planning should be done in a way that mixes uses and reduces the distance that people have to travel. Planning which considers the needs of pedestrians such as providing sidewalks, street lighting and street planting, encourages people to walk as well as use other modes.

This type of transportation system would provide quality service for those who depend on transit. It would also attract many people out of their cars, thereby contributing to improvement in air quality, traffic reduction, and energy conservation.

This type of transportation system also has greater potential for generating jobs than rail transit. More bus and jitney drivers would be needed,

as well as mechanics. (The MTA Monthly Rail Construction Report says that every $1 million spent on rail construction creates 2.4 job years. The MTA fiscal year 93-94 Budget spent $424 million on bus subsidies that supported 7,394 jobs. So the bus created about 7.3 jobs for every job created by rail construction per dollar). Moreover, construction jobs are temporary, while jobs for drivers and mechanics are permanent. (Ryan Snyder Associates, Inc. 1995.)

Such a flexible transit system would grow as Los Angeles grows and could adjust service as demand changes. *A flexible transit system is better suited than rail transit to develop along with the changes in land use patterns that are, to a large degree, unpredictable.*

Financing Issues

With the money the MTA spends on rail transit, flexible transit service could be doubled or tripled in Los Angeles County. Since the LACTC began investing in rail transit, transit ridership has dropped by about 20 percent, primarily through service cuts and fare increases. (In 1985, 497 million passengers rode SCRTD buses. The fiscal year 1996 MTA Modified Budget projects 369 million transit riders, a 26 percent drop. Some of the loss has occurred as service has spun off to other operators. Thus, the actual drop in passengers is closer to 20 percent). For starters, the easiest way to gain the ridership lost since 1985 would be to restore service that was cut and to lower fares. A full shift of funds could do much more.

The hypothetical shift of funds could not occur in full for several reasons. First, much of the discretionary money is now tied up in debt service to rail construction. Second, funding guidelines in Propositions A and C, as well as in other sources don't allow it. Much federal money has been available for rail construction only. However, if the MTA decided to halt the rail development program, some discretionary funds could be made available for initial service improvements. *The Board of Supervisors could put Propositions A and C back on the ballot to allow for greater flexibility in the use of the revenue.* This would free up more money for flexible transit. Congressional committee members would likely be receptive to Los Angeles forfeiting rail construction funds in favor of bus improvement expenditures. A transformation could begin this way and set Los Angeles on a more prudent vision of our transit future.

Conclusion

Ever since the 1970s, transportation experts have criticized rail transit schemes for Los Angeles County. They warned of high costs and low ridership, and of the demise of the bus system that would result from rail transit investment. Rail proponents maintained that rail would be more cost-effective to operate and that overall transit ridership would increase. We now live eleven years into the rail vision. So far, the experts were right - after spending billions of dollars, rail transit has brought skyrocketing costs, declining transit ridership and overall deterioration of Los Angeles' transit sys-

tem. MTA officials choose to ignore the high subsidies that rail transit requires (more than 10 times that of the bus), the drop in transit ridership and their lack of funds. They dismiss facts and numbers. They claim there are no alternatives. They no longer claim, however, that rail is cheaper than buses. They are left with one remaining argument that is not based on fact -- that Los Angeles needs the rail system for the future. Nebulous statements such as "every world class city has a rail system therefore we need one," "we must plan for Los Angeles 100 years from now," and "the Parthenon would have never been built without the type of long term vision that is building our rail network" have been used by MTA officials to justify their rail investment.

This paper argues against that rationale. Since the flexible transportation vision presented here -- with more bus service, shuttles, jitneys, enhanced ridesharing and bicycling -- would serve many more transit riders, it is inherently more transit-friendly. It is time for MTA officials to begin basing long term planning on facts and good policy. There can be no justification for wasting billions of taxpayers' dollars.

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THE EVOLUTION OF LA BROADWAY

Kyle Ko Francisco Shinseki

Downtown Los Angeles, in many respects, is not unlike downtowns of most United States cities which, "evolved gradually in response to changing technologies and socioeconomic patterns, and to factors affecting policy at both the national and metropolitan levels" (Robertson 1995: 429). Broadway has been one of the key corridors in downtown Los Angeles throughout most of the city's history. In particular, the stretch of South Broadway between Second and Ninth Streets has for diverse sectors of the city's population been a retail, office, and social center.

Foundation of Los Angeles

The area which is now known as Los Angeles was originally inhabited by the Gabrieliños, a Native American tribe that had established forty villages in the region by the time the first Spanish settlers arrived (Hayden 1995). The largest of these villages was *Yang-Na*, near which the Spanish colonizing party established *El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora La Reina de Los Angeles del Río Porciúncula* in 1781. These original settlers from *Nueva España* (now Mexico) were of Spanish, Native, African, and mestizo descent and created ranches and wineries in the area as an economic base.

When California was taken over by the United States in 1848, Broadway Street was called *Calle Fortín* or Fort Street, as reflected on the survey map drawn by Lieutenant Ord in 1849. The street was so named because of Fort Hill located at the northern end of the street. It carried this name throughout the first years of U.S. settlement. It was during this period that the population of people of Mexican descent began to steadily decline. However, prior to the connection of the transcontinental rail-

road in 1876, Los Angeles continued to be a "predominantly Mexican town" (Ríos-Bustamante in Hayden 1995: 91). The original Spanish-speaking settlers were virtually absorbed by the daily arrival of trainloads of Anglo Americans (Hayden 1995).

The discovery of gold in 1848 in northern California drew Anglo settlers to California. Soon southern California began to be seen as a place where one could begin anew, where opportunities were seemingly endless and where life would be easier and more pleasant (Nelson 1983). Through travel books and articles sponsored by railroad companies, southern California became known for its mild winters and rainless summers. The idea of a warm, sunny climate without the need for chimneys and the labors of chopping firewood attracted more and more migrants from the East Coast and Midwest.

Anglo American Broadway

When Anglo Americans began to arrive in great numbers between 1880-1890, the present-day Broadway served as their main street and was home to many rapidly expanding businesses catering to the growing city. In the 1880's a new city hall was built on Fort Street between Second and Third Streets, serving as a key factor in drawing commercial businesses southward (Roseman 1993). In 1887, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that, "Fort Street will become within five years one of the most important business thoroughfares of the city" (*Los Angeles Times* 1887: 1). Fort Street was described as "naturally the best street in the city;" its supposed advantages being its width and its being straight and level for ten blocks (*Los Angeles Times* 1887).

In the same year, the City Council of Los Angeles passed a resolution renaming Fort Street as Broadway. In 1896, Arthur Letts opened the street's first department store, The Broadway, at the intersection with Fourth Street. Until then, only the most adventurous merchants would locate a store at this location outside of the business district, and therefore become isolated from customers (Nelson 1983). Letts' store was successful from the start and expanded annually. Several other department stores followed the lead of Letts and located on Broadway.

By the beginning of the 20th century, major structures were being built further and further south on Broadway. In reference to the stretch of Broadway from Seventh to Eight Streets, it was said that "there is perhaps nowhere else in the business section an unbroken row of structures which are so strictly in keeping with the size and importance of Los Angeles" (*Los Angeles Times* 1909: V, 1). By 1910, the department stores that would be the foundation of the Broadway commercial district for fifty years were all established. Between them lay complementary retail establishments ranging from apparel shops to cigar stores. In approximately 1910, nickelodeons and vaudeville theaters began to appear on Broadway. This had the effect of drawing business further downtown away from the original Plaza, today known as El Pueblo de Los Angeles Historic Park (Los Angeles Conservancy 1992).

During 1910 and 1920, the Mexican population of Los Angeles began to increase, particularly stimulated by immigration fueled by the Mexican Revolution. In response to growing numbers of nonwhites in the city, theaters, like the Palace Theater which opened in 1911, were designed to segregate Mexicans and other groups, and often had two balconies, the upper of which was for people of color (Los Angeles Conservancy 1995).

It was the opening of Sid Grauman's theater in 1918, later named the Million Dollar, that established Broadway as a major location for the motion picture industry (Los Angeles Conservancy 1992). Broadway soon became the key venue for the majority of retailers and theaters in downtown and was undoubtedly the most glamorous street in all of Los Angeles (Nelson 1983). Elaborate window displays, fancy façades, ornate marquees, and bright lights drew swarming crowds of shoppers and theater-goers day and night. Perhaps one of the most critical components of its development was mass transit. The local streetcar line, Los Angeles Railway, had one of its three major arteries on Broadway thus providing access to this commercial district.

In 1920, the significant prestige of Broadway had grown to the extent that its name was again questioned. From a list of fifty names (several in Spanish) reaffirming the reputation of the street, the name "Broadway, the Radiant Way" was chosen by the Broadway Improvement Association. Experts hailed Broadway of the 1920s as "the most brilliantly lighted street in the world" (*Los Angeles Times* 1920: II, 1).

Broadway of the 1920s had become the core of a central retail and entertainment district serving all of greater Los Angeles (Roseman 1993). In 1924, a traffic survey indicated that 1,200,000 persons entered downtown daily while finding that only 750,000 people lived in the city proper. It is thus not surprising that downtown was the densest and most valuable sector of southern California (Nelson 1983). As downtown continued to grow in importance, so did the Mexican population. From 1920 to 1930, the population "born in Mexico or with parents born in Mexico" tripled from 90,000 to 275,000 (Nelson 1983: 190-191). This growth rate drew concern from the Anglo population, labeling it the "Mexican problem" in local newspapers (Nelson 1983).

Despite such concerns, Broadway remained Anglo territory in the 1930s and it was described as the West Coast equivalent of New York's Great White Way (Los Angeles Conservancy 1992). In this six-block area there were a dozen major theaters, making it the highest concentration of movie palaces in the world. During the 1930s and 1940s, these palaces drew large crowds allowing for the success of these "pleasure-oriented establishments" (Moore 1984: 23). Upper floors of buildings were office space occupied by doctors, lawyers, and other professionals.

The department stores were always bustling with activity and window displays drew people's attention with their animated figures. "[Broadway] was just alive with people" commented Connie Humberger, a Caucasian woman who frequented Broadway every Saturday from the mid-1930s to

the early 1950s (Humberger 1995). Humberger notes that it was a very comfortable and safe environment where children walked unaccompanied. She also believes that a mix of ethnic people frequented Broadway during that time period. However, Marian Spencer, an African American woman who also knew Broadway of that period, feels that it was a predominantly Anglo crowd. While shopping at department stores like Broadway and Bullocks, she affirms that "if I ever saw any black people there I knew them" (Spencer 1995).

Seeds of Change

The regional plan for the Los Angeles basin in the 1930s officially codified the view that downtown should serve as only one of many urban centers for the Los Angeles region (Gebhard 1985). Freeway systems built during the post-World War II period allowed for improved mobility and suburbanization. This brought about a gradual out-movement of predominantly Anglos from the center city. Nonetheless, the mix of people on Broadway continued to be predominantly Anglo into the 1950s. However, by the 1940s the Latino presence on Broadway was emerging as the Million Dollar Theater was hosting live shows by Mexican entertainers and showing Spanish-language films once a week. It was not long before other cinemas began to do the same.

It was during the post-World War II period that definite changes began to take place on Broadway. Stores became less formal, both in employee uniforms and window displays, in response to the less affluent clientele frequenting the area (Humberger 1995). By the late 1950s and 1960s downtown Los Angeles went through what was perceived as a general decline as the wealthy looked for diversion in districts of the region closer to their new residences (Moore 1984). Serving downtown workers by day and deserted at night, Broadway gradually lost its role as a central shopping district. Correspondingly, the dismantlement of the streetcar system brought greater reliance on the automobile (Roseman 1993), and reflected an increasingly lower density in residential suburban areas.

The proliferation of tracts of such houses led to urban sprawl and the demise of the majority of the Los Angeles region's agricultural lands. Homes could be built further and further away from downtown and other job centers because of the increased use of the automobile. The white flight of Angelenos to the suburbs was perhaps also motivated by the Watts civil unrest in the mid-1960s (Nelson 1983). Many retailers followed residents out to the suburbs, abandoning their downtown locations. Today, residential subdivisions, commercial centers, and industrial buildings extend throughout the Los Angeles region, stretching from Pacific Palisades to San Bernardino, from the coast of Ventura to southern Orange County.

While the Los Angeles population gradually spread further and further out and away from the city center, downtown itself went through a redevelopment process. The so-called "classical approach" was taken to urban renewal, that is to say, "bulldoze away the past and start anew" (Gebhard 1985: 220). The redevelopment of Bunker Hill was

key to the creation of the new western downtown area replacing the now deteriorated Broadway. Towering skyscrapers were built over the relatively low buildings of Broadway. The city center became divided into two parts, one Anglo and one Latino. The old downtown to the east, where Broadway is, became a major shopping area for the Latino working-class population, while the new western downtown became the territory of primarily Anglo professionals.

Latino-ization of Broadway

By the late 1950s the most frequent customers of Broadway merchants were Latinos. Places like the Grand Central Public Market which previously catered to the city's so-called "carriage trade" began to sell Latino groceries. Latinos are known for having a distinct and well-defined pattern of urban living emphasizing social interaction which naturally leads to a lively street atmosphere (Nelson 1983). Despite a vibrant commercial life, the demand for office space gradually declined as the new downtown to the west continued to develop. In fact, by the 1960s many buildings on Broadway closed their upper floors instead of paying for costly improvements required to meet new fire codes.

Virtually all the theaters which remained open during the 1960s achieved economic survival by catering to the Spanish-speaking audience through not only Spanish subtitles on first-run English-language films, but also by selling Mexican candy and *churros* at their concession stands (Los Angeles Conservancy 1992). Some theaters which did not stay in operation were adopted for other Latino uses. The United Artists Theater, built in 1927, was used for a period during the 1960s to 1970s as a Mexican bakery or *panaderia* (Los Angeles Conservancy 1995).

Although shopping at department stores such as Broadway, Bullocks or May Company was still a big part of the draw of Broadway in the mid-to late-1960s, Latinos (predominantly Mexicans) began going to Broadway as a center for social interaction. In addition to the movie theaters, dances were held at the Alexandria Hotel featured orchestras from Mexico. Othón Estrada, Sr., a Mexican immigrant who frequented Broadway every weekend during that period, recalls that everything was much cleaner, people were generally friendlier, and there was not as much crime (Estrada 1995).

It was during this period that Broadway truly became established as a predominantly Latino social and commercial center, a fame which has remained to the present despite the changes which have occurred over the years (Gutiérrez 1995). In the 1960's Anglos began to express their resentment of the Latino-ization of Broadway -- people bartering goods on the street, crowded sidewalks, -- and perhaps most annoying to many Anglos -- people speaking in Spanish (Roseman 1993). Nonetheless, the volume of immigration from Mexico into the central city area increased significantly, adding to Broadway's client base. By 1970, the census reported 1,700,000 persons of "Spanish heritage" in the Los Angeles region, a figure widely believed to be an inaccurate undercount (Nelson 1983).

Several attempts were made to stop what Anglos perceived as the degradation of Broadway. At a time when Broadway was home to more than thirty merchants who peddled their wears on the street, the city began enforcing a law which required vendors to build adequate shelters. By 1974, street vending on Broadway was a thing of the past. Nonetheless, the local newspaper continued to describe Broadway's streetscape as a "carnival" or "circus," with its endless stream of pedestrians, street comedians, and Hare Krishnas (Banashek 1974: II, 1-2). Although there was still a distinct but greatly diminished Anglo presence even into the 1970s, those who had worked the street for many years saw it becoming a "Little Mexico," having changed from an Anglo shopping and entertainment center to a Latino fiesta-like environment (Banashek 1974: II, 1-2).

In the 1980s, the Latino presence on Broadway increased as Mexican immigrants and Chicanos were joined by an influx of Central Americans primarily from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The recent arrival of Central Americans to Los Angeles consolidated the future of Broadway as a Latino shopping district because many of them settled in areas directly adjacent to downtown, cre-

1996, Broadway, view looking north.

ating an important resident consumer base. Many of the recent immigrants also contributed to the area by starting their own businesses (Estrada 1995). In the early to mid-1980s dozens of immigrants began operating newsstands in dyed-green plywood booths along Broadway selling predominantly Spanish-language newspapers and periodicals (Becklund 1986). As might be expected these booths, common in Latin American cities, were soon perceived by city officials as unsightly and detrimental to the image of Broadway. Many of the operators of these booths worked 8:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., 365 days a year, making only $50 to $75 per week. Newsstands were restricted to selling only papers and periodicals and their numbers were limited. As a result, many newsstand operators, like the street vendors before them, were placed out of business (Becklund 1986).

Among the other issues which were brought to the forefront of Broadway's well-being during the 1980s, were the increase in crime, proliferation of trash in the streets, and street derelicts. In 1985, a redevelopment project attempted to deal with these concerns through the refurbishment of the sidewalks with paving details inspired by Latin American design , the installation of colorful pennants along the street, the creation of a fund for renovation or restoration of buildings, and some $125,000 set aside for storefront cleaning distributed on a matching-funds basis (Fortier 1985).

Despite conflicts with vendors, problems of crime, and Anglo-perceived decay of the street, Broadway continued to be alive with activity throughout the 1980s. Especially on weekends, when the adjacent new financial district was described as a "ghost town," Broadway was "a city in itself" (Baron 1980: I, 1). Latinos came with their families to shop, eat, and be entertained. When one Latino was asked why he came downtown, he responded, "It's comfortable here. It's like a fiesta" (Baron 1980: I, 1).

Changes were made to the physical environment to adapt to the Latino presence during the 1980s including the conversion of the 1913 Morosco (Globe) Theater into a swapmeet or *mercado*-type environment. Although the adornments and balcony remain from the original theater, it has become a lively scene of Latino-oriented merchandise and speakers blasting regional Mexican music. In total, about half a dozen former theaters along Broadway have been converted into swapmeet-type set-ups.

Perhaps the culmination of the "Latino-ization" of Broadway is the annual L.A. Fiesta Broadway. The event, first held in 1990, marks the beginning of a week of *Cinco de Mayo* celebrations and was attended by 500,000 people who filled ten blocks of Broadway. The fiesta celebrates Latino music and cuisine. The first celebration was broadcast across the nation and in fifteen Latin American countries by the Univisión network. As a result, the Latino-ization of Broadway was given international recognition (Wride 1990: A1, A18).

Role of Broadway in Today's Latino Community

Broadway has had such a fundamental role in the Latino community that going to "La Broadway"

for many has become tradition. Among many Latinos it is known as the main street of Los Angeles. Much more significant than just a shopping area, Broadway for Latinos is a place for strolling and social interchange, serving the same functions plalyed by plazas in Latin American villages or towns. Although one tends to see other ethnic groups on Broadway during the week, on weekends Broadway is frequented by a predominantly Latino clientele. Broadway is most heavily populated on the weekends, the exact opposite of the rest of downtown. In fact, Eustaquio Euan-Canul, a newspaper vendor originally from Yucatán, Mexico, who has worked on the street for ten years, says that more sales are made from Friday through Sunday (Euan 1995).

Vendor Eustaquio Euan-Canul

Low prices are one of the key reasons why people choose to shop on Broadway. A Nicaraguan woman who has shopped on Broadway for twelve years notes that, "the department stores are very expensive and the stores here in Los Angeles are cheaper." Jaime Ramos, a merchant originally from Aguascalientes, Mexico, has run music stores on Broadway for three years and agrees that people come to Broadway because they are searching for cheaper merchandise (Ramos 1995). A security guard originally from Mexico City who has worked on Broadway for nearly a year states that "people like to buy things that look good although they may not be original." Another reason why people choose to shop on Broadway is that, as opposed to most stores in the United States, prices on Broadway are generally flexible. Bartering or *regateando* is a common practice in Latin American cities and this tradition continues on Broadway. Many shops do not have price tags for their items, requiring the customer to ask. As a result, social interaction becomes a necessary part of the shopping experience. Ramos notes that the ability to barter helps make Broadway have a marketplace-like environment (Ramos 1995). Not only is bartering common, but perhaps more importantly, it is done in Spanish, the native tongue of most of Broadway's shoppers. The Nicaraguan shopper notes that even though she knows a little English "we prefer our language." Clearly, shopping becomes a more enjoyable experience if one does not need to deal with a language barrier.

Though it is true that one can easily shop on Broadway only knowing Spanish, the reality is that there are many other areas in the Los Angeles region where one can do the same. In fact, East Los Angeles is located just a few miles away and is recognized as, "the cultural center of the Latino popu-

lation" (Nelson 1983: 247). But one Latino cleaning worker at the Grand Central Market who has been working on Broadway for twelve years notes that "in the East [Los Angeles] there aren't the things that there are in downtown." Music store merchant Jaime Ramos mentions that people come to Broadway to buy music from their native countries which cannot be acquired elsewhere (Ramos 1995). The security guard notes that, "those that come here the most are... those who like Mexican *banda* and *ranchera* music."

A wide range of Latino-oriented merchandise along with the street ambience attract Latinos to Broadway from throughout the Los Angeles region. Newspaper vendor Eustaquio Euan-Canul notes that "they come from everywhere: from Hollywood, from Pomona, from El Monte, from Santa Ana" (Euan 1995). Although a predominant number of the shoppers come from East Los Angeles, on weekends people come from as far away as Lancaster and San Francisco, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Arizona (Ramos 1995).

Re-invention of Space

With speakers playing Latino music, people bartering and conversing in Spanish, and sights and smells from Latin America, it is not surprising that some people who come to Broadway feel as if they are back in their native lands. In fact, two different merchants mentioned that Broadway is like San Juan Beltrán Street in Mexico City. Music store merchant Jaime Ramos notes that the streets have a similar style of commerce, but Broadway is different because everything has its own place and parking, while in Mexico City things tend to be more mixed (Ramos 1995). Newspaper vendor Eustaquio Euan-Canul feels that the two streets, especially on the bustling weekends, are exactly alike, stating that "you come here and you go about as if you were in Mexico" (Euan 1995).

In fact, for the Mexican immigrant, Los Angeles is "a place with a landscape similar to his homeland and... a land once part of his background" (Nelson 1983: 246). Ironically, "Latinos represent both the oldest and newest groups in Los Angeles" (Nelson 1983: 248). As a result, it is understandable that the average Latino immigrant finds little value in giving up the Spanish language or abandoning his cultural values. For many Latino immigrants a trip to Broadway is almost like an attempt at realizing an often unrealistic dream of returning back to their homeland. Many Latinos from throughout Los Angeles recall having been brought to Broadway by their parents as young children.

However, there are differences between Broadway and Latin America, regardless of the amount of signs in Spanish, scents of Mexican food, and salsa blasting from speakers. Although these features may provide some comfort in an otherwise hostile environment, Latino immigrants on Broadway still realize that they are in a foreign country with which they are really not familiar. Despite the strong Latino presence on Broadway, many East-Asian and Middle-Eastern immigrants are part of the street scene mostly as merchants and at times as customers. Even on a more subtle level, people

notice how life in the multi-cultural United States has made changes to Latinos' attitudes and social interaction patterns. Mexican immigrant Othón Estrada, Sr. sums it up by stating "there is always a difference that exists between what a street is like in Mexico... and one here" (Estrada 1995).

Nonetheless, merchants attempt to create an environment that is more or less Latino for their customers. Shopkeepers play Mexican music on weekends because they know that they can attract more people that way, even though they themselves may not be Latino. Even jewelry stores will sell items like gold pistols or cattle heads which they know will appeal to Latinos who come from ranch lands. Although the owners may be from different countries, they well know that such items will sell. The security guard from Mexico City affirms that "yes, it does work; they do buy." This guard believes that the Latino image of Broadway is false because it was created merely to attract customers. Shopkeepers will speak to prospective customers in Spanish to make them seem more trustworthy so that people will buy from them, but when these same customers want their money back for defective merchandise, the shopkeepers will tell them that they cannot give them back their money, speaking no longer in Spanish, but in English. At that point, "they do not even want to speak in English to the Mexicans." Another Broadway shopper, Othón Estrada, Sr. indicates that many "unsuspecting" customers are sold falsely labeled items (Estrada 1995). Apparently some merchants

El Gallo Giro Restaurant: Spanish style architecture on LA Broadway.

under-handedly trick customers, luring them in with Spanish and Latino music in order to make a quick sale.

The reality is that despite the majority of Broadway's clientele being Latino and the outward Latino-ness of the street, many of Broadway's store owners are non-Latinos. The falseness of the Latino image of the street has a physical significance also. Most buildings, with the exception perhaps of El Gallo Giro restaurant, are no more Latino than the signage which has been placed over their frontage and the racks of Latino merchandise hanging from their walls. The owners of the buildings are definitely not Latinos, and merchant Rosie Gutiérrez feels that recently "[owners] are trying to and are succeeding in placing rents outside of the reach of Latinos" (Gutiérrez 1995). As a result, what may have appeared to be a Latino-ization of the space which Broadway comprises, may be just a façade which could easily be broken down. A switch from Spanish to English by multilingual non-Latino merchants, different cassettes in the stereos, and new signs could easily transform Broadway to a very different place almost overnight.

Future Outlook

Beginning in the late 1980s, an increased interest developed in Broadway as a vital segment of downtown Los Angeles. Developer Ira Yellin purchased three key buildings in the area, the Grand Central Market, the Million Dollar Building, and the Bradbury Building. He envisioned for Broadway buildings being brought back to life, drawing Anglos, Asians, and Latinos alike, bringing economic benefit to the owners, merchants, and city (Groves 1989). In 1986, Yellin played a fundamental role in the formation of a public-private partnership named Miracle on Broadway, involving the local business community and the City's Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA). This organization has the purpose of promoting Broadway as an office, retail, and entertainment hub.

After several years of planning, on February 1, 1994, the Los Angeles City Council established the Broadway Business Improvement District (BID), to be operated by Miracle on Broadway. The BID program involves the approximately 1,300 merchants on Broadway, each of which is required to pay a fee of $200 to $12,000, depending on net sales. The nearly $500,000 collected is allocated for revitalization projects, principally for security and cleaning . These efforts have the purpose of bringing back Broadway's "old splendor" (Ballesteros 1994). However, one must question whether this "old splendor" translates into an Anglo-exclusive sense of splendor.

Latina merchant Rosie Gutiérrez, who has been on Broadway for thirty years notes that "it is not that we do not like progress, but in the path of progress that they [Anglos] have wanted to lay out, they have cut the wings of many people" (Gutiérrez 1995). Many Latinos have been forced to find other areas to shop because of expensive parking fees and prices that have been forced up by rising rents. Recently many stores have closed and new ones have opened due to increased competition (Ramos 1995).

The cleaning worker from Grand Central Market has noticed during his twelve years working there how what was once a completely Latino clientele has changed to be more Anglo-American, African-American, and Asian-American.

Conclusion

The present-day state of downtown Los Angeles is one reflected in many cities throughout the nation. It is a "dual city" where one realm of activity is the cluster of new office buildings and nearby shops and restaurants catering to white-collar workers and the other being a collection of retail stores offering lower-priced goods and services to a clientele predominantly composed of lower-income people of color (Robertson 1995). Broadway, once a center for entertainment and shopping for the Anglo population of Los Angeles, now forms part of this second sector of downtown, catering to a mostly Latino public.

Although the built environment of Broadway is one developed by Anglos, a "Latino-ization," of the street has occurred since World War II. However, this "Latino-ization," has largely been one created through social interaction and surface-level changes and not through major changes in the built environment. This leaves the Latino identity of Broadway in a very tenuous position, especially when one considers that today, like Anglos in the post-World War II era, "[Latinos] are moving to the suburbs and shopping there, too" (Bressi 1993: 28). Meanwhile, as Broadway loses some of its Latino clientele, it faces increasing pressures for redevelopment by investors and the City.

With mixed support, Miracle On Broadway has emerged as an organization which has taken on the task of shaping the future of this historic corridor. The challenge faced by the organization is well-expressed in the City Redevelopment Agency's 1992 Downtown Strategic Plan which proposes that "a positive image for the Historic Core would evolve from the multi-cultural diversity of the Broadway Retail Corridor, [through] the preservation and adaptive re-use of the elegant historic buildings" (CRA 1992). Many Latinos see Broadway as part of the Los Angeles Latino tradition and feel that despite the challenges it faces, it will always have a Latino environment.

The reality, however, appears to be different. Latinos do seem to be losing a foothold on "La Broadway." Redevelopment efforts appear to be pricing many merchants and as a result many Latino clients literally out of the market. It is incumbent upon Miracle On Broadway to recognize the Latino legacy of Broadway as a significant part of the street's history. A realistic vision for the future would incorporate this legacy and allow for a future Broadway where Latinos, Anglos, and others could come for shopping and entertainment, breaking down the divide which lies between the "new" and "old" downtowns of Los Angeles.

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Photographs by the author.

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THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND TITLE VIII

Teron McGrew

> I was first alerted to much broader implications of 'racial segregation' through the writings of two historians: John Cell and George Fredickson. Their critiques of segregation in South Africa and the American South suggest not only that the distinctions between de jure and de facto 'racial' separatism are finer than might be expected, but also that racial (racist) exclusivity may be less a legacy of the past and more a strategy for the future in advanced industrial economies (Susan Smith).

During the past quarter of a century the quality of life in America's large cities has declined. The mass exodus of whites from urban cities has left disenfranchised communities. As a result of this flight, the quality of the urban housing stock has deteriorated. Kusher (1983), Tobin (1987), and Massey and Denton (1993) have documented government efforts to improve housing which have failed and only exacerbated the situation, transforming ethnic neighborhoods into residentially segregated communities. A report issued the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) identified the stark differences that exist in the urban area:

- In 1990, 11 percent of the population of 100 largest cities lived in extreme poverty neighborhoods, compared with 5 percent in 1970.
- More than 40 percent of the working-age males, age 16 to 63 were unemployed in the previous year, compared with over 19 percent in non-poverty neighborhoods.
- While 11 percent of all central city households received public assistance, and 33

> percent of households in extreme poverty neighborhoods were on welfare.
> Good-paying jobs for those with less than a college education are vanishing in central cities. Between 1970 and 1990, for example, manufacturing employment just about held steady in the United States overall, while declining by nearly 11 percent in America's urban centers (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995).

Indeed, a major cause of many of the urban ills afflicting American cities is the systematic exclusion of low-income and people of color from adequate, accessible and affordable housing and job opportunities. One phenomenon afflicting most inner city communities is the affordable housing crisis. As typically defined, the affordable housing crisis centers on the fact that the new generation of inner city residents are not afforded equal accessibility to adequate housing. Disenfranchisement and the affordable housing crisis are really aspects of the same problem; both result from housing policies that have promoted segregation along racial lines. Massey and Denton (1993) believe that this pattern of segregation intensifies social ills such as homelessness and persistent poverty.

This paper offers a brief overview of the historical connections between race and planning in the United States. It first describes the planning strategies used between World War I and World War II which helped to shape the modern era of racially segregated cities. It then considers three postwar periods; first, the era of public housing; next, urban renewal: and finally, the consolidation of the ghetto. The historical analysis will offer an insight into how the enforcement of the federal Fair Housing Act -- Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and its 1988 Amendment to existing state-administered housing programs -- can combat residential segregation by promoting a more racially and economically integrated society.

Between World Wars, Planning and Residential Control

Before War I, the nation's cities were primarily industrial centers, taking advantage of railroads, port facilities, and a large pool of unskilled laborers. The demand for workers during and after World War I stimulated the northward migration of hundreds of thousands of southern blacks into industrial cities. For example, 10,000 black immigrants arrived in Chicago between 1914 and 1918 (Drake and Cayton 1970). In Detroit, heavy migration waves launched by jobs in the automobile industry occurred between 1916-1924 (Deskins 1972).

This migration changed the racial, social, economic and political landscape of American cities. Cities were confronted with complex social problems that changed their demographic characteristics. Racial tension become paramount as city officials promoted and perpetuated racial division by supporting segregation and discrimination in housing, employment and social services (Massey and Denton 1993).

The major connection of these events with residential segregation is the rise of residential controls proposed by progressive urban strategists and planners. One of the most important developments during this period was the establishment of zoning as a tool for social segregation. Zoning was introduced in New York City in 1916 and encouraged by the U.S. Commerce Department through the publication of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in 1922. Some of the early proponents of zoning were progressive urban planners who felt the laissez-faire theory of government was no longer tenable (Coyle 1993). During this time, urban planning consisted mostly of a hierarchical strata of men who felt their profession called for "sacrifice and almost supreme efforts on the part of noble men consecrat[ing] themselves to remedy the social ills of the times" (Coyle 1993:22).

The pinnacle of progressive planning was the formation of regulations that established a hierarchy of uses. Zoning resulted in communities in which planned and orderly development provided a specific place for everything (Coyle 1993). Metzenbaum, one of the creators of the zoning standards, declared the single family home to be:

> the bulwark and stamina of this country.... It is generally conceded that the home owner who has the opportunity to have his little garden, to rear his family in a house and to raise his children with a greater freedom of fresh air and abundance of light, is one of the important factors in the sustaining of the American people and American ideals" (Metzenbaum 1993: 22).

It was believed that home ownership could be the solution for the corrupting influences of economic and political freedom. The responsibility of homeownership was thought to breed responsibility to society, elevating the character of the public and tempering the volatility of democracy.

The progressive housing planners set up middle-class values as a societal paradigm. They were trying to produce a set of societal standards for the American people, which included the desire for order, homes and family. These standards were intended to bring the masses up to grade. To accomplish this mission, special residential zoning codes were created to encourage homeowners to follow the aforementioned, established criteria (Coyle 1993).

The pressure for zoning, particularly in New York, was established because of the rapid growth of cities fed by an influx of millions of immigrants. Zoning proponents and progressive planners argued that:

> zoning was necessary to avoid the fate that had befallen urban ethnic neighborhoods inhabited by the new arrivals, who have crowded the city's hospitals, have taxed its juvenile courts, have greatly impoverished its tax returns, and have made greater police and fire departments necessary (Coyle 1993:21).

Progressive housing planners felt that single family homes on large lots, segregated from the harshness of industry and the temptations of commerce, would not suffer these social ills, nor (perhaps not coincidentally) would they provide the proximity of services and jobs that would encourage ethnic immigration (Coyle 1993).

Planners saw zoning as the tool for preserving middle-class standards. Landmark zoning cases such as the *Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Company* (1926), supported strongly exclusionary views towards African-Americans and European immigrants. These exclusionary views continued to prevail, despite the fact that *Buchanan v Warley* declared racial zoning unconstitutional in 1917. Unchallenged discriminatory ordinances allowed residential segregation to become entrenched (Haar and Kayden 1989: 41-42). Zoning became a powerful tool for maintaining class and racial segregation, particularly in southern cities.

In Atlanta, Georgia, zoning laws divided residential areas into "three race districts; white, colored and undetermined." Bruno Lasker warned that, " as precedent it opens up the possibility of new zoning ordinances embodying restrictions against immigrant... persons or certain occupations, political or religious affiliations, or modes of life" (Coyle 1993, 23). Robert Whitten, the author of the Atlantic zoning ordinance, also led the development of zoning laws in the North (Randle 1989).

Another mechanism which maintained racial segregation was the use of restrictive covenants, which were private contracts limiting home sales or rentals to Blacks or Jews. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld restrictive covenants in *Corrigan v. Buckley* which it decided in 1926, the same year that it upheld *Euclid v Ambler* (Randle 1989). These two mechanisms for racial control and segregation -- zoning and racially restrictive covenants -- effectively perpetuated segregation by limiting housing opportunities for people of color.

In addition, the development of suburban communities during the two decades between 1930 and 1950 changed the demographics of cities. The new housing opportunities in suburban communities stimulated the mass exodus of whites from the cities. These new, typically all-white, suburban towns lured manufacturing jobs away from the inner city with cheap land and low taxes, leaving poor minority families and the increased tax burden behind. When minority families tried to pursue the housing opportunities in the suburbs, they found few affordable housing opportunities and often encountered government condoned racism, which made relocation to the suburbs impossible.

The federal government became a principal agent in supporting the development of residential segregation by refusing to allow minorities access to subsidized housing in white areas and by requiring racially restrictive covenants in suburban developments as a condition for receiving Federal Housing Administration (FHA) [11] mortgage insurance (Tobin 1987). During this period, three out of every five homes purchased in the United States were financed by the FHA, yet less than two percent of the FHA loans were made to non-white home buyers. The FHA did so by only providing mortgage

insurance for properties meeting certain appraisal criteria. One of the primary criteria was the racial composition of the neighborhood. The FHA's underwriting manuals referred to "the infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups as 'adverse' to neighborhood stability and advised appraisers to lower the rating of properties in mixed neighborhoods, often to the point of rejection" (Tobin 1987: 235). As one commentator noted:

> [I]n Detroit, the FHA refused to approve federally subsidized mortgages when Black and White neighborhoods abutted each other, until a White developer built a wall between the two areas. Then the White properties were approved for FHA mortgages, whiles the Black properties were not. Until the late 1940's, the FHA also advocated the racially restrictive covenant so energetically that the idea spread throughout the country. Builders everywhere adopted the covenant so their property would be eligible for FHA insurance in the future (Hartnett 1993: 16).

Moreover, such federally-financed segregative practices became a leading model for private mortgage lenders to enforce racial segregation. The FHA also refused mortgage insurance to minorities in urban neighborhoods. FHA policies meant that blacks were denied mortgages for the only housing available to them in inner city neighborhoods, which caused deterioration in the black housing stock and precluded blacks from accumulating the wealth that accrues from home ownership. Such "redlining" of urban neighborhoods prevented minority families from purchasing their homes (Leigh and Stewart 1992).

During the period between World Wars, zoning and the federal government played a crucial role in the development of racially segregated communities. Thereafter, other strategic maneuvers, including plans for war housing, public housing, and slum clearance, became the provisional means for further segregative efforts.

Public Housing, Urban Renewal and the Consolidation of the Ghetto

During the period after World War II, and up until the 1960s, there existed two segregative processes: the movement of the white middle classes to the suburbs, and the proliferation of the deteriorated urban core.

The mass exodus of whites to suburban communities is what Fox (1990) call the "metropolitan revolutions," which clearly established decentralization as the dominant urban pattern for the following decades. Although white families found new opportunities in the newly constructed suburbs black families suffered disproportionately from overcrowding and limited mobility (Fox 1990). The end of the war brought home black and white soldiers, but only returning white veterans were afforded the opportunity to obtain suburban home loans. Blacks who returned home were confined to the restricted areas of the urban cities.

Most black war veterans, like the black migrants from the South during this time, became disillusioned as they found Northern cities like New

York, Detroit and Chicago lacking in opportunities. Between 1910 and 1970, six and a half million black Americans moved from the South to the North (Lemann 1992). They found that blacks were highly concentrated in major urban centers, mired in the lowest paid jobs, living in the worst housing and not advancing as other immigrants had done (Marks 1989). To cite an example, in 1948, 435 families of black war veterans in Detroit lived in overcrowded rooms, cabins and trailers (Drake and Cayton, 1970).

During the postwar era, blacks lived in the inner city and normally close to the central business districts. The proliferation of black migrants from the South became a matter of concern to downtown business interests as their presence and close proximity was perceived as a threat. Public housing and urban renewal policies, often disguised as humanitarian efforts by political offices, were devised and implemented to ameliorate social ills. The only problem addressed, however, was the intent and desire to retain or redirect black residential patterns to reflect a racist agenda of containing blacks in restricted sections of cities (Momenti 1987).

Prior to the advent of the Great Depression, very little support existed for the direct intervention of the government in housing markets. Those Americans --the working class and poor-- who were unable to purchase homeshad little or no hope of ever acquiring one as a central element of the "American Dream." Additionally, many Americans believed any form of governmental intervention in housing was communism and "deemed to be ideologically antithetical to American values, seen as both an assault on private enterprise and as fostering dependency, rather than self-reliance on part of the poor" (Momenti 1987: 3). However, the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 became largely concerned with minority housing.

The Housing Acts appeared to indicate a significant victory for supporters of public housing. First, the objective of the legislation was proclaimed to seek nothing less than the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family. Second, local housing authorities were authorized to produce 810,000 units of public housing, a sizable expansion of the program, which had built only 135,00 dwellings since 1933 (Momenti 1987).

The location of public housing was primarily based on race. Meyerson and Banfield (1955) explain the role of race in the decision making process for public housing in Chicago. These authors pointed out in their landmark study of Chicago, that race was a crucial factor in the city's decision about where to locate public housing. These decisions become the proving ground for the ability to prevail over the power of segregationist political reality (Meyerson and Banfield 1955). For instance, the Housing Act of 1949 was amended in 1954 thereby broadening the 1949 slum clearance and urban redevelopment program. In most cases, blacks occupied the dilapidated housing scheduled for demolition. Under this program, provisions were made for families displaced by the demoli-

tion. As a part of the displacement package, residents were relocated into public housing. Hirsh argues even more forcefully that the incentive to contain blacks in restricted areas decisively shaped Chicago's public housing placement policy (Hirsh, 1983:36). Although housing professionals and planners wanted to initiate reform, federal policy and local attitudes based on race defended racial segregation.

The segregative measures gave rise to the fears of whites and resulted in their relocating to newly constructed suburban communities. Whites felt that public housing would inevitability erode the property value of neighborhoods and communities. Whites perceived blacks as having no sense of responsibility. One author notes that "[t]he presence of such people apparently threatens important values and interests, such as safety, economic investment, and the racial stability of the surrounding neighborhood" (Goering 1986:263). Goldstein and Yancey (1986) identify this ideological assumption as the "spillover hypothesis," which suggests that the construction of public housing in a neighborhood will produce "white flight," the result being an increasing concentration of the black population.

Urban renewal also provides countless examples of the interconnection of racial change with local policy. Many opponents felt that urban renewal caused the systematic destruction of many black communities. That this clearance worked in conjunction with clearance for highway construction only made matters worst. In the City of Oakland, California, slums of the West Oakland area were cleared out for redevelopment and highway construction. The building of the Cypress Freeway displaced thousands of black residents and destroyed hundreds of Victorian homes. In particular, the Acorn Housing Project in displaced 9,000 black residents to develop a residential housing project for 1,000 (Haussler 1987).

Black residents suffered markedly because of the relocation process. Studies on urban renewal reveal that people of color suffer disproportionately from relocation. In Oakland, the relocation of many of black West Oaklanders took place after the Rumford Act[2] and federal government facilitation in creating new homes in the suburbs. Whites left East Oakland at an alarming rate, leaving East Oakland as the new designated area for those black Oaklanders who were displaced by redevelopment project in West Oakland. Consequently, many blacks who moved to East Oakland did not find the system of social organization that existed in West Oakland. East Oakland did not have a well-established black neighborhood with a history of cooperation and community organization. The inability to adjust to the new community caused many black residents of East Oakland serious problems. Black East Oaklanders suffered from unemployment, drug epidemics and the blight of abandoned houses (Haussler 1987).

With public housing, urban renewal and inner city highway construction, the connections between federal, state and local policy and changes in the black community are obvious. Decisions

made by political officials determined the location of blacks in particular communities, while public housing and highway construction determined the physical configuration of low income neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993). The relocation process, an integral component of urban renewal, served as a disjunctive force which disassembled community organization and cohesion. These policies shaped and defined racially segregated communities and neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993).

In the following section, a discussion of how these historical policies and practices have been curtailed by Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act will be provided.

Title VIII: An Attack on Residential Segregation

Today's racially segregated communities were created by both suburban expansion and federally sponsored discrimination, which together prevented minority families from moving to the suburbs and denied investment capital to inner-city communities. However, the Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 1988) may be the most viable solution to ameliorate residential segregation.

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 1988 was established to help diminish the isolation of the urban ghetto and promote a more racially integrated society. Title VIII prohibits the denial of housing on the basis of race, color or national origin. One of the Act's primary purposes is to end racial segregation in housing (Leigh and Stewart 1992). Several studies indicate that Title VIII has been useful in detecting racial discrimination in the housing market. However, these studies also indicate that this method of attack is particularly cumbersome because the system relies heavily on individuals to file complaints against suspected violators (Leight and Stewart 1992). Ideally, then, Title VIII should be enforced vigorously to ensure that affordable housing is made available in a manner that promotes racial integration. Title VIII provides that:

> 'It shall be unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after making a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.' Section 3603(b) provides an exemption to this general prohibition under the following circumstances the sale or rental of a single-family home by an owner who (1) does not own interests in more than three houses at one time, (2) does not use any type of broker or salesman, and (3) does not use any type of discriminatory advertising in violation of section 3604 (c) (Harnett 1993: 7).

Title VIII was proposed as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Sponsored by Senator Walter Mondale, the legislation passed in the Senate but appeared unlikely to pass in the House.

However, a series of events in the summer of 1968, including the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King and riots in a number of urban areas, prompted the House to pass the bill without delay (Lois 19891).

The Senate floor debates indicate that Congress intended Title VIII to help disperse urban ghettos by fostering the development of more integrated neighborhoods. As Senator Mondale asserted, "[t]here must be knowledge by whites that the rapid, block-by-block expansion of the ghetto will be slowed and replaced by a truly integrated society... If America is to escape apartheid we must begin now" (Mondale quoted in Metcalf 1988:79).

Towards this goal, Title VIII prohibits a wide range of discriminatory practices: the refusal to rent or sell housing on the basis of race or other prohibited status; discrimination in the terms of sale or rental (including requirements for deposits, down payment, or credit checks); discrimination in the advertising of housing sales or rentals; and discrimination in the terms of mortgage or home improvement financing (Tobin 1987).

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is the federal agency responsible for administering Title VIII. As such, it has the authority to investigate cases; it may also ask the Department of Justice (DOJ) to enforce Title VIII through litigation. The Attorney General may pursue civil actions against both public and private entities for violations of Title VIII. Finally, individuals may litigate under the statute in either federal or state courts. Prevailing plaintiffs can recover compensatory and punitive damages or seek injunctive relief (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1994).

Title VIII's immediate effect was to eliminate the most blatant discriminatory practices of realtors, lenders and landlords. Moreover, the Amendment to the Fair Housing Amendment in 1988 has strengthened its enforcement mechanisms, but the system continues to rely solely on private individuals to file complaints. As such, the effectiveness of these enforcement tools may be limited.

The elimination of racial barriers in urban housing markets requires the direct institutional involvement of the federal government. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, in particular, must fully commit itself to fair housing enforcement. HUD's recognition of its failure in devising effective fair housing policy shows its potential for change:

> HUD must acknowledge its failures. This means abandoning failed housing and community development policies that have contributed to the current crisis by concentrating very low-income families in dense, high-rise public housing projects, and by discouraging poor people from seeking work. It mean ending policies that see subsidized housing as a destination rather than a new start in life, and policies that support projects over people and buildings over neighborhoods. It means doing away with centralized, overly bureaucratic, top-down approaches that tell communities

> what they need and how to go about solving their problems. It means reversing the historical practice of creating a separate program for every problem and a new regulation for every situation. And it means finding new ways of relating to cities and metropolitan regions, community-based organizations, and the private sector (Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995: 6).

Furthermore, HUD's new goal -- to give state agencies more administrative power -- allows the application of Title VIII in conjunction with such powers to help remedy racial and economic segregation through the United States.

A more racially integrated society can be obtained. First, HUD must increase financial assistance to local fair housing organizations to strengthen their ability to investigate housing discrimination. Grants made to local agencies that are dedicated to fair housing enforcement will enable them to expand their efforts in conducting research and in making services more accessible to individuals so that individuals will not be afraid to file complaints (Massey and Denton 1993).

Second, HUD must establish a permanent testing program capable of identifying realtors, property owners and lending institutions who discriminate against minorities. Audits are a viable approach to establishing criteria that help determine more readily the case for discrimination (Massey and Denton 1993).

Third, effective enforcement of the Fair Housing Act requires prompt judicial action and timely relief. Since 1968, fair housing enforcement has been a long process. The primary cause for the delay in enforcement is the lack of administrative mechanisms, which impeded court litigation and deterred many victims of discrimination from taking action. Moreover, in James Charles Boeger's essay *Towards Ending Residential Segregation: Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction*, he argues that up until 1988, when the substantial legislative revisions were adopted, federal officials were given limited authority to pursue independent enforcement efforts. Therefore, within this context, Boeger further asserts that if federal authorities were to use more vigorous enforcement, there would be less incentive to engage in illegal discriminatory practices. Federal judicial authority must become more active in the elimination of racial discrimination.

Thus, the best weapon to combat racial segregation is the law. It is the use of the law, Title VIII, that gives the greatest assurance of progress. Every effort must be made toward fair housing enforcement through the federal agency of HUD. However, especially given the dismaying possibility of HUD being dismantled, the pursuit of fair housing will definitely require participation on all levels of government, fair housing organizations and private plaintiffs to ensure that fair housing is afforded to all walks of life.

Conclusion

It was only fifty or so years ago that widespread practices of exclusionary zoning, racially restrictive covenants, mortgage redlining and gov-

ernment-sponsored segregation became an official part of American housing policy. Furthermore, as result of these policies residential segregation continues to plague our urban areas. However, Title VIII can be applied effectively to state affordable housing agencies, given HUD's new mission to give greater administrative power to states. Title VIII, in this light, should be used to the fullest extent possible to encourage racial integration and to alleviate the pervasive problems of the inner city. Towards this end, Title VIII could promote racial integration along with affordable housing. In principle, such enforcement will promote diversity, the development of all communities and respect in all communities. The failure to end racial inequality in neighborhoods and communities will only lead to a downfall, unless as Henry Cisneros advocates, we "fulfill our hopes for a society that enshrines the ideals of 'liberty, equality and fraternity." Each of us must "assume personal responsibility for embracing diversity and developing common environments where people of different races can relate to each other as persons with dignity and respect" (Cisneros 1993: 12).

Notes

[1]After the Great Depression, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created to help revive the collapsed housing market.

[2]The Rumford Act declares that "the practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry, in housing accommodations is against public policy and that this position is taken under the police power of the state, for the protection of the welfare, health and peace of the people of California" (Denton 1964:134). Furthermore, it outlaws discrimination in conventionally financed residential structures of more than four units. It adds to the publicly-assisted coverage of the Hawkins Act, which replaces housing on land sold below cost in connection with urban renewal projects, and housing on land acquired through condemnation by agency of state government.

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ANALYZE, CRITICIZE, MOBILIZE, ENERGIZE: PLANNING TASKS AFTER THE LOS ANGELES REBELLION

Hany Khalil

May 15, 1992

Dear Jameela,

A thousand blessings and greetings to you and your family. As for me, tell anyone who asks about me that I am in good health and preparing to return to the work world after I graduate this June.

Thanks for your letter. You're right: Now that you've settled into your 24-hour-a-day teaching job and I've started my thesis, we've both dropped the ball with letters. Too bad Egypt isn't on the global internet yet, no?

You asked about what we planning students have been thinking since South Los Angeles burned for the second time in less than three decades. Some of the planners I know were visibly shaken by the events. They've begun to ask probing questions about their own work. For a few days, the uprising lay bare the limits of conventional models of planning; it was obvious that "urban development" had done little to significantly alter the day-to-day suffering, subordination, and despair experienced by the urban poor. These planners began to ask: can enough affordable housing be built, even under a liberal Democratic Mayor, to shelter those the private housing market excludes? Would even expanded support for community development corporations create adequate jobs and reinvestment in South LA given the ongoing restructuring of the LA economy?

Maybe the best way to answer your question is to share this experience with you.

A few days after the uprising, as the last embers began to die down and the INS eased off its daily any-Latino-on-the-street-is-illegal posse hunts, I attended an American Planners Association gathering at UCLA. My stomach filled with tasty sandwiches (and rancid wine), I chanced upon an intriguing conversation between two planners. One, a white economic development planner, had graduated from USC two years ago, and he now worked for the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency as an economic trends forecaster. The other was an African American woman raised in Compton in the 1980s, when the city became more than 50 percent Latino. Before joining UCLA's Urban Planning program this year, she had worked as a researcher and community organizer with the Respect for Security Guards Campaign, an effort to unionize LA's immigrant security guards.

The gulf between how each viewed the planning issues in the aftermath of the uprising could not have been wider. As you might expect, the government planner clearly identified with the "rational statist" model of planning our zany planning professors at UCLA keep attacking. He carried himself confidently, almost as if he were a member of FDR's Brain Trust.

The trade unionist, in contrast, articulated a conception of planning that was very new to me. She called it an "insurgent- catalyst" approach to planning. Intrigued, but feeling a bit woozy from the wine, I leaned against a wall and listened intently, only occasionally posing a bizarre question (as you know I'm wont to do!). To the best of my recollection, here is what transpired:

Rational[1]**:** You're absolutely right to say that Mayor Bradley's policies haven't achieved the goal of creating jobs for the residents of South LA. Where I disagree with you, though, is that I think the Mayor has all the right intentions. Unfortunately, his efforts are hamstrung by the current irrational process by which City policy makers make decisions. Right now all the special interests -- community organizations, labor leaders, real estate developers -- keep pushing and pulling him to pay attention to their own private interests at the expense of the city's common welfare. Only technical analysis, not politics, can bring reason to the City's planning process (Friedmann 1987: 105).

Insurgent: And how would technical methodology do that?

Rational: The problems the city of Los Angeles faces are just that -- problems. With the knowledge gained through technical analysis, they can be solved. What decision-makers need most is a coherent, objective analysis of which programs are likely to be most effective and efficient in meeting the City's goals (Friedmann 1987: 139).

The first thing we would do is inventory our local economic resources. We economic forecasters at the Community Redevelopment Agency employ a variety of techniques capable of building a com-

prehensive picture of the LA economy. Data from the Department of Commerce would help us answer the following questions. What are the industries we have here in Los Angeles? Which ones are growing and which are declining? We would then mathematically model the LA economy and forecast long-term business trends to analyze the specific economic situation faced by LA's residents. With that information, we would be able to project the intended and unintended impacts of alternative policies, and then evaluate them in relation to the City's stated goals and objectives.

Policy makers would be in a much better place to make decisions on how to invest resources to stimulate economic growth. We planners would then help implement these decisions. The kinds of activities involved might range from planning transportation infrastructure to packaging locational incentives for private investment to financing construction of commercial shopping malls.

Insurgent: Your approach seems to leave little room for groups beside officially trained planners to define the problems and conceptualize solutions. Don't you think it's important to involve the public in analyzing, shaping, and implementing development?

Rational: Absolutely, we need the public to be involved, if only to be sure that we build up consensus for the plans we develop. The Community Redevelopment Agency holds public hearings on planning issues all the time. Members of the communities being planned also sit on our advisory planning commissions.

But make no mistake; only dispassionate analysis of the facts by professional planners can help us diagnose what's wrong with the urban economy and find a serious cure. In contrast, people lacking training in these procedures inevitably distort the analysis with their particular experience and values -- be they African American businessmen, or suburban housewives. Values and politics have their place in helping specify social goals. But specifying the means for achieving those goals should be left to professional planners.

There's another problem, too; the underlying social and economic conditions that led to the uprising are very complex. The City needs a *comprehensive* plan for the economic, social, and physical revitalization of South Los Angeles (Sandercock forthcoming). By definition, that plan can only be developed, coordinated, and implemented by those who specialize in managing planning processes. Who else can possibly guide planning so as to protect the public welfare? Otherwise, we're back to square one, where political interests hijack planning processes for their private benefit.

Insurgent: I've got one more question for you, and then I'll tell you how I see the planning project after the uprising. What is it that your planners will actually do? In which arenas will they work on a day-to-day basis?

Rational: We'll do what all planners do -- write documents describing the LA economy; make policy recommendations to the City Council; sponsor public hearings with presentations from key local economic experts, business leaders, and others; generate consensus on how to build public-private partnerships to stimulate regional economic growth. There's even talk that Peter Uberroth, the "Wizard behind the Olympics," will head up this effort. How fortunate! Once technical analysis shows us the most effective course of action to revitalize LA (given limited resources), I'm sure we'll be able to bring development to South LA.

Insurgent: You know, I really made a mistake. For a few days I had entertained the hope that Los Angeles City Planners would humbly reevaluate the foundations of their urban development strategies. Thanks for setting me straight!

In the wake of the uprising I think we need to develop a very different way of thinking about and doing planning, one that proceeds from a fundamentally different political and epistemological stance.

I'm currently trying to work out what I call an *insurgent-catalyst* model of planning. Let me share its core elements with you...

As I see it, planners inevitably act as organizer-intellectuals in situations pervaded by unequal power relations. No matter where we work -- in city planning agencies, as community organizers -- no matter what our concrete activity -- be it writing documents, giving presentations, or organizing community meetings -- we help *frame conceptions* of what the problems are, what kinds of solutions exist, and who should be involved in creating solutions. Moreover, in the process of making those judgements and implementing planning solutions, we involve and *organize* particular actors in the effort.

Despite planners' pretensions to objectivity and neutrality, both of these activities are essentially political activities -- that is, they have the potential to affect the life situations of groups within the Los Angeles community, and therefore are rightly subject to political analysis, interrogation, and intervention.

If what I've said is true, the question becomes: to what extent does the work of planners help maintain existing power relations (consciously or unconsciously) or help build more democratic ones? By and large, the rational-statist model of planning you put forward tends to support the current arrangements of power that create the difficulties brown and black poor people face in Los Angeles.

Take the work of David Friedman and Joel Kotkin, whose paper *The Los Angeles Riots: Causes, Myths, and Solutions* has quickly become *the* authoritative interpretation of the uprising in planning circles. By attacking both liberal and conservative urban revitalization strategies as failures, Friedman and Kotkin position themselves as experts free from contamination by politics. In the story they tell "flexible," entrepreneurial small firms are replacing large corporations as the drivers of job creation and technological innovation.

African Americans, they say, have been crippled by "dependence" on government employment and welfare. In contrast, they point to supposedly successful Korean, Vietnamese, Latino immigrant entrepreneurs who "devoted their energies to small business development, self-help and education" (Friedman and Kotkin 1993: 4). Government's task in the post-liberal era is to "focus on building a flexible, sophisticated industrial base embedded in the society, fostering in its wake a culture of enterprise, family and self-help" (Friedman and Kotkin 1993: 5).

In fact, this supposedly neutral planners' recommendation is deeply informed by -- and helps spread -- a variant of neoliberal ideology. The heroic "entrepreneur," backed by a private enterprise-oriented government, becomes *the* actor solving the city's ills, not organized communities or a progressive local state. Yet, other aspects of "entrepreneurial" culture -- the role of corporate decisions to move thousands of good manufacturing jobs overseas in expanding black unemployment, the virtually unregulated apparel industry's exploitation of primarily Latino and Asian women workers -- remain invisible in their account. And rather than see public sector employment as a source of sustenance for people whom the private economy has long failed to supply adequate, living wage jobs, they frame public sector job creation as a form of "dependence." This can only further expand the political space for right-wing efforts to shift the role of the public sector away from its minimal commitment to communal support and more fully toward facilitating private accumulation.

Now don't get me started on a full-blown critique of the empirical and conceptual weaknesses of the small business, liberate-the-entrepreneur development approach. But as Michael Omi and Howard Winant have also suggested, "traditional" organizer-intellectuals like Friedman and Kotkin often disseminate market ideology/culture by the way they frame issues and involve actors:

> Poverty and discrimination, seen in the past as problems requiring state action, are now seen as the *results* of state activity. What was once the solution (activist state policies) has now become the problem (dependence), and what was once the problem (the lash of poverty) has now become the solution (market forces)... Surely this dramatic analytical inversion is indicative of broader changes in racial ideology and politics in the post-civil rights era (Omi and Winant 1993: 99).

Rational: I'm certainly not ready to concede that my approach to planning supports inequities of power. But let's suppose I were to agree with you. How would your model be any different?

Insurgent: For one, I would begin with an epistemological strategy that places the experience of subordinate groups and dialogue with them at the center of the research process. There are limits to how much we can grasp the social and economic conditions that form the backdrop of the uprising

solely with macro-models and viewing LA from a comfortable sixth-floor downtown office. We need to ground ourselves in experiences of everyday life in South LA. I would begin by talking with people living in South Los Angeles about their everyday experiences at the workplace, on the streets, at the county hospital. I would walk in the neighborhoods of South Los Angeles to have a first-hand look at the conditions people live in, learn about what kind of jobs people used to have and find out what happened to them. I would figure out ways to talk with people in their own life spaces, in their churches, schools, and community organizations, about their own experience of the rebellion and what led to it. Sure, people's perceptions as to what's going on may not clearly correspond to an input-output model of economic change, but subordinate people build up a great deal of experiential *and* theoretical knowledge about the relationships and developments placing them in a subordinate position.

Rational: So you're saying talking with poor people can somehow give you a better understanding of what's going in the LA economy than can our department's statistical analyses? That's a pretty bizarre idea, but... go on.

Insurgent: Not better, just necessary and complementary. The ends of my work would be very different, too. The goal would not be to lay out alternative policy options for policy makers operating under structural constraints and such a lopsided balance of political forces. Instead, the goal of my work would be to aid South LA residents in developing *strategic* analyses and action to gain greater control over the political, economic, and cultural processes shaping everyday life (Gilroy 1987: 411). For me, strategic work differs substantially from allegedly "non-ideological" organizing typical of Alinskyite community organizations or conventional trade unions (Fisher and Kling 1990). What I'm interested in is the broadening of worker and community struggles over seemingly isolated issues into a wider movement, ideology, and demands to significantly expand the institutional capacity of ordinary people to shape the terms of daily life. To do that I would try, following Cornel West, to foster or reenergize organizational networks that "promote high-quality critical habits primarily for the purpose of black [and brown] insurgency" (West 1993: 83) at the same time that I try to spur and assist practical community or worker struggles. *Analyze, criticize, mobilize, energize...* these are our tasks.

Why do I emphasize the strategic role planners can play? Most community groups rarely move from defensive tactics to resist the imposition of power to offensive strategies capable of transforming social structures and genuinely democratizing social relations. That's not surprising, given the minimal time, resources, conceptual or analytical tools with which most community organizations work. They rarely have the opportunity to think beyond immediate, highly tangible goals like winning expanded social services, raising a single employer's wages a dollar, or getting landlords to clean up vacant lots.

There's another reason, too: In the US where subordinate groups have won a fair amount of rights and authority (voting, some collective bargaining, etc.), the position of dominant groups is maintained largely by getting those on the bottom to identify with, and cooperate (Epstein 1991: 234) with, the current macro-structures and micro-practices of power. The daily operations of institutions of everyday life (schools, religious institutions, the workplace), combined with active efforts of conservative political groupings, function largely to disseminate and reinforce outlooks, values, and norms -- often deeply internalized by subordinate groups -- which make contingent social arrangements and the balance of power underlying them appear natural and inevitable. In this world self-preservation or domination appears to be the only sane strategy for survival. This way of seeing and being becomes "common sense," as everyday as urban crime, although its acceptance is always partial and contradicted by experiences and ideas that could lead in another direction.

When subordinate groups begin to resist oppression, their outlooks and responses remain largely shaped by this common sense. Combined with the limited resources with which groups attempt to fight, the pervasiveness of "common sense" leads struggles to take place around incremental reform and isolated issues. As a result, social conditions like low wages are improved marginally or only for a limited group of workers (like white males working in Detroit's auto factories). Transportation investments that prioritize the needs of the urban poor remain off the agenda. The promise of social movements -- the institutionalization of the capacity of ordinary people to control the decisions and processes that shape the terms of everyday life -- remains truncated.

Even more rarely do movements pose issues or their demands on a "universal" plane, so that they speak to the needs and concerns of a broad range of subordinate groups -- African Americans, students, Latinos/as, women, workers. Movement demands fail to develop into fighting for fundamental structural reform (such as the institutionalization of collective bargaining rights across whole regions or industries, equal pay for equal work, placement of workers and environmental groups on corporate boards, controls on industrial relocation, etc.).

So as an insurgent-catalyst planner, the main task is to counter this common sense. This involves a complex process of working with urban social movements to win near-term demands, but in such a way that strengthens people's belief in the legitimacy of, and their actual capacity to, implement stronger demands for democratic reform of the economy, state, and culture. As I work with existing popular organizations like environmental justice groups and trade unions, I would try to bring the full range of my tools (conceptual, emotional, quantitative, historical) to shape and foster critical analysis of the situation, the sources of power and processes creating the situation, and strategic possibilities for devolving power to popular organizations. Insofar as possible, we would want to institutionalize this process of critical reflection on my and the groups' practice, so as to promote ongoing learning about power and strategy.

Neither officially trained planners nor some essentialized "community" have all the answers. In my model planners don't act just as technicians for community groups with previously defined goals. Through dialogue and critical skill-building, they also act as catalysts for modification of goals, strategies, and tactics. At the same time, subordinate people's knowledge is validated and their self-organization aided. Planners neither dictate to nor "represent" subordinate groups in fights over crumbs of the pie as was the case with 1960s style advocacy planning.

Me (rudely interjecting): So if "strategic" work with social movements becomes the focus of planning, are you suggesting that we throw out the whole model of planning in operation for most of this century, with its analytical skills, evaluative methods, and so on? If you are, then ...

Insurgent: No, not at all. Many of the critical skills and methodologies we learn in planning school can be useful, if deployed in the appropriate context and used with caution. The rationalist planning model does have some valuable insights. Technical analysis should inform formulations of strategies for shaping urban development. GIS, sectoral analysis, these are important to know, if only to be able to combat conventional planning's use of numbers to legitimate the perspectives of dominant groups. As an organizer at my union, I came to realize that skills in industry-wide analysis would help greatly in developing strategies for workers to build real power in the security guard industry. So I came back to graduate school to get skills in industry research and broader political economic analysis.

At the same time we have to avoid being technocratic imperialists: How can we deploy these tools without seeing them or using them as the most advanced tools of knowing? We need to walk a fine line between rejection of the totalizing aspects of the rationalist/technical model and skeptical paralysis caused by seeing technical analysis and state planning solely as instruments of domination.

In addition, this model's emphasis on human will and transformative powers is valuable. But we do need to reformulate it in non-elitist, collective terms so as to sustain collective human effort to transform urban conditions.

Me: And are you proposing that planners give up on working within city government?

Insurgent: I do think that there's more room for this kind of work outside the local state than there is within. In US capitalism with its federal governmental system, local governments depend upon the private sector for jobs and tax revenue. Faced with unwelcome progressive reforms pushed through by a public energized by a "new common sense," industry threats to withdraw investment can bring even the most progressive government to its knees, as the early 1980s French Socialist government quickly learned. So in some cases governments are structurally constrained by the cur-

rent ability of industry to exercise veto power against policies perceived to be against their self-interest.

On the other hand, that power over the state is far from total. It's important to note three things about the role of the local state in the US economy: (1) the local state is an important actor in urban development issues, and therefore its activities deeply penetrate everyday urban life; (2) the state does support private accumulation, but it must also appear to represent broader public interests, so popular movements can pressure the government to protect their interests, within limits; and (3) people's outlooks on racial issues, the urban "crisis," are largely shaped by active ideological efforts by participants in the local state. Hence, movement struggles to shape urban development inevitably involve contestation over the role of the local state.

Even without a serious progressive/left government in authority, *in alliance with social movements* planners can utilize their position to influence struggles within and outside the state (by providing information, advocating organizations' positions, making media statements, etc.). For example, if efforts are underway to organize a regional industrial planning initiative, planners could work with trade unions and environmental justice groups to demand their participation in the process, and provide them with resources to develop their own plans for restructuring industries. Here, the popular planning initiatives of the Labor-led Greater London Council in the 1980s are instructive. We also need to keep in mind that many of the processes affecting the terms of urban development operate at national scales (think of highway investment) and global scales (North American integration). So it's important to affiliate with movements and states operating at these levels, too.

In Los Angeles organizations like AGENDA (Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development) somewhat fit this insurgent-catalyst model. Concerned with the attempts of the LAPD and the National Guard to impose military-style "containment" as the solution to the uprising, AGENDA organized residents to develop and win their own model of genuine community-based policing. They have since gone on to involve local residents in developing and incorporating their own indigenous development agenda into new public financing projects targeting South LA. Their organizing work is also consciously educational; it helped counter the Right's notion that repression will somehow contain urban crisis, and it helped legitimate and foster movement toward democratization of community-state relations.

A comparable organization is the Labor/Community Strategy Center. The Center has combined aggressive organizing of bus riders to protect and expand regional bus service, upon which LA's poor greatly depend, while linking democratizing of public transportation services to longer-term strategies making industries and city government more accountable to workers and communities. In all their work, they explicitly attempt to reshape common sense; in the process of day to day organizing,

they explicitly attempt to develop a counter analysis of the roots of urban crisis and poverty to that of the Right. They work with their membership on developing a clear world view centered on their rights to have basic material and environmental needs met and to shape the priorities and goals of the LA economy.

Rational: I'm still having trouble understanding how all this talk of "social movements," "power," and "organizing" janitors will improve urban conditions. As I told you at the beginning, I admit that the kind of planning we do at the Community Redevelopment Agency has not successfully brought in enough investment into poor areas of LA. However, I'm not yet ready to jettison this approach in favor of your so-called surgeon's... I mean, "insurgent" model of planning. It may be worth continuing the discussion, however...

How's that for an answer to your question, my friend? Write back soon.

Bis-salaama,
Hany

Notes

[1]To construct the "rational-statist" perspective, I combined elements of the social reform and social policy traditions of planning described by John Friedmann (1987) and the more encompassing modernist tradition described by Leonie Sandercock (forthcoming). Any similarities to actual persons or events are purely coincidental.

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PLANNING IN THE MULTICULTURAL CITY: POSTMODERNITY AND THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DIFFERENCE

Gene J. Kim

Several months ago while shooting hoops at the Wooden Center, a fellow planning student (and close friend) -- steeped in the modernist traditions of econometrics and policy analysis -- asked me a somewhat innocuous sounding question (or so I thought): "In a sentence, can you define postmodernity?" The question seemed simple enough. No problem, I said to myself. He knew I had more than a passing interest in postmodernism and planning theory, and that I'd be more than eager to respond. As I gathered my thoughts in an attempt to articulate a coherent one-sentence response, though, I gradually began to realize that the scope and complexity of the postmodern critique defied an "easy-to-assemble" definition, and that he was asking a question to which there was no easy answer (at least, one that an econometrician could understand). I could still see that shit-eating grin on his face as I shot the basketball. Before I could tell him that postmodernity could not be reduced to a singular mathematical model with a set number of discrete variables, he abruptly interjected, "That's what I thought. No need to elaborate. . ."

I got the point. In essence, he was saying: "Postmodernity is an irrelevant critique because it repudiates the legitimacy of science and, as a paradigm, doesn't provide any new empirical tools for improving social policy and making the world a better place." At the time, I guess I wasn't about to defend an evolving paradigm whose existence I wasn't fully convinced of myself. My mind was swimming ('Damn, we haven't gotten to that part of the course yet!' I lamented silently). I could conceive of postmodernity as style, epoch and method, but could not articulate how these representations

and forms affected the modernist project of planning and social science in general. I could conceive of the paradigmatic breakdown of planning theory, but could not connect it with the evolution of postmodern critical thought. The more I grasped for answers, more and more questions arose. Does the postmodern critique of planning allow us as planners to connect meaning (i.e. how we interpret and navigate the material, social and cultural constructions around us) with action in a manner that facilitates social justice? Does the postmodern deconstruction of planning allow us to incorporate outside perspectives on race, ethnicity and gender in framing conceptions of inclusion for oppressed peoples of color? Or does postmodernity leave planning at the precipice of a deep theoretical chasm in which anxiety and self-doubt necessarily lead to "political acquiescence and hopelessness?" (Sandercock 1994) I felt paralyzed. I also played terribly. I missed five of seven shots (two easy lay-ups!). Lost the game.

Because of that silly little conversation back in early October, I began to do some reading and soul-searching on the prospects of postmodernity in planning and the question of how perspectives of race, ethnicity and gender can lead to greater inclusion in the planning decision-making process. Fortunately, the final paper in my course on planning theory provided a fortuitous opportunity through which to articulate these critical inquiries, and, at the same time, to respond more formally to my dear colleague's original query. Although I will not attempt to define postmodernity explicitly, hopefully my discussion of racial formation, acknowledging 'difference,' and planning in the multicultural city can illuminate the theoretical contours of postmodern thought.

In this paper, I attempt to do three things: (1) briefly discuss implications of the historical exclusion of people of color from the theoretical mapping of the *modernist* planning project and the subsequent paradigmatic fragmentation of planning, (2) explore how the postmodern acknowledgement of 'difference' and multiculturalism is manifested in relation to pre-existing matrices of racial identification and power relations, and (3) evaluate the inherent tension between acknowledging 'difference' and the essentialism implied in *a priori* racial meanings. While postmodern critical thought creates theoretical spaces for new oppositional and insurgent movements based on conceptions of 'difference,' in planning terms, there is no clear consensus on how this acknowledgement can lead to the formation of multicultural alliances and coalitions that shift the balance of institutional power relations.

Modernist Planning in the Post-war Era

Prior to the evolution of late capitalism (Jameson 1984) and the genesis of the postmodern city, *modernist* social science fields like planning did not consider the extent to which conceptions of race, class and gender affect the spatial distribution of economic growth and the formulation of social policy. The 'utilitarian' world view -- that as

along as the national economy and social policies produced positive benefits for most of the people (i.e. the public interest) most of the time -- anchored much of the moral rationale for public policy and economic outcomes during the post-war baby boom era of white middle class expansion and economic growth. Under the guise of "scientific inquiry," planners viewed the social construction of society as a necessary function of capitalism, the rising middle class, and an orderly, integrated urban city (Beauregard 1989). The city was the focus of the reform-minded technical planner's inquiry. The derivation of politically neutral, scientific expertise in social policy, by definition, meant that the public interest could not only be objectively identified, but skillfully served.

For those "colored" folks excluded from the public interest, however, life in the city meant experiencing the world as second class citizens, and realizing that white America did not and could not acknowledge the legacy and practice of racism in the construction of society, and the distribution of public resources. Being a woman or "colored" meant being invisible, unacknowledged, and irrelevant to society, capital and the state. The absence of race in *positivist* social policy constructs belied the reality that, in white America, racial formation and the hierarchial racial classifications have intimately shaped imbalanced power relations, which in turn have constantly reproduced and strengthened the illusion of free enterprise and the myth of a colorblind democracy. In the popular media, newsprint, city politics, chambers of commerce, rotary clubs, trade unions, professional societies, corporate boardrooms and universities, the systematic exclusion of "colored" people from political participation and the silencing of their perspectives assured the economic, class and intellectual hegemony of white America. Like the corporate boardrooms, critical thought in the academe was the exclusive domain of privileged white males. The theoretical terrain of planning prior to the breakdown of the rational comprehensive model in the 1960s provides an illustrative example of this.

Shaped by writings of critical thinkers (all white males) such as Ernest Alexander, Andreas Faludi and Herbert Simon, the dominant tradition of American planning, the rational comprehensive model, has rested firmly on *modernist* principles which link scientific reason, applied rationality and the production of social action under the name of Truth. In theory, because technical knowledge could be derived only through rational processes outside the boundaries of political negotiation, planners, as professional observers and advise-givers, stood apart from the groups, communities and constituencies whose lives would be affected by the planners' grand schemes. As technical experts, they refused to enter the political fray. The theoretical assumptions embedded into the policy analysis meta-narrative left no critical spaces in which the recognition of institutionalized racism could contextualize the transformation of *subjective* knowledge to social action. As far as technocratic planners were concerned, low income minorities living in the central city had needs, desires and expe-

riences that were no different from middle class whites in the suburbs.

During the post-war baby boom era, the rapidly shifting spatial, demographic and socioeconomic context of new growth in Sunbelt regions altered the paradigmatic parameters of the *modernist* planning project and, in effect, destroyed the theoretical nexus between planning and social reform. The flight of the white middle class from the central cities, the erosion of the industrial job base, and the accumulation of capital signaled the beginning of a prolonged era of fiscal and economic crisis for working class blacks living in the central city. As metropolitan areas became increasingly polarized on the basis of race, class, and income, the modernist planning establishment quickly became disenchanted with the notion of improving society, and increasingly adopted economic development strategies that facilitated new growth trends in outlying metropolitan areas (Beauregard 1989). While stridently maintaining its claim to technical and scientific reason, it quietly and permanently abandoned the twin goals of social welfare and economic growth, and redefined the 'public interest' accordingly (Beauregard 1989). Over time, the older inner city areas not only became unacceptable for private capital investment, they were now also seen as impervious to the remedies of state intervention. The local polity could forego redistributive programs to the inner city without losing any political capital because the dominant power structure succeeded in racializing inner city inhabitants (through housing segregation, job discrimination, and authoritarian policing) and excluding these groups from mainstream political participation.

The middle-class biased planning establishment paid little attention to the plight of marginalized peoples of color trapped in declining inner city areas by institutionalized forms of racism. In some instances, the ghettoized urban poor became the objects of paternalistic social welfare programs designed to eradicate poverty (i.e. The Great Society). Their voices and experiences, however, were never integrated into the decision-making process in a manner that allowed interpretive meaning to drive the formulation of social policy. In most cases, when policymakers did implement large-scale social programs designed to serve the public interest, they came directly at the expense of these marginalized racial groups (i.e. the federal highway program, urban renewal). In the 1950s, hundreds of thousands of low income homes in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Boston were demolished to make room for freeways designed to allow suburban commuters easy access to downtown jobs. Communities were torn apart. Social networks were destroyed.

In the wake of these federal and state programs, however, planning began to question its social mission and the efficacy of the rational comprehensive planning paradigm. There was a growing recognition that the environmental and economic impacts of hierarchical planning decisions designed to increase social welfare were falling disproportionately on minority communities in poor inner city neighborhoods. Black folks knew this all along. But

their voices were silenced. Their lives were uprooted by a capitalist state that did not include their interests in the calculus of the social good.

Critical planning theorists began to challenge the positivist planning project in part because the normative implications of social action were *ambiguous* when they were not attached to subjective experiential contexts. In other words, there was no basis from which to derive the consequences and meanings of social action. Likewise, the reproduction and impacts of racism and sexism became *invisible* also. Once race and gender became legitimate perspectives through which to evaluate the outcomes of planning decisions, the burden of many of these social and economic injustices on women and people of color gradually became more identifiable. Marris (1987) argues that it is in fact impossible to evaluate social actions purely in terms of their effectiveness:

> They can only be effective or ineffective from some standpoint of attention which itself reflects a whole context of purpose and understanding. We have to ask not only whether some action succeeded, but how, in the light of events, ought we to regard it: from what point of view, in what terms and with what feelings? (Marris 1987)

When social programs are intentionally severed from the interpretive context in which social policies are to be understood, marginalized groups excluded from the decision-making process lose faith in the moral authority of public sector planning. We've seen examples of this in every urban city in the United States. In areas like South Central Los Angeles, the restructuring of global capital, the fiscal abandonment of the inner city, and systematic exclusion on the basis of racial and gender interact in ways that cause poor folks, minorities and women to feel hopelessness, frustration and despair. Clearing the way for postmodern critiques of social action, Marris (1987) warns that "[u]nless we respect the autonomy of understanding, any critical study of social policy becomes either a polemical assertion of some particular understanding, or a parade of illusions -- and both lead towards authoritarian and self-defeating conclusions."

Postmodernity, Race and Planning

So where does that leave the modernist planning project? Is it in a state of crisis as some would suggest? Can the postmodern critique provide a means through which social action can be transformed and reinvigorated? Certainly, it would be premature to declare the official death of modernism in planning. While its assumptions have been shown to be dubious, its analytic frameworks and empirical methods are still employed in a variety of planning sub-fields, most notably transportation planning. Moreover, we must not forget that public policy (our new home at UCLA) is still steeped in the language of the *positivist* tradition, and is quite comfortably ensconced in the Enlightenment paradigm of scientific rationality. We should, however, recognize that the death of metatheory in planning, and the emergence of new postmodern discourses on racial formation, iden-

tity, and difference in other critical disciplines provide exciting new ways of knowing, interpreting and acting in the world around us that can lead to greater political and social empowerment (Sandercock 1994). The trick is to incorporate new ways of knowing that reattach new meanings and oppositional modes of action to the lives of subordinated groups that have historically been excluded in society.

In promising radical forms of democracy based on the acknowledgement of difference, the postmodern critique of planning provides a level of epistemological freedom that is both exhilarating and paralyzing. It is exhilarating because it validates *subjective* knowledge and our ability to become agents of social change. There is, however, an underlying tension between essentialism inherent in racial formation (how racial classifications and hierarchies are assigned) in the U.S. and the anti-essentialism required in acknowledging difference.

In the postmodern critique, race and gender oppression are socially constructed realities which gain significance (meaning) through the constant reproduction of complex micro-level and macro-level interactions within a given structure of institutional and cultural constraints. While racism and sexism are often manifested through the exercise of hegemonic practices, postmodern theory emphasizes a non-dualistic approach to social action in which human agency allows social creatures to assert oppositional practices and behave as political actors capable of influencing power relations (Sandercock 1994). Acknowledgement of difference *must*, however, precondition action; and anti-essentialism *must* precondition the acknowledgement of difference.

Since the early 1970s, people of color and women have begun to challenge and claim spaces in theoretical discourses that were previously monopolized by white males (Sandercock 1994). Insurgent thinkers such as bell hooks, Cornell West, Gloria Anzaldua and Ron Takaki have begun to provide a *subjective* discourse on American racism and have given voice to the experiences of people of color from the perspective of people of color. Collectively, these critical thinkers have begun the process of dismantling the Enlightenment project of unitary social progress and truth (Sandercock 1994). By obliterating the critical distance between subject and object, they have widened the boundaries of epistemology in a way that provides new perspectives on socially constructed phenomenon.

In particular, an emerging discourse on race has provided fresh insight on how the dominant white power structure assigns historically specific racial meanings through a process of political and ideological struggle. Omi and Winant (1989) suggest that: "racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context in which they are embedded."

While racial meanings may change over time, these historically-specific racial categorizations form the basis for crude perceptual tools which

provide us with a means of decoding human action and deriving meaning from social interaction. *This process of racialization is socially conditioned and **not** innate.* In micro-level social contexts, the human mind constantly attempts to simplify the interaction of complex and ambiguous processes in an effort to arrive at some intelligible level of interpretive meaning. In the absence of full and complete information, Americans (white and non-white) generally presume that race and gender suggest some irreducible things about an individual's constitution when they match preconceived racial perceptions (although few readily admit it). Waiting at a stoplight in a car at the corner of Vermont Avenue and Jefferson Avenue at 1:00 a.m., for example, the presence of black males in a car that pulls up in the next lane means something entirely different than the presence of Asian women. While this exercise of racial identification does not necessarily have to produce racism, by definition, it essentializes the object of perceptual inquiry and may reduce her/him to something entirely incommensurate with the sum of her/his real qualities.

Racial hierarchies, stereotypes and impressions gain significance over time because the ambiguity of difference is resolved through cognitive processes that essentializes the other into a distinct set of symbols and meanings. While these meanings are generally assigned first by hegemonic groups, they are reinforced and perpetuated through micro-level and macro-level social interactions. Though these meanings may change over time, the process of racial formation remains constant. Americans navigate the intersection of race, class, gender and politics to establish social networks, professional associations and identity in a manner that legitimizes pre-existing normative perspectives. For middle class white America, racial formation serves as a collective tool for maintaining racial and class homogeneity in the production of social space.

If we live in a highly racialized multicultural society that, on the whole, values racial exclusivity yet refuses to acknowledge that economic and social benefits are distributed along strictly defined racial and class lines, how then can difference be acknowledged in a manner that produces social justice for subordinated people of color? How does the postmodern critique address the fact that a variety of symbols and meanings associated with skin color are vigorously employed to maintain the existing social order yet concealed at every turn? While the postmodern critique provides those of us with an experiential awareness of racial and gender oppression with new ways of knowing and acting, racism and sexism have been historically embedded in the production of institutional, material and social relations in manifestations which are highly difficult to disentangle and expose. As a result, appropriate modes of action and empowerment are difficult to identify, particularly in racialized multicultural settings like Los Angeles. While many Angelenos of various skin colors pay lip service to respecting difference and diversity, there is no agreement about what respecting dif-

ference means -- especially when there is a cultural incentive to conceal racial and gender biases.

What Does Acknowledging Difference Mean?

The influence of the postmodern deconstruction of Enlightment epistemology in the production of critical thought (even in planning) and its legitimation of new modes of interpretive meaning is well documented. By comparison, it has had relatively little impact on the politics of empowerment and the formation of organic trans-cultural groupings which transcend the divisions of identity politics. This theoretical gap between meaning and action is a fundamental tension which postmodern theorists like bell hooks and Cornell West have attempted to address. So far, however, no consensus has been reached.

Certainly, the postmodern emphasis on the critique of identity allows for an unprecedented level of *subjective* control over the meanings and symbols surrounding one's own race and gender. hooks suggests that "[a]bandoning essentialist notions would be a serious challenge to racism" (hooks 1990: 28). While I would agree with her general assertion that postmodernism provides a valuable *subjective* means of self-identification, in practice, racial essentialism is a critical cognitive function which allows people (non-white and white) to interpret social relations in a multicultural environment and distinguish their collective interests from those of "other" groups. In seeking membership to political, social or cultural organizations, for example, the racial composition of that group triggers a matrix of differential meanings and symbols which frame the future prospects of membership and group interaction. Although we may accept difference, we often seek interactions that validate who we think we are. This is why hooks values blackness over racial anonymity. It also speaks to why she is solely concerned with the black experience. Taken to its extreme, anti-essentialism should challenge and subvert notions of racism precisely because it precludes the potential for forming gut-level interpretative meanings on the basis of skin color. If we deny the existence of racial formation in the production of racism, however, people of color cannot adopt oppositional struggles that bring democracy to public decision making.

It is not coincidental that hooks frames the postmodernity critique of essentialism exclusively in terms of the black American experience. She challenges black people to abandon the presumed link between essentialism and shared historically specific experiences, but makes no comment on essentialist perspectives which shape how racially distinct groups view other groups. hooks suggests that to the extent that "other groups now share with black folks a sense of deep alienation, despair, uncertainty, loss of a sense of grounding even if it is not informed by shared circumstance," these shared sensibilities can form the basis for collective action that can cut

across the boundaries of race, class, and gender (hooks 1990: 27). In this context, hooks identifies shared oppression as the basis for solidarity and coalition-building, not the acknowledgement of difference. Certainly, the theoretical claim that collective action ought to be based on shared oppression is morally appealing, but the evidence thus far suggests that the essentialism embedded in the construction of macro-level racial and class meanings and hierarchies precludes the formation of inter-ethnic solidarity and a palpable acknowledgement of difference. Despite the prevalence of shared racial oppression in Los Angeles, inter-ethnic conflict and simmering racial tensions between blacks, Koreans and Latinos has overwhelmingly characterized the tenor of social relations before and after the 1992 uprising. This does not mean, however, that movement in the direction of mutual cooperation and multi-racial political solidarity is necessarily implausible. While postmodernity opens the way for oppositional subjectivity, we must constantly attempt to identify and challenge the presence of racial essentialism as an obstacle to acknowledging difference.

The contemporary reality in Los Angeles is this: whites no longer constitute a racial majority. The growth in Hispanic and Asian populations in Los Angeles have spawned new perspectives on diversity which suggest that, as a society, we must move beyond the black/white framework of racism because it has become increasingly irrelevant to the post-industrial restructuring of metropolitan areas. As the postmodern restructuring of capital continues, income differentials are increasing along racial and gender lines. This is where planners must intervene. Highly labor-intensive low wage service-oriented industries and manufacturing contractors have ruthlessly exploited non-English speaking immigrants throughout metropolitan areas around the country. The recent disclosure of the brutal exploitation of Thai nationals in Los Angeles suggests in stark terms that processes of internal colonialism and 'third-world' exploitation flourish right in our own backyard. While on the one hand Americans have reacted to the exploitation of these Thai national laborers in the garment industry with measured horror, the state knows that middle class consumers and the industry will not tolerate the enforcement of state labor laws if it means higher prices across the board at local retail outlets. While in theory labor laws are intended to protect the 'public interest,' an examination of LA's garment industry reveals that the differential enforcement of these laws coincides with *a priori* conceptions of racial hierarchy.

In combination, these new emerging voices have shaped a new consciousness in planning which acknowledges that the economic and spatial outcomes of planning decisions are not distributed evenly on the basis of race and gender (Grigsby 1993). Because ethnic groups are often times heavily segregated in a handful of central area neighborhoods, large scale planning decisions produce outcomes which heighten racial exclusion and lower inner city access to employment, social and

cultural opportunities. In this context, planning for the 'public interest' becomes a by-word for racial and gender exclusion. We must recognize that race is a critical element in determining how the benefits and costs of social policies are likely to be distributed. Instead of presuming that the public interest is homogeneous, the practice of planning in poly-ethnic post-industrial cities must develop modes that acknowledge difference and diversity. Recognizing and respecting difference in terms of class, race and gender is the first step in allowing planners to implement a vision of society that speaks to the needs of all groups, especially those that have historically been excluded to the margins.

This recognition embodies a fundamental presumption that racial and gender oppression are constantly reproduced through the interaction of words, deeds, thoughts and actions that serve to maintain existing power relations in society. In this way, racialization and the exercise of power permeates all social constructions and our cognitive ability to comprehend the social relations around us. Only after diversity is perceived as a societal asset and people demand to know how difference is to be acknowledged can embedded power relations be exposed and challenged. And only then can the process of inclusion begin. This, however, is not an easy task. Dynamic movement from exclusion to inclusion requires a sensitivity to racial and gender differences that is foreign to most planners today. Planners have a tendency to couch their understanding of the city in the language of science and rationality, and seek problems that fit neatly into their methodological toolkit. By reconstructing our historical role as social reformers, however, planners, irrespective of race, have a moral responsibility to adapt to the shifting parameters of demographic and structural change in order to alleviate the conditions of exploitation, exclusion and marginalization.

The next fundamental step in the process of inclusion requires coming to terms with what acknowledging difference and diversity means. This is the most critical gap in the formation of a multicultural society which concerns itself with notions of social justice. Although many gains have been made by people of color since the birth of the civil rights movement, we must recognize that we still live in a highly racialized society that constrains the distribution of opportunities on the basis of race, class and gender membership. Hegemonic resistance has countered the emergence ofthese new perspectives on race. In the post-Reagan era, the New Right in particular has embraced and systematically perpetuated the myth that we now live in a color-blind society in which employment, housing, recreational and cultural opportunities are available on an equal basis to all persons irrespective of race and gender. By legitimizing this myth, acknowledgement of difference is made to seem irrelevant to the social, economic and political construction of urban space. Planners, therefore, must constantly to seek to understand how difference can be acknowledged in ways that bring about increased social justice and empowerment. While this discus-

sion may invariably raise more questions than it attempts to answer, I hope that this paper has provided some context for understanding the meaning of difference and postmodernity in terms that even an econometrician can understand.

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HANOI: A NIGHT AT THE RACES OR SYMBOLIC ACTS OF COLLECTIVE INSURGENCY AND DEFIANCE OF AUTHORITY WITH A CHANCE TO WIN A FREE MOTORBIKE

Michael DiGregorio

Saturday night in Hanoi. A Saturday night like other Saturday nights. A small town Saturday night where boys meet girls and girls meet boys and old folks nod their heads as they pass each other on the street wishing they were young and glad that they're not. In March, a cold wind blows down from Southeast China, picking up warm water off the gulf of Tonkin, mixing it all up in the Red River delta in a confused climate of misty-cold tropicality. Men in berets and trench coats; women in scarves and pointed lantana leaf hats. Can you see the streets wet with drizzle, the lights dim, the trees, fooled by the moisture, just beginning to leaf? Can you hear the street sweeper, her long swipes on the black Macadam tearing away at the waste of a day passed by in the hurry of things to do?

Now look. At the edges of the road, in sidewalk cafes and noodle shops, straddled over curbs, and packed under awnings, teenagers cluster in conversation, drinking, laughing pairing up. Here a boy marks his conversation with cigarette stabs into the night air. There a girls checks her lipstick in a compact.

"Jerks," I shout as ten kids on five motorbikes dive through the intersection, running a red light and cutting me off. The last kid on the last bike turns to look back over his shoulder as the bike he's on slides into the turn. I skid to a stop, my own motorbike stalled in the intersection.

"Jerks," I mumble, half to myself and half to whoever would care to listen, "I hope you all die."

I resent them for invading my dream-space, for cutting into the few moments of the day when Hanoi contemplates itself; the sound of bicycle gears and rain dripping off the roof, grandmothers singing babies to sleep as young boys streak down the streets hustling lottery bets, the seven o'clock chime calling an end to the day...

My hotel is on the Silk Dyers' Street, Tho Nhuom, a block away from the Hanoi Hilton. I can see its mustard yellow walls from the roof. Can you see the French police bringing in their prisoners? Can you see the Yen Bai rebels writing their final notes to loved ones? Can you hear the American pilots tapping messages between walls? I got a letter, it says, my kid started high school.

Only the outer wall remains. The inside has been gutted. A Singaporean company has entered into a joint venture with the Hanoi People's Committee. They plan to build a twenty-one story "world trade center" here. They are digging the foundations even though the project has not received final approval from the city architect. That's balls. Or faith in another logic. US veterans opposed the demolition, as did prominent members of the Communist Party. But it was a done deal, as they say. Not even Do Muoi, Party secretary, could stop it. Money had already crossed the table.

"It's Saturday night," says the attendant as I pull up to the hotel. He's standing at the door, dressed in suit jacket, pressed slacks and dress shoes. "Yes," I say. He attempts a smile, but it alludes him. He's a serious boy, filled with a sense of the demands placed upon him. "I have work to do," I say. He nods. But the serious boy is perplexed. He attempts one more smile and I know what he is thinking. I hear it like a finger pointed in my face. "Get a life," he says, "Get a fucking life."

It's 10 p.m. on a Saturday night and the streets are thick with warm hopes for love, money, and weeks of seven Sundays. But I have made no plans. I am here for work. It is work that constrains me. Demands my time, but entices me into a city whose faces greet me as a returning relative. Chu oi, chu moi ve a? Uncle, have you just come back?

The cafe across the street sits like a shoe box in the front yard of a pre-revolution villa, its straight cement walls and flashing Christmas tree lights contrasting the ochre, multistory curves of the old villa. A huge banyan wells up from a crack in the wall, reaching up and over the chimney bracketed red-tiled roof to engulf the old home in a sea of branches. The cafe, in comparison, looks thrown together and out of place. But there it sits, as much a pioneer as the old banyan.

The owner, a former guest worker in East Germany, reminds me that he is not normally open at this hour. "I work nine to five, like people in advanced countries," he says, "and no weekends." He is open this evening for a special event. He has invited friends to watch a football match, broadcast live from France. The gap he has left open in the security grate was my invitation to impose. "I wish I could afford a satellite dish," he says as I settle in. "Don't bother," I respond, "All I get in the hotel is MTV and advertisements." He smiles, pleased at the prospect. "Madonna," he says, "I like to look at Madonna."

So do others. The teenage daughter of the hotel owner has now appeared at the opening in the grate. She is calling me. "Chu oi. Coi day chu." Hey uncle. Uncle, Look here. Can you see her peering through the grate, her eyes quickly taking in the scene and her own right to intrude. Can you see her cropped black hair dripping out from under a pork pie hat, her black work boots, tights and knee-length knit tunic (slit

to the thigh) saying "I am young. I am free. I am urban. I am industrial. I am modern. I am part of it all"?

"The races, uncle, come to see the races," she says, "The races, come quickly."

It is now 11 p.m. The streets have changed. Most shops are closed behind their grates. But the sidewalks are crowded. The teenagers are still here, in the same places. But they have been joined by older men and women, grandmas and grandpas, parents with children. They mark the route, hundreds of them, filling the intersection at South Gate, lining the streets from there up Dien Bien Phu and down Trang Thi.

The hotel owner's daughter leads me. "When the cops come, run," she says. "If they catch you, they'll put you in jail, maybe beat you. So run. Can you run, uncle?"

"Yes," I say, "I am very good at running."

Four racers have lined up across the street, in a file, with the lead closest to the curb. They are two to a bike, on ripe plum Honda Dreams. They take off as another group of racers whines past. The crowd gasps, then wheezes.

"Did you see them, uncle?" "Yes," I say, not particularly impressed. "The ones with white headbands want to die. Can you believe it? If they win, they get a motorbike. They are not afraid of anything. Not death, not even the cops."

The crowd is tense. It is not so sure about the cops. Jail? Beatings? Fines? These are adult concerns. But still they push in close to the route.

"Cops," someone shouts. And they leap back "Cops," a second warning. And its a full retreat to the edge of the stage.

"Run, uncle, run!" The hotel owner's daughter grabs my hand and turns to flee. But she slips as she turns, stumbling over the curb. I grab her ready to pull her along, and there is a hand on my shoulder.

It is her brother. The smiling serious boy. "My father," he says, "thinks you should come back to the hotel. If the cops catch you, you will be beaten. He says you can watch from the roof." I grunt. But now refuse to run.

I think of an elderly friend, a junk dealer, and the artful ways she has learned to manipulate political authority, agreeing to every odd policy while slowing undermining them through well placed questions, until, in the end, her plan is voiced, and she, in turn gives due praise to the wisdom of superior intellect. How many times had she done this to me? It's impossible to say. But how many times have I put her out on the end of a plank only to find that she had put me out in front of her? "You leap," she says, "I'll guard the rear."

The owner of the hotel is waiting for me on the roof. He is bathed, in pajamas, elbows on the ledge. The crowd, by now, has re-formed at the intersection and along the streets "oohing" and "aahing" as another group of racers whines past, through the intersection, down Phan Boi Chau, turning at Hai Ba

Trung, then up Tho Nhuom, past the government offices on Tang Thi, and out of sight.

The police reappear and attempt pursuit, but their sidecared East European hog is no match. The crowd flees to the edge of the conflict, cautiously taking in the drama. The cops block Tho Nhuom and shut off their light, but as the racers approach, they slide into a fishtail and retreat into their origin. One of the cops -- there are three -- leaps out of the side car, baton in hand while the other two make a false attempt at pursuit. They have been out-maneuvered and they know it. They are out-maneuvered every week, in a different place, by the same kids, with the same drama unfolding before an expectant crowd which cheers the kids on.

The baton wielding cop turns. He singles out a teenage boy who, sensing the cadence, dashes up a flight of stairs. "He is trapped," I say to the hotel owner who, like me, is now enthralled in the chase. "Look," he says. A door opens. An old women emerges to confront the cop as he heads for the stairs. The pause is just long enough for the boy to make it over to the next street.

The other two cops have now returned. And the three stand by their bike, engine running, one eye on the crowd and the other on the street. Another pack of racers turns up Tho Nhuom, sees the cops, and slides into reverse. This time, the cops, ready, pursue in earnest, thundering down the narrow lane in their copy-cat Czech Harley.

And the crowd fills the space of retreating authority.

"It's no good," says the landlord, "those kids should wear helmets."

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CAPITALES FATALES: URBANISIERUNG AND POLITIK IN DEN FINANZMETROPOLEN FRANKFURT UND ZÜRICH

Edited by Hansruedi Hitz, Roger Keil, Ute Lehrer, Klaus Ronneberger, Christian Schmid, and Richard Wolff

Zürich: Rotpunktverlag, 1995.

Neil Brenner

In his most recent statement on world city theory, John Friedmann suggests that the world city "hypothesis" (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Friedmann 1986) has now developed into a full-fledged international research "paradigm" generative of extraordinarily fruitful and creative urban scholarship (Friedmann 1995). The essays included in *Capitales Fatales* provide ample evidence to support this claim. The volume emerged from the founding meeting of the International Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA) held in Salecina, Switzerland in May of 1991, and contains some of the most theoretically ambitious and creative research to date on world cities. Though many of the essays have already been published elsewhere (both in English and in somewhat less accessible German sources), the volume will provide German-speaking readers with an indispensable overview and synthesis of recent international research on world cities. Along with Stefan Krätke's *Strukturwandel der Städte* (1991), *Capitales Fatales* is among the first synthetic contributions to world city theory by German-speaking urbanists; and it is undoubtedly the most comprehensive and theoretically rigorous study to date on Frankfurt and Zürich within the world city paradigm.

Roughly one third of the volume contains German translations of various recent texts on world city theory and regulation theory, including the above-mentioned essay by Friedmann on the current state of world city research; a new essay by Sassen on the spatial form of world cities; Soja's comparison of Los Angeles and Amsterdam; and Lipietz's diagnosis of the politics of post-Fordist restructuring in the 1990s. The book also includes detailed comparative analyses of globalization,

post-Fordist urbanization and local politics in Frankfurt and Zürich (by Ronneberger and Keil; and Hitz, Schmid and Wolff). To date most major comparative global city research (e.g. Sassen's work on New York, Tokyo and London [1991]) has been focused largely on socio-economic restructuring. Without neglecting the latter aspect of global city formation, these essays provide one of the first comparative studies of local politics and spatial restructuring in global cities, an important initial foray into an area of key sociological and political significance. Both essays trace the local political preconditions and consequences of global city formation in Frankfurt and Zürich since the early 1970s. Even in an era of globalization, the authors argue, the struggles of urban oppositional movements have resulted in locally specific patterns of spatial development.

Finally, the volume contains a wide range of theoretical interventions that begin to explore the still largely uncharted interface between global city formation, the crisis of Fordism, the shift towards "post-Fordist" modes of local state intervention, the restructuring of urban space and the rise of new forms of urban social conflict. One of the most innovative and promising aspects of these latter papers is the simultaneous deployment of world city theory, regulation theory, and sociospatial theory (particularly that of Lefebvre) to decipher various aspects of contemporary urbanization patterns. This methodological strategy enables the authors to develop a bold new thesis on the emerging spatial form of global cities: in contrast to the traditional "Chicago model" of urban form as a series of concentric rings surrounding a single central business district, the authors argue that contemporary global cities have become increasingly polycentric. Thus the appropriate geometric image for describing cities such as Frankfurt and Zürich is no longer that of core/periphery, but that of the mosaic, the cluster and the patchwork (Ronneberger and Schmid, p. 365). On this basis the urban fringes of Frankfurt and Zürich are viewed as the central sites of globalization. Whereas Ronneberger and Keil, and Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff provide an historical political economy of this new urban form, Lehrer's essay on "FlexSpace" examines some of its implications for the built environment. This emerging pattern of urbanization is captured dramatically in Lehrer's cover photograph, which depicts a peripheral industrial complex refracted through the window of a moving train, as if to signify the impossibility of representing capital's new "landscape of power" (Zukin 1991) from any single, fixed perspective. Along with the paradigmatic case of Orange County (labeled "exopolis" by Soja [1992]), Frankfurt and Zürich provide particularly striking examples of this newly emerging pattern of polycentric, patchwork urbanization.

This thesis inevitably raises the question of whether current patterns of globalization and sociospatial restructuring have rendered the concept of the city itself obsolete: can inherited notions of urbanization be revamped to account for these emerging forms of industrial sprawl, or must altogether new categories be developed to grasp

the "production of space" under global capitalism? Following Lefebvre, the authors insist on the continued importance of both urbanization and urbanity: the latter are viewed at once as the major patterns through which the production of space occurs in the contemporary era and as sites of "resistance" against its destructive socio-ecological consequences. Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff summarize their agenda for research and practice as follows:

> We can no longer reconstruct "the city" as a privileged space within arbitrary territorial boundaries, or get side-tracked in the attempt to conquer, maintain or embellish isolated urban archipelagos. The goal, rather, is to retheorize "the city" and simultaneously to win back democratic control over the urbanization process: what is needed is nothing less than a new model of urbanization (p. 278).

Indeed, the attempt to link critical reflection on contemporary forms of urbanization to new and progressive forms of urban praxis is one of the unifying themes of the entire volume. Ronneberger, and Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff, in particular, discuss the emerging local-global linkages through which cities are articulated with supra-urban spaces, from regions and nation-states to the world economy. The essays by Kipfer and Keil; Mayer; Ronneberger and Keil; and Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff relate diverse forms of urban protest and conflict to the process of global city formation and diagnose some of the strategic dilemmas facing progressive social movements in global cities. Prigge's fascinating essay on the "Epistemology of Urbanity," finally, can be read as an attempt to deploy Lefebvre's "principle of interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces" (see Lefebvre 1991/1974: 86-89) to decipher the multiple, superimposed spatial scales in terms of which world city formation must be understood.

There is an implicit tension, however, between the sociospatial mode of analysis deployed by these authors to analyze the "globalization of urbanization" (Keil and Lehrer, p. 18) and the rather despatialized version of regulation theory they rely upon to periodize contemporary capitalism. Whereas the Parisian regulation theorists tend to presuppose that regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are always structurally coupled within self-enclosed, bounded nation-states, the contributors to *Capitales Fatales* are explicitly concerned with analyzing sub-national scales such as regions and cities and their intensifying global interlinkages. Yet the disjuncture between state-centric theoretical categories and their sub- and supra-national scales of application is not recognized and leads to certain ambiguities and contradictions.

On the one hand, following the Parisian regulation theorists, many of the authors characterize contemporary capitalism as a new regime of "flexible accumulation" that has uniformly *replaced* the Fordist model that prevailed up through the late 1960s, apparently on all spatial scales. However, especially when it is contrasted to its supposed bi-

nary opposite, "Fordism," the overarching concept of "flexible accumulation" is at odds with the analyses contained in the book that emphasize uneven geographical development among cities, regions and nation-states throughout the world-system. By implication, this sociospatial approach undermines dualistic, linear periodizations of contemporary capitalism that interpret the post-1970s world as an entirely new "phase" of capitalist development. From this point of view, global cities, like other flexible production complexes, must be viewed as urban-regional nodes embedded within a global mosaic of differentiated, multi-scalar restructuring processes whose character cannot be captured adequately through the trope of "flexibility" (Amin and Thrift 1992; Sayer and Walker 1992: 191-223). While concepts such as "flexible accumulation" and "post-Fordism" have the advantage of referencing the macro-context within which contemporary cities and regions are situated, they cannot substitute for an analysis of uneven geographical development on divergent spatial scales within that context. Once such an analysis is provided, as it is implicitly by many of the contributors to *Capitales Fatales*, it becomes increasingly problematic to characterize contemporary capitalism in terms of a single, homogenizing "regime of accumulation" or "mode of regulation." Indeed, it may be more plausible to describe the current configuration of world capitalism in terms of continued global disorder in which a "new institutional fix" for stable capital accumulation has yet to be secured (see Peck and Tickell 1994).

A spatialized mode of analysis complicates the task of periodization without rendering it altogether impossible: "phases of capitalism" no longer appear as merely temporal units but correspond as well to distinct hierarchies, patterns and scales of sociospatial organization. For this theoretical approach to bear fruit, however, an analysis of the *re-scaling* of global capitalist sociospatial organization must be integrated into the study of capitalism's temporal dynamics. Prigge's essay in the volume, with its explicit invocation of Lefebvre and Poulantzas, comes closest to such a spatio-temporal methodology, but unfortunately its extremely suggestive implications are not further developed. The recent work of regulationist researchers such as Jessop (1995), Peck and Tickell (1995, 1994) and Swyngedouw (1992), which integrates an analysis of spatial scale, spatial restructuring and state form directly into the framework of regulation theory, might also provide useful tools for addressing some of these issues.

But the methodological difficulties just outlined are probably an unavoidable aspect of the immensely complex and wide-ranging questions pursued in the volume. The forms of urban theory and analysis developed in *Capitales Fatales* point towards a rich terrain of sociologically crucial and politically urgent questions that have yet to be researched in detail, and not least for this reason the book deserves international attention. Particularly when combined with the macro-theoretical concerns of regulation theory and contemporary sociospatial theories, the world city paradigm may well prove to be one of the major organizing frame-

works of critical urban studies for many years to come. This is hardly cause for self-congratulation or methodological laxity among global city researchers--for the paradigm will remain useful only as long as it continues to generate the rigorous analyses, robust hypotheses, creativity and political engagement displayed in *Capitales Fatales*. As Friedmann notes in his contribution to the volume: "Our work has only just begun" (p. 42).

Acknowledgement

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PLANNING AND THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A SYMPOSIUM CELEBRATING THE PLANNING CAREER OF JOHN FRIEDMANN

UCLA, April 11-13, 1996

Kathleen Lee and Gail Sansbury

A heady mixture of wine and food, music and poetry, serious talk and genuine celebration marked this symposium held earlier this spring on the UCLA campus. In three short days, current and former colleagues and students came together to celebrate John Friedmann's seventieth birthday and his career as a planning theorist, practitioner and educator, and to respond to his most recent work on the subject of civil society. Through a series of invited papers, several sets of contrapuntal themes arose: the oppositions of conflict versus consensus, form versus content, the universal versus the particular. Though these themes are not new in themselves (think of the debate over ends and means), and by no means limited to the discussion at hand, there was a sense, as the leading voices of planning theory presented papers and comments, and our thoughts moved from theoretical notions of civil society to empirical studies and back again, that a process of redefinition and refinement was taking place. If we could speak of resistance in this context, then we might say it took the form of a critical engagement with John's concept of civil society. And if there was a consensus, it might have been the suspicion that if John was re-thinking the concept of civil society, then surely it would soon register throughout planning theory and practice.

The gathering of former faculty, such as Peter Marris and Peter Marcuse, and former students from all over the world -- many now teachers themselves, served to further underline the historic nature of the symposium. But even as participants enjoyed the celebration and conviviality, the latter a category made newly prominent by Lisa Peattie, a more somber note marked the end of an era for urban planning at UCLA. John's retirement coincides with

the end of GSAUP, the end of the school founded by his own teacher, Harvey Perloff. Certainly for his former and current students, John's role as a teacher has been critical, and invariably participants in the symposium spoke directly to that influence. John's tenure at GSAUP was both subject and structure of Ed Soja's brilliant opening address on Thursday evening -- twenty-five sonnets, one for each year of John's association with the school. But the recurring themes within these twenty-five Viennese sonnets were not just centered around John's work at GSAUP, but rather all of his long and renowned career. His uncanny prescience, his restless intellect, and his seemingly relentless search for "new beginnings" served as a kind of continuo for the sonnets as well as the entire symposium, the base line for several contrasting movements around his own chosen theme, the rise of civil society.

On Saturday afternoon, the last day of the symposium, at the end of his remarks on alternative development, Bish Sanyal suggested that John's students, and in fact all of those in the audience, and all who have been inspired by John to embrace a normative vision, were faced with dilemmas and tensions such that we were necessarily a "melancholy" group of scholars and practitioners, made "sad" sometimes by theresulting intellectual loneliness of this perspective. Indeed, the laughter in response to this characterization suggested both skepticism and recognition. But if there was an air of sadness, for John's retirement from UCLA, for the end of GSAUP (with all the uncertainty of the urban planning program's "new beginning" within the public policy school), and for our assessment of the still daunting tasks facing planners today, it was and is a sadness that inspires great work -- from "World City Facets: Los Angeles, London, New York, Tokyo and Paris, 1990-1996," the wonderful drawings of Klaus Kunzmann shown in conjunction with the symposium at the gallery in Perloff Hall, to the provocative papers exploring the concept of civil society. The richness and complexity of each paper, and the equally inspiring responses of the commentators, defies easy summary or synthesis. We simply refer you to the forthcoming book which will collect them all. In the meantime, we suggest three questions that we took away from the symposium: one, what does John Friedmann mean by civil society; two, what is new about John's re-thinking of this concept, especially in the context of the empirical work presented at the symposium; and three, how might this concept of civil society, especially the concept of a "good" civil society, influence current planning theory and practice.

While civil society has most often been defined as "those social organizations, associations, and institutions that exist beyond the sphere of direct supervision and control by the state," echoing ideas formulated in western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, John Friedmann's definition expands and builds upon this. He describes civil society as one of "four partially autonomous and overlapping spheres of action and valued social practices," such that our understanding of civil society as a heuristic device must be based on our ability to conceive

of these four spheres as an ensemble. Thus, civil society stands not just in relation, and often in opposition, to the state, but also in relation to the spheres of the corporate economy and political communities. In this terrain of social formation as mapped by John, a central element of civil society is the household and its moral economy. Networks of trust and reciprocity formed in households, not unlike the politics that Peter Marris proposed in opposition to the "competitive management of uncertainty," are centered around "the production and reproduction of life and livelihood," and influence in turn the organized and mobilized elements of civil society. But civil society is not homogeneous, and the challenge for planners at this historic period of devolution of state responsibilities is to maintain an openness for such multiple perspectives to inform our theories and actions.

In light of this re-definition of civil society, the case studies presented at the symposium by Rebecca Abers, Francisco Sabatini, Robin Bloch, Roger Keil, and Michael Douglass revealed real dilemmas, contradictions and problems associated with ideas and definitions of participation, normative content, social mobilization, community, democracy, and empowerment. These case studies critically addressed several contemporary urban debates: (1) the growing tension between globalization of capitalism on the one hand and the historical and socio-cultural constraints on localities on the other; (2) the rise of local and regional states and the weakening of the nation-state's regulatory power; (3) the intersection between state and civil society; (4) the rise of new social movements claiming rights to membership and entitlement in the political community; (5) the meaning of democratization; and (6) a renewed interest in the ideological and normative discourse in the public sphere.

Reflecting on the tension between globalism and localism, Douglass told us that the intrusive mega-infrastructure projects requiring linkage to the global system and the deterioration of urban environments are creating severe social and political tensions in Asian cities. His study reaffirmed that urban space is a contested terrain where state and civil society are often in conflict. Keil echoed Douglass' argument for an active civil society. He described an "insurgent civil society" in a network of democratic self-organizations working against a hegemonic discourse that denies civil society and nature in Los Angeles, a capital of world-city networks on the Pacific-Rim. Bloch suggested a "correct interaction between state and civil society," as he described South Africa's efforts to rebuild a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic nation. The inherent tension between the state's role as mediator and negotiator was one of the themes in Sabatini's presentation on local environmental conflicts in Latin America. Abers' recent research on participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, suggested a renewed possibility and hope for participatory decision-making at the local level. Civil society, in this case, households and neighborhood associations, found material incentives for participation. In this process, learning democratic skills,

such as how to engage in public debates, making collective decisions, and conducting meetings, was a critical aspect of effective participation. Abers reminded us that cooperative action is a result of negotiation, and that the state's policy and programs must be able to address issues of inclusion and participation.

What will all this discussion and debate about civil society among planners have to do with planning theory and practice? In part, it may have to do with our long lost faith in the notions of public interest and the beneficent state. It may have to do with the increasing complexity of urban problems exacerbated by global capitalism. Still, it may reflect our renewed interest in normative ideas of inclusive democracy, political community, social justice and pluralism. Today, as John Friedmann observes, more planners are working directly with progressive segments of civil society. However, good intentions may not lead to critical judgments about what constitutes progressive or radical planning. Janet Abu-Lughod, Michael Storper, Robert Beauregard and others warned us against a danger in confusing form with content. They raised critical questions regarding the usefulness of the concept of civil society. Abu-Lughod asked, how are we to distinguish and treat "good" from "bad" civil societies? Storper raised a related question: on what basis and whose values are we to define the normative content? Beauregard and Flyvbjerg further stressed the inherently fragmentary and conflictive nature of civil society that resists discipline.

Given these debates about procedure versus content, or consensus versus conflict, our task may be to find a way to critically link form and content. Similarly, the concept of civil society may only become useful if we understand it as having dialectical relations with other spheres of action, other collective actors, such as the state, corporate economy, and political community. Recognizing the interdependence between these four collective actors may lead to a reformulation of the planner's role in the public domain. John reminds us to be aware of the critical link between themoral economy of the household and the exchange economy, as the former makes possible the existence of the latter.

Civil society may constitute an aspect of the new political economy as John defines it; or it may be a new lens, or a complex hybrid as Storper and others suggested, through which planners can rethink relations of power in the production and reproduction of social relations in our modern society. Depoliticization of civil society, as Sanyal pointed out, may be an unintended result of both our utopian biases and incrementalism, our pragmatic practices without normative content. Many questions remain: What is the planner's relationship to the state and civil society? How do we engage in what John Friedmann calls "transformative politics for inclusion and social justice?" How do we rebuild a normative content into our theories and practice?

These questions remind us that the impetus for so many of John's own new beginnings took the form of a question, asking "what is planning,"

"what is the good society." Indeed, as Marty Wachs told us in his opening remarks, it was John's desire that the symposium be a "useful" birthday celebration. And thanks to Marty, Leonie Sandercock, and everyone who helped plan the symposium, its usefulness is undisputed. Not only did participants begin to elaborate an answer to John's questions about civil society, but the gathering of so many former students and colleagues recaptured the power of GSAUP's legacy; the brilliant papers of several generations of scholars spoke to a continuity of a community of like-minded planners, theorists and educators; the abundance of music, dance and poetry demonstrated the multiple forms of expression open to post-Euclidean planners; and the sum of all of these inspired new hopes, and new beginnings, for urban planning at UCLA. In this convivial context, there seemed to be no limit to new beginnings.

Presenters

Peter Marris: *Introduction to the Debates*
Lisa Peattie: *Convivial Cities*
Rebecca Abers: *Learning Democratic Practice: Dristibuting Government Resources through Popular Participation in Porto Alegre, Brazil*
Roger Keil: *Greening the Polis and Policing Ecology? Local Environmental Politics and Urban Civil Society in Los Angeles*
Francisco Sabatini: *Local Environmental Conflicts in Latin America: Opportunities for Radical Planning*
Janet Abu-Lughod: *Civil/Uncivil Society: Confusing Form with Content*
John Forester: *Rationality, Dialogue, and Learning: What Community and Environmental Mediators Can Teach Us About the Practice of Civil Society*
Bent Flyvbjerg: *Empowering Society: Habermas, Foucault and the Question of Conflict*
Robin Bloch: *Reconstructing South Africa's Cities: State, Civil Society, Planning*
Michael Douglass: *World City Formation, Poverty and the Environment of the Asia Pacific Rim: Reflections on the Work of John Friedmann*
John Friedmann: *The New Political Economy of Planning: The Rise of Civil Society*

Discussants

Robert Beauregard, James Holston, Judith Innes, Klaus Kunzmann, Peter Marcuse, Haripriya Rangan, Neal Richman and Bish Sanyal, Michael Storper, and James Throgmorton.

Moderators

Edward Blakely, Margaret Crawford, Hemalata Dandekar, and Guillermo Geisse.

Keynote Address

Edward W. Soja

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MARTIN WACHS LEAVES UCLA

Brian D. Taylor

Editors' Note: *At the end of this year three professors from the Department of Urban Planning will be leaving: John Friedmann, Martin Wachs, and Leonie Sandercock. All three have made invaluable contributions to the department, and their absence will be greatly felt. We have decided to recognize their accomplishments by including several short pieces that reflect upon their work.*

After twenty-five years in the Department of Urban Planning, Martin Wachs is moving to Berkeley to become the system-wide Director of the University of California Transportation Center, the federally sponsored university research center for the southwestern states. At Berkeley he will have a joint appointment in the Department of City and Regional Planning and the Department of Civil Engineering. While his leadership of the University of California Transportation Center will surely be a boon for the transportation research community in the UC system, his loss will certainly be felt here at UCLA.

The roles of faculty are typically defined as research, teaching and advising, service to the university, and service to the community. Marty Wachs is rare in that he has so consistently excelled at all of these.

Among his students and colleagues, his relentlessly pleasant demeanor clearly belies his international reputation as a preeminent scholar in transportation policy and planning. Though trained as an engineer, his research has always centered on the connections and boundaries in transportation planning -- perceptional, demographic, spatial, political, and ethical. His earliest research sought

to integrate community values and perceptions into the transportation planning process, and in later years he published extensively on the travel perceptions, behaviors, and needs of women, the elderly, and the disabled. His historical work on the role of transportation systems in shaping urban form in Los Angeles has been widely quoted both inside and outside of planning. More recently, Marty was among the first scholars to document the ways that fiscal politics distorts the provision of public transit in cities. And he is perhaps best known for his devastating critiques of the (mis)use of transportation planning techniques to mask blatant advocacy in the planning process. Since coming to UCLA in 1971, Marty has been awarded more than $1.6 million in research grants, received a Guggenheim Fellowship, won two fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation, produced four books, and published more than one hundred articles on transportation policy and urban planning.

In addition to his outstanding scholarly achievements, Marty has been an active and devoted member of the Urban Planning community at UCLA. He has a longstanding reputation among planning students as a caring and accessible advisor. And today it is difficult to travel far in transportation planning circles without crossing paths with one of his loyal former students. In his quarter century at UCLA, Marty served as principal advisor to over twenty doctoral graduates and more than one hundred and fifty master's graduates. He has long been among the most popular teachers and advisors in the Department; in 1986, he received the Distinguished Teaching Award from the UCLA Alumni Association and was named a "Distinguished Planning Educator" by the California Planning Foundation.

Marty has also been a tireless contributor to his department and the transportation planning community. He served three terms as head of the UCLA Urban Planning Program, is currently on the Executive Board of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of the Sciences, and has been a transportation advisor to the Governor of California and the Mayor of Los Angeles. In addition to advising leading policy makers, Marty has been active in controversial planning issues as well. He served as a Special Master to the United States Federal District Court in a landmark lawsuit by the Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense Council over transportation planning for compliance with the Clean Air Act. And most recently, he has served as an expert witness for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund in a Federal Title VI race discrimination suit over the allocation of public transit services in Southern California.

As a scholar, advisor, teacher, colleague, and practitioner, Marty Wachs' contributions to the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA have been exceptional. The department, its students, staff, and faculty, will greatly miss him.

BRIAN D. TAYLOR is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. His teaching and research focus on transportation policy and finance and the relationship between transportation and urban form.

LETTER TO LEONIE SANDERCOCK

Ferrucio Trabalzi

There are two ways to teach critical theory: the hard way and the soft way.

The hard way puts you right in the middle of the political debate, of what counts in our everyday life. It asks difficult questions, raises personal issues and generates passionate controversy.

The soft way stays out of the heat of the political arena by either simply ignoring issues of gender, race, knowledge and power or by treating them as concepts separated from the lived experience.

Leonie, you have chosen the hard way and for this you deserve respect because the "hard way" is not everybody's cup of tea. And it shouldn't be either.

It takes a lot of personal time, courage, intellectual passion and a strong moral integrity to come into a classroom with the intention to open a discussion on arguments such as gender, race, ethnicity, knowledge and power that in L.A. constitute the turbulent pulp of our social relations.

By asking such questions in the classroom, the relations of power that bind us all are thus revealed and we are often left with the question: what now? We have done the talk, let's see how we do the walk.

Teaching theory is also difficult because professors aren't forced to teach it, and students aren't forced to listen to those professors who do teach it. However, if we do not raise such controversial issues we will not open the space to discuss them. And you can be sure that the Chancellor will not open them for us. Keeping these spaces open is an opportunity not only to acknowledge our differences, but also to build on our similarities and therefore the possibility to imagine what a new political project of emancipation and empowerment could be.

Maybe this won't happen, maybe we are not ready yet to look each other in the face without the filter of marginalizing categories, but, as progressive planners, opening spaces of contestation is a political priority and there shouldn't be any confusion or misunderstanding about it.

Critical theory has also played an important role in our own political project (if we have any, or want to have one) and intellectual scholarship (if we care about it). How does Leonie's method contribute to our way of thinking about social relations and relations of power in society? How can her teaching makes us focus on important questions and social issues that, as engaged planners, we will face in the future?

Speaking from a personal stand point, in working with Leonie and with the students who took her classes, I have gained an awareness and sensitivity to the unspoken narratives of oppression and marginalization that I did not have before.

Even if at times it is a painful process of introspection into my own personal contradictions (as a white male, heterosexual European living in a multicultural society), I nevertheless feel empowered and alive by Leonie's teachings and I know that this is also true for other people in this school.

Leonie kept such precious spaces open to everybody, and it is one of the things that made our school a great place to be. Now that Leonie starts another phase of her life, it is up to us to decide what to do with her legacy. We may want to close such a space because we consider our differences to be irreconcilable, or we may want to keep the space open and continue to work with each other on potentially divisive topics.

For me, I feel that no matter how difficult it is going to be, this is the way I want to go in the future; always in the middle of it, always working for the proliferation of spaces of insurgent behavior, always the hard way.

For this, a big thanks goes to you, Leonie.

Ferrucio Trabalzi

FERRUCIO TRABALZI is a second year doctoral student in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA. His research interests are multiculturalism, systems of knowledge, technology and labor relations.

LEONIE SANDERCOCK has recently been appointed Head of the Department of Planning, Policy, and Landscape at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, after spending the last decade at UCLA.

IOLANTHA

John Friedmann

A green snake lives in my garden.
Early one morning, she lies among
the shimmering grasses, taking the sun.
Her ruby-red eyes stare at me
without blinking. (Her coordinates
are no longer the same).
A delicate tongue flicks in and out
from a mouth without lips; her eyes
lock into mine. Will she make me the gift
of her venom? Will she devour me?
For weeks I've been waiting
for something to happen. But all I see
is that switchblade tongue,
like a hired assassin, move
through the invisible grid.

A green snake lives on my jet-black
driveway. Mornings, when I rev up my car,
it slithers away into a patch of warm sunlight.
Safe at last! It is just a green snake,
I tell myself, a green snake with jeweler's eyes.
One day I will kill it.
It will try to escape the spinning wheels,
but in vain.

O Iolantha, snake of my dreams!
Return to the garden of the shimmering grasses
and the smell of the wet earth. Hold me tight
in your reptilian gaze; I won't harm you.
Here, on this tarmac, you are displaced,
a green snake lost in the suburbs.

I watch the professional killer
twist through the grid.
Her ruby-red eyes do not turn on me.
They imagine a bit of live protein
to break the monotony of an eternity
of waiting.

After teaching in the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA for twenty-five years, JOHN FRIEDMANN is retiring and moving to Australia to write poetry.

FRIENDS of Critical Planning

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C R I T I C A L P L A N N I N G
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CALL FOR PAPERS

Submission Deadline: January 31, 1997

Critical Planning is a student-run journal formed by students of the Department of Urban Planning in 1993. The journal was established to serve as a forum for members of the urban planning and public policy community at UCLA, particularly students, who wish to present current research interests and debate timely issues. We welcome submissions from graduate students, faculty, and alumni.

Guidelines for Article Submissions:

1. Submissions should be no longer than 20, double-spaced pages. Contributors must submit one hard copy version of the article and one version of the same paper on an IBM formatted computer disk using WordPerfect version 6.0 or higher.
2. All submissions are reviewed by the Editorial Review Board. The author's anonymity will be protected during the review process.
3. The Editorial Review Board evaluates submissions according to the following criteria: clear statement of thesis or objective; relevance of subject matter; clear development of ideas; clear and concise writing.
4. Place the author's name, phone number, e-mail address, and title of submission on the cover sheet. The first text page should contain the title of the article, without the author's name, as a means of identification.
5. Tables, illustrations, and photographs should be titled, numbered, and included separately at the end of the text.
6. Cite sources by the author-date system of reference described in the *Chicago Manual of Style,* fourteenth edition (University of Chicago Press, 1993), chapter 16.
7. All submissions are subject to editing by the Editorial Review Board and the editors. Authors will be given the opportunity to review the final edited version of their paper prior to publication. The editors, however, have the final authority on the publication-ready version of all submissions.

CONTRIBUTORS

Hinesmon-Matthews	*The Evolution of the Faith-Based Development Movement in Los Angeles*
Keys and Collons	*The Invisibility of America's Native Communities: Absent in Theory, Excluded in Practice*
Weber	*The State They're In: How National Institutions Influence the Development of Local Industrial Districts*
Njuguna	*Impacts of Planning and Building Regulations on the Provision of Low-Income Urban Housing in Kenya*
Snyder	*The Capabilities of a Bus That Can't Turn and an Alternative Vision: Rail Transit's Role in the Future of Los Angeles*
Shinseki	*The Evolution of LA Broadway*
McGrew	*The History of Residential Segregation in the United States and Title VIII*
Khalil	*Analyze, Criticize, Mobilize, Energize: Planning Tasks After the Los Angeles Rebellion*
Kim	*Planning in the Multicultural City: Postmodernity and the Acknowledgment of Difference*
DiGregorio	*Hanoi: A Night at the Races Or Symbolic Acts of Collective Insurgency and Defiance of Authority with a Chance to Win a Free Motorbike*
Brenner	*Book Review: Hitz, et al. Capitales Fatales*
Lee and Sansbury	*Symposium Review: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society*
Taylor	*Martin Wachs Leaves UCLA*
Trabalzi	*Letter to Leonie Sandercock*
Friedmann	*Iolantha*